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ABSTRACT
Nigeria is a federation of twelve States each of which 
is competent, according to the Constitutional allocation of 
legislative powers, to make laws practically on all matters . 
of family relations. The municipal law of each State comprises 
one system of territorial (Western-type) law and another system 
of non-territorial (Customary or Moslem) law,. There is not 
only multiplicity in the bodies of the latter system in each 
of most of the States, but the system itself contains institu­
tions more unusual than those the legal systems of Western 
civilization are accustomed to dealing with.
Yet the world's modern technological developments, and 
recent upward trends in the economic development in Nigeria, 
are bringing peoples and diverse legal institutions far closer 
together. The mobility of population, and hence the possibility 
of complex legal relations, is greatly facilitated at the inter­
state level by the consitutional guarantee of the right of move­
ment within the federation to all persons who are legally with­
in one part of it. These factors of federalism, dualism of 
system of law, diversity of legal institution and the mobility 
of our time, have jointly made Nigeria a special problem area 
for the study of conflicts of laws.
In this pioneering work, an attempt is made not merely 
to state the existing rules of Nigerian private international 
law of family relations in the context of the above phenomena.
An analytical approach is linked with a discussion on the 
prospective development of the law in the fields covered by the 
work. In these circumstances, the work cannot be anything but 
comparative. Chapter One deals with the sources and development 
of the Nigerian private international law o f .family relations. 
Chapter two considers Domicile as a jurisdictional and choice
of law concept. In Chapter Three, the problem of the choice 
of the applicable laws in the formation of both monogamous 
and polygamous marriages is considered. . Chapter Four is devoted 
to an examination of the Choice of the system of Court, Basis 
of Jurisdiction, Choice of the applicable Law and Recognition 
of sister-state and foreign decrees, as regards the dissolution 
of both types of marriage. Chapter Five is a discussion on the
concept of Legitimacy under the domestic laws in Nigeria as a
prelude to an appreciation of Legitimacy in its conflicts of 
laws, a subject which is discussed in Chapter Six. Chapter 
Seven is on Adoption. Chapters Eight and Nine concern Adminis­
tration of Estates and Succession respectively; while the 
Postscript considers the effect of a recent Nigerian Decree on
few of the matters discussed in Chapters Two and Four.
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CHAPTER ORE
SOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FAMILY RELATIONS IN
NIGERIA
A. THEORIES ON SOURCES OP PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW*
1. INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORY. ■
The sources of private international law or conflict of 
laws have been a matter of argument. Two major and contrasted 
juristic views have been expressed from time to time as to the 
sources of the subject. One view, mainly expressed by some con­
tinental and a few Anglo-American jurists, is that private inter­
national law "is not merely a part of the domestic law of a state
but a subject that must be considered from a wider angle as ’’the
pprivate law of the universal society of mankind” akin to, or 
part of, the law of nations; common to all countries and is, or 
should be, everywhere the same. According to this view the rules 
of this body of law are an international obligation binding upon 
all the diverse municipal systems of law. Decisions on the same 
matters involving foreign elements should not be different what­
ever the national court before which they are brought. The only 
factor that may give rise to divergent decisions in respect of 
the same matters is attributable to the doctrine of public policy 
or, as Jitta would like to call it, a right of non-collaboration ^
1. Bar: Private International Law, Gillespie's translation (1892)p.2,
2. Jitta: La Method du Droit International Prive (1890), p.242.
3. Jitta: The^Renovation of International Law, p.93* Jitta regards 
public policy as a vague term.. The doctrine itself, he claims, 
labels a foreign law rejected through its application as of no 
legal effect. This is unacceptable to him on the basis that a mu­
nicipal system cannot deny the validity of a foreign law.
inhering in the court; of the forum which operates "bo reject; the
application of a foreign lav; which is repugnant to the forum’s
4- . . . .social or legal institutions* With Savigny as the original
5protagonist, this school of thought found some disciples-' both 
in the civil law and the common law countries and has, at a time 
when it was supposed to have heen eclipsed by the theory of terri 
torial law, been somewhat revived by an American jurist.^
2. TERRITORIAL'LAW THEORY.
Diametrically opposed to the above view is that which 
regards rules of private international law of a particular 
country as being directly governed by its rules of substantive 
law. In this sesne, the rules of substantive law are consti­
tuents of private international lav;. This body of law therefore 
constitutes an embodiment of interacting rules, the.sources of 
which must have to be looked for in almost all different branches 
of the municipal system but which rules are attuned to each and 
every one of these branches nevertheless. Professor Gfcaveson 
expresses the view in clearer detail when he observes that:
The principles of English conflict of laws 
applied in the English courts form part of 
English law in its widest sense, while indi­
vidual principles of the. conflict of laws form 
an integral part of the branch of law to which 
they relate. Thus, the rule that the validity 
of a contract as to form depends on the law 
of the place where the contract is made is 
equally a rule of conflict of laws and the law 
of contracts. Particularly for the purpose of 
this subject, lav; cannot be divided into a. 
nuiiber of well-defined and water-tight compart­
ments. Por the conflict of laws is a cross- 
. section of almost the whole law." n
4-. System des heutigen roemischen Recths, Vol. 8 (184-9)} Para.34-8,
pp.2b et seq. See also, Savigny, A Treatise on the Conflict of 
Laws (G. Guthrie's Translation) 1869, p.27. 1
5« Bar and Zitelmann of Germany; Jitta of Holland (for a discussic 
of the views of the continental advocates of international ruleg 
of ^ conflicts of law, see III, Beale, Conflict of Laws, pp.194-8- 
62); and Wharton: I, Conflict of Laws, p . 6 in the U.S.A.
6 . Jessup: Transnational Lav; (1956) esp. at p.15..
7. Grave son: The Conflict of Laws,' (6th ed.X p.5.
Similarly Beale, the great exponent of the theory of territorial
law in the United States of America stated that:
"It follows from the principle [of territorial 
law] that conflict of laws is part of the laws 
of each state, that it is subject to the same 
development in each state as any other branch 
of the law^f q
The conclusion deducible from this school of thought can'be sum­
marised simply in two propositions. 1. Private International 
Law being an all pervading subject draws for its authoritative 
sources on the statutes and judicial decisions making up almost 
all the different branches of a country's legal system* 2. It 
therefore varies according to the diversity in the legal system 
of the world*
This is not an appropriate forum to engage in a theo­
retical and extended discussion on the validity of either of the 
two theories. Suffice it to say that the utopia envisaged by 
the internationalists has not been attained. The diversity of 
national, state or provincial rules of private international 
law belies their argument in favour of a body of law having 
international validity. The opinion prevalent and widely accepted 
by the courts in the common law and most continental countries 
is that Private International Law is part of, and derives from,
the same national, state or provincial sources as any other legal 
q
rule. y
8 . Beale: Conflict of Laws, Vol.3 (1835), p.52.
9* Almost all English writers regard the conflict of laws as a 
branch of the English municipal law. That part of Dicey's 
thesis in his earliest edition designed to show this has now 
been dropped in the most recent editions as a result of its 
being "universally accepted". See, e.g. Dicey's Conflict of 
Laws (7th & 8th Eds.), p.8 .
U.S.A.: The American Law Institute Restatement Second, of the
Conflict of Laws (Proposed Official Draft," Part j)T~T96r 
s~.$ describes the subject as part of the law of each 
state and that it is subject to the same development 
in each state as any other branch of the law.
E/note continued ......
This view, however, recognises the fact that the devel­
opment of this subject may not successfully be made by main­
taining a spirit of complete isolationism about the municipal 
law. It therefore does not object to, but actively encourages, 
the adoption of foreign principles where the municipal rules are , 
non-existent or have been found defective in the light of present 
knowledge or modern' developments. The adoption however, must be 
a conscious effort by the courts or the legislature of the adopt­
ing country. The impact on national institutions must be fully 
considered. Otherwise more difficulties than those the foreign 
rules are designed to solve may be created by the fostering of 
unsuitable principles on the courts of the receiving country.
For example, owing to the late development of the English pnivate 
international law, this approach has, at one time or the other, 
b®n followed, though now less consistently as in the latter part 
of the 18th century when a reasonably ascertainable body of 
principles in this field had not been evolved. Thus in Potinger 
v. Wightman Sir Romily observed:
"Of authority on this subject, in the English 
law, none exists ...., but it has been much 
discussed ly foreign jurists, to whose opinions 
in the absence of domestic authorities) our 
courts are accustomed to resort, on questions 
which (like the present), must be decided rather 
by general principles of law."
F/note 9 cont. from previous page.
Canada: Johnson: Conflict of Laws (2nd ed.) p.l "these rulesCof
Conflict of LawsJ form part of the general corps of its 
law, expressed in formal texts or latent in influential 
jurisprudence".
German Democratic Republic: Szaszy: Private International Law in
European Peoples Democracies, p.1 2. : ~
Continental and other countries: e.g. where conflicts rules have
been codified, See. I, Rabel: Conflict of Laws: A Compa-
rative Study, pp.29-32. : ’ -----
1 0. (1817), 3 Mer. 67.
He then went on to quote extensively from the works of foreign
jurists ^  in search of the principle which he proposed to adopt
for deciding the case in hand. With this argument Sir William
Grant, M.R. agreed stating that there “being so little to he found
in English law on the subject of domicile, English judges ’’are
obliged to resort to the writings of foreign jurists for the de-
12cision of most questions that arise concerning it”. This work 
of "social engineering" started by intellectually open-minded 
English judges has now virtually been taken over on the legisla­
tive plane. Most innovations introduced by Acts of Parliament
13in this field received inspiration from the civil law. It is,
therefore, not surprising that the practice of English judges
in the development of the norms of English conflict of laws was
reflected even in the positivist approach adopted by Dicey in
the treatment of the subject when he stated:
"The sources from which to ascertain the law of
England.with regard to rules of Private
International Law are, first, Acts of Parliament;
secondly, authoritative decisions or precedents;
t^hirdly, where recourse can be had neither to 
statutory enactments nor to reported decisions, 
then such general principles as may be elicited from, 
the judgment of foreign courts, the opinions of dis­
tinguished jurists, and rules prevalent in.other 
countries." ,
11. John Voet, Rodenburg, Bynker Shoek, Grivello, Pothier and 
Huber.
12. Potinger v. Wightman (1817) 3 Mer. 67 at 7 9..
13. See Graveson: "Philosophical Aspects of the Conflict of Laws" 
in 78, L.Q.R. 337 ^  p.333 where a list Is made of Acts of 
Parliament introducing new concepts into English Private 
International Law.
14. Dicey: Conflict of Laws (2nd ed.) p.23.
The modern conception of the territorial theory* with its bias
towards a comparative method in the development of rules of pri-
15 .vate international lav;, having been implanted into the Nigerian 
legal system for so long, it is unthinkable that the courtswill 
deviate in this respect from their common law heritage and sub­
stitute for a solid foundation erected on a universal principle,, 
one that was based on a shaky and moribund doctrinal theory. It 
is this universal practice that we propose to adopt in tracing
the sources of Nigerian private international lav;. Our initial
investigation is solely concerned with all the relevant cate­
gories of the Nigerian legal system. Only if the national 
sources are inadequate or found to be defective can we be justi­
fied in looking to other, quarters.
B. NIGERIAN LAW SPURGES.
A consideration of the Nigerian sources is.prefaced with 
an examination of the pre-colonial period in Nigeria so as to 
discover whether or not there existed any^system of law capable 
of throwing up rules of private international law.
There is no doubt that before the advent of the British
Colonial Administration, some legal rules of customary law for 
the regulation of the affairs of the communities now constituting 
Nigeria had e x i s t e d . T h e  rules of this system of law had not 
been, and are still not, the same throughout the country. . 
Customary law varied from place to place through adaptations to 
the needs of the various communities or "kingdoms” they served.
15» See below,
16. See Allott: "The Euture of African Law" in Africah Law:
Adaptation and" Development (ed. Kuper and Kuper), p.216 et seq^ 
Nwabueze: Machinery of Justice in Nigeria, p.2.
The general characteristic of this system of law was that it 
was wholly unwritten and therefore uncertain. An exception was 
the northern part of the country where there had "been a system 
of courts, the Alkali courts, applying local laws mostly of the 
Maliki school1*'7 of jurisprudence as expounded in the manuals of 
the school. Also in this area, there had been a judicial system 
which, like the present period, was wholly detached from the exe­
cutive. 18 In some areas in the north, however, there had been 
such a great fusion of the Maliki law with tribal customary law 
that the two systems became almost impossible to be sorted into 
different compartments.1^ But the development of rules of pri­
vate international law implies the existence of peaceful and 
commercial intercourse between different law districts or 
countries, aided in this respect by a network of means of easy 
communication. All these elements were lacking during the pre- 
colonial days - a period of inter-tribal wars, actively encouraged 
by the slave trade.
Even in its developed form, the system of customary law 
has been found .'.deficient to cope with inter-communal or intra­
national relations owing to its insistence on non-recognition and 
non-enforcement of any other law other than that prevailing in its 
area of operation. Accordingly, it was through recent legislative
17. See Sharia Court of Appeal Law, Cap.122, Laws of Northern 
Nigeria (1965 ed.) s.2.
18. Anderson: Islamic Law in Africa, pp. vi-vii.
19* The present definition of customary law as inclusive of 
Moslem law in the Northern Nigeria High Court Law, Cap.4-9*
(1965 ed.), s.2 recognises the fusion of Moslem law with 
customary law in places.
enactments^ that clioice of law rules - generally known as 
internal conflict of laws rules - for the governance of inter- 
conmrunal relations were established* We therefore dismiss 
customary law, at the pre-colonial era and also in its modified 
form, as too imprecise and not sufficiently suphisticated for 
the solution of problems created by the easy means of inter­
communication between distant countries, thereby giving rise to 
international and interstate transactions between diverse 
persons.
1. COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND.
Private international law, in the common law world,'
is a branch of law which has been built up mostly by judges in
pursuance of the concept of justice and convenience. According
to the American Law Institute,
"In the United States, and in other Anglo- 
American countries, Conflict of Laws rules 
generally form part of the common law.
Occasionally these rules are found in Con­
stitutions, statutep and treaties. To the 
extent that they are embodied in common law 
rules, conflict of laws rules are as subject 
to change by the courts as are other common 
law rules.”
And in the words of Professor Graveson,
"very few English statutes deal exclusively, 
or even substantially with questions of con­
flict of laws, ... a survey ... would under­
line more than anything the judge-made
20. Eastern Nigeria, Customary Courts (No.2) Edict, No.29 of 1966, 
s.1 5, replacing Customary Courts Law, Cap.52, (1965 ed.) Laws 
of Eastern Nigeria, s.23.
Northern Nigeria, Native Courts Law, Cap.78, (1963 ed.) Laws o: 
Northern Nigeria, ss.23 & 24-, now replaced by the Area Courts / 
of the six Northern Nigerian States ss. 20 and 21. Edict
Western & Mid-Western Nigeria, Customary Courts Law, Cap*31 
(1959' ed.) Laws of Western Nigeria, ss. 19 & 20, now made 
applicable to Lagos State, by the Lagos State (Applicable Laws' 
Edict, No.2 o f " O T T
21. Restatement Second, of the Conflict of Laws (Proposed Official 
Draft, Part iT? 196’/: s. 3 , Commenfcn
character of the English conflict of 
laws. 11 22
This tendency to " judicial legislation*’ in the field of private 
international law is not confined to the common law countries hut 
extends also to most civilian countries even where rules of this 
body of law are mostly codified.2  ^ This is due,, for example, 
in France to the "fragmentary and inadequate nature of the texts 
[of the Code Civil which] calls necessarily for a large and 
constructive body of case law. In fact the essential source of 
French private international lav; is to be found in the case law 
of the Cour de Cassation and of the tribunals subjected to its 
control".2^
The common lav; rules of private international law in 
Nigeria, however, have a statutory foundation since their use 
rest on the reception statutues 2^ prescribing that the "common 
law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes of general appli­
cation" that were in force in England at a certain date shall be 
part of the laws of Nigeria, The pertinent question that must 
be asked is, which part of the phraseology "common lav;" and 
"the doctrines of equity" imports rules of private international 
law into Nigeria since it has been shown that private interna-, 
tional law permeates nearly all the branches of the English legal 
system. Common law is a term which occurs in many legal contexts
and bears diverse meanings depending upon the nature of the pur-
is
pose for which it is employed. The sense in which it/here used 
is, in contradistinction to statute law, to denote the whole
22. Graveson: "Philosophical Aspects of the English Conflict of. 
Laws", 73 L.^.R., 33? at p.3^9. ;
23. Rabel: The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study, Vo1.1
(1958), WT. —  “
24. Battifol: Traite Elementaire de Droit, International Prive
(3rd ed.) p . 2(5. 
25* See below
•unwritten or judge-made law, not deriving its authority from.
Off
any express legislative enactment* By this definition, the., 
received "doctrine of equity" refer only to those equitable 
rules, particularly in the law of trusts, which were designed 
to mitigate the harshness and excessive rigidity of common law 
courts1 decisions on the same subject* -With these, we are here 
not concerned.
As the first area of Nigeria to come under British
27colonial rule, in 1862, the Colony of Lagos passed an Ordinance 
providing that all the "laws and statutes which were in force 
in England" on the 1st January, 1863,.so far as they were not 
inconsistent with any Ordinance in force in the Colony,, should 
be deemed to be in force in the territory* The application of. 
such English laws and statutes was to be made as far as local 
circumstances would permit. Brandford Griffith, J. in Cole v*
po
Cole was able to say that the "common law" of England was
included in the term "laws and statutes" of England*
In 1874-, the Colony of Lagos was amalgamated with the
British Settlement of Gold Coast (now Ghana) under,the title of
the Gold Coast Colony. While from this date onward, Ordinances
were passed for the whole of the newly constituted Gold Coast
Colony, numerous enactments previously existing in each of the
two constituent parts of.the new colony remained applicable to
them. But as a result of the passing of the Supreme Court Ordi- 
2q which ,
nance in 1876, /established one Supreme Court for the Gold Coast 
Colony, the relevant provision of the Ordinance of 1863 ^  were
26. Jowitt: The Dictionary of English Law Vol.I, p.426.
27. No.3 of 1863.
28. (1898) 1 N.L.R. 15, at p.18.
29. No. 4- of 1876.
30. This Ordinance was repealed by Ordinance No. 8 of 1889.
2$. ■ !
superseded "by section 14 of .the. Supreme Court Ordinance. The 
section provided that
"the common lav;, the doctrines of.equity 
and the statutes of general application 
which were in force in England at the date 
when the colony obtained a local legislature, 
that is to say on the 24th day of July, 1874"
should he applicable within the jurisdiction of the court i.e. 
the two territories of Lagos, and Gold Coast. By section. 17» 
the Imperial laws were to apply subject to local circumstances 
and any local Ordinances.
In 1886, the Gold Coast Colony was once again sub­
divided into the Gold Coast Colony and the Colony of Lagos, thus 
restoring the status quo of the two colonies before the amalgama­
tion of 1874. Each colony resumed legislating for herself. And
"SIby an Ordinance of 1886,, the laws of the , former Gold Coast Co­
lony and the former Settlement of Lagos were provided to be 
applicable to the new Colony of Lagos.
With the establishment of the Protectorates of Northern 
and Southern Nigeria in 1900, all the Imperial laws which had
hitherto obtained in the Lagos Colony were extended by Proclama-
32tion  ^ to these areas. Finally, by the Supreme Court Ordinance
331914, the reception date of English lav; was altered to 1st
January, 1900. Section 14 of the Ordinance provided that:
"Subject to the terms of this and any other 
Ordinance, the common lav;, the doctrines of
equity and the statutes of general application
which were in force in England on the 1st 
January, 19Q0 shall be in force within the 
jurisdiction of the court."
31. No. 1 of 1886. ,
32. Supreme Court Proclamation, No. 6 of 1900 and, with the merger
of the Colony of Lagos■with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria
by the Supreme Court Ordinance No. 17 of 1906.
33* No. 6 of 1914 (Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria), replaced by 
Ordinance No. 23 of 1943, Cap..211, Laws of Nigeria (1948 ed.)
26.
In 1954- a federal system of government was established 
in Nigeria. Four law districts, namely, the. eEas tern, Northern 
and Western Regions plus the Federal Territory of Lagos, were 
created each with its own High Court of Justice. The Regions 
each had legislative competence in respect of certain matters 
mostly on the residuary list while the Federal legislature, in 
addition to its federal powers, was responsible for the exer­
cise of legislative powers in respect of the Federal Territory 
of Lagos. The application of English law was made possible in 
the Regions and the Federal Territory of Lagos by substantially 
similar but slightly differently phrased reception clauses 
as in the Supreme Court Ordinance, '1914-• As a result of the 
tremendous amount of argument that the interpretation of these 
clauses has generated, it will be necessary to set out in full 
their provisions in the different law districts of Nigeria. 
Starting with the Federal enactment on this matter, section 4-5(1)
■Xh
of the Interpretation Act ^ provides:
’’Subject to the provisions of this section 
and except in so far as other provision is 
made by any Federal law, the common law of 
England and the doctrines of equity, toge­
ther with the statutes of general applica­
tion that were in force in England on the 
1st day of January, 1900, shall be in force 
in Lagos and, in so far as they relate to 
any matter within the exclusive legislative 
competence of the Federal legislature, shall 
be in force elsewhere in the Federation.”
35
The Northern Nigeria High Court Lav; by section 28 . provides:
’Subject to the provisions of any written 
lav; and in particular of this section and 
of sections 26, 32, and 35 of this Law -
(a) the common law;
(b) the doctrines of equity; and .
(c) the statutes of general application 
which were in force in England on 
the 1st day of January, 1900,
34-. Cap.89 (1958 ed.), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. .
35• No. 8 of 1955? replaced by High Court Law, Cap.4-9 (1963 ed.), 
Laws of Northern, Nigeria.
shall, in so far as they relate to any matter 
with respect to which the Legislature of the 
Region is for the time being competent to 
make laws, be in force within the jurisdiction 
of the court.”
The Western Nigeria High Court Law ^  of 1955 adopted the provi­
sion of the Supreme Court Ordinance. A variation in formula was
-zrj
however introduced by the Laws of England (Application) Law
in 1959 when the Region compiled a list of English statutes of
general application in the Region and re-enacted them as its own
statutes. For the continued application of other types of English
law in the Region the Law, at section 3? then provides that:
"From and after the commencement of this Law and 
subject to the provision of any written law, the 
common law of England and the doctrines of equity 
observed by Her Majesty1s High Court of Justice in 
England shall be in force throughout the Region."
The Eastern Nigeria High Court Law retains the formula in the
old Supreme Court Ordinance.
As pointed out above, the interpretation of these pro­
visions has given rise to much dialectical discussion, mostly by 
text-book writers. As the purpose of the argument is to determine 
the extent of the basic common law (the private international law 
rules of which we are here concerned with) received into Nigeria, 
a short summary of the different views expressed on the reception 
clauses will be made. Our opinion on them will also be expressed.
The first interpretation is that the common law the
Nigerian courts are required to apply, in view of or despite the
provisions of the reception clauses, is as "applied to the common 
law countries", that is, "the legal system and habit that English­
men have evolved. In this it is contrasted with systems of law 
36. No. 3 of 1955? s. 14.
37* Cap. 60, (1959 ed.) Laws of Western Nigeria.
38. No.27 of 1955? s.14 replaced by the High Court Law, Cap.61 
(1963 ed.) Laws of Eastern Nigeria, s.15.
m .
derived, from the Roman Law” • ^  According to this view, the
Nigerian courts are not authoritatively hound hy any specific
version of English common law hut are entitled to apply as a
ha sic law, the universal system of the. common law as found in
40the common law countries as a whole,
41As a matter of principle, we have already indicated 
that the modern theory of territorial law actively encourages 
a comparative approach to the development of private internation­
al law through the adoption of uniform rules whatever he the 
source of such rules, , The goal to which this aim is directed 
is that no two municipal courts shall he compelled hy the systems 
of law they apply to reach different decisions on the same set 
of facts. To achieve this aim, however, it is not necessary to 
jettison clear provisions of municipal laws. Neither is it pre­
supposed the simultaneous application of diverse foreign rules 
to a single set of circumstances. Surely a foundation must he 
laid before something is huilt on it. Even the most vociferous 
advocates of the international theory of sources of private 
international law recognise that positive norms of the lex fori
, . ZLp
are binding on the judges. Our main objection to this type of 
interpretation is the regrettable tendency to sacrifice specific 
enactments of the Nigerian legislatures on the altar of develop­
ment. The more recent of these reception clauses all speak of 
the ’’common law of England’1. Where they are less clear, the
39. Nwabueze: Machinery of Justice in Nigeria (1963) p.21.
40. Ibid.
41. See supra, p. 20.
42. Savigny: System des heutigen roemischen Recht, Vol.8 (1849)»
pp.26 et. seq.; Zitelmann: Internationales Privatrecht, Vol.
I> p p . 23 et seq.; cited by Kahn-Ereund in ’’The Growth -
of Internationalism in English Private International kaw1’, 
p. 7. : ; "
43marginal notes, admittedly not, forming part of the statutes, 
at least offer permissible approach, to a consideration of their 
general purpose. They too, all contain expressions "Extent
i \  i \
of application of the law of England”, . "How far the law of
JEngland in force" ^ or words to similar effect.
The impracticability of adopting a "universal" system
of common law as a basic law in Nigeria is further illustrated ■
by the wide divergence between rules of private international law,
for instance, in England and the United States of America, both
of which are common law countries. To give a few examples, first,
in England there is a distinction,between the laws that govern
the formal requirements and the essential requirements of marriage.
The former is governed by the lex loci celebrationis xvhile the
latter, as a general rule, is determined by the law of each
party's domicile at the date of marriage. In the United States
of America, however, this distinction is non-existent. A marriage
is valid everywhere if the requirements of the law of the place
where the marriage is contracted are complied with. Secondly,
in the United States, a wife living apart is legally capable of
acquiring a separate domicile for almost all purposes during the
subsistence of the marriage; in England at present, this is
absolutely impossible. Thirdly, turning to the content of the
law of domicile, for quite a time the term "domicile" has meant
different things in the two .jurisdictions: the, rules for its
acquisition and loss, its retention and revival, have all gone
4-3. This assertion may be doubted in relation to Nigeria before 
the enactment of the Interpretation Act, 1964. Before then 
amendments to, and insertion of, side notes are actively con­
sidered by Nigerian Legislatures: See e.g. Northern Nigeria 
House of Assembly Debates, 4th Session, lOtb. - l/’th Ivtarch,
T955, p.29.
44. Northern Nigeria High Court Law, Cap. 49 (1963!. ed.), s.28.
43. Eastern Nigeria High Court Law, Cap. 61 (1963 ed.), s.15.
their own different ways. And inside the United States itself,
the question may be asked: how common is the common law between
Private International
the states. The effect on/'/,paw’ .. of the application of a uni­
versal system of common law as the basic law of Nigeria is that 
until there is a court’s decision, reached after sifting all the, 
applicable common laws, it will be impossible for any advice to 
be given on the law that should govern a particular transaction* 
Our conclusion which is in keeping with the uninterrupt­
ed practice and usage of the Nigerian courts since 1900, is that 
it is the common law of England that was received as the basic 
law of Nigeria and not a universal system of common law obtaining 
in all the common law countries. It is submitted that Mr. 
Nwabueze's interpretation is contrary to express statutory pro­
visions, difficult to operate in practice and constitutes a 
dangerous and unjustifiable encroachment, if accepted by the 
courts, on the legislative competence of the Nigerian legisla­
tures.^
Limiting date of the received common law*
It is indisputable that the limiting date i.e. "1st day 
of January, 1900" indicated in the various reception clauses ap­
plies to the English statutes of general application. Whether the 
date equally is applicable to the ’’common law and the doctrines 
of equity” is debatable owing to the ambiguity of these provi­
sions coupled with the different effective dates of the several
no
enactments on them. The traditional view ( based, inter alia,
46. Cf. Allott: ’’Common Law of Nigeria” in "Nigerian Lav;, Some
Recent Developments": I.C.L.C). kupp. Pub. No. 10 (1965),
p.31. ,
47. Ibid., p.38; and Allott: New Essays in African Law,p*32«
on the constitutional practice at the time the. original statutes 
were passed and their consistent interpretation, hy the courts in 
former colonial territories,.regards the limiting date as govern­
ing not only the statutes of general application hut also the 
English common law and doctrines of equity. The result to which 
this interpretation leads us is that only English common law as 
it existed as on the first January, 1900, is of any authoritative 
effect on the courts of Nigeria. No doubt, post 1900 English
decisions may still apply so long as they are decisions, of the ,
48Privy Council up to October 1963 adopting English common law 
principles as part of the Nigerian law.
On the other hand, any pre-1900 common law principle 
which is subsequently abrogated by an English statute or over­
ruled by a later English decision will still apply in Nigeria. 
Support for this contention is afforded by the fact that in Ni­
geria, there are provisions which.' empowered the courts , to exer-
49cise their jurisdiction in respect of certain matters y "in con­
formity with the law and practice for the time being in force in 
England". If the Nigerian legislatures, it is argued, had wanted 
to make a 'timeless reception of the English common law and the 
doctrines of equity, similar words could have been employed.^
There have been many objections, formidable enough in 
51themselves, raised"^ against this interpretation. They are all 
offered to show that, it is the current common law of England that 
is in force in Nigeria - a view which is also shared b y . some other 
legal writers on Nigerian Law. ^  The whole exercise of trying
48. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ceased to be part
of the hierarchy of Nigerian courts with effect from 1st October 
1963.
49* See below
50. Allott: Essays in African Law (I960), .p.31.
51. By Mr. Park, Sources of Nigerian Law, pp.20-24.
52. Kasunmu and Salacuse: Nigerian Pamily Law, p. 14*
to discover the extent of the English common law received into 
Nigeria has even been dismissed as irrelevant by another text­
book writer ^  who is of the view that it is the universal system 
of the common law that is operative in the country. A brief state­
ment of these objections are: \
(a) • That the punctuation, even in the older reception
clauses, clearly separates the common law from the 
English statutes of general application in Nigeria.
The reception date therefore applies to the statutes 
only and leaves the common law as well as the doctrines 
of equity timeless. Agreeing that the older enactments 
are ambiguous, the ambiguity, it is claimed, have been 
resolved by the much more recent Regional provisions.
Eor example, the Northern Nigerian provision makea a 
list of the three types of English law received into the 
Region, while the Western Nigerian enactment contains 
no limiting date at all;
(b) That on the principle of the immutability of the common
law, it is unreal and inconsistent with authority to
give the common law a limiting date; and
(c) That the judges in Nigeria have assumed that it is the
current common law of England that applies in Nigeria 
by their consistent application of English precedents 
after 1900.
These objections have been adequately analysed and found 
not convincing in a recent work.*^" We may, however, add that a 
loose strand which constitutes a great flaw in the above objections
53. Nwabueze: Machinery of Justice in Nigeria, p.22.
54. Allott: "Common Law of Nigeria", op.cit., pp.37-42; See also 
Allott: New Essays in African Law, pp.55-69.
is that they all fail to recognise the historical factors leading 
to the successive "reception” of English law in Nigeria as a 
whole. We have already shown that, unlike most Federations, 
where several independent states were brought together to form 
a type of association, Nigeria was a single nation and hence a 
single legal unit, operating throughout the country the English 
common law introduced by the Supreme Court Ordinance,.as its 
basic law, before the unique Constitutional arrangement of 1954, 
whereby separate legal units were carved out of a single geo­
graphical area. The necessity for new enactments on the re­
ception of English law in all the component parts constituting 
separate law districts of the Federation of Nigeria, therefore, 
arose as a result of the 1954 Constitution. In the case of Fe­
deral enactment, the purpose was to adapt the existing laws so 
as to bring them in accord with the provisions of the Constitu­
tion relating to the distribution of powers between the Federal 
and the Regional legislatures. It is of interest to note that 
Section 45 (1) of the Interpretation Act ^  was inserted by the 
Adaptation of Laws (Judicial Provisions) Order, 1955, ^  made by 
the Governor-General under powers conferred on him by section 57 
of the Constitution. In the case of the Regional enactments, 
section 142 of 1954 Constitution empowered each of the Regions 
to enact laws for the establishment of a High Court of Justice 
in substitution for the old Supreme Court whose jurisdiction had 
extended over all parts of the country. Consequently, it was 
necessary to provide for the laws that should be applied by these 
Regional courts.
The pertinent question that must be asked in construing 
these new provisions is: Are they made with a view to continuing
55. Cap. 89 (1958 ed.), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
56. Legal Notice No.47 of 1955, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
or altering the existing laws in the different law districts 
established under the Constitution? To deal first with the 
Interpretation Act, it is our contention that the correct 
approach is for the whole of section 45(1) to be read as a 
whole* It is clearly wrong to start with a pre-conceived idea 
of its meaning, based on the supposed practice of the Nigerian 
courts, and then by construction to work that idea into the clause,
57As admitted by Mr. Park, the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1914,
which the Interpretation Act replaced, has been commented upon
as far back as 1928 by Patrides, J. in Solomon v. African Steam­
ship Co. ^  where he said:
11 The statutes of Limitation • ••• were statutes 
of general application in force in England on 
January 1, 1900, and they, in common with other 
statutes of general application which were in
force on that date, are, together with  ^ 59
the common law and the doctrines of equity 
which were in force in England on the same date, 
in force within the jurisdiction of this court; 
by reason of section fourteen of the Supreme 
Court Ordinance.n
6(
In our view, the words of section 45(1) of the Interpretation Act 
smacks of an adoption of Patrides, J*s language rather than a 
deviation from it. The point which arises for serious considera­
tion is whether a delegated, legislation, albeit in the form of 
an Order made by the Governor-General, which re-enacted the pro­
vision of an earlier Ordinance in similar terms, should be pre­
sumed to have changed the construction previously placed by the 
courts on the earlier enactment without the words of the new le­
gislation pointing unmistakably to such conclusion.^ In any
57* Replaced by Ordinance No.25 of 1943, Cap.211, Laws of Nigeria, 
(1948; ed.).
58. (1928) 9, N.L.R. 99 at p.100.
59* Emphasis supplied.
60. Compare text, supra, p. 28.
61. In Rqtibi v. Savage (1944) 17 N.L.R. 77, i*t was held that a 
new wording of a subsequent Act does not alter the meaning 
previously placed on Lan,. earlier enactment.
event, section 57(5) of the Constitution only empowered the 
Governor-General to make adaptations and modifications of the 
existing federal (National) legislations so as to bring them 
into accord with the federal structure created by the Constitution. 
It did not authorise him to alter the meaning previously placed 
on the. existing legislations. The provision of section 57(5) of 
the 1954 Constitution, it is submitted, precludes an interpre­
tation which will make the Governor-General1s Order ultra vires 
the powers conferred on him to be placed on it. It is therefore 
not surprising to observe that the Attorney-General of the Fede­
ration, in explaining the section of the Interpretation Act, 
stated that the English law in force in Nigeria is the "common 
law, the doctrines of equity and statutes of general application 
up to 1900".62
Turning to the Regional enactments, attention may be 
drawn to the Parliamentary history of the Regional High Courts
Laws and the policy statements leading to them not as an did to
their Interpretation but to show the state of the law and the 
desire to preserve the scope of the received common law in the 
Regions when the Laws were passed. Starting with the contro­
versial Northern Nigeria High Court Lav/, it was explained that 
the Bill leading to it
"seeks to preserve the judicial system established 
by the Supreme Court Ordinance 1943 which came
into effect in 1945* The court, however, had
full and complete jurisdiction all over Nigeria, 
whereas the High Courts which are to be established 
in the Regions will have jurisdiction limited in a 
way which I will describe later, certain special 
jurisdiction in federal and other matters having 
been reserved by the Constitution to the New Fede­
ral Supreme Court which will shortly be established.
An examination of the Bill will disclose many clauses 
which have been repeated from the old Supreme Court 
Ordinance." 63
62. Debates of the Federal House of Representatives, 1st Session, 
l?th-30th August, 1955, pp.117-118.
63. NorthernJRegion, House of Assembly Debates, 4th Session, Pt.II< 
10th - 17th March^ 195’b’T "p» 2 9.— --------
3§.
One of such, repetitions was clause 29 of the Northern Nigeria 
High Court Bill, 1955* At the Committee stage, however, an 
amendment was proposed hy the Attorney-General for the insertion 
of the words "in so far as they relate to any matter with respect 
to which the Legislature of the Region is for the time being 
competent to make laws" so as to provide, according to him, for 
greater clarity for those who will have to work the law and to 
enable them to appreciate the limitations on the jurisdiction 
of the Regional Court, The approved amendment which ultimately
f/L
became section 28 of the High Court Law appears to have listed 
the three types of the received English law, not with an inten­
tion to alter the existing law, but for purposes of convenience 
so as to incorporate new words denoting the extent of matters 
with respect to which the Regional legislature was competent 
to make laws.
The official report on the Western Region High Court
Law, 1955* is more instructive. It states:
"This Bill is not a controversial Bill. It follows, 
almost section for section, the Supreme Court
Ordinance. If members will take pains to compare
the present Bill with the Supreme Court Ordinance 
they will find that the points of departure are 
only two•"
The first, it was explained, related to the salary and tenure 
of office of the Regional High Court Judges, and the second con­
cerned the provision conferring on the High Court original juris­
diction in land matters. It could* therefore, be seen that it 
was not by accident that section 14-, like its counterpart in the
Eastern Region High Court Law, 1955» contained virtually identi­
cal terminology with the Supreme Court Ordinance. Pour years-
64-. No.8 of 1955.
65. Western Region, House of Assembly Rebates, 2nd Session,
Oct.-Dec., 1954-, "p.?5. ’
later, when the statutes of general application applying in the
Region were consolidated and re-enacted as the Laws of Western
Nigeria, the Minister of Justice, after reiterating the need
for consolidating all such English statutes, went on to say
that the aim of the proposed Law was to provide "that the common
law of England and the doctrines of equity will continue to
apply to this Region".
Eurthermore, owing to the unusual emphasis placed on
these Regional reception clauses as pointing conclusively to the
view that it is the current English common law that is applicable
in Nigeria,^ attention may be drawn to the relevant provisions
of the 1954- Constitution which sought to preserve uniformity of
legislations at the inception of federalism in Nigeria in respect
of all existing laws in all the different jurisdictions created
under the Constituttion. Thus by section 58(1) of the 1954-
Constitution, it was provided thatj
"If any law enacted by the Legislature of a 
Region ....... is inconsistent with any law
enacted by the Federal Legislature, then, to 
the extent of the inconsistency, the law 
enacted by the Legislature of the Region, ...*.. 
if enacted before the law enacted by the Fede­
ral Legislature, shall cease to have effect and 
if enacted after the law enacted by the Federal 
Legislature, shall be void."
The above Constitutional requirement, it is submitted, precludes
a different interpretation being placed on the Regional reception
clauses. Otherwise they will all be void or cease to have any
effect,
A re-examination of the most appropriate interpretation 
of the new reception clauses in the light of Constitutional and 
Parliamentary history of the High Court Laws, and the policy 
statements leading to them confirms the view expressed by
66. Western Region, House of Assembly Debates, No. 14- of 4-th -6th 
Febr., 1959.  i--- :-
67. See, e.g. Park: Sources of Nigerian Law, p.21; Nwabueze:
P*22; Kasunmu and Salacuse:
Professor Allott that the now provisions effected no fundamental 
change in the extent of the English common law originally re­
ceived into Nigeria. They are merely declaratory of the existing 
law when they were passed.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that it is the common 
law of England as at 1st January, 1900, and consequently its 
rules of private international law as at that date that were 
imported into Nigeria. An interpretation that it is the current 
common law of England that is transported into Nigeria is unde­
sirable and objectionable. It is contrary to Constitutional 
principles and inconvenient in the sense that it unusually ties 
Nigerian courts to the apron strings of the English courts. It 
suggests that the Nigerian judges are not competent to develop 
the basic law received into the country in accordance with the
national requirements. Indeed, an adoption of this view,
68coupled with Mr. Parklb Pure Theory of English Law appears 
a real danger which may give rise to stagnation in legal thought. 
Eor on this basis, Nigerian judges are no more than a collection 
of judicial instruments for the mechanical application of a 
ready-made English common law, from day to day. It is therefore 
rejected.
2. SPECIFIC ADOPTION OP A PARTICULAR BRANCH OF ENGLISH LAW.
Another instance of the statutory foundation of English 
rules of private international law in Nigeria is through Nigerian 
legislations adopting a particular branch of the English Law. 
Section 4 of the State Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act ^
68. See infra, p. 47*
69* Cap. 177? Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, (1958 ed.) re­
placing as to matrimonial causes the Supreme Court Ordinance, 
Cap. 211 (1948 ed.) Laws of Nigeria,.s.22; See also High 
Court of Lagos Law, Cap.80, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, (1958 ed.) s. 16.
provides that
"The jurisdiction of the High Court of a 
State •_ in relation to marriages, and annulment 
and dissolution of marriages and in relation 
to other matrimonial causes shall, subject 
to the provision of any laws of a so
far as practice and procedure are concerned, 
be exercised by the court in conformity with 
the law and practice for the time being in 
force in England."
Marriage and matrimonial causes are, by section 2 of the Act, 
defined with reference to "Christian" or monogamous marriage.
The above provision is once again illustrative of the 
unsatisfactory method of drafting often found in Nigerian le­
gislations. Consistent with the words of the section, it may 
be argued that this provision only empowers the courts to exer­
cise jurisdiction in conformity with the law and practice in 
England but does not require them to apply the substantive English 
law in relation to the matters enumerated. The law, in England, 
relating to jurisdictional requirements in divorce and other 
matrimonial causes is entirely different although part of the 
same genus, from the substantive law dealing with the mechanics 
of divorce and other matrimonial causes. The former is predomin­
antly judge-made, with occasional legislative incursions designed
to eliminate hardships- and correct injustices created by the
70common law rules in this respect. The latter comprises
entirely of statutory enactments, starting with the Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1857? which had been the subject of modifications,
71alterations and replacements by subsequent legislations' to 
cater&r the changing social attitudes of the English people.
70. See s. 15? Matrimonial Causes Act, 1957? as amended by 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950? s.18: now replaced by
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965? s.40.
71. Matrimonial Causes Acts, 1925? 1957? Matrimonial Causes 
(War Marriages) Act, 1944, Matrimonial Causes Acts, 1950,
1965 and 1965.
Also, when it is remembered that there is in existence a spatial­
ly inadequate Nigerian Marriage Act ^  dealing with the sub­
stantive law of monogamous marriages, it will be seen that 
the provision cannot imply the reception of the totality of
the English law on "marriages, and  .matrimonial causes".
The provision has, however, been taken by the Nigerian ,
judges as entitling them to apply both the jurisdictional and
73the substantive English law, from time to time, ^ at least in
74divorce and other matrimonial causes.( No other course seems 
open to them in so far as the Nigerian Federal Legislature has 
not considered it necessary to enact its own law as regards the 
dissolution of monogamous marriages. For the moment it is obli­
vious to the fact that the law of divorce, like that of marriage 
or succession, is a branch of the legal system deeply rooted 
in the popular conscience and in which the national character 
of the people expresses itself more vigorously than in any other . 
field of law. In other words, it is undesirable and ludicrous 
for the law of a foreign country which takes no account of the 
social conditions of the people of Nigeria to be foisted on 
them by the legislature. If Dean Roscoe Pound could point out 
that "the widest difference between English law and American law 
and as between the law of any one of the United States and any 
other is as to divorce" ^  and one recalls that this diversity 
relates to the dissolution of the same type of institutional
72. Cap.115, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
73* Presumably on the authority of Taylor v. Taylor (1935)»
2 W.A.C.A., 348 in which a similar provision in s. 16 of the^  
Supreme Court Ordinance, Cap.3, Laws of Nigeria (1923 ed.) 
was held to effect a timeless reception of English law in 
probate matters.
74. Odiase v. Odiase QL9653 N.M.L.R. 196 at. p. 198.
75. "The Development of American Law and Its Deviation from Englis'
Law*1, 6? L.Q.R. 49 at p.64.
marriage known to, and practiced by, peoples of the same civi­
lisation and social outlook, one should he surprised to observe 
that there is no local legislation on divorce of monogamous 
marriages in Nigeria and that the divorce law of Nigeria changes 
with the several mutations of the English law. Indeed, the Ni­
gerian judges are finding it rather intolerable to apply English 
law on divorce to the dissolution of a Nigerian monogamous mar­
riage, the formation and subsistence of which are usually attended 
with customary law observances. The injustice of such arrange-
r j r
ment led Sowemimo, J. in the Lagos case of Ubeku v . Ubeku 
to observe as follows:
"My attention had been drawn to some English 
authorities on what is known as cruelty. What­
ever may be the. connotation which that word carries, 
the circumstances of its applicability in England 
must be distinguished from that obtaining in Ni­
geria* A background to a marriage in England is 
quite different to that in Nigeria and this parti­
cular case is an instance of the difference.
Here is a [monogamous] marriage between two indi­
viduals, who had not been previously in love, but 
according to customary law could be married on the 
consent of the bride's parent on payment of dowry 
by the would-be husband. We have always got to 
look on this background in applying English law 
to [the dissolution of a monogamous marriage con­
tracted under] our out-moded Marriage Act."
The crux of this matrimonial dispute was that both parties found 
to their consternation after an arranged monogamous marriage, 
which was not preceded by a period of courtship, that they were 
unsuited to each other. The wife, by reason of her further edu­
cation in England for which the husband was responsible, prevented 
(perhaps not deliberately, but quite effectively) the husband from 
being "the master in the home". In other words, she insisted 
that no member of the husband's extended family should invade 
the matrimonial home unannounced and without her prior permission.
76. Unreported, Lagos High Court, Suit No. HD/52/67 of 17/6/68.
nnmjr* v •
The husband felt that the wife was overstepping the hounds of 
Nigerian custom as regards matrimonial relations, monogamy or 
no monogamy* He was also of the opinion that she was being un-^  
appreciative of the dowry paid on her behalf and the cost of 
her further education which he bore quite willingly. He re­
acted accordingly. To adapt slightly the words of Sowemimo, J.,
77the result was that "the marriage broke down completely"•1 r 
The learned judge then went on to say; "I asked the wife who 
is a young girl whether she was prepared to give the marriage 
a further trial but she replied that she had made up her mind 
about it and she was not prepared to go back to the matrimonial 
home". In these circumstances, the judge granted a decree dis­
solving the marriage. But rather than dissolving the marriage 
on the ; main ground permitted by customary law, i.e. that it 
had irretrievably broken down,^ he held that both spouses were 
guilty of cruelty as alleged by the petition and the cross- 
petition. This was done in order to satisfy the statutory re­
quirement that he must apply English law for dissolving mono­
gamous marriages.
In these circumstances, we must agree with the view 
expressed by Sowemimo J., in the case that there is a crying 
need for a change, first, in the Customary Law on marriage; 
secondly, in the statute which compelled High Court Judges in 
Nigeria to apply English law on divorce; and thirdly, the pre­
sent Nigerian Marriage Act which is modelled on English law. It 
is, therefore hoped that the Federal Government, in conjunction 
with the respective authorities in the states,, will consider the 
time ripe enough for the enactment of a composite matrimonial
77* The words in the judgment read "the marriage has broken down 
completely."
78. Cf. Divorce Reform Act 1969 (England).
Statufce that will reflect the social mores of the Nigerian people.
In other words, a statute that will cater for the need of the
growing number of persons for whom polygamy is an economic waste
and, at the same time, respect the wishes of the majority for
whom the institution is still a way of life. And to achieve
this objective, the archaism of the laws of yesterday, e.g. the
concept of arranged marriage or the principle of fixed grounds
79for divorce, should be discarded.
To return to a more relevant part of the topic under 
discussion, it has been observed that the individual principles 
of private international law constitutes an integral part of the 
branch of law to which they relate. By the adoption of English 
law and practice in divorce and matrimonial causes, all the 
English conflicts rules concerning judicial jurisdiction, choice 
of law, and recognition of foreign decrees, in matrimonial
80causes, become operative in Nigeria. Thus in Arinze v. Arinze,
William J., having adverted to the fact that the Nigerian High
Courts are by statute obliged to apply the law and practice in
force in England as regards matrimonial causes, said:
"Under the law of England, that part of the 
law which deals with jurisdiction [and] which 
is part of English Private International Law, 
makes it clear that in divorce matters the ge­
neral rule is that the court has jurisdiction 
to hear petitions only where they are filed by 
persons domiciled within the geographical area 
of jurisdiction of the court".
This principle has been applied in a number of cases throughout th€
79* See now the Postscript^of the present position as regards 
the law on Matrimonial Causes.
80. {19663 N.M.L.R. 155 at p. 156.
46.
federation 81 to determine the basis of the state's jurisdiction 
in divorce proceedings.
One final point about the specific adoptioh in Nigeria 
of English law on divorce is that any innovation introduced into 
the body of English private international law in this field, as 
distinct from other branches of'the law, automatically applies 
in Nigeria. Thus, for example, the additional bases of juris­
diction in divorce and other matrimonial causes, introduced by
o p
section 40 (1) (a) (b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965*
become part of the Nigerian private international law as soon
83as they come into effect in England.
3. LOCAL MODIFICATION OF THE RECEIVED ENGLISH LAWS.
The Nigerian jhdges have statutory powers to reject
English statutes received as part of the Nigerian law by reason
of their unsuitability to local circumstances or inconsistency
84with any Nigerian statute. Also in applying the English sta­
tutes in Nigeria, they are to be read with such formal or verbal 
alterations not affecting the substance as to names, localities,
offices, courts, etc., as may be necessary to render the statutes
83applicable to local circumstances. ^
81. Lagos: Shyngle v. Shyngle (1923) 4 N.L.R. 92; Jones v. Jones
(l93o) 14 N.L.R.T2; Machi v. Machi (i960) 1j.L.R.103T 
Adeyemi v. Adeyemi (1962; L.L.S.70; Udom v. Udom (1962) 
L.L.R. 112; Odunjo v. Odunjo (1964)~LTL.R.43.
Northern States: Okonkwo v. Eze .1960,/. N.N.L.R.80; Adeoye v.
Adeoye .1962. N.IKf.L.R.65: Arinze v. Arinze . fl966 1 N.ii.L.R,
155 •
Western States: Odiase v. Odiase [1965]. N.M.L.R.196.
Mid-Western States: James v. James, Unreported, High Court
Suit No.W/32/63 of 25/4/64; Akhigbe v. Akhigbe, Unrenorted 
High Court Suit No. U/l/67 oF“26/S/67. —
Eastern Nigerian States: Uzo v. Uzo, Unreported, High Court 
Suit No. E/4D/63.
82. Which replaced s.13 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 19371 as re­
enacted and amended by the Matrimonial Causes Act,1930, s.18.
83• See now, the Postscript; as regards the sources of Nigerian 
private international law on this topic.
84. See the Interpretation Act, Cap.89, Laws of the Federation of 
5v:§er^a’ 1938 ed. s.43(2). Similar provisions are contained in 
tue High Court Laws of some of the States.
83. Ibid.. s.43 r^.
But in relation to the received common law, it has been 
conclusively shown that these statutory rules of interpretation 
are inapt to confer on the Nigerian judges similar powers to 
modify or_reject the pre-1900 common law rules obtaining in the 
country.88 Nevertheless, the question must be raised whether 
the courts can, and should, modify or reject common law principles 
of private international law received into the country because 
of their failure to take account of local circumstances or be­
cause of the differences in the legal institutions in England 
and Nigeria.
Characteristic of the Nigerian law, there have been for 
some time two schools of thought as to the relative position of 
the received English law in a predominantly customary law environ­
ment. One school, which may be termed "The Pure Theory of English 
Law", maintains that the English common law, and consequently 
all rules of private international law derivable from it, should 
be applied in its full strength and rigidity, without modifica­
tions, and with all its technicalities. The argument is that the 
courts, in the interest of predictability and the preservation 
of the system, must occasionally decide cases in a way that they 
would want to avoid. That is, if injustice is caused by strict 
adherence to the English common law rules, then the problem must 
be remedied by legislation and not by adjusting the received 
common law to local circumstances. The duty of the court, it is 
claimed, is not to administer justice but to enforce law. More­
over, the circumstances under which the Nigerian courts will be 
forced by slavish adherence to English common law to produce
87
unqust results are rare since the rules of common law are not harsh
86. Park, op.cit., pp.36 and 37*
87* Park: Sources of Nigerian Law, p.39*
The other school of thought maintains that when the 
English common law is in danger of causing injustice and producing 
irrational results which are neither'in accordance with con­
venience, common sense and justice, then the technicalities and 
doctrines which produce these results should, even in the absence 
of express provisions, be trimmed away and shaped to meet local 
circumstances so that justice may be done. "'Otherwise the appli­
cation of English law would be stultified and the legal system
88
would be brought into justifiable contempt."
Many objections may be levelled against the first con­
tention from the point of view of private international law. It 
is proposed, however, to consider in brief only two of them. The 
statement that a court is not empowered to administer justice 
but to enforce law, if accepted in argument, would be a matter 
of surprise to a private international lawyer, not only in the 
common law world but also in the civilian countries. For the ge­
neral policy consistently being pursued by judges and legislatures 
alike in the development of conflicts rules is to ensure fairness, 
convenience and justice.8*^ Otherwise, nothing prevents any na­
tional court from deciding matters involving foreign elements 
brought before it solely with reference to the municipal law, 
thereby disregarding any foreign law that may be applicable.
But the hardship to commercial life and injustice to people that 
such an insular approach will entail make it not feasible.
The second objection concerns the assertion that the 
situations are rare where the strict application of the common
88. Allott: Essays in African Law (i960) p.23. Cf. Roberts-Wray:
"The Adaptation of Imported Law in Africa", 4 J.A.L. (I960),
p. 68.
89. See h.g. Graveson: "Judicial Justice as a Contemporary Basis of 
English Conflict of Laws'* in Twentieth Century Comparative and 
Conflicts Law (1961) pp.307-520. See also, "Graveson: P^hiloso­
phical Aspects of the English Conflict of Laws", 78 L.Q.R.35Y 9-i 
pp.35^— 356; Lazar, *'Phillips V. Eyre Revisited" in 32 M.L.R. 
(1969) 638. ------------
law of England will 'yield unjust results in Nig&riau. The 
assertion is too general and sweeping that the common law is 
not full of harsh rules. It is submitted that strictly applied in 
a far-off land, where social attitudes are different, its prin­
ciples of "manifest justice" may produce manifest injustice.
In the field of private international law, a few illustrations
of English conflicts rules that would be unsuited to Nigerian 
or African conditions will be given. Although there was an
initial tendency on the part of English courts to disregard 
polygamous marriages for most purposes oh the basis that it was 
"a union falsely called marriage",^8 in the words of Professor 
Cheshire, this "disdainful attitude"^1 had long been abandoned. 
English courts have progressively moved towards equating poly­
gamous marriages with monogamous marriages for certain purposes 
and consequences as well.^ But there remains some vital excep­
tions. In the first place, parties to polygamous marriages are 
still unable to seek the aid of the. English courts for most matri­
monial remedies or reliefs, on the basis that the machinery of 
English courts is constructed with a view to adjudication only 
in respect of monogamous marriages.Secondly, children of
polygamous marriages are precluded under English law from in-
94heriting certain types of landy and barred from succeeding to 
titles of honour.^ Obviously, the succession restrictions are 
rules of English domestic law which have been carried into English
90. Harvey v. Farnie (1880), 6 P.L.35 at P*53.
91. Cheshire: Private International Law, (7th ed.) p.273* [1965'
92. See e.g. Baindail v. Baindail [1946] $.112; Shahnaz v. Rizwan/
1 Q.B. 39CTTI9W] 2 IHT.R".’ 993; Mohamed v. ffoott [19553
2 W.L.R. 1446; Lin v. National Assistance Board L19&7] 2 Q.B. 
213: [1967] 2 W7E7r . 257T : ~
93. Hyde v. Hyde (1866) L.R. 1 P. & D.130; Sowa v. Sowa [1961]$.70.
94. Birthwhistle v. Bardill (1840) 7 01. & F.895«
95. Sinha Peerage Claim [1946] 1 All E.R.348.
conflicts rules• Since such, rules of succession are not known 
to Nigerian law, it becomes clear tbat that alone will make 
their application in Nigeria not justifiable. Moreover, the 
last of the restrictions is a common law rule established after 
1900,*^ and hence has no binding effect on Nigerian courts. But 
that notwithstanding, should the Nigerian High Courts accept. 
the jurisdictional limitation in matrimonial proceedings con­
cerning polygamous marriages because of the reception of the 
English common law in Nigeria?
According to the view expressed by Park, the answer 
should be yes since the Nigerian courts have no statutory powers 
to modify or abrogate any common law rules, as opposed to their 
powers to make formal alterations to English statutes received 
into the country. In so far as only the High Courts, in many 
of the Nigerian states, have jurisdiction over persons who are 
not Nigerian subjects, the result would be a refusal to assume
jurisdiction to dissolve polygamous marriages contracted by 
97foreigners."  The fact that Nigerian parties to such marriages 
can pursue their matrimonial rights and remedies in the Customary 
Courts will be considered immaterial. The effect of such rule 
will be the introduction of a curious phenomenon into the Nigerian 
private international law, i.e. that of complete inequality betwe­
en foreigners and Nigerian subjects in the enjoyment of matri­
monial rights!
96. Supra, p.40.
97• For a full discussion on this point see, Chapter 4.
£1.
Confronted with this absurd' situation which cannot
he averted unless Nigerian judges exercise their inherent powers
to modify or reject unpalatable principles of the received
English law both in this and other branches of the law, a pure
theory of English law is not capable of support. Moreover,
when one recsLls that the English private international law is
of relatively recent development, that the early English judges
"worked on virgin soil, ••• that their 
decisions were necessarily hesitating 
and tentative
and that few English decisions
"over a century old are of great value 
or authority at the present time" ^
in this branch of law, what justification is there for expecting 
Nigerian judges to stick faithfully and diligently to these
same pre-1900 common law decisions which, in England, are con­
stantly being reformed on all fronts?
4-. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
Constitutional provisions relating to private interna­
tional law in a country having many political affiliations in­
variably concerns inter-state or inbra-«iational as well as, but 
rather more than, international conflicts. This cannot but be 
so on the basis of the territorial theory of law, in this respect 
both historically and currently true, that a municipal statute, 
whatever its position in the hierarchy of the legal system, does 
not have extra-territorial effect beyond the geographical limits 
of the sovereigns territory. The significance of such Consti­
tutional provisions in a federation of several states is that
98. Cheshire: Private International Law, (7th ed.) p.38.
99* Graveson: The Conflict of Lav/s (£th ed.) p.7.
the system of private international law ceases to he predominantly 
concerned with the; solution of transactions between parties on 
the international plane, but becomes a body of law for the 
regulation of both inter-state and international transactions. 
Also, at the inter-state leveL, the solution of conflictual pro­
blems as between the states may become inextricably bound with 
constitutional law. And it is with regard to the ascertainment 
of such constitutional solutions of problems of private inter­
national lav/ at this level that, quoting the words of Professor 
Graveson, Mwe enter into a mixed questions of constituttional
law and conflict of laws"'*' and with respect to which Professor 
2
Ross has asked whether the inter-state conflict of laws in 
America has not become a branch of constitutional law. Our 
inquiry in this respect is to discover whether any rules relating 
to the solution of inter-state conflicts exist in the Nigerian 
Federal Constitution or any federal statutes implementing such 
constitutional provisions. This in turn necessitates a short 
but up to date survey of the features of federalism in Nigeria.
We have already noted that Nigeria ceased to be under 
q unitary system of government from 1954. In that year, practical 
necessity, sharply brought to mind by separatists' activity, 
impelled the fragmentation of the country into four parts,each 
with a certain degree of autonomy. The 195^ Constitution provided 
for the creation of three regions and a federal territory of Lagos
1. Graveson: Conflict of Laws (5th ed.) p.79, 6th ed. p.93.
2. Ross: "Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitu— 
tional Law?w 15 Minn."Ill Rev. 151 f 1931 ^ --------------- ;--
3* The Constitution, at s. 3? also provided for the establishment 
of Southern Cameroons as a territory of the Nigerian Federation 
This territory however had ceased to be part of the Federation 
of Nigeria.
Judicial and legislative powers were shared "between the Federal 
government and the Regional governments, while the Federal' 
Parliament was empowered to legislate for and on behalf of the 
Territory of Lagos. On 9th August, 1965, a fourth Region - the 
Mid-Western Region - was carved out of the former Western Region 
of Nigeria. ^ Pursuance to the provision of section 147 of 
the 1954 Constitution, a Supreme Court, as the final court of 
appeal in Nigeria, was established,^ and by section 149 all the 
processes and orders made by the Supreme Court are to be effective 
throughout the Uederatioii*
The legal separation of the Regions and the Federal 
Territory of Lagos as distinct units within the Federation was 
secured by section 142 of the 1954 Constitution which authorised 
each of the units to enact laws for the establishment of a separate 
Court of Justice, especially a High Court of Justice. This posi­
tion is further emphasised by the provision of eection 4 of the
c.
Federal Supreme Court (Appels) Act the effect of which is that 
the Supreme Court, on appeals from the regions and the territory 
of Lagos, functions as the court of the law district from which 
the appeal is taken. This arrangement was continued under the 
I960 Independence Constitution and the Republican Constitution 
of 1965, both of which in addition secured to every citizen of 
Nigeria the right to establish himself anywhere within the Federa­
tion.
The federal Parliament was also empowered by section 126
4. By the Mid-Western State Act, 1962 (Fed. Act, No.6 of 1962), S.l
5. By the Federal Supreme Court (General Provisions) Act, Cap.68, 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
6. Cap.67, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1958 ed.).
of the 1965 Constitution to establish, .federal courts of first 
instance for the enforcement of federal laws. It will be perti­
nent to observe, however, that no such courts have so far been 
established. The federal government has contended itself with
7
investing the administration of federal laws in state courts.
It is almost gratifying to note that the federal Parliament's 
lack of enthusiasm for exercising its constitutional powers in 
this respect has, for the moment, neatly sovied the problem of 
diversity of jurisdiction, that is, the (question as to which 
court has jurisdiction over a particular matter. A prospective 
litigant or petitioner needs not, unlike the United States or 
to a certain extent in Australia, concern himself with ascertain­
ing which court is federal or state. With the exception of 
matrimonial causes,^ to confer jurisdiction, he simply insti­
tutes proceedings in the court of the state in which he is re­
sident or where the defendant can be found, thereby leaving the 
court with the determination of the applicable federal or state 
law.
The significance of these constitutional provisions on
private international law at the inter-state level has been aptly
illustrated by certain decisions of the Federal Supreme Court.
The statement of Jibowu, Ag. C.J.F. in British Bata Shoe C6. v.
Melikian^ that as a result of the regionalisation in Nigeria
and the establishment of High Courts in the various Regions
7* Excluding State Customary Courts; see State• Courts -
(Federal Jurisdiction) Act, Cap.177 (1958 ed.). The establish­
ment of Federal courts in the states in the foreseable future 
appears a remote possibility in view of the last upheaval in 
the country• Even after the cessation of hostilities, the re­
sources of the Federal government ar^,certainly, needed for the 
more urgent problem of reconstruction.
8. See Chapter h, infra.
9. (1956) 1 F.S.C. 100 at p.102.
which are separate and. distinct from one another, "each region
is like a foreign country to any other region” compares, although
less forcibly, to that of an Australian judge that "for the
purposes of private international law, South Australia is a
foreign country in the courts of New South Wales" Also, in
Lanleyin v. Rufai 11 the foreign nature of the Nigerian Regions
to on© another was further emphasised by the Federal Supreme
Court when it was held, following the English decision in The
12British South African Co. v. The Companhia de Mocambique, that
the Lagos High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain
an action to recover damages for trespass to land in Western
Nigeria. Western Nigeria was, for purposes of the jurisdiction
13of the Lagos High Court, equated with a foreign country.
The above survey shows the features of federalism in
Nigeria and the separate legal life of the Regions up to January,
1966‘, when, as a result of two military Coups d'etat, Military
Governments replaced, both at the Federal and Regional levels,
the civilian governments in the country. The Federal Parliament
and the Regional Legislatures were suspended. Legislative
powers, as regards federal matters, become exercisable by means
of Decrees signed by the Head of the Federal Military Government;
while in the case of Regional matters, by Edicts issued by the
14Regional Military Government. The Federal and the Regional 
Constitutions of 1963 have since then undergone several processes
10. Chaff and Hay Acquisition Committee v. J.A. Hemphill and Sons 
Ltd. L194-7J 74 crZ.R.375 at p.396 per Williams, J.
11. (1959) 4- F;S.C.184.
12. (1893) A.C.602.
13. See also Ijaola v. Banjo (1958) L.L.R. 56; Owe v. Owe, TJnre- 
ported, Lagos High Court, Suit No.LD/13/66 oT”5/9/§£7
14. See The Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree,No.1 
of 1966.
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of matamorphosis. They were partly abrogated, in part suspended, 
modified, repealed and restored. The net result is that the Fe­
deral Republican Constitution of 1963 has been subjected to sys­
tematic degrees of amendments by Decrees, not less than twenty 
within the past four years. The interpretation of several pro­
visions in it will require the considered opinion of a consti­
tutional lawyer. The federal system of government itself was
superceded by a unitary one ^  for about three months and then 
16 'reconstituted as it was before. Of more importance to
the purpose of our study is the. States (Creation and Transitional
Provisions) Decree of 1967 ^  which creates twelve new States in
18place of the former Regions and the former Territory of Lagos.
Turning, then, to this recent constitutional amendment, an
attempt will be made to discover how far the separate legal life
of the new States vis-a-vis the former Regions has been preserved
or restricted; how far their integrity as separate law districts
has been affected.
By section 7(2) of the States (Creation and Transitional
Provisions) Decree (which for convenience will henceforth be
referred to as the ’’States Creation Decree”), it is provided that
all references in the Constitution and the Interpretation Act,
1964 to ’’Region” should be construed as references to a State
created under the Decree. Also by section 7(3) of the Decree
the former ’’Federal Territory” of Lagos becomes a ’State within
the meaning of the States (Creation and Transitional Provisions)
15* By the Constitution (Suspension and Modification)So.5 Decree, 
So. 34 of 1966. ' V
16. By the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) So.9 Decree,
So.59 of 1966. ’
17. So. 14 of 27th May, 1967.
18. These new States are the Sorth-Vestern; Sorth-Central; Kano; 
Sorth-Eastern; Benue-Plateau; Central-West, which is now known 
as Kwara State (See Central—West (Change of Same etc.) Decree, 
So.7 of 1968); Lagos: Western: Mid-Western; Central—Eastern;
South-Eastern; and Rivers.
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Decree, 1967". An amendment 1<^  to the States Creation Decree
further provides, at section 1 (b), that:
"For the avoidance of any doubt, — ~
the reference to "Region” in section 7 (2) of 
the Decree aforesaid [Ehe States Creation Decree]
shall in addition to the meaning to be assigned to
it in the Constitution of the Federation be con­
strued and have the like meaning where it occurs 
in any enactment.”
$his amendment, which applies to all enactments throughout the 
20 effect
Federation, was made to have retrospective/from the date the
twelve states structure was made, that is, 27th May, 1967. All
the existing law in the Region out of which a State was created
is made applicable, subject to any modifications necessary to
bring it into conformity with the provisions of the States Crea-
21tion Decree, in the new State. At first blush, it might be 
concluded that the new States, by virtue of the above provisions 
of the States Creation Decree, simply stepped into the shoes of 
the former Regions and assumed all the powers - legislative, 
executive and judicial - of the former Regions. The Decrees as 
to the powers of the new States, however, cast some doubts on 
such conclusion.
Details of the legislative and executive powers of the 
Federal Military Government vis-a-vis the former Regional Mili­
tary Governments, as spelt out in the Constitution (Suspension 
and Modifications) Decree, No.l of 1966§ i/taere made applicable 
to the new States by the Constitution (Repeal and Restoration) 
Decree of 1967.22 Section 3(1) of the Decree (No.l of 1966) 
provides that "The Federal Military, Government shall have power
19. States (Creation and Transitional Provisions) (Amendment) 
Decree, No.19 of 1967.
20. Ibid., s.2.
21. States (Creation and Transitional Provisions) Decree, 1967, 
s. 1 (5).
22. Decree No.13 of 1967j as amended by the Constitution (Miscella
neous Provisions) (No.2) Decree, No.27 of 1967.
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to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria
23or any part thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever”.
At sub-section (3)» the Military Governor of a State shall have
power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of
the State. He is not, however, entitled to make laws with respect
24to any matter on the Exclusive List* Neither can he legislate
on matters on the Concurrent List without the prior consent of
25the Federal Military Government. ^
The effect of section 3 of the Decree No.l of 1966, is 
obscure. For if the Federal Military Government has powers to 
make laws for any part of Nigeria "with respect to any matter 
whatsoever", nothing remains for the States to legislate upon.
The provisions as to the legislative competence of the States 
are either nugatory or at least merely window-dressing. Indeed, 
on this basis Nigeria', is a Federation only in name and a unitary 
State in practice. Perhaps a better interpretation of sub-section 
3(1) of the Decree is that as a result of the upheaval, leading 
to the last civil war in the country, reserved powers are neces­
sary on the part of the Federal Military Government to override 
any State law which undermines the interests of the nation as a 
whole. On this interpretation, then the previous arrangement undei 
the 1963 Constitution whereby the Regions could make laws both 
on the residuary and the concurrent lists continues to apply to 
the States with the important distinction that the States, could 
legislate on matters within the concurrent list only with the 
prior consent of the Federal Military Government. It appears that 
the purpose of this new device as to "prior conseirt" is to ensure 
a greater degree of co-ordination between Federal and State laws
M l  Sfi-i^Boiitl^S^ion^CSuspension and Modification) Decree, No.l 
of 1966, s.3(2) (a).
25. Ibid., s. 3(2) (b).
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on matters falling with, the concurrent list. It also prevents 
the shifting of categories between Federal and State laws in that 
it precludes the possibility of some matters of state law be­
coming Federal law through subsequent federal legislation on 
them. The provision therefore constitutes a welcome and fun­
damental change in practice without in the least affecting the 
autonomy of the States.
Although these provisions are too recent to be the
subject of judicial Interpretation, the view expressed above
appears to have been adopted by the different States. Thus
some state enactments not falling within the legislative lists
26have been made. She Edicts promulgating them were issued not 
by the Head of the Federal Military Government but by State Mi­
litary Governors. Moreover, the Edicts do not appear to have 
been promulgated under any powers delegated by the Federal 
Military Government. Be that as it may, legislative competence 
is not the sole criterion for determining the identity of a 
territory as a legal unit. For example, the legislative compe­
tence of the United Kingdom Parliament in respect of England, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland does not destract from the fact 
that this group of territories are, in English private interna­
tional law, separate law districts and consequently foreign
26. See, eg. North-Western State: The Area Courts Edict, No.l of
T W :  :
North-Central State: The Area Courts Edict, No.2 of
1967 •
North-Eastern State: The Area Courts Edict, No.l of 
1968.High Court Law (Amendment)Edict, No.2 of 1968 
Sharia Court of Appeal Law (Amendment) Edict, No. 3 
of 1968.
Kwara State: The High Court Law (Amendment) Edict,
No.l of 196^. The Sharia Court of Appeal Law (Amend­
ment) Edict, No.2 of 1968. The Area Courts Edict,
No.2 of 1967.
Kano State: The Area Courts Edict, No.2 of 1967. 
n0J1^ e~ ?^la^ eau State; The Area Courts Edict, No.4 of
£agos^State: Lagos State (Applicable Laws) Edict, No.
countries to one another. "A law district11 and hence a foreign 
country in private international law, "means a district or 
territory which (whether it constitutes the whole or a part only 
of the territory subject to one sovereign) is the whole of a 
territory subject to one body of law". ^ With the establishment 
of separate High Court of Justice and other courts in most of the 
new States, 28 each State, for purposes of our study, is a separate 
law district and as such a foreign country to one another.
Having shown the legal separateness of the Nigerian 
States, attention must now be directed to theConstitutional 
provisions directed at solving problems of inter-state conflicts 
in the two important topics usually dealt with by such constitu­
tional provisions. These are the jurisdiction of the courts and 
the enforcement of the laws and judgments of one State in the 
other.
With the common law as the basic law in all the law
districts in Nigeria, the principle on which the Nigerian courts
(including the customary courts2^ will assume jurisdiction in
3personam is, like that of the English courts, based on submission. 
At common law, therefore, no State has authority to assume juris­
diction over persons who are absent from the State. To obviate 
the difficulties inherent in the common law basis of jurisdiction
27. Head:Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the
Common~Law Units of the British Commonwealth tl33&)» p. 6. ”
28. See supra, fn. 26.
29. Whose basis of jurisdiction in this respect derives from Sta­
tutory provisions. See e.g. the Western Nigeria Customary Courl 
Law, Cap.31 (1959 ed.) s.22 (2) of which provides that
"civil causes shall be tried and determined by a customary cour 
having jurisdiction over the area in which the defendant was at 
the time the cause of action arose".
30. Dicey and Morris, op.cit., (8th edi) pp.179-182.
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at the inter-state level, section 151 of the 1954 Federal Consti­
tution provided that:
11 (2) (a) The Federal Legislature may, hy law ^
enacted under this Order, make provision 
for....
the service and execution in any Region 
or... Lagos of the civil and criminal 
processes, judgments, decrees, orders 
- and' decisions., of. the Federal Supreme Court 
and of any.;court in any other part of 
Nigeria, and the attendance of persons in 
any Region.... or Lagos at any such court.”
”(L) The Legislature of the Region may make pro­
vision for the service and execution in 
that Region of the civil and criminal processes, 
judgments, decrees, orders and decisions of 
any court, and the attendance of persons in
that Region at any court.”
The above provisions have been characterized by Dr. Awa as the 
"full faith and credit clause” of the Nigerian Federal Constitu- 
tion:^ that is, a provision of the Federal Constitution which
makes it obligatory for any of the States in the Federation to
give full recognition to the Laws, processes and judgments of 
other States; the breach of which makes such non-recognition a 
violation of the Federal Constitution. The effect of the 1954 
Federal Constitutional provisions he stated to be that the pro­
cesses, judgments and, surprisingly, legislative enactments, of 
one region must be recognised and accepted at their face value
in every other region.^
It is submitted that-this.analysis is clearly wrong.
Compared, for example, with Article IV, Section 1 of the United
31. For the current provision: see Item 22, Concurrent Legisla­
tive List, Schedule Part II, The Constitution of the federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1963 which replaced an identical Item 
in the I960 Constitution.
32. Awa: Federal Government in Nigeria (1964), pp.186-187.
33* Ibid., at pJB7.
States Constitution which requires the grant of full faith and 
ctedit to the acts, judgments and records of sister states, and 
the more effective section 118 of the Australian Constitution 
which provides that "Full faith and credit shall he given through­
out the Commonwealth to the laws, the public Acts and records, 
and the judicial proceedings of Svery State", there is nothing 
compelling in the above Nigerian Constitutional provisions, or 
in those replacing them, to warrant their being termed a full 
faith and credit clause. The provisions only empower the Fe­
deral and State Governments to regulate, i.e. establish a pro­
cedure for, the service and execution of processes, andi'the 
enforcement of the judgments of one Region (now a State) in the 
other. Moreover, the provisions, as could be observed, do not 
even authorise the passing of legislative enactments either by 
the Federal or the State Legislatures for the recognition of the 
laws of one unit in the other. In the absence of implementing 
statutes, these provisions which are not more than enabling ones, 
standing by themselves, cannot give rise to any constitutional 
issue in the Supreme Court of Nigeria as in the United States 
og* Australia.
The absence of a full faith and credit clause in the 
Nigerian Constitution is regrettable. It gives any of the Nigerian 
States unrestricted latitude to develop some whimsical doctrines 
of local public policy for refusing recognition to the statutes 
and other laws of the others. Whatever may be the position in 
international conflicts, it is absolutely undesirable that sister 
states in a Nigerian community with a common nationality, a common 
baSic law and substantially the same legal institutions and social 
ideas, should be allowed to tread what at the inter-state level 
amounts to a dangerous and divergent path. With the introduction 
of new legal concepts unknown in other jurisdictions in some States
£3.
it will be realised that the fear herein expressed far from 
being imagined is very real.^ It cannot be too strongly urged 
that a full faith and credit clause, for example, on the Austra­
lian line, be entrenched in the future Federal Constitution of 
the country to ensure equal treatment to all citizens of Nigeria 
through reciprocal enforcement of the laws of one State in the 
other. '
5. FEDERAL STATUTES.
(a) Jurisdiction in Personam.
It is significant to observe that all Federal legisla­
tions concerning inter-state conflicts arose as a result of con­
stitutional provisions empowering the Federal Legislature to re­
gulate such matters. In exercise of the powers conferred by 
section 151 of the 1954- Constitution, the Adaptation of Laws 
(Judicial Provisions) Order of 1955^ was made which inserted 
a hew Part VII into the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. Sections 
95 to 103 of the Act deal with the service of the process of one 
State in the other. This enactment is effective throughout the 
Federation and obviates the necessity for any similar provisions 
by the State legislatures. Any writ of summons issued in one 
State may be effected in the other State as if the writ was served 
on the defendant in the State in which the writ was issued. ^
34. For example, only in the Lagos and the Eastern States is the 
concept of statutory adoption known; (see Chapter 7) As the 
Federal Constitution at present stands, nothing prevents any of 
the Northern States, where this concept is unknown, from refusing 
to give full effects to the adoption laws of these States.
35. Legal Notice No.47 of 1955.
36. Cap. 189 (1958 ed.) Lav/s of the Federation of Nigeria.
37. Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap.189 (1958 ed.) Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, s. 96 (2).
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The appearance of the defendant gives the issuing State jurisdic­
tion under ordinary rules of the common law, hut in case of de­
fault the plaintiff may, by order of the court, proceed in the 
suit if it is made to appear to the court from which the writ 
was issued that the subject matter of the suit falls within one 
of the eight categories enumerated in section 101 of the Act.
The clear and desirable purpose of this enactment is that the 
whole of the Federation is treated as a unit for purposes of 
service and execution of processes. On the inter-state level, 
these set of provisions which make the service of processes 
more efficacious in that no leave to serve out of the jurisdic- 
tion is necessary, have displaced the rules of "assumed juris­
diction" introduced into Nigerian law by the English statute, 
the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, which was classified a sta­
tute of general application by Abbott, J., in Ribeiro v. Chahinff^ 
The provisions of the English legislation, which are now con­
tained in the Rules of the High Courts of some States, can now,
Il Q
since Federation, be used for serving writs outside Nigeria.
(b) . Enforcement of State Judgments.
The provisions on the enforcement of State judgments, 
as we have already observed, derive from the same Constitutional 
source as those on the service and execution of processes. It 
is least surprising therefore that the implementing enactment 
should be the same Sheriffs and Civil Process Act . 41 Under the
38. See Okonkwo :V. Okonkwo '1959i N.N.L.R.65.
39. (1954) 14 W.A.C.A.476.
40. E.g. We st ern and Mid-Wes t ern St at e s; See the High Court Rules,
Order IV, Rules 1 to 7;
_Eastern States; High Court Rules, Cap.61 (1963 ed.)
Laws of Eastern Nigeria, Order IX, Rules 15 and 
13*
41. See ss. 104-112.
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provisions of the Act, any judgment obtained in a State Court may 
be registered in another State by the person in whose favour it was 
given. Section 105 of the Act provides for the maintainance in each 
of the States, a Register called 11 The Nigerian Register of Judgments 
Upon the production of a Certificate of judgment issued in the ap­
propriate form by the court of a State giving the judgment, the re­
ceiving State must register the judgment by entering it in the 
Register of Judgments.
"From the date of registration the certificate shall 
be a record of the court in which it is registered, 
and shall have the same force and effect in all res­
pect as a judgment of that court, fend the like pro­
ceedings may be taken upon the certificate as if the 
judgment had been a judgment of that court”. ^
"Judgment” in the Act is defined to include any judgment, decree or
order given or made by a court in a suit whereby any sum of money
is made payable or any person is required to do or not to do any act
43or thing other than payment of money.  ^It therefore covers, e.g., 
Judgments in divorce and other matrimonial causes, custody of a 
child, payment of alimony and any other decrees given in a matri­
monial suit.
A great defect in the Nigerian provisions which makes
them an uncritical and pedantic adoption of the Australian Service
44and Execution of Process Act, on which they were based, is that 
despite section 151 of the 1954 Constitution and Item 22 of the 
Concurrent Legislative List in the I960 and 1963 Constitutions, all 
of which authorise the Federal Government to establish by legisla­
tion a procedure whereby the "processes, judgments, decrees, orders
45and decisions ............  of any court of law in Nigeria” ^
will be enforced in the sister-states; the implementing statute,
i.e. the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, only applies to the 
grocesses and judgments of the High Court and the Magistrate's
42. s. 105 (2).
43. s. 95.
44. 1901-1950 (Commonwealth of Australia statute).
45. Emphasis supplied.
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Court as in Australia. 46 Consequently, the processes and judg­
ments of Customary Courts are excluded. The unhappy result of 
this imperfect exercise of constitutional powers is that while 
the processes and judgments of a Magistrate1s court ^ ust he 
mutually enforced in the sister-states, the processes and judg­
ments, for example, of a "grade A" Customary Court in Southern 
Nigeria, or of a Sharia Court of Appeal in Northern Nigeria, 
whose judges are as professionally qualified as, and often more 
than, a Magistrate, are denied under the Act reciprocal recogni­
tion inter-state. It must he admitted that some State Customary 
Courts are obliged by state statutes4*^ to accord recognition to 
the judgments and processes of other States' customary courts.
The existence of such a provision in any state makes an exequtor 
process unnecessary before the judgments of other states' custo­
mary courts can be enforced in such state. However, it is our 
conviction that the regulation of the conflictual aspects of 
customary courts' processes and judgments should not be left 
to the enlightened self-interest of individual States. Apart 
from the fact that the provisions of the State enactments are 
not as effective as those of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act,
rules of inter-state recognition of judgments and processes are
ASabsent1; in some other States.
Unless there is a uniform provision regarding these 
matters and with reciprocal effect throughout the States, a State
46. See ss. 95 and 105, Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap.189.
4'?* ttie Western Nigeria, Customary Courts Law, Cap.33
(1959 ed.); s.39 of the Area Courts Edict, No.l of 1967, of 
the North—Western State. Similar rule is contained in the 
Area Courts Edicts of the five Northern Nigerian states, at 
identical sections.
48. The Three Eastern Nigeria States.
whose processes and judgments are not accorded similar treatment 
as it gives to other States' may he justified in engaging in a 
spirit of retaliation thereby rendering the State provisions value­
less. It is submitted that the Federal authorities should amend 
the relevant parts of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act so as 
to enable the processes and judgments of all customary courts to 
be mutually enforced in the sister-states as those of the High 
Courts and Magistrates' Courts. Otherwise the ill purported to 
have been removed, that is, that a person should not be allowed 
to evade his personal obligations by moving interstate, will still 
be present, in a substantial degree, in the country. The sugges­
tion as regards the insertion of a full faith and credit clause 
in the Federal Constitution is also directed towards this goal.
(c) Marriage and Matrimonial Causes.
Until three years after the establishment of a federal 
system of government in Nigeria, it did not occur to the founding- 
fathers of the Nigerian Constitution that the field of marriage 
and matrimonial causes is the most fruitful aspect of private 
international law not only at the international but also at the 
state levels. The failure of the 1954 Constitution to provide 
for a uniform law in this respect was, however, rectified in 1957^ 
when general powers in respect of these matters were taken out 
of the competence of the Regional legislatures and placed on the 
Exclusive List of the Federal legislature. This remedy is, howeve 
of a partial nature. Although the Marriage Act^° and the Federal
49. By the Nigeria (Constitution) (Amendment No.2) Order in Counci 
of 1957, s . 50 (1) (d): See now, item 23 of the Exclusive Le­
gislative List, Part I of the Schedule to the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963; and s. 69 (2) of the 
Constitution.
50. Cap.115 (1958 ed.), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
51enactment relating to matrimonial causes are of universal 
application within the country, they relate exclusively to the 
celebration and dissolution of monogamous marriages. The 
Federal Acts still leave intact diversity of laws in respect of 
customary polygamous marriages and matrimonial causes regarding 
such marriages in State hands* Consequently, what constitutes 
the formal and essential requirements of customary law marriages, 
capacity of the parties to enter into them, the grounds or 
reasons for their dissolution, and the jurisdiction of the courts 
to dissolve them, are entirely state matters. Conflicts rules 
relating to them, also being state matters, vary from state to 
state.
6. STATE STATUTES.
Only in very rare cades do State statutes deal with 
specific rules of private international law. A notable exception 
to this is in the field of legitimation by the subsequent marriage 
of a child*s parents with respect to which all State statutes ^  
contain uniform provisions as choice of law rules ^  and those 
for the recognition of the incidents of the status of legitimacy 
created by any foreign applicable law.^It must be observed, 
however, that uniformity of state legislations in this respect is 
due to the division of legislative powers between the federal and
51. State Courts (Federal Jurisdiction)Act, Cap.177, (1958 ed.) 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
52. Lagos State: Legitimacy Act (Lagos), Cap.105, (1958 ed.) Laws
of the Federation; Northern States; Legitimacy Law, Cap*65 
(1965 ed.) Laws of Northern Nigeria'; Western and Mid-Western 
States: Legitimacy Law, Cap.62, (1959 ed.J Laws of Western
Nigeria; Eastern States: Legitimacy Law, Cap.75, (1965 ed.)
Laws of Eastern Nigeria.
53* s. 9(1) in the above Legitimacy Laws which contain identical 
sections.
54. Ibid., s. 9(2).
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State authorities during the two successive stages in the history 
of federalism in Nigeria. With legitimacy and legitimation 
■becoming a residuary topic under the federal constitutional 
arrangement of 1954, each of the former Regions adopted and re­
enacted the then existing national Legitimacy Act.^ This process 
has again been indirectly repeated hy the States (Creation and 
Transitional Provisions) Decree ^  by which all existing laws 
in the Region out of which a State was created automatically be­
come the laws of the new State. As a "Marriage” in each of the 
States* Legitimacy Laws is defined solely with reference to mono­
gamous marriage, it becomes clear that the provisions of the 
statute dealing with private international law rules of legitima­
tion by subsequent marriage exclude legitimation by customary 
law marriage.
There are other statutes of the states which are of 
interest from the point of view of private international law. For 
instance, both the Eastern Nigeria Adoption Law, 1965 ^  and 
the Lagos Adoption Edict, 1968 provide for the basis of the 
jurisdiction of the court of a state in adoption proceedings; 
while the Lagos Edict alone contains a rule on recognition of 
sister-state and foreign adoptions. Also, by the provision of 
the Western and the Mid-Western Nigeria Torts Law,“^  it may be 
confidently asserted that even though there are no adoption 
statutes in these two states, the incidents consequent on the 
status of adoption created by the law of a sister—state or a 
foreign country will, at least for certain purposes, be recognised 
in the states.
55. Cap.Ill, Laws of Nigeria, 1948 ed. The Act was itself passed 
in 1929.
56. No. 14 of 1967, s.l (5).
57. No. 12 of 1965.
58. No. 14 of 1968.
59. Cap. 122, Laws of Western Nigeria (1959 ed.) s . 5 (c).
7 . NIGERIAN CASE-LAW AND AUTHORS.
In all the law districts of the Nigerian Federation,
English rules of private international law are generally followed.
Although there are some Nigerian cases, emanating almost entirely
from the field of matrimonial causes, their distinctive Nigerian
characteristic lies in the adaptation of the English principles
to accord with the federal division of powers in the country.
Only occasionally has the difference in social habits and legal
institutions in the country restrained the courts from giving too
loyal adherence to the received English principles of private
international law. Only in rare cases is a side look cast
on the legal systems of other countries for the development of
61this branch of law in Nigeria. It must be admitted, however,
that Nigerian judges, like their counterpart in other countries,
"have conflict of laws cases before them 
far less frequently than local laws. [That] 
they rarely feel equally at home with the 
conflict cases, and they do not decide them and 
write their opinions with the same assurance 
and dependability as in other fields." ^
The temptation to adopt English principles is very 
great and fascinating. English law is the basic law in Nigeria. 
Almost all Nigerian judges are trained in English Inns of Court 
or British Universities. Only a very insiginficant number of 
Nigerian legal personnel ever studies the conflict of laws on a 
comparative basis. We therefore lack the knowledge of other 
systems of private international law, apart from the-.:, English 
system, which is a sine qua non to the development of the municipa: 
system in this field. It is not surprising, then, that there is
60. See Asiata v. Goncallo (1900), 1 N.L.R.42.
61. e.g. Benson v. Ashiru [1967] N.M.L.R.363.
62. Cheatham: "Problems and Methods in Conflict of Laws". QQ 
Recueil des“"dours ^1960)," 247. --------------------
no literature on this subject; the extremely few contributions 
in legal periodicals being merely repetitive of the reasons ad­
duced by judges in arriving at their decisions, agreeing or dis­
agreeing with them in places, without offering any helpful sug­
gestions ^  as to what the judges should do in future. Conse­
quently, Dicey*s Digest of English Conflict of Laws, the rules 
of which are not designed, in the words of its late author,, for 
a countiy whose institutions "are utterly foreign to the insti­
tutions and habits of life in the admittedly civilised countries
CJx
of the world” continues to predominate in shaping rules of 
private international law in Nigeria, a country, which according 
to Dicey*s definition, cannot be included in the "charmed 
circle of civilised countries".
CONCLUSION.
A common feature of Nigerian private international law 
as indicated by the various sources considered above is that it 
is all geared to the basic English law ideas and institutions re­
ceived into the country. The tendency is that customary law and 
its legal institutions are being progressively relegated to the 
background in the development of this branch of law in Nigeria. 
And yet some institutions of customary law, particularly in the 
field of family law, are imbued with characteristics of a perma­
nent nature. To contemplate any supercesion of them in the fore- 
seable future will be a fruitless and unworthy task..^ We have 
had occasions to point out that the growth of rules of private
international law is the necessary result of modern technological 
development which is shrinking space in time and bringing peoples
see, Karibi-Whyte, 1 Nigeria Lawyers Quarterly 9» at p. 18 
64. Dicey: Conflict of Laws (3rd ed.) pp.30 and 781.
63. cf. Ajayi: "The Interaction of English Law with Customary 
Law in Western Mgeria" 4 J.A.'L. (I960) 48.
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and diverse legal institutions far closer together. Can it he
urged that only persons subject to the English type law in
Nigeria have intercourse with other countries or other law
districts? If not, should the Nigerian private international
law, then, reflect only English law attitudes and disregard.
customary law when other foreign systems, even where institutions
analogous to those of our customary law are unknown, are showing
increasing readiness to accord recognition to such "unfamiliar”
66legal institutions. Or should we in Nigeria adopt an unpre­
cedented and unique experiment of having two systems of private 
international law - one for the common law and the other for 
customary law. It is submitted that for the purpose of this 
subject, the actual dualism of the Nigerian legal system should 
be considered immaterial. Being an all pervading subject, one 
of the facts which Nigerian private international law must deal 
with and put into effect is that customary law is part of the 
Nigerian law. Its rules should be part of the substantive 
sources - the energising forces - which are constantly remaking 
the body of Nigerian private international law.
6 6. Apart from the recent liberal attitude of the English law 
towards polygamous marriages noted above, a polygamous 
marriage, if valid according to the personal laws of the 
parties at the time it was celebrated, is recognised in 
France so as to entitle each of the wives to assert in the 
country her full marital rights. See the decision of Civ.
Jan. 1958* D.1958, 265> cited by Von Landauer in 15, I.C.L.Q.
P.22.
The American law makes a distinction between actually poly­
gamous marriages and potentially polygamous but actually 
monogamous marriages. The former enjoys limited recognition 
while the latter is equated with monogamous ”Christian” 
marriages for all purposes (See Bartholomew; "Recognition of 
Polygamous Marriages in America” 15, I.C.L.Q.1 6 2 T at pp.1073-5) 
The American attitude appears to be that a marriage is not 
polygamous unless there is de facto plurality of wives. See 
Royal v. Cudhay Packing Co. (1922) 195 Xa. 759; 190 N.W.4-27.
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CHAPTER TWO 
DOMICILE
A, INTRODUCTION
It Las already been observed that the English common
law concept of domicile Las a statutory foundation in Nigeria
by virtue of tLe reception clauses which provide that the common
law of England as at a certain date shall be operative in the
country.^ The formative period in the evolution of principles
as regards the concept of domicile in England occurred well be-
pfore the Nigerian reception of the common law. There seems to
be no significant difference between the concept in the Nigerian
law and that of the English law from which it originates. This
is especially so in view of the fact that jurisdiction of the
Nigerian High Courts in divorce and other matrimonial causes
- all situations in which domicile predominates - is exercised
in conformity with the law and practice for the time being in
*
force in England.  ^ And, moreover, as a result of the unitary 
concept of domicile, i.e. that it bears exactly the same meaning 
in matrimonial causes as well as in other matters of personal 
law, (the effect of which is that judges cite indiscriminately 
cases dealing with domicile for purposes other than the one
1. See Chapter 1.
2. As instanced by the leading cases of e.g. Whicker v. (1856 
7 H.L.Cas. 124; Lord v. Colvin (1859), 4 Drew.5&6; Moorhouse
v. Lord (1865), T^TS.L.C. 872; Bell v. Kennedy (186SJ7T7I7T 
Sc* & 307 and Udny v. Udny (1869), L.&.1 Sc. & D. 441. See
also Graveson 'law of Domicile in the Twentieth Century11 in 
Marshall: The Jubilee Lectures Cl96Q)» •p.8t?» where he observed 
that by 1900,the date of reception of English common law in 
Nigeria, the subject of domicile had achieved an apparent 
completeness in matters of law.
3. See the postscript for the present position of the law.
immediately on hand) any opinion expressed by the judges as re—
* *
gards the law of domicile in matrimonial causes are bound to be 
reflected in other branches of the law. It is therefore un­
necessary in a study of this nature to embark on a detailed 
re-statement of the Nigerian rules for the acquisition, loss 
and change of a person*s domicile, except in so far as they are: 
necessary for a consideration of the reform of the concept 
in the Nigerian law. A survey will show more than anything
4that they are, at present, the same as the English principles.
Three problems are involved in the consideration of 
the law of domicile. The first is to ascertain the area of do­
micile i.e. to locate the territorial unit where a person has 
his domicile. Is domicile to be fixed for all purposes in Ni­
geria as a whole; Is it in Nigeria for certain purposes and 
in a state for others or, in the state for all purposes? This 
will involve an examination of the legislative division of 
powers on matters which depend on domicile between the National 
and state governments.
The second is to determine what legal consequences re­
sult from the location of a person's domicile.
The third problem is to consider reform of the concept 
of domicile in view of the handful of hard cases tte general 
pattern of which seems to have established that the strict appli­
cation of the traditional concept of domicile in Nigeria is 
fraught with a substantial amount of injustice. This appears 
to have arisen not only because of the widespread diss alas faction 
with certain principles of domicile in the common law world but 
more importantly as a result of the federal nature of government
4. Except that in England,as a result of s.l of the Eamily Law 
Reform Act 1969, a person of the age of 18 years attains full 
age and can therefore acquire a domicile of choice as from 1st 
January, 1970; whereas in Nigeria a person has no capacity to 
il^years311 121 Pendent domicile until he attains the age of
in Nigeria and the existence of a dual system of law i.e. the 
territorial common law and the customary law, in each of the 
twelve states of the Federation. The result of this diversity 
of laws is that certain concepts and observances under customary 
law cannot hut have some impact on the law of domicile in Nigeria 
just as the rules of common law have had tremendous influence 
on customary law.
The first problem indicated above will be dealt with in 
the first part of this chapter while a consideration off the 
third problem will be made in the second part. But briefly to 
dispose of the second problem, it is generally agreed in the 
common law systems of law that the essential purpose of the law 
of domicile is to determine the personal law of a person. The 
position in Nigeria is, as a general rule, not different since, 
as we have already observed, Nigerian private international law 
has a historical basis in the English law. The only exception . 
is that in England, liability for income tax depends,in certain 
cases, on a person’s domicile in the United Kingdom;^ whereas 
in Nigeria, residence within a State, and not domicile, is the 
basis of liability for all types of income tax.^ But like in 
England, liability for estate duty in Nigeria would seem to be 
closely linked with succession and is accordingly governed by 
the law of domicile.
Therefore, the scope of the personal law in Nigeria 
does not extend beyond settling questions affecting matters of 
domestic status, i.e. matters of family relations and "family
n
property". Thus, under the Nigerian as well as English private
5. SeeGfraveson, op.cit., 6th ed., p.98 et seq.
6. Income Tax Management Act, No.21 of 1961, s.3 (2) and the 
First Schedule, s.l.
7. "Family Property" as here used should be construed as the rights 
of spouses in each other’s property as a result of marriage. It 
should therefore be distinguished from family property in the 
sense of a common property of members of an extended family 
under Customary Law.
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international law, the law of domicile regulates the following 
matters of personal law: The essential validity of a marriage
including capacity of each party to enter into it. The mutual 
marital rights of the spouses and the effect of marriage on the 
proprietary rights of the spouses. Traditionally, it is the 
law that determines the judicial jurisdiction in divorce and, to 
a limited extent, also the court’s jurisdiction in other matrimo­
nial causes. As a general rule, it constitutes the basis on 
which a foreign divorce decree is recognised. It governs le­
gitimacy and legitimation and determines the validity of wills 
of movable property and the division of such property in the
Q
event of intestacy. But since the application of law in each 
of the Nigerian States is partly territorial and partly personal, 
these matters of personal status are not necessarily determined 
by a single system of law applicable to all persons resident 
within the limits of a territory as in England, New York or 
Gataria. In most cases, matters of personal law of a Nigerian 
person are governed by a system of Customary law which, is deter­
mined by his membership of an ethnic community or his adoption 
of the ’’mode of life” of another community. This customary law 
may be designated as Moslem law, if it has a religious connota­
tion as in some of the Northern Nigerian states* Domicile in 
the Nigerian law, therefore, appears to perform an additional 
function through which a foreign court can make a further 
internal reference to the system of customary or Moslem law 
governing an individual's personal rights.
8 . For the scope of personal law under English Conflict of 
Laws, See Cheshire, op.cit., 7th ed., p. 143, and also,
Seventh Report of the Private International Law Committee, 
cmnd. 1935 6T p.8.---  -----------  - --------------
B. AREA OF DOMICILE IK NIGERIA.
It is a basic principle of common law that domicile 
signifies a personal connection with a territory subject to one 
system of law. In this respect, a distinction is invariably made 
between (a) the whole of a Federation which is co-extensive with 
a national boundary and subject to one sovereign, for example, thw 
United States of America, Canada, Australia, Switzerland or Nige­
ria and (b) a territorial unit subject to one system of law but 
forming a component part of the whole of the territory subject 
to one sovereign, for example, New South Vales or Western State 
of Nigeria* In Dicey*s terminology, the former is a "State"
Q
whilst the latter is defined as a "Country" * 7 For the purpose
r  ' '
of the ensuing discussion about the Nigerian law of domicile, 
however, "country" is used to describe the former while the 
word "Region" or "State” is employed to refer to the latter situa­
tion so as to make the use of the term herein comformable with 
the political and constitutional sense of the word in Nigeria*
The traditional common law view as regards domicile in 
a federation, or other political affiliations like the United 
Kingdom, is that a person can only be domiciled within a state 
orjprpvince of a federation and not in the country constituting 
the political affiliation generally. The location of domicile 
must be in a territorial unit under a single system of law. Thus 
a person would be domiciled in England or Scotland but not in 
the United Kingdom; in California state or New York state and 
not in the United States. Similarly, the domicile of an indivi­
dual would be fixed in Western Australia, Alberta or Lagos but 
not in Australia, Canada or Nigeria.*^ The policy consideration
9. Dicey & Norris: Conflict of Laws (8th ed.) pp.12-15*
10* See e.g. Attorney-General for Alberta v. Cook [1926]« A.C.Wt-; 
Gatty and Gatty v. A.G. L195ll)» B.444: Travers v. Hollev ClQS^I. 
p.246; and the Restatement Second, Proposed OfficiairUraft. Pari
I.#1967: Para.11, Comment g, as regards the position in the 
United States of America*
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underlying this view rightly maintains that if domicile is fixed 
in a larger nnit than that having a single system of law, the 
concept of domicile will fail in its essential purpose of estab­
lishing the personal rights of the individual in accordance with
the system of law most close to him. For instance, it is a common 
law principle of private international law that succession to 
movables is governed by the law of the place where the deceased 
was domiciled at the date of his death# If his domicile is fixed 
in Nigeria, the problem is still unresolved as the solution pro­
vided by the different laws of the states of the federation differ 
considerably# The correct solution would be for the domicile of 
the propositus to be fixed in a state subject to one territorial 
system of law, for example, the Western state or Lagos state.
Nevertheless, the establishment of a federal structure
of government in some of the countries within the common law world,
necessitating a division of legislative competence on matters
which are regulated by domicile between the federal and state
legislatures, has given rise to a reappraisal of this unitary
11 .concept of domicile in the common law world. The view among 
legal writers is, also, moving progressively towards the possibi­
lity of establishing a national domicile in a federation, at least, 
for certain matters on which the Federal Parliament has legisla­
tive competence to create uniform law in the whole of the federa­
tion. 12 In this sense, the whole of the federation would in.':1aat 
become a country operating a single ’’system" of law in those mat­
ters with respect to which there is a uniform law, even though in 
other areas of personal status, domicile may still be located in 
a legal component of the federation.
11. See below.
12# Graveson: ’’Reform of the Law of Domicile" in 70 L.Q.R.4-92, also 
the same author in Marshall:' The Jubilee Lectures (I960) p. 85 
et seq., and The Conflict of Laws, 6th ed# p.188; Cowen and 
Mendes da Costa: 7& L.Q.R.6S; Morris; 11 I.C.L.Q.64-1; Dicey and 
Morris: The Conflict of Laws, 8th ed., p.82; Cheshire: Private 
International Law, 7th ed. p.150: and Walter Poliak: 50 S.A.L.J, wyat pp
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The area of domicile in Nigeria poses a pressing problem 
in the country’s private international law* Different judicial 
views have been expressed. The uncertainty created by these di­
vergent views has, at times, necessitated the employment of the 
’’rule of alternatives” whereby a judge will base his decision on
two alternative views in the hope that whichever view ultimately
13proves triumphant, the decision in the case will still stand.
The Chief Justice of the High Court of Lagos, in the case of
14Ogunmuyiwa v. Osunmuyiwa, was so exasperated with these con­
flicting views that he actively encouraged a Counsel or party to 
a case to take the point on appeal to the Supreme Court for final 
determination. He said:
’’This point has been raised in Matrimonial 
Causes on so many occasions and I am made 
to understand that there are more than two 
conflicting decisions as to whether there 
is one Nigerian domicil or [twelve] separate 
[state] domicils. These decisions have been 
in the High Court and I am not aware of Coun­
sel or parties taking the final step to put 
the matter at rest once and for all by pro­
ceeding on appeal to the Supreme Court* I 
express my own view when I say that the 
sooner this red herring of delay and confu­
sion is allowed to return to its normal ha­
bitat the better.”
Three solutions have been proposed. None of them has been con­
firmed, as far as we are aware, by the highest tribunal in Nigeria.
It will be pertinent to preface a discussion on this point 
with a consideration of the allocation of legislative competence 
between the Federal and State Governments. Nigeria was a unitary 
country until 1954. Prior to that date domicile needed be fixed in 
Nigeria as a w h o l e B u t  with the establishment of five law
13. See e.g. Udom v. Udom (1962) L.L.R. 112; Odiase v. Odiase ri965l 
N.M.L.R. 1957    —  ------
14. Unreported, Lagos High Court, Suit No. WD/49/65 of 23/3/66.
3.5. Shyngle v. Shyngle (1923) 4 N.L.R.92; Jones v. Jones (1938) 14 
JN.L.R.12; In Smith v. Smith (1924) 5 N.L.k.102/Tan Der Meulen, 
J., however erroneously stated that the parties to the suit 
were ’’domiciled in Lagos”.
80.
districts, which in 1967 were increased to twelve, certain matters 
of personal status are specifically allocated to the sphere of 
federal law while the rest remains matters ;of state law. The 
following aspects of matters of personal law are, under the con- . 
stitution, within the exclusive legislative competence of the fe­
deral legislature:
"Marriages other than marriages under Moslem 
law or other customary law; annulment and disso­
lution of, and other matrimonial causes relating 
to, marriages other than marriages under Moslem 
law or other customary law11*
i.e. monogamous marriages and matrimonial causes relating to such
marriages. ^  The Constitution further provides that the Federal
legislature has exclusive competence on
"any matter that is incidental or supplementary:-
(a) to any matter mentioned elsewhere in the 
list; or
(b) to the discharge by the Government of the 
Federation or any officer, court, or autho­
rity of the Federation of any function con­
ferred by this Constitution"
The Federal Acts implementing these constitutional provisions are,
•10
the Marriage Act and the State Courts (Federal Jurisdiction)
Act, 1958.^ The Marriage Act operates throughout the Federation
while the State Courts(Federal Jurisdiction) Act excludes the
Lagos state from its operation. This state, however, has a si-
20milar Act, the High Court of Lagos Act, v also passed by the Fe­
deral Parliament. The purpose of the State Courts (Federal Juris­
diction), Act and the High Court of Lagos Act are two-fold. They 
confer jurisdiction in matrimonial causes on the High Court of a
16. The Federal Republican Constitution of Nigeria, 1963* Schedule 
Part I, Item 23* As "Marriage" within the context of the above 
constitutional provision refers only to monogamous marriages, 
any reference to marriage, divorce or matrimonial cause in the 
rest of this Chapter should be construed, unless otherwise 
stated, as reference to a monogamous marriage.
17# The Federal'Republican Constitution of Nigeria, 1963* Schedule 
Part I, Item 4-5.
18. Cap.115, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, (1958 ed.).
19. S.4-.
2 0. S.16.
state and provide for the law that should he applied in granting 
reliefs in divorce and other matrimonial causes. But instead of 
the Federal Parliament enacting its own law on matrimonial causes, 
it simply provides, by these two Acts, that each of the states 
should hpply the current Matrimonial Causes Act in force in 
England, ^ 1 It is, therefore, obvious that the present contro­
versy as to the area of domicile in Nigeria arises as a conse­
quence of the constitutional division of legislative and judi­
cial powers whereby matters in which domicile is relevant are 
shared between the federal and state governments.
1. A COMMON NIGERIAN DOMICILE FOR ALL PURPOSES.
The first view, presumably based on a broad inter­
pretation of the above constitutional provisions and the mean­
ing of marriage as an institution on which almost all matters 
concerning family relations are inseparably attached, was
expressed by Adefarasin, J., in a Lagos case of Odunjo v.
2?Odun.jo where he maintained that the area of domicile remains
exactly the same as the pre-federation period on the footing
that legitimacy and succession are incidental to marriage under
the Marriage Act and that the law practiced in all the Nigerian
States as to these is the same. In his view, the infalible test
applicable is
"to look more closely to the marriage laws 
of a country with a Federal system of govern­
ment as we have in the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria to determine whether or not there is 
one common Nigerian domicil. It seems to me 
that if one system of marriage laws obtains 
in all the component parts of the country, 
there will be one domicil as in the case in 
England and Vales. If, however, there are 
different marriage laws obtaining in the 
Regions, then there will be as many domiciles
as there are regions”• 23
21. This statement is no longer true as from 17th March 1970#
See the Postscript.
22. (1964) L.L.R.43.
23- Ibid., at pp. 45-46.
Thus applying this remarkable criterion for determining the area 
of domicile in a federation, the learned judge found that the 
effect of the constitutional allocation of legislative competence 
on monogamous marriage and matrimonial causes relating to it (as 
opposed to the formation, annulment and dissolution of polygamous 
marriages) to the Federal Government is as follows: First, the
competence of the Federal Government to enact laws on the forma­
tion, annulment, dissolution, etc. of monogamous marriages implies 
power on the part of that Government also to enact laws on suc­
cession, legitimacy and such other matters of status. Secondly, 
the exercise of the constitutional power by the enactment of a 
Marriage Act which deals mainly with the celebration of mono­
gamous marriage and the capacity of a person to enter into it, 
and applies throughout the federation, means that there is now 
"a unity of law in Nigeria in respect of matters which depend
on domicile, i.e., Marriage under the Act, Divorce under it,
24Succession, Status, Legitimacy, etc". Therefore, he held that 
"there is one Nigerian Domicile" in relation to these matters.
p
Confronted with Lord Westbury’s test in Bell v. Kennedy,
which was applied by the Privy Council in A.G. for Alberta v.
26Cook /establish the principle that the domicile of a person 
can only be located in a Canadian Province as opposed to the fe­
deration as- a whole, Adefarasin, J., remarked that the decision 
in Cook’s case was founded on the ground that there was no uni­
formity of marriage laws in the Canadian Provinces. On this 
hypothesis, perhaps the learned judge will want us to believe 
that as a result of the Australian Marriage Act of 1961, which 
provides for a uniform marriage law throughout the Australian
24. (1964) L.L.R. 47.
25. (1868) L.R. 1 Sc. & D. 307.
26. [1926] A.C.444.
Federation, there is now a common Australian domicile in respect 
of all maters depending on domicile!
Be that as it may, the judgment of Adefarasin J., 
deliberately left out so many factors which affect the location 
of domicile in a federation in his search for unity of law. The 
word "deliberate" is used since it is inconceivable that a High 
Court judge in Nigeria will fail to realise that there is dualism 
of laws in the federation of Nigeria and that whatever the posi­
tion under the general law (i.e. under statute and at common law), 
there is no ■uniformity in the law of succession under the system 
of customary law, nor in the law of legitimacy under that system.
But even as regards legitimacy and succession under the
general law, Hurley Ag. C.J.,in the Northern Nigerian case of
27Okonkwo v. Eze, f had earlier on expressed the view that these 
two matters are not incidental to marriage so as to justify them 
being regarded as falling under the law-making powers of the Fe­
deral Government. He said:
"Neither legitimacy nor succession are subject 
within the exclusive legislative competence of 
the Federal Legislature. In regard to them the 
Regions may legislate independently of the Fede­
ration and of one another, and they may legislate 
variously. Each Region, in relation to these 
matters, is a territory subject to a separate 
system of law".
Postponing for the moment a detailed discussion on the absurdity 
of holding that legitimacy and legitimation are incidental or
Of}
supplemental to marriage and therefore within the exclusive 
legislative competence of the Federal Parliament,- it is surprising 
how Adefarasin J., arrived at his conclusion that succession is 
incidental to marriage. As previously stated, it must be assumed 
that the learned judge had in mind succession under the general lav
2 7. ;i960\ l.N.N.L.R. 80, at p.81.
28. See Chapter Six, p. 498 et seq.
as it is beyond dispute that succession under customary law is 
as varied as the diversity of the system of customary law within 
the country. ^  What is equally disturbing is the learned 
justice’s assertion that the Marriage Act "provides for succession 
on intestacy in section 36" without going further to explain 
that sub-section 3 of section 36 provides in clear terms that 
the section applies to "the colony only", i.e. now a part of the 
Lagos State.
Attention may be drawn in this respect to the Probates 
(Re-Sealing) Decree, 1966,^ the effect of which is that the Fe­
deral Parliament recognises the legislative competence of the 
states in matters of succession, thdr separate jurisdiction in 
the grant of probate and‘-letters of administration and consequently 
the possibility of diversity of laws on succession even under the 
general law in the federation. Section 2 of the Decree, which 
replaces a former Act, provides for the re-sealing of probates 
or letters of administration granted by the High Court of one 
Nigerian state in respect of the estate of a deceased person in 
the other sister-states Then section 3 of the Decree went on to 
provide that before re-sealing, the High Court of the state 
where application for re-sealing is made may require evidence of 
the ’’domicile of the deceased person".^ It is submitted that 
if, as stated by Aderarasin, J., there is -uniformity of law of 
succession throughout the federation and consequently one uni­
field jurisdiction for probate, there would have been no neces­
sity for a federal enactment providing for the re-sealing of pro­
bates granted in one state in the others, much more an inquiry 
as to the place of domicile of the deceased person within the 
federation.
29* See e.g.Kasunmu and Salacuse, Nigerian Family Law, p.291*
30. No.13 of 1966, replacing a previous Act, Cap.161, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 1958 ed.
31. Emphasis supplied.
It is significant in this respect to observe that the 
Federal Government has made no attempt, since the inception of 
a federal structure of government in Nigeria in 1954, to enact 
a law on succession applicable to the whole of the federation* 
Hence it requires no penetrating power of analysis to discover 
that the Administration of Estates Law ^  and the Wills Law ^  
of the Western State of Nigeria, both of which subsequently be­
come operative in the Mid-Western State,^ are substantially 
different from the succession laws of the other Nigerian states* 
For while the Laws of the Western and the Mid-Western States are 
adaptations of the current English statutes to suit local con­
ditions, the other states still operate the three-century old 
English Statutes of Distribution, 1670 and 1685* To speak, 
therefore, of uniformity of law of succession in Nigeria and 
that it is governed by "one Nigerian domicile’1 is to fly in the 
face of realities*
It is also difficult to understand the basis for the 
assertion of Adefarasin, J., that all matters of status are with­
in the exclusive power of the federal Parliament. The Celebra­
tion of monogamous marriage and the capacity of parties to enter 
into it, with which the Marriage Act is primarily concerned,
create only a limited number of domestic status which are deter-
35mined by the law of domicile, i*e*, that of husband and wife*
The Act, in addition determines the majority of a child for the
36purpose of celebrating a monogamous marriage under it* It has
also been shown that the status of being a testate or an intestate
32. Capf 1, Laws of Western Nigeria, 1959 ed*
33* Cap. 135* Laws of Western Nigeria, 1959 ed.
34. By virtue of the Mid-Western State (Territorial Provisions) 
Act, No.19 of 1963, s.2.
35« See Graveson: Status in the Common Law, (1963) p.138.
36. Marriage Act, s.18.
is outside the legislative competence of the federal parliament* 
Are we then to -understand that a monogamous marriage is a ne­
cessary or essential ingredient in the process of legitimacy or 
legitimation in Nigeria? Are other categories of domestic 
status like that of the adopter or adoptee inclusive in the le­
gislative competence of the federal Parliament? The statement 
that "Marriage lays the legal foundation for the family, "but the 
family can exist without marriage" is a sufficient recognition
of the factual situation of life to justify a negative reply to
37the above inquiries. In Nigeria, it has the force of law. It 
is Submitted that the view of Adefarasin, J., completely dis­
regards the devolution of legislative powers that was brought 
about by recent constitutional changes and is, therefore, un­
tenable. It ought not to have been considered were it not for 
the fact that it was voiced by a High Court judge. The Marriage 
Act is not a necessary peg upon which all categories of domestic 
status must be hung.
2. NATIONAL DOMICILE FOR MATRIMONIAL CAUSES AND STATE 
DOMICILE TOR OTHER PURPOSES.
A second solution proposed by the Nigerian case law 
favours the location of a common Nigerian domicile for matters 
on which the Federal Parliament had exercised its constitutional 
powers and enacted laws of universal application throughout the 
federation, i.e. on monogamous marriage, divorce and other matri­
monial causes, relating to such marriage. Thus, for example, in 
38Udom v. Udom, ^ a case decided by the Lagos High Court and which
37* In Lawal v. Younan [19613All N.L.R. 243, the Federal Supreme 
Court, in a comprehensive statement about the law of legiti­
macy in Nigeria held that children not the issue of a monoga­
mous marriage or a customary law marriage are regarded under 
Nigerian law as legitimate if paternity has been acknowledged 
by the putative father.
38. (1962) L.L.R. 112 at p.119
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concerned the dissolution of a monogamous marriage, Coker, J.,
having assumed jurisdiction on the basis of the parties' domicile
in Lagos, observed, obiter, that
"Under the constitution of Nigeria "Marriage and 
Divorce" is a matter within the exclusive competence 
of the Federal Legislature ..... and it is incon­
ceivable that on this subject different laws will 
exist in the different regions. No particular advan­
tage is derivable by claiming domicile in any parti­
cular Region except perhaps that of convenience.
...» but I wish to say that it will be a matter for 
regret if it could be urged by any Nigerian at any 
time that the fact of residence within a particular 
region does entitle him to confine his domicile to 
that place alone as opposed to a common Nigerian . 
domicile".
Four years earlier, Onyeama, J., had decided in the undefended 
divorce case of Nwokedi v. Nwokedi ^  that there is only one do­
micile in Nigeria for purpose of jurisdiction in matrimonial 
causes on the ground that there is only one uniform law relating 
to this subject throughout the Federation and that the jurisdic­
tion of the regional High Courts, though separately exercised, 
derives from the same source. But before the decision in Udom's 
case, Onyeama, J., had changed his view and insisted on regional 
(now state) domicile.^ Indeed, conversion from the view-point 
of a "two dimensional concept of domicile" to that of a state 
domicile for all purposes is not merely an aberration of Onyeama,
J. Such change of view has taken place in decisions by the Chief
4-1 4-2Justice of the Lagos state, and other judges in the state.
39. (1958) L.L.R.94-.
40. See below
41. In Effiong v. Effiong, Unreported, Lagos High Court Suit No. 
WD/6/67 of 13/10/67; Akemu v. Akemu, Unreported, Lagos High 
Court Suit No. WD/51/66 of 6/11/67; and Enwezor v. Enwezor, 
Unreported, Lagos High Court Suit No. WD/51/67. of 18/3/68; 
it was held by Taylor, C.J., that a common Nigerian domicile 
is sufficient to found the court's jurisdiction in matrimonial 
causes, whereas in Omo-Osagie v. Omo-Osagie,• Unreported, Lagos 
High Court Suit No. HD/l2/b8 of 8/7/68, the same' Chief Justice 
assumed jurisdiction inthe divorce proceedings on basis of 
the parties domicile in Lagos.
42. Despite the strong, but admittedly wrong, view of Adefarasin, 
J., that domicile for all purposes should be fixed in Nigeria
(see
/Fnote cont.....
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The net result is that only a few decisions of the ^agos 
High Court support the view that domicile should he related 
to purpose links and consequently, that a common Nigerian domi­
cile exists as basis of the court*s jurisdiction in matrimonial 
causes, even though for other purposes a state domicile should 
be fixed.
The two-dimensional approach is also favoured in the
Western and the Mid-Western states by individual judges. For
Fatayi-Williams J., in the Western Nigerian case of 
44Odiase stated his view on the matter in the
terms:-
“there is one law with respect to matrimonial 
causes arising out of a monogamous marriage 
throughout Nigeria, in the same manner as the 
Marriage Act •.•• operates throughout the 
country. This, as has been pointed out, 
follows from the distribution of legislative 
power by the Constitution and from the exercise 
of that constitutional power. To my mind, the 
framework within which this unity of law and 
jurisdiction is established contemplates Nigeria, 
for that particular purpose, as a single law 
district within which a domicile by reference to 
the common law concepts of animus and factum may 
be established. It is, in my view, possible in 
a Federation like Nigeria for a person to acquire 
a Nigerian domicile for the purpose of [establi­
shing the jurisdiction of the courts in matri­
monial causes] even though for other purposes.his 
domicile or residence may be connected with a 
[state]".
F/note 4-2. cont. from previous page.
above), he assumed jurisdiction in divorce proceedings in Vigo v. 
Vigo, Unreported, Lagos High Coprt Suit No. WD/4-6/1966 of 10/2/67 
and Obi v. Obi, Unreported, Lagos High Court Suit No. HD/58/66 of 
25/3/1967 on the basis that the “parties are domiciled in Lagos". 
See also, Omololu J.*s decisions in Eneli v. Eneli, Unreported, 
Lagos High Court, Suit No. HD/52/65 of 27/6/66 and Ekprikpo v. 
Ekprikpo. Lagos High Court, Suit No. Wd/59/65 of 14-/11/66.
4-5. Besides the cases cited in F/note 4-1 above, see Ofodile v. 
Ofodile, Unreported, Lagos High Court Suit No. WD/6/1965 of 
7/3/66, per Adedipe J.; Ishioye V* Ishioye, Unreported, Lagos 
High Court Suit No. WD/2£/6'5 of 16/5/66, per Adedipe J.; and 
Omagbemi v. Omagbemi. Unreported, Lagos High Court Suit No. 
WD/56/66 of 28/4/67 per Kazeem,Ag. J.
44. (1965) N.M.L.R. 196 at p.198.
instance, 
Odiase v. 
following
89.
And to complete the picture, a similar view was expressed by
Irikefe J., in the MidtWestern Nigerian case of Akhigbe v.
A 5
AkhiAgbe ^ where he held that both "the petitioner and the 
respondent are domiciled in Nigeria and resident in the Mid- 
Western State thereof when the petition was filed". Consequently, 
he assumed jurisdiction to dissolve their monogamous marriage.
3. STATE DOMICILE FOR ALL PURPOSES.
By far the view commanding the greatest support of
judicial opinion in Nigeria is the traditional one that domicile
for all purposes should be fixed within a legal sub-division of
the country i.e within a state. It will not be necessary to dis-
cuss more than two of these cases by way of illustration. The
first case to adopt this (.traditional approach since the division
tin
of the country into separate legal components is Okohkwo v. Eze. (
43* Unreported, High Court of Mid-Western Nigeria, Suit No.
U/l/67 of 26/6/67.
46. Okonkwo v. Eze ,1960j',r.N.N.L.R.80; Machi v. Machi (i960) L.1L.R. 
163; Olugele v. Olugele (1961) \l E.N.L.R.35; Uzo v. Uzo, Un­
reporteHTHigh Court of Eastern Nigeria, No. E/4D• 63; Adeoye v. 
Adeoye >1962/ 'j.V.N.N.L.R.63; Adeyemi v. Adeyemi (1962; L.L.R.70; 
Tames v. James, Unreported, High Court of:md-Western Nigeria. 
Suit No. V/32/63 of 23/4/64; Uchendu v. Uchendu (1962) L.L.R. 
101; Arinze v. Arinze [1.9663 N.M.L.R. 133T~Jnmes v. James 
Unreported, Western Nigeria High Court Suit No. 1/24/66 of 17/ 
6/66; Eneli v. Eneli, Unreported, Lagos High Court Suit No. 
HD/32/65 of 27/6/66; Apara v. Apara, Unreported, Lagos High 
Court Suit No. WD/7/66 of 7/1/67; "The v. Ibe, Unreported,
High Court of Eastern Nigeria, Suit ffo. 0/4D/b3 of 10/2/67;
Obi v. Obi, Unreported, Lagos High Court, Suit No. HD/38/66 of 
23/3/67; Sode v. Sode, Unreported, Lagos High Court, Suit No. 
HD/33/66 of 6/6/67; Onanuga v. Onanuga, Unreported, Lagos 
High Court, Suit No. Vd/43/66 of l3/?/67; Johnson v. Johnson, 
Unreported, Lagos High Court, Suit No. WD/31/66 of 28/8/6?; 
Eafore v. Eafore, Unreported, Lagos High Court, Suit No. 
Wd/25/67 of 22/12/67; Adeleke v. Adeleke, Unreported, Lagos 
High Court Suit No. HD/32/66 of 4/3/68; Gbaja-Biamila v.
Gba,ja-Biami 1 a, Unreported, Lagos High Court, Suit ]tfo. WD/20/67 
of l()/3/68; Omo-Osagie v. Omo-Osagie, Unreported, Lagos High 
Court, Suit No. HD/12/68 of""'877/68'.
47. 'I960: ■ .N.N.L.R.80
In that case, a wife brought a divorce petition against her hus­
band on ground of adultery. The petition alleged that the parties
j
were domiciled in Nigeria. Hurley, Ag. C.J.,(as he then was) 
declined jurisdiction on the footing that the jurisdiction of the 
High Court of Northern Nigeria in divorce is confined to situa­
tions where the parties are domiciled in Northern Nigeria. In 
dismissing the argument of the counsel for the petitioner that 
as a result of the unity of law on this subject throughout the 
federation, Nigeria should be regarded as a territory subject 
to one system of law in matrimonial causes and therefore con­
sidered as a unit for the location of domicile as a basis of 
the courtfs jurisdiction in divorce, the learned Chief Justice 
said:
"But a person cannot have more than one 
domicile at the same time: Dicey, Conflict
of Laws, rule 3* How domicile gives exclusive 
jurisdiction to the courts of the country of 
the domicile in other causes, for example, 
in causes raising questions of legitimacy.
It gives jurisdiction to the courts of the 
domicile also, though not exclusive juris­
diction, to determine the succession to 
movables: Dicey, rule 75- And it governs
the succession to movables in whatever court 
the succession may fall to be determined:
Dicey, rule 178. Neither legitimacy nor 
succession are subject within the exclusive 
legislative competence of the Federal Legis­
lature. In regard to them the Regions may 
legislate independently of the Federation 
and of one another, and they may legislate 
variously. Each Region, in relation to these 
matters, is a territory subject to a separate 
system of law. Each Region is a unit, to the 
exclusion of the other Regions and the Fede­
ration, for the purposes of domicile where 
domicile comes in question in relation to 
legitimacy, or in relation to the succession 
to movables. The person whose domicile is 
material in any dispute concerning legitimacy 
or concerning the succession to movables will 
necessarily have a domicile in one of the Re­
gions or in the Federal Territory of Lagos, 
not in Nigeria as a whole. When he comes to 
court to petition for a disoolution of marriage, 
he cannot have a different domicile, for he 
cannot have more than one domicile at the same 
time; he must have the same domicile as he has 
for all other purposes, and that will be a Regional
domicile or a domicile in the Federal 
Territory."
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According to this view, there is no distinction between domicile 
as basis of Jurisdiction in matrimonial causes and domicile as 
the test for determining the personal law of a person. No apo­
logy is required for quoting at such length Hurley, C.J.'s view 
as it represents, in our opinion, a concise statement of the 
operation of the law of domicile in Nigeria not only in the light 
of English precedents, but by virtue of the Nigerian Statutes 
dealing with domicile for purposes of Jurisdiction in matrimo­
nial causes.^
About seven months after the decision in Okonkwo's
case, the same problem arose for determination in the case of 
50Machi v, Machi, brought before the Lagos High Court, De 
Lestang, C.J., was also concerned with the question whether 
he should assume divorce Jurisdiction ini respect of a wifefs 
petition alleging that she and the husband were domiciled in 
Nigeria, The parties were Ibos who had been resident in Lagos 
for over 16 years. The Chief Justice examined the line of cases 
dealing with area of domicile in a federation. He found.that 
it was a universal principle that domicile cannot be fixed, for 
example, in the United States, Canada or Australia generally, 
but in one of the constituent states or provinces as the case 
W  be. He argued that Nigeria is a Federation composed of* se­
veral independent and sovereign territories, each with its own 
system of law and accordingly decided that a person may only 
acquire domicile in a territory subject to one system of law
i.e. a state, but not in Nigeria generally. He also held that 
since each of the former Regions has a separate Jurisdiction
48, 1960 s IT.N.N.L.R. 81-82.
49• See below
50. (I960) L.L.R. 103.
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from the point of view of Nigerian private international law* a 
person alleging the acquisition of a domicile of choice in a 
particular law district "must prove an actual residence in 
such place with a fixed settled determination of making his 
permanent residence therein”• Proof of animus manendi in the 
federation of Nigeria generally without a reference to any 
particular state is insufficient.
As to the suggestion . that since divorce law is uni­
form throughout Nigeria and that the test of a territory subject 
to one system of law he adopted for matrimonial causes juris­
diction, the Chief Justice replied "that the fallacy of such 
argument lies in the fact that the identity of law on one parti­
cular subject is not conclusive of one system". According to 
him, there must be, in addition, an identity of courts as a 
foundation for a unitary domicile in the Federation.
Views similar to the reasoning in Okonkwo’s and Machi's
cases have been expressed in later decisions of the state High 
51Courts. Thus, for example, Onyeama, J., having rejected the 
dogma of one domiciliary law for all purposes and adopted a two- 
dimensional concept of domicile in Nwokedi v. Nwokedi ^  by 
holding that "there is only one domicile in this country for 
matrimonial causes and that is the Nigerian domicile", later re­
lented in three subsequent decisions ^  and maintained an empha­
tic view on regional domicile for purposes of jurisdiction in 
matrimonial causes as well as for other matters.^ He seems to 
have been overawed by the reasoning of Hurley, C.J., in Okonkwo's 
case. Hence in Uchendu v. Uchendu, ^  he observed that the "view
51. See note 46 supra.
52. (1958) L.L.R.94.
55. Adeyemi v. Adeyemi (1962) L.L.R.7O; Uchendu v. Uchendu (1962) 
L.L.R.101; fero v."Ero, Unreported, cited from Kasunmu and 
Salacuse, op.cit., p.115.
54. See, especially, Adeyemi v. Adeyemi (1962) L.L.R. 70 at p.71.
55. (1962) L.L.R.101.
appears to prevail that domicile for purposes of matrimonial 
causes in this country must be proved to he in the region in 
which the High Court called upon to grant relief has jurisdiction" 
and cited Okonkwo's case in support.
The High Courts of the three Eastern Nigerian states 
had had no opportunity of making their views felt on the possi­
bility of having a two-dimensional concept of domicile within 
the federation. This is, presumably, because they are territo­
ries more of emigration rather than of immigration. Even before 
the last civil war (6th July, 1967 to January 15, 1970) had a 
chequered effect on their legal development, the question of 
domicile as a criterion for jurisdiction in matrimonial causes 
arose only in cases where the parties are indigenes of Eastern 
Nigeria. It is not surprising, therefore, to,observe ffom the 
few reported cases emanating from those legal units, that the 
High Courts assumed jurisdiction in matrimonial causes on the 
basis of the parties domicile in the forum. ^
In a nutshell, the existing views as to the area of 
domicile in the federation of Nigeria are (1) that, on the 
basis that there exists a uniform law on all matters in which 
domicile is relevant throughout the federation, there is one 
common Nigerian domicile for all purposes. (2) That a two- 
dimensional concept of domicile i.e. a common Nigerian domicile 
for purpose of jurisdiction in matrimonial causes and a state 
domicile for all other purposes, had been brought about by the 
Federal Acts creating uniform law on marriage and divorce.
(5) That the historic common law doctrine of a single domiciliary 
status precludes the operation of a two-dimensional concept of 
domicile in Nigeria. Despite the uniformity of law on monogamous
56. See e.g. Olugele v. Olugele (1961), V E.N.L.R. 35 p. 56,
Uzo v. Uzo Iunreported) High Court of Eastern Nigeria de­
cision NoT E/4D/65.
marriages and matrimonial causes relating to them, the domicile 
of a person for all purposes should still he fixed in a state 
of the Nigerian Federation.
The first view has ^een dealt with ahove and shown to 
have "been based on a misinterpretation of the Marriage Act whtolse 
provision in relation to succession is only applicable to the 
Lagos State. Moreover, it failed to appreciate the limits of the 
federal government in matters of personal status and family re­
lations. On these bases, it is submitted that the view is 
faulty and misleading. It will not be pursued further.
The line of reasoning supporting the second view i.e. 
Uniformity of Federal laws on marriage and divorce as giving rise 
to a common Nigerian domicile as basis of Jurisdiction in matri­
monial causes as opposed to state domicile for other matters
of personal law, is not without precedent in the common law world.
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For example, in Australia, the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959 
which came into effect on February,c 1, 1961 made a radical 
alteration to the unitary concept of domicile within the Austra­
lian Federation. The Act, having unified the grounds for 
granting decrees in divorce and.,other matrimonial causes through­
out the country, stipulates at section 23 (4-) and (5) that do­
micile of a person "in Australia" shall be the basis of the 
courts Jurisdiction in proceedings for dissolution of marriage 
and, additionally, for nullity of void marriage, or for a decree 
of Judicial separation, restitution of conjugal!rights or 
Jactitation of marriage. In this respect, it must be pointed 
out that Messrs Kasunmu and Salacuse^are in error in stating
57* As amended by the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965.
58. Nigeria Family Law, p.117. Although it must be conceded^ that 
these authors might not have been able to read the full text 
of the Australian Act, yet Cowen and Da Costa*s Article "The 
Unity of Domicile" in 78 L.Q.R. which they cited contained^ 
in extenso, s . 23 of the Act which established an Australian 
domicile for matrimonial causes.
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that the Act ”did not expressly provide for an Australian do­
micile (as opposed to state domicile) in divorce and matrimo­
nial causes’*. The effect of this Act as interpreted by Barry,
J., in the Victorian case of Lloyd v. Lloyd ^9 iS that a person 
domiciled in an Australian state according to the common law 
rules, could institute divorce proceedings in any other state 
even though he retained his state domicile for other purposes.
This Australian expedient has now been introduced, 
with slight modification, into the Canadian system of private 
international law. The Dominion Parliament in 1968 produced a 
uniform Divorce Act,^ which came into force throughout the. 
Canadian Provinces on July 2, 1968. Section 5 of the Act pro-, 
vides that any Provincial Court (which is defined as including 
the courts of the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories) 
has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for divorce and to grant 
relief in respect thereof if,
”(a) The petition is presented by a person domiciled 
in Canada; and
(b) either the petitioner or the respondent has been 
ordinarily resident in that province for a period 
of at least one year immediately preceding the 
presentation of the petition and has actually 
resided in that province for at least ten months 
of that period.” ^
Section 6 - of the Act provides that for the purpose of establish­
ing the jurisdiction of a court to grant a decree of divorce, 
the domicile of a married woman shall be determined as if she 
were unmarried and, if she is a minor, as if she had attained 
her majority.
The above provision represents a marked departure from 
the provision in the Draft Bill submitted to the Dominion
59. [1962] V.R.70; [1961] 2 F.L.R. 349.
60. 16 Eliz. II, Cap.24.'
61. See also, in South Africa, Matrimonial Causes Jurisdiction 
Act,^No.22 of 1939; s.l of which made domicile of a person 
within the Republic of South Africa the ubasis of the courts* 
jurisdiction m  matrimonial causes.
fc.
Parliament by the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of 
Commons on Divorce.^  Section 9 of the Draft Bill, which was 
ultimately passed in an altered form as section 5 of the Act 
quoted above, provides as follows:
«9—  (i) A husband or wife domiciled in Canada may
institute proceedings praying for the dis­
solution or annulment of the marriage, and 
for ancillary relief, in any province with 
a court having jurisdiction to provide such 
relief, if the petitioner or the respondent 
has resided continuously in that province 
for a period of at least one year immediately 
preceding the presentation of the petition.
(2) For the purpose of this section,
(a) a husband has Canadian domicile if he
is domiciled, in accordance with the 
existing rules of private international 
law, in any province of Canada; and
(b) a wife has Canadian domicile if she would, 
if unmarried b§ domiciled, in accordance 
with the existing rules of private inter­
national law, in any province of Canada".
A comparison of the above two provisions reveals that instead of 
a Provincial domicile ripening into a Canadian domicile, as
proposed in the Draft Bill, the now accepted basis for jurisdic­
tion in matrimonial causes in Canada is domicile of either party 
in Canada as a whole coupled with an attachment with a Canadian 
province by actual residence there for a period of at least ten 
months. For example, a husband and wife renouncing their domicile 
of origin or of choice in emigrating from a foreign country to 
Canada need not be concerned as to the particular province in 
Canada in which they intend to settle. Provided they have a 
present intention to reside in Canada permanently, and so long 
they establish the required period of residence in a particular 
province, the courts of the province will have jurisdiction under 
the Act to dissolve their marriage, even though for other purposes 
their domicile will be fixed in the foreign country from whence 
they came•
62. Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House 
of Commons on DIVORCE, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1967, p.159.
We have observed that the solution adopted by Austra­
lia, Canada and South Africa has the support of juristic opinion 
in the common law world. They consider the inflexible doctrine 
of unitary domicil as tending to become a social anachronism,
particularly in a federation. A few years before the Australian
63innovation, Professor Graveson had suggested < that domicile, 
especially in question of divorce jurisdiction, may be located 
to accord with practical necessities of constitutional division 
of powers in a Federation. His doubt, consistently maintained, 
as to the adequacy of the unitary concept of domicile in a fe­
deration has recently been re-stated in greater detail as fol­
lows:
“domicile is traditionally based on a single 
territorial system of law, yet the citizen of 
a federation is subject to two legal systems, 
state and federal, in both of which domicile 
may be relevant. Surely this common situation 
calls for a new and two-dimensional concept of 
domicile, so that a citizen may have federal or 
national domicile as a basis for application of 
the law of the federation to which he belongs 
and a state or provincial domicile as a basis 
for applying the law of that legal unit of the 
federation in which he habitually lives. What 
matters of personal law and jurisdiction should 
be allocated to the respective spheres of federal 
and state law would be a question of a constitu­
tional and policy nature for each federation to 
resolve in its own way. N
The adoption of this two-dimensional concept of domicil 
An parts of the common law world has necessitated a fresh con­
sideration of the principles that should determine the applicabi­
lity of this doctrine in a federation. First, it is beyond doubt 
that a deliberate creation of uniform laws by a federal legisla­
ture on matters within its legislative competence coupled with 
the employment of the term “domiciled in the Federation" or
63. 70 L.Q.R. (1954) at pp.499-500.
64. See e.g. “Law of Domicile in the Twentieth Century" in 
Marshall: The Jubilee Lectures (19&0) at p.161; Graveson:
The Conflict of Laws (Ath ed.) p.75.
words to similar effect, as a criterion for jurisdiction or
nhoice of law, for those matters would result, as in Australia and
65Canada, in a two-dimensional concept. ^ This is also the view 
of Valter Poliak, Q.C., who, writing exclusively for South 
Africa, states ^  jfhat there is a "Union domicile" at least for 
purposes of some South African Acts in which the term "domiciled 
in the Union" was used.
Secondly, it has been suggested by Dr. Morris that 
a National domicile might exist for the purpose of an Act of a 
common legislature which did not employ the expression "domiciled 
in the Federation" but which created uniformity of law on a parti­
cular subject throughout the federation. But he goes on to ex­
plain that the two-dimensional concept of domicile will probably 
not apply simply as a result of a coincidence of laws of the le­
gal components of a federation even though such coincidence was
67brought about by separate Acts of a common legislature. 1
It will now be necessary to examine the provisions 
of the Nigerian Federal legislation on divorce and other matri­
monial causes in the light of the above propositions, and in 
comparison with the Australian and the Canadian Acts, so as to 
discover whether or not a two-dimensional concept of domicile, 
as urged in few decisions of the Nigerian courts, can be justi­
fied. The first Federal enactment on this matter, the High Court 
of Lagos Act, which came into effect on Jlst December, 1955 a^ -d
O
applies exclusively to the Lagos State,, provides that
"The jurisdiction of the High Court in divorce
and matrimonial causes and proceedings may ....
subject to rules of court, be exercised in conformity
65. Dicey and Morris: The Conflict of Laws ©bh ed. ) p.85.
66. in 50 S.A.L.J. p.457 et seq.
67. Dicey and Morris, op.cit.
68. As to its applicability to the whole of the newly constituted 
Lagos State, which now includes part of the former Western 
Region of Nigeria, See Lagos State (Applicable Law) Edict,
No.2 of 1968.
with the law and practice for the time 
being in force in England." ^
The second, the State Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act of 1958
70became operative on 25th September of the same year.r It,:. .,
too, provides that
"The Jurisdiction of the High Court of a State ^  
in relation to marriages, and the annulment and 
dissolution of marriages, and in relation to Mother 
matrimonial causes, shall, subject to the pro­
vision of any laws of a State 7^ so far as practice 
and procedure are concerned, be exercised, by the 
court 71 in conformity with the law and practice 
for the time being in force in England." ^
The effect of these provisions is that, by a process 
of legislation by reference, the Nigerian Federal Parliament, 
like those of Australia and Canada, created uniformity of sub­
stantive law as regards matrimonial causes throughout the 
Nigerian states even though it recognised that each of them may 
have different Rules of Practice pertaining to divorce and other 
matrimonial causes. It is on this basis that the Nigerian cases 
discussed above have raised the question, logically perhaps, 
whether on the analogy of the Australian situation, this unifor­
mity of substantive law does not imply that the Federal Parliament
69. Lagos High Court Act, s. 16. See the Postscript fef the 
present position of the law.
70. The apparent difference in the date of commencement of these 
two Federal Acts is due to the fact that in the 195^ Consti­
tution, Marriage and divorce af all types were within the 
residuary list of the Regional legislatures. But in 1957 > 
Monogamous Marriage and matrimonial causes relating thereto 
were taken off the residuary list of the Regional legislatures 
and placed on the exclusive list of the Federal Parliament.
And, as there are no federal courts of first instance in the 
country, jurisdiction in respect of matrimonial causes was 
conferred on Regional Courts by the State Courts (Federal 
Jurisdiction) Act, 1958, which, as we have seen, also provided 
for the application of the English law on this subject. The 
identical Regional provisions on monogamous marriage and 
matrimonial causes ( See s.32 of the Northern Region of Nigeric 
High Court Law, 1955* s.22 of the Western Region of Nigeria 
High Court Law, 1955 and s.16 of the Eastern Region of Nigeria 
High Court Law, 1955) were repealed. But since Lagos was then 
a Federal Territory and all its laws enacted by the Federal le­
gislature, the High Court of Lagos Act was preserved. The schp€ 
of the State Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act was, therefore, 
restricted to the former Regions.
71. Emphasis supplied. The original text reads "the High /cont....
100.
had legislated on the hasis that there should he a common 
Nigerian domicile for the exercise of jurisdiction in divorce 
and other matrimonial causes* But unlike the Australian, the 
Canadian and'.the South African Acts, none of these Nigerian 
provisions contains the slightest hint that the domicile of a 
person in Nigeria generally should he the hasis of the High 
Courts' jurisdiction in divorce and other matrimonial causes*
While it is unnecessary to express an opinion on the validity 
of Dr. Morris' second test also, according to this view, the 
more coincidence of matrimonial causes law throughout the Nigerian 
Federation, established hy two separate Acts of the Federal . 
Parliament, will not equate the hasis of jurisdiction on this 
subject with that of Australia.
It cannot he too strongly emphasised that the High Court 
of Lagos Act applies exclusively to the Lagos State. Further­
more, it is clear from the language of the State Courts (Federal 
Jurisdiction) Act, that each of the other state courts is impelled 
to exercise its jurisdiction in divorce and other matrimonial 
causes separately and indpendently of the other. Hence the use 
of the phrase "The jurisdiction of the High Court of a State" 
and not "The jurisdiction of the High Courts of Nigeria". Yet 
the judgment of Fatayi-Williams, J., in Odiase's case proceeded 
on the baas that Parliament had not only provided for the 
application of a uniform substantive law on matrimonial causes 
in Nigeria hut also created, hy implication, "unity of
F/notes 71 & 72 cont. from previous page.
Court of a Region" hjit by s.(l (h) of the States Creation 
(Transitional Provisions) (Amendment) Decree, 1957* re­
ference to a "Region" in any enactment must he construed 
as reference to a "State".
72. State Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act, 1958* s.4.
See the Postscript for the present position of the law.
jurisdiction"^ on this subject. As pointed out by Williams, J*, 
in Arinze v. Arinze, ^  the view of Barry, J., in the Australian
hcl
case of Lloyd v. Lloyd'y seemed to have influenced Fatayi-
Williams, J., in the Odiase*s decision. Thus in Lloyd’s case,
Barry, J•, had said that
"The Parliament of thed Commonwealth of 
Australia has legislated either on the basis 
that, independent of the Act, there is now 
an Australian domicile, or that, for the pur­
poses of the law it has made relating to matri­
monial causes, there is now an Australian do­
micile by virtue of the Act.” ^
In Odiase's case, Fatayi-Williams observed:
”It is, I think;, difficult to escape the con­
clusion that in applying, albeit by implica­
tion, the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 tan
English statute] .... to the whole Federation,
Parliament has legislated on the basis that, 
ind.epen.dent of the Act» there is a Nigerian 
domicile, or that, for the purposes or that 
Act, Li.e. for purpose of jurisdiction in 
matrimonial causes] there is now a Nigerian do­
micile. ” ^
There is no doubt that the language of Barry, J., was 
directed to the interpretation of an Act :in which reference to 
’’Australian domicile” is made and which unified the jurisdiction 
of the Australian state courts for proceedings in matrimonial 
causes. Indeed, it is provided in section 27 of the Australian
Matrimonial Causes Act that all courts having jurisdiction under
the Act should act severally in aid of and be auxiliary to each
other in all matters under the Act. The intention of the
73. Odiase v. Odiase {1965] N.M.L.R.196 at p.198.
74. {jL966] E.M.L.E. 155.
75. C1962] V.E.70.
76. Ibid at p.71.
77- Emphasis supplied. Odiaae v.. Odiase {1965] N.M.L.R. 196 
at p.199.
.Nigerian Federal Parliament appears different. It unified the
law on matrimonial causes but leaves.intact the state courts to
exercise a separate jurisdiction in matrimonial causes. Support
for this contention is afforded by section 101 of the Sherrifs
and Civil Process Act.*'7® The section sets out certain specified
situations where the court of a state may proceed in a suit
against a defaulting defendant who had been served inter-state
according to the provisions of the Act. One of these is that' if
the court of a state in which a writ of summons was issued is
satisfied nin a matrimonial cause, that the domicile of the person
against whom that relief is sought is within that State f' or
80part of the Federation11, then the court, on the application 
of the plaintiff, may proceed with the suit in the absence of 
the defendant. It is surprising that no reference appears to 
have been made to this important section in any of the contro­
versial discussions about the area of domicile in Nigeria. It, 
however, dismisses, it is submitted, the view that the Federal 
Parliament had impliedly recognised that there is a common Ni­
gerian domicile for purposes of jurisdiction in matrimonial causes.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that whatever the. merits
0-1
of a two-dimensional concept of domicile in a federation the 
state of existing law in Nigeria does not permit the adoption 
of this view by the courts. Domicile for all purposes should be 
fixed within a State. Any decision adopting the two-dimensional 
concept of domicile will result in an unnecessary straining of 
words to achieve an objective which the courts consider to be
78. Cap. 189, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1958 ed.). A 
federal Act s.101 of which applies throughout the Federation.
79. See note 71 supra. Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, s.l01(l)(f)
80. Emphasis supplied.^
81. See Chapter 4- for domicile as basis of jurisdiction in 
matrimonial causes.
ideal for Nigeria. But in so far as this interpretation is 
not compatible with the express language of the Federal Act on 
matrimonial causes jurisdiction and so long as it is contrary 
to the intention of the Federal Parliament as clearly shown in 
the relevant provision of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, 
it must be rejected as a fumbling effort resulting in a judicial 
error. By adopting this view, the judges will not only be 
thwarting the clear intention of the Federal Parliament but also
arrogating to themselves a role greater than that allocated to
them under the constitution, i.e. that of replacing Acts of 
Parliament with judicial decrees of their own. If a common 
Nigerian domicile as basis of jurisdiction for matrimonial causes 
is desirable in Nigeria, only the Federal Parliament can bring
o p
it about. It is our opinion that it has not done this.
C. REFORM OF THE CONCEPT OF DOMICILE IN NIGERIA.
The reform of the law of domicile in Nigeria should 
be viewed with regard to the following factors. First, Nigeria 
is historically comprised of several tribal municipalities or 
"pseudo-nations” which, as a result of the British influence, 
were later incorporated into a national entity. Political uni­
fication apart, a notable feature of th|s historical background 
is that the citizens of Nigeria still cling tenaciously to,the 
idea of "traditional" or "ancestral home" which is greatly 
accentuated by the system of extended family prevailing within 
the country. This ancestral hornet: is still determined by ethnic
82. See Postscript for the present position as regards the 
area of domicile for purposes of jurisdiction in matri­
monial causes in relation to monogamous marriages.
criteria. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the
pattern of life in Nigeria, at present, appears more parochial
fchfpl in England in the second half of the 19th Century - the
era of the evolution of the concept of domicile - when, in the
words of Professor Cheshire, "England was a nation of tenter-
prising pioneers, most of whom regarded their ultimate return
83home as a foregone conclusion.’1 ^ Secondly, Nigeria, in legal 
terminology, is also a federation of many states in each of which, 
as has been shown above, domicile for all purposes can be fixed. 
Thirdly, there is considerable mobility of persons inter-state 
and internationally. This multifarious and active intercourse 
between persons which is dictated by economic necessity of 
finding new hopes in distant places, is greatly encouraged at 
the inter-state level by the federal constitution which guaranteed 
unrestricted movement to persons within the federation.
It has been observed in Chapter I that the effect of 
federalism (or more appropriately, regionalism) in Nigeria is 
that the Nigerian private international law, like other federa­
tions, becomes a branch of law for the regulation of inter-state 
and international conflicts. The problem engaging the attention 
of a student of the Nigerian private international law is how 
the concept of domicile evolved solely with reference to the 
conditions of a unitary country, i.e. England, should be adapted 
for employment not only for international transactions but also 
for inter-state purposes in view of the above sociological 
factors.
83. Cheshire: Private International Law (7th ed.) p.164.
84. Federal Republican Constitution of Nigeria, 1963, s.27*
1. MERITS AND DEMERITS OF DOMICILE IN NIGERIAN LAW
While not being dogmatic as to the relative advantages 
of domicile (as opposed e.g. to Nationality) as the pre-requisite 
for the determination of the personal law, where continuity of 
application of the same law is important, domicile seems the 
more appropriate territorial basis of personal law in Nigeria 
where the same nationality embraces many systems of law* Further­
more, the principle of domicile appears to afford an easy 
means of transition from a territorial to a non-territorial basis 
of personal law in so far as religion as well as membership of 
an ethnic community are other criteria for determining the per­
sonal law of a person on a non-territorial basis. Perhaps some 
illustrations will make the last statement more explicit* A 
Ceylonese who acquires a domicile of choice in the Kano State 
will firstly be subject to the general territorial law of the 
State. If, however, he subsequently accepts the Moslem reli­
gion he should in principle be able to have the validity of his 
marriage contracted under the Moslem law determined by that law* 
Similarly, on the inter-state level, a Western Nigeria domicilia­
ry who acquires a domicile of choice in the Kwara state would
be amenable to the customary law of that state if he later adopts
8Sthe mode of life of the autochthonous community there. ^ In 
addition, the principle of .domicile as a criterion for the terri­
torial ascertainment of personal law has the positive virtue of
certainty as it is settled law that a person cannot be without 
86domicile, whereas the adoption of nationality as the basis of
85. In Yesufu Kosoko v. Shaba Nakoji ,1959} -l.ft|.N.L.R.15, the fact 
of the plaintiff's ’’permanent residence” In the former Northeri 
Region of Nigeria and his acceptance of„the Muslim faith were 
held to entitle the Northern Nigerian native court to assume 
jurisdiction and apply the loca.1 customary law to him.
86. Udny v. Udny (1869), L.R. 1 Sc. & D. 441; Bell v. Kennedy
UB68), nso. & d. 307.
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personal law in other countries®*'7 has led to difficulties in 
cases of persons without nationality or dual nationalities.
In Nigeria, however, these ddvantages of domicile as 
the criterion of determining matters of personal law and for 
transition from a territorial to a non-territorial basis of 
personal law are bogged down in the morass of excessively ri­
gid rules devised for the change of domicile and due to the te­
nacity of the domicile of origin. The law as regards the ascer­
tainment of a person's domicile of origin and that of a dependent 
person presents little or no difficulty even if the unrealistic 
attitude of operating it often results in the actual connection 
between a person and his place of domicile becoming somewhat
Q Q
tenous. It is settled law that everybody obtains at birth a
89domicile o:f origin ' and that the domicile of a dependent person,
90except in few obscure cases,' follows, as a general rule, that 
on whom he is dependent and continues until he has capacity to 
change it. Any proposals for reform should, therefore, be 
directed towards the domicile of choice which is the practical 
area for its operation. Attention will be directed in this res­
pect to the definition of domicile which presupposes the severance 
of all ties connecting a person with a previous domicile of origin
8^. For the list of countries operating the principle of nationali­
ty as the basis of personal law, see Rabel: The Conflict of 
Laws: A Comparative Study, Vol.l, pp.121-123. This list must
now be read as excluding Israel which has adopted domicile 
as the basis of personal law. See below.
88. See Re O'Keefe [194-0] Ch.124.
89* See Dicey & Norris: Conflict of Laws (8th ed.)p.84 and the
authorities therein cited.
90. Relating to the domicile of lunatics, adopted children and 
children legitimated by subsequent marriage of the parents 
and by acknowledgment. Also the domicile of children under 
custody.
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or of choice before he can acquire a new domicile. This will 
be done with a view to showing that the facts of life and the 
federal structure of government in Nigeria do not permit of 
this rigid view, at least, for inter-state conflicts.
2. DEFINITIONS OF DOMICILE
The starting point in the definition of domicile under
91Nigerian law is Whicker v. Hume. In that case, Lord Cranworth
defined domicile as "home, the permanent home; and if you do not
understand your personal home, I am afraid that no illustration
drawn from foreign writers or foreign language will very much
help you to it". A year later the definition was aplified by
92Kindersley, V.C., in Lord v. Colvin J where he remarked that:
"That place is properly the domicile of a person 
in which he has voluntarily fixed the habitation 
of himself and his family, not for a mere special 
temporary purpose, but with a present intention 
of making it his permanent home, unless and until 
something (which is unexpected or the happening of 
which is uncertain) shall occur to induce him to 
adopt some other permanent home."
Later decisions, while repeating that a permanent home consti­
tutes domicile, have introduced a further element of rigidity 
into the definition. Thus in Moorhouse v. Lord, ^  Lord Chemsfo^ct 
having expressed dissatisfaction with the above definition of 
Kindersley, V.C., proposed a new solution by saying:
"Now, ... [the] definition.... of the.Vice 
Chancellor appear[s] to me to be liable to 
exception, in omitting one important element, 
namely, a fixed intention of abandoning one 
domicile and permanently adopting another. The 
present intention of making a place a person's
91. (1858) 7 H.L.C. 124 at 160.
92. (1859) 4 Drew. 566.
95. (1865) 10 H.L.C. 272 at 286.
94. It must be pointed out that Professor Cheshire seems to be
clearly wrong in attributing this definition to Lord Cranworth. 
See Cheshire: Private International Law (7th ed.) p.145.
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permanent home can exist only where he has 
no other idea than to continue there, without 
looking forward to any event, certain or un­
certain, which might induce him to change his 
residence. If he has in his contemplation some 
event upon the happening of which his residence 
will cease, it is not correct to call this even 
a present intention of making it a permanent 
home. It is rather a present intention of making 
it a temporary home, though for a period indefinite 
and contingent.”
Mccrhouse v. Lord and other cases accordingly established the two 
requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice, i.e. 
residence in a particular place coupled with an intention to 
remain there permanently, both of which must coincide before 
a domicile of choice can be acquired.
These two elements were emphasised for the Nigerian 
law by Coker, J., in ttdom v. Udom?^ where he remarked that before 
it could be established that a change of domicile has been 
effected,
•’there must be proof of change of residence 
animo et facto. The subject must not only 
change his residence to that of the new do­
micile, but also must have settled or re­
sided in the new territory cum animo manendi.
The residence in the new territory must be 
with the intention of remaining there per­
manent ly."
In other words, a domicile once attributed or acquired can be
lost not simply by residence in another territory for a given
period but cum animo non revertendi. In the case of domicile of
origin, the evidence required to prove such intention is more
overwhelming in view of the "strongest possible presumption" in
support of its retention.Indeed, its almost immutable nature,
i.e. that "its character is m&re enduring, its hold stronger and
less easily shaken off", as indicated by Lord MacNaghten in
95* (1962) L.L.R. 112 at p.117; Fonseca v. Passman [1958] W.N.L.R. 
at p.42.
96. Munro v. Munro (1840) 7 Cl. & Pin. 842 at 891.
97Winans v. A.G., ■ ' has been echoed for inter-state conflicts 
98m  Nigeria. .
Thus, according to these statements, a Tiv, having
a domicile of origin in the Benue-Plateau State, who intends to
reside in the Lagos State for a fixed period, lacks the animus
99manendi, however long the period of residence may be. y - Similar
ly, a Mid-Western State domiciliary who intends to stay in the
North-Western State for an indefinite time but intends to leave
the state some day will not be domiciled in the North-Western
state.^ An Italian engineering contractor, whose domicile of
origin is in Italy and who intends to work in Western Nigeria
until the age of 60 and then settle down permanently in Italy
is still domiciled in Italy. If the Tiv dies in the Lagos
state after a period of 25 years* residence in that state, the
succession to his movable property must be governed by the Benue
Plateau law and, much more, the Xagos state cannot levy an
estate duty on his estate. If after a period of residence of
over 16 years in the North-Western state, the person from the
Mid-Western state wants to divorce his wife, he must incur the
trouble and expense of a long journey to the Mid-Western state,
and possibly the risk of losing his employment, before he can
2file a divorce petition.
97. [1904] A.C. 287 at p.290.
98. See Adeyemi v. Adeyemi (1962) L.L.R. 70 and Ildom v. Udom 
(1962) L.k.R. 112; Tames v. James, Unreported, High Court 
of Mid-Western Nigeria, Suit itfo. W/32/63 of 25/4/64.
99. A.-G. v. Rowe (1862) 1 H. & C. 31.
1. Jopp v. Wood (1865) 4 De. G. & J. & S. 616.
2. These are substantially the facts in Machi v. Machi (I960) 
L.L.R. 103.
3. CONCEPT OF DOMICILE IN NIGERIA CONTRASTED WITH THOSE OF
CONTINENTAL AND OTHER COUNTRIES.
The Nigerian conception of domicile, as well as those
of other countries taking their roots in the English law, is to
be distinguished from those of continental countries, the United
States of America and recently, Israel* Having had a humble
beginning in what, at its earliest inception, was considered as
a Homan law conception, the common law concept of domicile had
acquired a unique characteristic which makes it more enduring
4than nationality* By way of comparison,, the notion of domicile
was defined by the Justinian's lawyers as the "place where a
man has established his household and the centre of his business
activities which he does not leave unless something calls him
away, being absent from which he is said to be travelling and
5 ’returning to which he is said to have ceased to travel".
Modern laws derived from the Roman law still lay stress on a
person’s centre of affairs or habitual residence, with little
or no emphasis being placed on his intention, as a criterion for
the acquisition of a new domicile. For example, in French law,
domicile is no more than the place of "principal establishment"^
of a person, i.e. primarily "as an ordinary residence intended
7to be stable but not necessarily perpetual"• In Germany, it 
is synonymous with the place of "permanent residence". Similarly,
5. See Nyghs "The reception of Domicil into English Private 
International Law" in Tasmania University Law Review, Vol.I,
57555:-------------
4. Rabel: The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study, Vol*I,
p.118; Cheshire: Private international Law,(7th ed.) p.165*
Cf. Graveson, "Reform of the Law of domicile", 70 L.Q.Rev.
492 at p.497. ' : .
5. C.10 59.7
6. S. 102 of the Code Civil.
7* Donald Von Landauer: "Matrimonial Causes in French Law" in
13, I.C.L.Q. (1964) p.81-------------- :------ ”----------
domicile in the Spanish law is defined as the "permanent place 
of residence", and the Portuguese law equates it with "ordinary 
place of residence".
Also, most international conventions employing the con­
cept of domicile defines it less rigidly than the common law con­
cept. For example, Article 5 of the Montevideo Convention of 
1940 which was signed by Argentine, Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, 
Peru and Uruguay provides that in so ,far international juridical 
questions are concerned, domicile should be determined by the 
following circumstances:
"1. Hg&itual residence in a given place, coupled with
the intention to remain there;
2. In the absence of such a determining factor, the 
habitual residence in a single place of the family 
group composed of the spouse and the minor or 
incompetent children; or that of the spouse
with whom the said person lives; or, in the absence 
of the spouse, that of the minor or incompetent 
children with whom the person lives;
3. The location of his principal place of business;
4. In the absence of all of these circumstances, 
mere residence, which shall be regarded as consti­
tuting domicile. " g
Similarly, Article 3 of the 1951 Hague Convention to Regulate 
Conflicts Between the Law of the Nationality and the Law of the 
Domicile, defines domicile for the purpose of the Convention as 
"the place where the person habitually resides unless the domicile 
of such person depends on the domicile of another person or on 
the seat of some public authority" • ^
If it must be pointed out that the principle of domicile 
plays only a secondary role in the determination of the personal 
law^  of the propositus in some countries and that most matters of
8. Translation by J. Irrizarry y Puente and G.L. Williams in 37» 
Am. J. Int. Law, No.3 of July, 1943 at pp.142-143.
9. See Appendix B, 1st Report of the Lord Chancellor's Private 
International Law Committee, Cmd. 9068 at p.l6. '
personal law are determined by the law of nationality, the 
American law which, like those of other common law countries, 
rely on the principle of domicile as the basis of all matters 
of personal law defines it as the "place, usually a person’s 
home, to which the rules of Conflict of Laws sometimes accord 
determinative significance because of the person's identifica­
tion with that place”, ^  The Restatement then proceeds to 
describe what it means by home as "the place where a person 
dwells and which is the centre of his domestic, social and 
civil life"."^ As explained by the editor of the Restatement, 
a mental attitude, the animus manendi or the animus non revertendi 
plays an important role in the determination of the home of a 
person but is not necessarily a separate and subjective factor 
in addition to the factual pre-requisite of residence. According
to the explanation, mental attitude towards the place where the
12person dwells "is not always conclusive".
More recently, the traditional common law concept of 
domicile "with its inflexible and technical rules and exceptions 
which have caused unnecessary difficulties" ^ has been discarded 
in the law of Israel, In the Israeli Draft Family Code of 1955* 
an attempt was made to solve the problem of domicile by a re­
definition of the concept so as to eliminate the element of
intention - the animus semper manendi, as Wolff has appropriately 
14
termed it - as an additional factor for the ascertainment of 
person's domicile of choice. We shall have cause to return to 
the provisions of the Israeli Draft Family Code in due course,
10. Para.11 (1), Restatement Second on the Conflict of Laws (Pro- 
posed Official Draft) £art 1, 1967» P«53«
11. Ibid., Para. 12, p#64.
12. Ibid., at p.67•
13* Avner Shaki: "Domicile in Israel Private International Law"in
Studies in Israel Legislative Problems Ced. by Tedeschi and 
Yadin), 196^, p .188.
14. Martin Wolff; Private International Law, (2nd ed.) 1950, p*lll
The above short^ survey must have shown the existence
of a large diversity between the various concepts of domicile in
15the legal systems of the world ^ and emphasised the point that
each system of law adopts the concept for the particular policy
16the country wants to project. ' Thus, while the continental, 
American and Israel laws and some international conventions 
speak of the place of principal establishment, permanent place 
of residence, or the fact of a person’s centre of social or do­
mestic life, the emphasis in the common law world is on the per­
manent home* The situation is further confounded by its insistence 
on an intention to remain in a particular territory permanently*
The point which arises for consideration is whether the common 
law definition of domicile has any relevance to the social habits 
of a contemporary Nigerian Society.
4. PERMANENT HOME SYNONYMOUS WITH ANCESTRAL HOME IN NIGERIA*
It may be recalled that the concept of domicile, includ­
ing its constituent elements, is a necessary part of the common 
law of England received into the Nigerian law. Therefore, the 
idea of a family establishing a permanent home, as used in the 
above English definitions was, and still is, employed solely 
with reference to the social conditions of a fully developed
15« See Jacobs: The Law of Domicile (1887), pp*93-132 for the
various definitions of domicile collected from Codes, legal 
literature and judicial decisions of the world. Rabel, op* 
cit*, p.151* n.154, states that the reporter to the 
Institute of International Law, 1931 collected about fifty 
of such definitions from legal literature* See also 
Kennan; A Treatise on Residence and Domicile (1934)*
pp.1-37.
16. In China, a man who marries into the family of his wife 
(i.e. a chui-fu) takes the domicile of the wife; see 
Legal Status of Married Women (U.N. Publication) 
st7soa/35 of 195&.
English environment where the society, as well as legal precepts, 
like others in the Western civilization tends to he individualistic, 
A fundamental assumption underlying the development of the Family 
Law, including the concept of domicile, in these places is that 
a family consists of a man, his wife and minor children. Thus, 
for example, in his hook of Family Law in England, Bromley pre­
faces his subject by saying that "For our purposes we may regard 
the family as a basic social unit which normally consists of 
husband and wife and their children" A  judicial employment 
of this basic social unit as the rubric around which the concept 
of domicile is interwoven is observable from the illustration
-1 o
given by Lord Westbury in Udny v. Udny. Thus, to adapt the 
illustration of the Lord Justice, if an Englishman with an 
English domicile of origin breaks up his establishment in England, 
sells his house and furniture, discharges his servants and takes 
with him "his wife and children" and moves everything to Holland 
in search of another place of abode, and settles there for a 
number of years, then an English court will presumably say that 
he had severed connection with his domicile of origin and settled 
in Holland with the correct intention and consequently acquired
19a domicile of choice in Holland. Similarly, in Lord v. Colvin, ' 
Kindersley, V.C., interpreted the latin word "Larem" or its 
English equivalent "household" as the "united body, consisting 
of a man and his wife and children and domestics living together 
in one abode". It seems clear, therefore, that a person's per­
manent home as used under the common law concept of domicile does 
not connote more than the fixed abode of a man, his wife and minor 
children.
17. Bromley: Family Law, 3rd ed., p.l.
18. (1869) L.R. 1 Sc. & D. 441 at p.459.
19. (1859) 4 Drew 366 at p.373.
But in Nigeria, however, where a broad view is still 
taken of the composition of the family, the concept of domicile 
appears to have taken a twisted turn as the cases discussed below 
will show. The notion of the extended family seems to have 
been allowed to infiltrate into the concept of domicile- through 
the element of intention necessary to establish a person*s domi­
cile. But first, to explain what is meant by the extended family; 
most Nigerian statutes dealing with the problem of the family 
usually make a distinction between an "extended” and "elementary" 
family. Even where such distinction is made, the composition of 
the elementary or immediate family is still wider than that in 
the English or the European concept. For example, an "immediate
family" is defined in section 2 of the Eastern Nigeria Fatal
20Accidents Law of 1936 as consisting of "wife or wives, husband,
father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, stepfather, stepmother,
child, grandchild, stepchild, brother, sister, half-brother,
half-sister, nephew and niece". The Federal Workmen*s Compensa- 
21tion Act defines by implication a m  elementary or immediate
family, in a paternal system, as consisting of his "mother, father,
wife, son, daughter, brother, sister; father's father, and
father's brother". In a maternal system, it includes his "mother,
father, wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, mother's mother,
mother's brother, mother's sister, sister's son, sister's daughter,
22mother's sisterJsmefcfceaM toother's sister's daughter". On the 
other hand, according to recent surveys into the Nigerian family 
law, an extended family may connote several hundreds of persons
23
tracing their descent from a common acnestor through many generation
20. Cap. 52, Laws of Eastern Nigeria (1963 ed.).
21. Cap, 222, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, (1938 ed.) First 
Schedule..
22. Ibid.
23* See Obi, Modern Family Law in Southern Nigeria, pp.8-10; Lloyd, 
Yoruba Land Law, p.77.
To return then, to Lord Wesbury's illustration, it 
will he readily apparent that the facts of the hypothetical case 
do not necessarily presuppose that an Iho or Yoruba who had 
"settled" in a distant place has severed all connections with 
his place of birth, which is almost invariably his domicile of 
ohigin, so as to give rise to the inference that he did so with 
the intention of not returning and lead to the acquisition of 
a domicile of choice in such a place. He still has other members 
of his elementary and extended family in his ancestral home.
He is perhaps still a member of the "family council" in the tra­
ditional home. Undoubtedly, it is in this place that he has 
an indivisible interest in the "family property", which, unless 
he acts in concert with other members of the family, he cannot 
alienate. This interest in family property he seldom abandons, 
even if he can. It seems clear, therefore, that while an English­
man, as a result of the individualistic nature of members of the 
English society, may abandon his permanent home and establish 
another permanent home,e.g. in Australia or Canada cum animo non
manendi, or as Megarry, J., would like to put it "withoutthe
24intention of returning", these peculiar aspects of certain con­
cepts of customary law and the communal nature of the Nigerian 
society as a whole intimately link an indigenous Nigerian citi­
zen with his own clan or tribe. These are indirectly introduced 
into the concept of domicile through the element of intention 
which involves an inquiry into all aspects of a man's life.^
As a result, it is extremely difficult for a Nigerian person to 
adduce facts from which a prima facie evidence of his intention 
to stay permanently away from his place of birth could be inferred 
since notwithstanding his manner of life, social position, educa­
tional attainment or the length of time he had had connection
24. Re. Flynn deed. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 103 at p.113.
25. See Drevon v. Drevon (1864) 34 L.J. Ch. 129 at p.133.
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with a foreign place, he has throughout that period, as a result 
of these strong family ties, a homing tendency.
It is our conviction that the difference in social 
attitude accounts for why the strict application of the re­
ceived English conception of domicile has resulted in the fact
that few Nigerians, if any, since the division of the country, 
into separate legal units in 1954-» have been able to acquire a 
domicile of choice for purposes of Judicial Jurisdiction in any 
other Region or state apart from where he or his predecessors 
were horn. We shall now consider some of the Nigerian cases 
involving the ascertainment of domicile in order to show how 
communal orientation has frustrated the acquisition of domicile
of choice away from the ancestral or traditional home.
27In the Lagos case of Uchendu v. Uchendu, ( the husband
and wife were born of parents in Ufuma in Eastern Nigeria where
they had their domicile of origin. The husband instituted 
divorce proceedings against the wife on the ground of adultery.
In his petition, he alleged that both the petition and the res­
pondent were domiciled in Lagos. The issue of Jurisdiction was 
not raised by the respondent who seemed to have acquiesced in 
the allegation that the parties were domiciled in Lagos. It 
is not known from the meagre evidence in the report when the 
parties came to Lagos. It was, however, clear that the parties
were living in Lagos and that the petitioner had established
*
some sort of business there. The Judge, however, found it neces­
sary to consider the issue of Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in 
matters of divorce, he said, cannot be conferred on the court by 
consent of the parties. The petitioner testified that he had 
"formed the intention never to return to his original home",
26. Emphasis supplied.
27. (1962) L.L.R.101.
that he had purchased a plot of land in Lagos on which he intended
to build (this was denied by the respondent), and that he intended
to bring his mother to live with him in Lagos. The judge, as
a matter of fact, found that he still visited his "home-town Ufuma
28
from time to time and has one or both of his parents living there11. 
Onyeama, J., therefore regarded the evidence as inadequate to 
prove an intention to live for an indefinite time in Lagos and 
so establish the acquisition of a domicile of choice there. One 
could have found it difficult to understand why much emphasis 
was attached by both the Judge and the petitioner to the place 
of residence of the parents of an adult person and what he in­
tended to do with them in showing his intention to live permanently 
in a distant place except in a society where the family is not 
composed simply of a man, his wife and minor children and where 
family attachment is strong. On the other hand, if it was meant 
to show that the petition did not leave Eastern Nigeria with the 
intention of not returning, then it only confirms the contention 
that a Nigerian seldom abandons animus non revertendi the place 
where his parents and other relatives are to be found, to settle 
permanently in another place.
20In Adeyemi v. Adeyemi, v a case concerning an undefended
divorce petition presented by the wife-petitioner, it was alleged
that the parties were domiciled in Lagos. But as the parties
were from Ijebu-Ode in Western Nigeria, Gnyeama, J., was again
faced with the question of the jurisdiction of the Lagos High
6burt to dissolve the marriage. He started, as required under
the present law, by trying to ascertain the domicile of origin of
28. Uchendu v. Uchendu (1962) L.L.R;101 at p.102. Emphasis supplied 
It must be noted that Onyeama,J., did not say that the peti­
tioner visited his home-town from time to time because he had 
his parents there. Rather he seemed to have assumed that so 
long as Uchendu had his parents in Eastern Nigeria, he could 
not establish a domicile away from them.
29- (1962) L.L.R.70.
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the husband which he found to be in Western Nigeria. Then he 
proceeded by saying that once the domicile of origin had been 
established the burden is then thrown on the party alleging 
a change to prove that a new domicile had been acquired. This 
in turn necessitated a review of the life history of the husband 
to discover whether or not he had acquired, by the relevant 
time, a domicile of choice by residence in Lagos with the inten­
tion of living there permanently. The evidence of the wife is 
also instructive as to the view that the communally oriented 
Nigerian seldom has the intention of severing all links with his 
ancestral home.
The wife, while stating that the husband had expressed 
the desire to live in Lagos permanently, that he never liked to 
go to his ”home-town", that his parents were dead and that he 
had bought a plot of land in Lagos, nonetheless answered in 
reply to the question put by the learned judge that the ’’family 
home” of the husband was still at Ijebu-Ode in Western Nigeria. 
When it is recalled that the parties (a1 adults, the husband 
being 48 years old) had resided in Lagos for about fourteen years, 
a person unacquainted with the social pattern in Nigeria may be 
justified in wondering why the ’’family home” of the husband should 
still be stated as being in a different jurisdiction. By this, 
as already explained, was meant the place where the husband had 
his origin and still had other members of his extended family, 
i.e. the ancestral home. This peice of evidence had a fatal 
effect on the claim of the wife that both she and the husband 
were domiciled in Lagos. Accordingly, the judge was not impressed 
by the wife*s claim that the husband had formed a settled deter­
mination to make Lagos his permanent home. If ability to acquire 
a domicile of choice depends on such factors like the location 
of person* s ’’family home" it must be regarded as doubtful whether 
a Nigerian person*s domicile or origin can ever be changed under
the present concept. But in point of fact, one would have been 
surprised if the learned judge, aware of the group consciousness 
in Nigeria, regarded the assertion by the wife that they have 
regarded Lagos as their permanent home as more than a desparate 
attempt by an injured wife to establish the parties1 permanent 
home in a place where the stark realities of life in Nigeria 
and the present definition of domicile render almost impossible, 
so as to give the court jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. 
Regardless of the fact that the uncontradicted evidence of the 
wife established a good cause of action, the petition, like 
most others, was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Also in another decision of the Lagos High Court in 
Machi v. Machi^  the point which seemed to weigh most in the mind 
of De Lestang C.J., in deciding that the parties who had been 
resident in Lagos for over a period of sixteen years were not 
domiciled there so as to enable him to assume jurisdiction in 
respect of an undefended divorce petition brought by the wife, 
was that the "evidence shows .... that they-[the parties] origina­
ted from the Eastern Region of Nigeria". Having established 
that the husband initially came to Lagos to find employment, he 
seemed to have dismissed the possibility that the Husband might 
subsequently have formed the intention of residing permanently 
in Lagos. This, in our view, is only explicable on the basis 
that the judge being aware of the pattern of life in the country, 
readily assumed that the parties, who were Ibos, rarely establish 
a permanent home cum animo non revertendi away from the place 
where they originate. Alternatively, the decision might have 
been based on evidence which the judge could not accept to re­
but the presumption of the domicile of origin. However, this 
was not so stated in the judgment. The only reason given by
30. (I960) L.L.R.103.
De Lestang C.J., for finding that the Lagos High Court was not 
the court of domicile of the parties was that they originated 
from Eastern Nigeria, a statement which he repeated twice in 
his judgment. Indeed, the wife, presumably realising the dif­
ficulty of proving an intention to reside permanently in Lagos 
even after the husband's sixteen years' residence there, simply 
averred they were domiciled in Nigeria. De Lestang, C.J., there­
fore dismissed the case even though he found as a matter of 
fact that the husband had deserted the wife and ceased to support 
her and the four children of the marriage for about four years.
The only case in which it has been held obiter that 
a change from a previous domicile of origin to one of choice
was successfully established inter-state in Nigeria is Odiase v.
31Odiase. ^ But as will be presently shown, the rules of domicile
applied in that case appears less rigid than the traditional
32common law rules. The decision m  Udom v. Udom  ^ is not in 
point owing, it is submitted, to the, misapplication of the rules 
of domicile in that case. Udom's case concerned a divorce peti­
tion by the wife to dissolve a two-year old marriage on the 
ground of the husband's Cruelty. In her petition, the wife 
alleged that thepparties were domiciled in Lagos while the res­
pondent averred that they were domiciled in the Eastern Region 
of Nigeria. The evidence established, however, that the respon­
dent’s mother was a native of Lagos where she had a domicile 
of origin and where she and the respondent's father, a native 
of Calabar in Eastern Nigeria "had always lived". It was not 
clear when the father came to Lagos. It appeared that the father 
went back with the respondent to Eastern Nigeria to reside for 
a brief period before the father died there in 1947* The mother
31. Cl9653 N.M.I.E.196.
32. (I960) L.L.R.112.
appeared to have stayed in Lagos throughout. In the same year, 
immediately after the death of his rather, the respondent re­
turned to Lagos to live with his mother. The respondent was at 
this time 14 years old.^ There was no form of marriage between 
the respondent's father and mother. According to the evidence 
of the petitioning wife which the judged accepted, "his father 
and mother were not really married ••• they just met each other 
and started to produce children11. In other words, since there 
was no evidence that Mr. Udom was acknowledged under customary 
law, he was illegitimate. As regard the issue of jurisdiction, 
Coker, J., decided that
"after reviewing the authorities and expressing my 
own views with regards to the issues of fact in 
this matter, I have come to the conclusion that 
the petitioner had discharged the burden of proof 
placed upon her in establishing that the respondent 
had acquired a domicile of choice in Lagos at the 
time of the marriage and indeed at the time of the 
jurisdiction to entertain and decide the matter 
which is at present in issue".
It is submitted that the facts of the case did not
justify Coker, J.'s finding of a domicile of choice in Lagos
and that the domicile of origin of Mr. Udom had always been in
Lagos. It is a well established principle of Nigerian private
international law that an illegitimate child takes as his domicile
35of origin that of his mother at the time of his birth. ^ Since 
Coker, J., found that Udom's parents were never married, i.e. 
that he was illegitimate, he had as his domicile of origin that 
of his mother which had always been in Lagos. It is therefore 
erroneous for the learned judge to have started on the premise 
that the domicile of origin of Udom depended on that of his
33* Details of the Marriage Certificate of the Udoms obtained at 
the Somerset House in London showed that Mr. Udom was 27 
years old in I960 which means he was born some time in 
1933. A certified true copy of this Certificate was admitted 
in evidence as Ex. B. by Coker, J. See Udom v. Udom (I960) 
L.L.R. 112 at p.113.
34. Udom v. Udom (I960) L.L.R. 112 at p.118.
35. ggiProve (1888), 40 Ch.D.216; Udny v. Udny (1869) L.R.l Sc.&EL
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natural father in Eastern Nigeria. Only his mother could have 
"been legally entitled to change Udom's domicile during minority. 
The fact that Udom had a different residence from that of the 
mother during his minority did not alter the position. And in 
sd far as he returned to Lagos during his minority and continued 
his residence there up to time the petition was presented, that 
fact alone was conclusive proof that Udom’s domicile of origin 
in Lagos was retained throughout. This misapplication of the 
rules of domicile, it is submitted, vitiates the decision of 
Coker J., that Udom acquired a domicile of choice in Lagos. In 
fairness it should be added that this decision would not have 
been fatal to the petitioner in that the Lagos court could still 
have been able to assume jurisdiction in respect of the divorce 
suit. But owing to certain peculiar circumstances attaching to 
a person’s domicile of origin it is as well necessary to arrive 
at the correct nature of a person’s domicile.
Odiasefs case however proceeded on a different basis
which amounts, in our view, to a radical but a welcome change
in the concept of domicile in Nigerian private international law.
The facts of the case, in brief, are as follows. The respondent-
husband was a native of Benin-City in the Mid-Western state of
Nigeria. Until August 9> 1963» .the Mid-Western state was part
of the former Western Begion of Nigeria. On that date, however,
it bedame a distinct legal unit within the federation of Nigeria.
It therefore became a territory governed by a separate legal
system in which the domicile of a person could be fixed. In
principle the effect of this division into two of territory
formerly comprised of the old Western Region of Nigeria is that.
36. Adepye v..Adeoye /1962J N.N.L.R. 63 at p.63; See also Okonkwo 
v. Eze <1960 V ; .J4.N.L.R. 80 and Adeyemi v. Adeyemi (1962)
L.L.R.70. Cl. Re O ’Keefe [1940] Ch.T^; Re"M': rT9'373 N.Ir.151
(Northern Ireland) and Re P . [19453 Ir. Jur. Rep. 1?.(Republic 
of Ireland).
all persons born in the legal unit now constituting the Mid-
Western state are deemed to have had their domicile of origin in 
37the s t a t e . T h e  husband in this case therefore had a domicile
of origin in the Mid-Western state. Divorce proceedings was
however instituted by his English wife in the High Court of
Western Nigeria. At the time the petition was presented, the
husband had taken employment as a Magistrate under the Mid-
Western state government. He was stationed in Ubiaja in the Mid-
Western state. The wife's petition alleged that the parties were
domiciled in Nigeria while the husband contended that he was
domiciled in the Mid-Western, state. Since the domicile of J.
a wife follows that of the husband on marriage it automatically
follows the husband was alleging that the domicile of the wife
was also in the Mid-Western state. The connection of the husband
with that part of what is now known as Western state of Nigeria
did not appear to be more than residence in Ibadan, the capital
38town, where he practiced law, for about three years. It is 
not stated in the report of the case when the husband actually 
resumed duty in the Mid-Western state. But it does appear that 
the parties agreed that the wife and the children of the marriage 
should continue to reside at Ibadan, Western Nigeria.
Having first assumed jurisdiction on the basis of the 
"Nigerian domicile" of the parties, Eatayi-Williams, J., held in 
his alternative decision that, in case he erred in his view that 
37* See foonote 36, supra.
38. The impression given by the facts of the case as stated by 
Eatayi-Williams J.,was that the husband practised throughout 
in Western Nigeria before his assumption of duty in the Mid- 
Western state. And as a Barrister of less than three years' 
standing is not appointed as a Magistrate in the Mid-Western 
state, it must be assumed that Odiase was actively in practice 
in Western Nigeria for at least three years before his appoint 
ment as a Magistrate.
the Federal Parliament had impliedly created a Nigerian domicile 
for the purpose of jurisdiction in matrimonial causes, the 
parties were domiciled in Western Nigeria, The reasons given 
for this alternative view were as follows: That on the husband*s
return from the United Kingdom where he studied law in 1962, 
although a native of Benin-City,i.e. the capital city of what 
now constitutes the Mid-Western state, he settled with his wife 
and children in Ibadan, Western Nigeria. Out of the various 
items of furniture, costing about £854 which they acquired, all 
the husband took with him to the Mid-Western state on his assump­
tion of duty there as a Magistrate were one carpet, one dining 
chair and tio cushions* He paid regularly £10*10s. a month 
as rent for the house occupied by the jefcitioner and the children 
in Ibadan. In addition, he sent regularly £10. a month pre­
sumably for their maintenance and paid the children*s school 
fees from time to time.
It will be readily observed that Fatayi-Williams, J., 
did not follow the traditional line of ascertaining the domicile 
of origin of the husband and then proceeding by way of enquiry 
into his family life to discover whether he had shaken off his 
domicile of origin. Neither was it established whether the 
continued residence of Qdiase in Western Nigeria after the 
creation of the Mid-Western state amounted to an election to fix 
his domicile in Western Nigeria. If Odiase had acquired a domi­
cile of choice in Western Nigeria, what was his intention in 
seeking and accepting a position in the Mid-Western state?
Did his domicile of origin not revive by his return to the Mid- 
Western state? Did his acceptance of an office for life in the 
Mid-Western state not raise a strong presumption that his domicile 
had shifted to the place where he had to exercise his duty?
These and other matters which are relevant for ascertaining the
intention of the husband - respondent were brushed aside by the 
learned judge. According to him "there is only one inference 
to be drawn from all these overt acts and that is that the res­
pondent had no intention of making his permanent home in the Mid- 
West". One would have expected that the judge would have been 
bond, enough to say that the list of hard cases in other Nigerian 
states' jurisdictions had revealed the injustice caused, at any 
rate in matrimonial causes, by a strict adherence to the English 
conception of domicile in Nigeria and that a reform which will 
remove intention as a subjective factor in establishing a domi­
cile of choice under Nigerian law is desirable. Nevertheless, 
it seems clear that the facts leading Fatayi-Williams, J., to 
the finding of Odiase's domicile in Western Nigeria are all 
indicia of the place of "principal establishment". His view 
in this respect reveals a striking similarity to the third pre­
sumption in the Code of Domicile suggested by the English Private
International Law Committee. It reads as follows:
"Where a person is stationed in a country for
the principal purpose of carrying on a business, 
profession or occupation and his wife and children 
(if any) have their home in another country, he
shall be presumed to intend to live permanently
in the latter country."
His judgment, therefore, seems a deliberate relaxation of the
rigorous rules of proof of domicile in an effort (..to do effective
justice between the parties without expressly saying so. The
reforming zeal necessitating this change of emphasis is therefore
supported even though one is apprehensive whether Odiase's case
is the appropriate situation for the application of this desirable
reform in view of the respondent's more substantial connection
with the Mid-Western state, his state of origin.
To recapitulate, the objections to the present definition
of domicile in Nigeria, apart from the fact that it imposes on
the judges enormous and at times almost insoluble evidentiary
127.
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problems, J are that it is not evolved in response to the social 
conditions in Nigeria. It ties citizens of Nigeria to their 
"ancestral" or "Eamily homes", a temwhich, by accident of 
history, has become synonymous with the permanent home as the 
cases discussed above have shown. Not surprisingly, it prevents 
them from regulating their personal rights in accordance with 
the law of the place with which they have the most real and sub­
stantial connection. Unless the line of approach adopted in 
Odiase’s case is taken up, at-least for inter-state conflicts 
in Nigeria, the group consciousness and ethnic identity of the
Nigerian people will not permit the acceptance of the suggestion
4-0made in Whicker v. Hume that it should be much easier for a 
change of domicile from one sub-division of a country to the 
other. If the law of domicile in the Nigerian private interna­
tional law is to be vaunted as affording to a person the capabi­
lity to be master of his own destiny in the choice of the legal 
system that should regulate his personal law, it must be so defined
39. The two presumptions existing under the :pnehen&: law of 
domicile appear unhelpful; rather they seem to make the 
proof of domicile of choice more difficult. One is that 
residence of a person in a country is prima facie evidence 
of his domicile: Bruce v. Bruce (1790), 2 B. & P. 229 at p.231; 
Bempde v. Johnsbne (1796), 3 Ves. Jun. 198 at 201; King v. 
Poxwell (1676), 3 Ch. D. 518. Even though it was stated in 
Hodgson v. De Beauchesne (1858), 12 Moo. P.O. 285 at p.329 
that if residence is so long and so continuous it constitutes 
an incontrovertible evidence of domicile that only an actual 
departure from the country in which a person resides would 
displace it, nonetheless, it vis of "small practical importance 
since it easily is rebuttable by the mere fact that a person 
once had a domicile in a country in which he previously resided 
Hence it is pointed out by Dicey and Morris, op.cit. 7th ed., p: 
91 that the presumption is only useful in cases where a person’s 
domicile of origin is unknown e.g. in determining the domicile 
of a foundling or a vagrant whose ancestry cannot be traced.
The second which is often employed is that a person's do­
micile of origin continues until displaced by a person alleging 
the contrary. Indeed, as have been observed above, "its charac­
ter is more enduring, its hold stronger and less easily shaken 
off ”,. Winans v. Att.-Gen. [1904-] A.C. 207 at p.290; which was 
cited withapproval in Adeyemi v. Adeyemi (1962) L.L.R.70 and 
Udom v. Udom (1962) L.L.R.ll^. Therefore, this presumption does 
not, also, aid the change of domicile from that of origin to 
one of choice. Rather it makes it more difficult.
4-0. (1858) 7 H.L.C.124-.
that it will make it easy for a Nigerian to change his domicile 
from one Nigerian state to the other even if in international 
conflicts it preserves the real attachment of most Nigerians 
to their place of origin. In other words, domicile in Nigerian 
law should he a composite concept which takes account both of 
the need for stability of connection in certain situations and 
also the necessity to permit its severance in others.
As previously stated, the personal laws of most Nigerians 
are determined by the customary or Moslem laws to which they are 
subject. The scope of domicile as a criterion for determining 
matters of personal law is, therefore, necessarily limited. 
Moreover, the law on most matters in which domicile is relevant 
is fairly similar or identical in the Nigerian states, e.g. a 
uniform non-customary marriage and divorce law, identical state 
laws on legitimation per subsequens matrimonium and a common 
basis of succession laws. Also, the proximity of the states, 
making room for easy accessibility of legal information, is 
bound to produce a state of affairs under which any worthwhile 
legislative reform in one state will have tremendous effect in 
the others. In view of these factors we could see no justifi­
cation for requiring an intention to reside permanently in a 
place as a subjective and independent factor in the acquisition 
of a domicile of choice under the Nigerian conception of domicile.
5. TEE REFORM PROPOSALS IN ENGLAND V CANADA AND KENYA.
Since the Nigerian conception of domicile is based on 
that of English law, it might be contended that any reform pro­
posed under that law or any system of law operating the English 
concept should be closely examined as regards its possible appli­
cation in Nigeria. Reform of the law of domicile has been con­
sidered in three countries in the Commonwealth, viz., England,
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Canada and Kenya, The proposals recommended for adoption in
each of these countries will he found in the Appendices A, B
and C of this work. In the first report of' the Lord Chancellor's
4-1Private International Law Committee, the Committee found two
serious defects in the present law of domicile. These are (a) the
excessive importance attached to the domicile of origin and
(h) the difficulties involved in proof of intention to change
a domicile. Of course, Nigerian law.has these defects. The
Committee then considered whether domicile should mean no more
than habitual residence of person in a given place so as to
bring the English conception into line with the continental
doctrine. Alternatively, it was suggested by the minority
members of the Committee that the animus necessary to establish
a domicile of choice should be defined as a present intention
42of living in a place for "an unlimited time" . These proposals
were, however, rejected by the Committee on the assumption that
these views would have consequences unacceptable to English
public opinion. It was stated that:
"For centuries, people have gone into the 
world from this ccuntry [England] intending. 
ultimately to return and without any intention 
of severing their connection with the British 
legal system and the ideas underlying it. It 
would not be in harmony with the temper of the 
British people if those who happen to be living 
abroad had to be told that there was no method . 
whereby they could continue to regulate their 
lives according to the familiar British conceptions.
It shouE. also be remembered that a country which 
does not apply Nationality as a yardstick in mat­
ters of private international,law is bound to sub­
stitute for it a strict test involving a measure 
of permanence.1 ^
In the result, the Committee proposed the retention of the exist­
ing definition of domicile but recommended the adoption of three
41. Cmd. 9068, para.8, p. 5*
42. Ibid., para.7
43. Ibid.
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presumptions which will facilitate the proof of a person's 
intention. They are as follows:
1. Where a person has his home in a country, he shall he
presumed to intend to live there permanently. 2. Where a
person has two homes, he should he presumed to intend to live
permanently in the country in which he has his principal home.
3. In the case of a businessman*,v or professional person
stationed separately from his wife and children in a place for
the sole purpose of carrying on his trade or profession, he
should he presumed to intend to live in the country where his
wife and children are to he found. In the opinion of the
Committee these presumptions should not he made too difficult 
45to rehut. ^ For the reasons stated above, it is submitted that 
it will be quite easy in Nigeria to rebut these presumptions, 
except perhaps in undefended divorce cases in which the existence 
of these presumptions will make the Judges desist from asking 
where the "family home" of a person is. But in other cases 
where the issues are keenly contested, the same problems of
group identity of the Nigerian people will still arise. Moreover,
it is not inconceivable that the second presumption proposed by 
the Committee will still result in the domicile of a person 
being equated with that static phenomenon, the "family home".
It may he pertinent to observe that even as regards 
the English law which is uncomplicated by a federal structure 
and communal orientation like the Nigerian law, the proposals of 
the English Private International Law Committee that the present 
definition of domicile should be! retained was severely criti­
cised by the House of Lords in the recent case of Indyka v*
44. Cmnd. 9068, p.l5> Art.2 of the Code of the Law of Domicile.
43. Ibid., para.15* p.8. These recommendations of the Private 
International Law have not been accepted. For a detailed 
account of the Domicile Bills especially that of 1958 which 
sought to implement the proposals of the Committee, see 
Michael Mann: "The Domicile .Bills" in 8 I.C.L.Q.(1959) p.457.
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46Indyka. Their Lordships' statements in the case foresee a 
future House of Lords' decision departing from the present 
strict definition of domicile. Not less than three of the five 
Law Lords offer some scathing remarks about the English concept. 
Lord Reid makes a valuable historical point that the jurists on 
whom the early judges relied as authorities for establishing 
the concept of domicile used that term not in the strict sense 
adopted by recent English cases but in the sense of habitual 
residence.^ Lord Pearce lamented the excessive rigidity intro­
duced into the conept especially by the two decisions in Winans v.
48 49Att.-Gen. and Ramsey v. Liverpool Royal Infirmary y and suggests
that "until this rigid view of domicile is modified so as to ac­
cord more nearly with the views of other countries who look to
domicile as the test [for matters of personal status] it will give
50rise to constant difficulties". In his opinion, the view of the
minority of the Private International Law Committee which would
want domicile defined as the country where a person establishes
his home with a present intention of living there for an unlimited
time would be a wiser proposition than retention of the existing
51definition which was recommended by the majority. Finally, Lord 
Vilberforce contrasted the English concept of domicile with the 
American and Continental ones and observed that later developments 
in English law have meant that the English conception of domicile
52
frequently does not represent the community to which people belong,
4-6. [1967] 3 W.L.E.510.
4-7. Ibid., pp.520-521.
4-8. [1904-] A.C.287.
4-9. [1930] A.C.588.
50. [1967]3 W.L.R. 510, at p.537.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., at p.551*
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and that the principle of English law that a wife could not 
acquire a separate domicile, even after judicial separation or 
abandonment by her husband could cause great hardship to a wife.^ 
But since the question before the House was not that of domicile, 
but one concerning the recognition of a foreign divorce decree, 
their Lordships had no alternative but to "acknowledge the 
existence of the wide gap" that lies between the English concept 
and that of other countries" "until g question of domicile comes 
before [their] Lordships".
The Canadian Draft Domicile Act does not depart in 
any significant way from the English concept of domicile.
Section 5 of the Draft Act provides that "a person acquires and 
has domicile in the state and in the subdivision thereof in 
which he has his principal home and in which he intends to re­
side indefinitely". Thus, as could be observed, the only diffe­
rence between the Canadian definition and the English one is 
that instead of the Canadian Draft Act using "permanently" to 
define the intention with which a person resides in a country, 
it substitutes the word "Indefinitely". This appears only a 
difference in words and not in substance. It is on this basis
that the "superficially slight palliative" introduced by the Ca-
54-nadian Draft Domicile Act^ seems incapable of support.
The Kenya Commission on the law of Marriage and 
Divorce also recognises the difficulties involved in proof of 
intention to change a domicile in' operating the common law defi­
nition of domicile received in Kenya as part of the law o£ England, 
but got round such difficulties in a different manner. Having
33* The statements of their Lordships in this case appear a 
virtual endorsement of the criticism of the concept of do­
micile made by Lord Denning in Re P.(G.E.) (An Infant) [1964-]
3 All e .r .977 at p.980. :
54-. The Canadian Draft Domicile Act was recently criticised by 
U.S. Tarnopolsky, "The Draft Domicile Act - Reform or Con­
fusion? " in 29> The Saskatchewan Bar Review, Ho.4- (19&4-) p.l61i
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adverted to the rigidity of the English concept of domicile 
even for purposes of a country having a unified system of 
territorial law as Kenya, it recommends at section 8(1) of its 
Draft Bill on the Law of Domicile that domicile should be de­
fined as "residence [of a person] in a country ^  ... with an 
intention of making that country his permanent home". The 
term "permanent home” is not defined but this point seems to 
have been clarified to a certain extent by an important rule 
contained in sub-section 2 of section 8 which provides that 
"a person may intend or decide to make a country his permanent 
home even though he contemplates leaving it should circumstances 
change". In other words, if a person resides in a country with 
a present intention of settling down in that country, the fact 
that he intends to leave it on the occurrence of an uncertain 
future event will not preclude him from acquiring domicile in 
such country. The chief advantage of the rule would seem to 
lie in the fact that it throws some light on how the term 
"permanent home" would be construed by the courts in Kenya. In 
view of such provision, it is obvious that the courts would not 
equate it with everlasting home as in the English definition 
now being operated in the Country, This definition, if accepted
by the Kenya Parliament, will compare favourably with that offered
56by Kindersley V.C., in Lord v. Colvin ^ where he stated that
a person’s domicile is the place where he voluntarily fixed the
habitation of himself and his family with a present intention
of making it his permanent home, unless and until something
which is unexpected or the happening of which is uncertain should
occur to induce him to adopt some other permanent home,
55* Section 2 of the Bill defines a "country" as a sovereign 
state, except where the law of the state recognises that 
different domicils attach to different parts of that state, 
when it means any such part.
56. (1859) 4- Drew 366.
134.
If the definition of domicile contained int the 
Commission's recommendation is adopted, Kenya would be the first 
country in East Africa to accept the lead given by the Court of 
Appeal for East Africa in resolving the problem of ascertaining
57a person's domicile of choice. Thus in Thornhill v. Thornhill,'' 
the Court of Appeal for East Africa held that a person who had 
resided in Uganda for just over three years, who lived in an 
hotel throughout the period and stated that if he did not 
succeed in his business in Uganda or if things should become un­
pleasant for him, but who nonetheless invested money in a 
soluble tea business, had acquired a domicile of choice in Uganda. 
With this case may be contrasted that of Gordon v. Gordon, ^  
where a colonial civil servant who had been in Tanzania for al­
most 20 year®, who had married an African woman and who had ma­
jority of his assets in Tanzania, was held by the Tanzanian High 
Court as still retaining his English domicile of origin merely 
because he stated, as a realist, that if his employment were 
terminated he would, firstly, find another employment in Tanzania, 
or failing that, he would look to other East African countries 
for employment, and lastly, if he ware still unsuccessful, then 
he would return to England. Thus if a similar situation as 
occurred in Gordon's case were to arise in Kenya, there seems 
to be no doubt that Mr. Gordon would be held to have acquired 
a domicile of choice in Kenya. Eor a unitary country, the re- 
commednation of the Kenya Commission on the law of Marriage and 
Divorce would seem to be adequate and therefore most welcome.
But as regards a federation where domicile should be 
fixed within a legal district or subdivision thereof, e.g., a
57. C1965] E.A. 268.
58. [1965] E.A.87.
state of the federation of Nigeria, the definition proposed by 
the Kenya Commission still suffers from a major defect inherent 
in the traditional definition of domicile under the common law. 
Eor one of the problems involved in the definition of domicile 
wither animus manendi, however qualified, as one of its two con­
stituent elements is the location of a person's domicile in a 
federation of several states or provinces. Under the traditional 
common law approach, a person may be resident in Nigeria with 
an intention to settle permanently in the country. He may not 
yet have decided in which particular state he prefers to settle. 
Since domicile signifies connection with a territory subject to 
one system of law, such a person will not be domiciled anywhere 
in the country until he forms an intention to reside permanently, 
in one of the states. Similarly, under the proposed Kenya de­
finition, a foreigner who settles in Nigeria with an intention 
of Making Nigeria his permanent home but who contemplates leaving 
the country if his new business ceases to be a going concern, 
will still not be domiciled in any of the Nigerian states if, 
after six years' residence in the Lagos state, he is still un­
decided whether such permanent home should be fixed in the Lagos
59state or in the Western state where his business is located.
The fact that section.8(2) of the Kenyan Draft Bill, if adopted
in Nigeria, provides that a person may intent to make a country
his permanent home even though he contemplates leaving it should
circumstances change, does not help since the operation of the
sub-section is conditional on his having decided to establish
such permanent home in a legal district in Nigeria and not in
the federation as a whole. Whereas such a person would most
likely be held to have acquired a domicile of choice in Kenya.
59. Except for purposes of jurisdiction in matrimonial causes if
a National domicile is subsequently adopted. This point will
be fully considered in Chapter 4.
Moreover, for interstate conflicts, it is likely that the term 
"permanent home" will still he equated with the traditional 
home despite section 8(2) as a result of the reasons given above. 
Until the time when a Nigerian person will rid himself of such 
concepts as "Family-home", "Family-property", "Family-Council" 
and"Family-headship" - all of which at present are energising, 
factors rigorously attaching him to his ethnic origin - it is 
submitted that a definition of domicile which insists on the 
intention to reside permanently, or to establish a permanent 
home, away from his traditional attachment before he can acquire 
a domicile of choice has no hope of success in the Nigerian 
setting.
It may be interjected, however, that some proposals
contained in the English Code of Domicile, the Canadian Draft
Domicile Act, and the Kenya Bill^ may be usefully employed
in the Nigerian private international law. These relate to
the presumptions for ascertaining the domicile of choice and
the fundamental change proposed in the three recommendations
that the domicile of a person should continue until he acquires
61another domicile. So also are the principles giving a separate 
domicile to a wife in certain circumstances or those governing 
the domicile of a married infant, an adopted child and a mentally 
incompetent person. (These principles will be incorporated
60. For the full provisions of these three Model Acts, see 
Appendices A, B, and C, at the end of this work.
61. See Art.1 s.5 of the Lord Chancellor’s Private International 
Law Committee's Code of the Law of Domicile; s.4 (4) of the 
Canadian Draft Model Act, and s.10 (2) of the Kenya Draft 
Bill on Law of Domicil.
62. Art.5* Code of the Law of Domicile (England); s.6 of the-Ca­
nadian Draft, and s.6 of Kenya Draft Bill. This Bill does 
not contain any provision for ascertaining the domicile of
a mentally incompetent person neither does it allow a married 
male infant to acquire a separate domicile. Similarly silent 
about the ability of a married male infant to acquire an 
independent domicile in the Canadian Draft Model Act.
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in our conclusion at the end of this Chapter.)
6# THE DRAFT FAMILY CODE OF .ISRAEL,
The difficulties inherent in the oamnon law concept
of domicile appear to have been overcome by the Israel Draft
Family Code, not by substituting for the concept of nationality
which previously existed in the country as the basis of personal
law, with that of domicile, coupled with a greater or less degree
of animus manendi, but by redefining the concept of domicile#
Thus, para.28 of the Draft Family Code provides that "A person*s
domicile is the place which is the centre of his life”. Para#31
goes on to sray that "When a person's domicile is unknown, his
63residence is deemed to be his domicile",  ^ The intention of
the drafters of the Code is to provide a new definition which
will "create a legal concept that should indicate the basic legal
connection of a particular pa?son at a particular time to a parti- 
64cular place," It is immediately observed that only one 
factual connection, the objective factor is given prominence 
in the new definition. The intention of a person which plays 
an important role in the common law conception is not more than 
one of the factors which a court in Israel will take into con­
sideration in determining where a person's domicile, as defined 
under the Code, should be located. Indeed, the comment on 
paragraph 28 of the Code states that intention "is not independent
factor strong enough to take the place of other factors   nor
65is it an additional requirement (as in England)" . ^ As pointed
out by Inglis,
63* Para,$0 of the Code states that "An individual's residence is 
the place where he resides, either permanently or temporarily"
64, Draft Family Code for the State of Israel, 1953; Harvard- 
Brandeis Translation, p.2j?»
63* Ibid., at p.27#
"the principal value of the sections of the 
Israeli Draft Family Code dealing with domicil 
is in the fact that they may he regarded, to a 
certain extent, as a synthesis of the best of
the concepts applied in this matter by a wide
variety of Western countries. The language 
of the sections is simple, direct, and briefs 
so simple, direct, and brief, in fact that it 
will probably allow for. a considerable degree 
of judicial latitude". ^
In other words, one big advantage in favour of paragraph 28 of 
the Code is its flexibility and its capability of being mani­
pulated to serve different situations.
The adoption of such a broad definition of domicile 
in a Federation, it is submitted, will provide for an easy 
change of domicile from one subdivision of the country to the 
other.^ In Nigeria, especially for interstate conflicts, it 
will cease to be of any relevance whether a person has irrevo­
cably severed the link between him and his ancestral home be­
fore he can acquire a domicile of choice. Domicile for purposes
of interstate conflicts will not be more than the place where a 
person habitually resides with his wife (or wives) and minor 
children. The fact that he has his "family home" or other 
members of his immediate or extended family in another part of 
the country will not prevent him from regulating matters of his 
personal rights in which domicile is relevant according to the 
legal system of the place with which he has a real attachment.
66. B.D. Inglis: "Reform in the Private International Law of
Diverce, A Comparative Study of two recent Draft Codes1* 
in 4, McGill Law Journal, p.42 at pp.4V-48.
67* The Israeli definition appears to have been adopted in the 
American law. For while Para.11 of the Restatement (1967 
Proposed Official Draft) defines domicile as ‘'the place, 
usually a person's home, to which the rules of Conflict of 
Laws sometimes accord determinative significance because 
of the person's identification with that place" it proceeds 
to define a Person's home at Para.12 as "the place where a 
person dwells and which is the centre of his domestic, social 
and civil life" in substitution for the previous definition 
of ^Home*1 contained in para. 13 of the 1934 second Restatement. 
That para, read as follows: * A home is a dwelling place of
a person, distinguished from other dwelling places of that 
person by that intimacy of the relation between the person 
and the place".
On the other hand, a broad definition as contained in the Draft 
Family Gode of Israel, if adopted in Nigeria, will enable the 
judges to insist on clear evidence of intention to stay for an
go
unlimited time, or Mas long as circumstances permit11 as one 
of the factors to be taken into consideration in deciding objecti­
vely whether a person has acquired a domicile of choice at the 
international plane* In other words, this broad definition of 
domicile as a person's centre of life will enable the courts to 
distinguish between acquisition of a new domicile in another Ni­
gerian state and in a foreign country; this they seem unable to 
do at present, yet this proposition has been firmly established
69m  other federations, for example, the Commonwealth of Australia '
70and the Dominion of Canada*r
68. Graveson, Conflict of Laws (6th ed*) p.207; cf. s* 8 (2) of 
the Kenya Draft Bill on the Law of Domicile.
69» See e.g. Union Trustee 6o* of Australia Ltd. v. Commissioner 
of Stamp Duties (.192&J, Queensland S.R.304-; Carey v* Carey 
L1942j, South Australian S.R.62; Bradford v. Bradford L194-3 ] » 
South Australian S.R. 123; Walton v. Walton [ 194-8J, Viet. 
L.R.4-87* In the last case, Barry, J., after referring to 
the English rule that there is a heavy burden of proof on 
a person seeking to establish a domicile of choice away from 
his domicile of origin, said that such rule could scareely 
obtain in a federation. He pointed out that "in Australian 
community, where social ideas and customs are substantially 
the same throughout the continent, and where there is a com­
mon nationality and a common language, the same significance 
or importance cannot be ascribed to a person's conduct in 
moving from one State to another as when the question arises 
in connection with the action of a person moving to a commu­
nity where, by reason of a difference of language and national 
traditions, institutions and usages, he takes on the character 
of a foreigner". - at p.4-89• Even in Canada where there is 
no common language, the same principle is upheld as the 
following note will show.
70. See e.g. Baker v. Baker [194-1] 2 W.W.R.389; Gunn v. Gunn 
(1956) 2 D.L.R. (21)) 351; Young v. Young [I960] 21 D.i.R.
(2D) 616; Fedeluk v. Fedeluk [1968] 63 V.W.R.630* The last 
case concerned a divorce action in which the defendant husband 
had a domicile of origin in Manitoba. He came to Alberta in 
1963 and resided there for a period of less than 5 years, 
before the commencement of the action. After staying in 
Alberta for 3 years he married the plaintiff wife who 
appeared to have an Alberta pre-marital domicile. In November 
of the same year he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
for a year which he completed in October, 1967* Three months 
after his release, the present action was commenced. The
/Footnote cont....
Furthermore, since a definition which employs a per- - 
son's centre of life as the criterion for determining his 
domicile of choice neither requires the intention of such 
a person to be an independent factor strong enough to dis­
place other factors, nor a separate and independent element 
as under the existing law, it is submitted that such a simple 
definition of domicile will enable the courts in Nigeria to 
deal successfully with the perennial problem of ascertaining 
the domicile of a person who resides in Nigeria with an 
intention to stay but who has not decided in which particu­
lar state in the country he intends to settle permanently.
Once it is clearly established that the propositus has a 
settle determination to settle in Nigeria, in the political 
sense, it will then be possible for the court to disregard 
his present intention as to which particular state he intends 
to reside permanently and employ other objective and factual 
data (as in other interstate situations) to determine the 
particular state with which he has a more dnduring connection. 
Thus in our example above, the fact of his residence in the 
Lagos state for six years would provide a factual evidence 
that that state is the one ig. which he has the centre of his
F/note 70 cont. from previous page.
evidence showed that at the time of the proceedings in
December, 1967> he had obtained an employment in Alberta, and 
that he had no present intention of leaving Alberta but expres­
sed the desire to go to the United States of America in about
two years'time. The Supreme Court of Alberta stated that there
are several authorities for the proposition that "much less 
will be required in the way of evidence of a man's intention 
to establish a new domicile where a man moves from one province 
of Canada to another than where a man moves from Canada to a
foreign country". The court therefore held that a domicile of
choice had been satisfactorily established in Alberta and that 
the defendant's desire to go to the U.S.A. in two years' time . 
did not constitute an abandonment which could only take place 
by the concurrence of an intention to leave and the factum
of departure from the province.
life# If he resides simultaneously, or has homes, in more than 
one state, we may usefully employ the presumption contained in 
the English and Canadian proposals which states in effect that 
a person having two homes in more than one legal territory should 
he presumed to have his domicile at the place where his spouse 
and children (if any) habitually reside. ^  In short, it is 
our view that by defining domicile as the country where a person, 
has his centre of life and providing the courts with some pre­
sumptions to assist them, they will be able to arrive at a deci- 
aon consbnant not only with their idea of justice but equally 
in keeping with that of the common man in individual cases.
In addition, the definition of domicile on this modern 
line would seem to eliminate the fictions and technicalities 
observable in operating the revival doctrine of domicile of origin. 
Thus a person who has abandoned his former domicile but who has 
not settled in a new place,e.g. as a result of his death in transit 
will -not necessarily have the domicile of origin as under the 
existing rules. His new domicile or his domicile at the time of 
death will depend on the circumstances of the situation. Prima 
facie, his previous domicile will continue as in the American law# 
But if he was moving from a foreign country where he had been 
domiciled to a place where he had traditional, family or religious 
attachment, any of these factors must have demonstrated that the 
place which may logically be regarded as his centre of life at 
the time of his death is the country to which he was moving.
Finally, as will be shown later in this work, the applica­
tion of the law of domicile should not be.the sole prerogative of 
the High and other types of "English" courts in Nigeria.
71. See Art.2 of the Code of the Law of Domicile: (England) and 
section 5 (2) (a) of the Canadian Draft Model Act.
Especially for interstate conflicts, the concept of domicile
must play an important role as the connecting factor for juris-
the
dictional and choice of law purposes in/customary courts. These 
courts will therefore meed a definition easily understood and 
easily applied.
D. CONCLUSIONS.
The conclusions arrived at may he summarised in the 
form of the following short propositions. To these will he 
added some of the proposals found desirable for adoption in 
Nigeria in the recommendations contained in the English Code of 
Domicile, the Canadian Draft Domicile Act, and the Kenya Bill on 
Law of Domicile. These propositions are intended to he in sub­
stitution for the definition, and addition to the present rules, 
of domicile. It therefore becomes clear that they do not neces­
sarily represent what the law is in Nigeria, hut what we believe 
the law of domicile should contain in addition to the present 
rule s•
1. The domicile of a person shall he in the country 03? 
legal district in which the person, together with his 
spouse and minor children, has the centre of his social, 
domestic and civil life.
2. Where a person dwells in a country or legal district, 
he shall rebuttably be presumed to have the centre of 
his life in such territory.
3* Where a person is stationed in a country or legal
district for the principal purpose of carrying on a 
business, profession or occupation and his wife and 
children, if any, reside in another territory, he 
shall rebuttably be presumed to have his domicile in 
the territory in which his wife and children reside.
h. Subject to Rule 1, the domicile of a person shall con­
tinue until it is proved that he has acquired another 
domicile*
5. The domicile of a married woman shall be that of her
husband: Provided that for the purpose of jurisdiction
in matrimonial causes, a wife who is living separate
and apart from her husband shall be entitled to
72acquire an independent domicile of her own.
6. On the dissolution of a marriage, the domicile of an 
infant child of the parties shall be that of the 
person in whom the custody of the infant is lawfully 
vested by the order of a competent court, or if it is 
vested in more than one person, that of the person 
with whom it lives.
7* The domicile of a lawfully adopted child shall be
that of the adopter: Provided that in the case of
joint adoption by spouses, the adopted child shall 
take the domicile of the male adopter.
8. The domicile of a child legitimated by the subsequent
inter-marriage of its parents, or by the acknowledgment 
of its paternity by its putative father, shall be that 
of the father. Such dependent domicile shall be opera­
tive from the date the act of legitimation takes effect.
9* The domicile of a posthumous child shall be that of
the mother: provided that if the custody of the child
has been award&d to a member of the deceased father*s 
family, by a court of competent jurisdiction in the 
country or legal district in which the father was do­
miciled at the time of his death, the child's domicile 
shall be that of such family member. (It is submitted
72. See the Postscript for the present position of the law.
that this proviso will cater for the rule of customary 
law by which the legal custody of the deceased minor 
child may, occasionally, be awarded to a member of 
the family group of the deceased, if it is in the 
interest and welfare of the child that such an order 
should be made.)
10. An infant shall have capacity to acquire an independent
domicile of choices
(a) If he is validly married; or
(b) If he is emancipated; or
(c) With the approval of the court of the country or 
legal district in which he resides, if he has 
been abandoned by the person on whom his domicile 
depends.
11. , A lunatic, or a mentally incompetent person, shall re­
tain, during his lunacy, the domicile which he had 
immediately before the period of his lunacy: Provided
that the person or authority in charge of the lunatic
may, to his benefit, change his domicile with the appro­
val of the court of the country or legal district in 
which he is domiciled. Where the lun&tic or the mentally 
incompetent person is the head of a family unit, a sub­
sequent change of his domicile by the person or autho­
rity in charge of him shall not affect the domiciles of 
his wife and minor child; the domiciles of such depen­
dent persons, during the lunacy of the person on whom 
they depend, shall be determined as if the lunatic were 
dead.
Finally, since the rules of private international law,are 
part of the domestic law of each state, it must be pointed out 
that legislation incorporating these rules will have to be passed
either by each state, or preferably, by the Federal Government 
under an authority conferred on it by all the states. Such 
legislation should contain the following definition of terms: 
that an Memancipated" infant is an infant who no longer depends 
on any of his parents for his custody, maintenance and education 
and that the word "marriage”, "husband” or "wife" includes a 
marriage, husband or wife under Moslem law or Customary law.
CHAPTER THREE
MARRIAGE
A . THE DOMESTIC CONCEPTION OF MARRIAGE
Marriage is a conception which partakes of different
1
forms under the Nigerian municipal law. Though one basic 
institution, the employment of a particular form of ceremony 
rather than the other for the creation of the marriage deter­
mines the incidents appertaining to the status thus created.
It will therefore be necessary to attempt a short description 
of the various forms under the municipal law before a discus­
sion about their conflictual aspects at the interstate and 
international levels is embarked upon.
The first, which is often described as a "Statutory", 
"Christian" or "monogamous" marriage is conceived of as a
consensual "union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of
2
all others during the continuance of the marriage". But 
despite the suggestion offered by one of these appellations, 
it has no religious significance. Whatever the religious 
beliefs of the parties thereto, it can be validly celebrated 
by anybody within the country. Its chief distinguishing 
characteristics from the other forms of marriages in Nigeria
1. See the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,, 
1963, Schedule Part I, Item 23.
2. Interpretation Act 196^, (No.l of 196 )^ S.18.
3. Obieke v. Obieke (Unreported) E/2D/62.
are that it is brought into being through the intervention of 
a state official and by well-defined and easily ascertadnable 
body of formalistic rules.
The second, the Moslem marriage possesses a common factor 
with the third, i.e. the customary marriage, in that both are 
potentially polygamous at their inception. In other words, a 
Moslem or customary marriage is one which facilitates a pos­
sible union of one man with another woman during the continuanc 
of a prior marriage. Before a subsequent marriage is entered 
into between the man and another woman, the existing marriage 
remains in fact monogamous although potentially polygamous.
When a subsequent marriage between the man and another woman is 
contracted, then the marriage becomes a multiple one and the 
man is actually polygamously married. Each of them can also be 
easily converted into a monogamous or statutory marriage pro­
vided it remains potentially polygamous at the time of conver- 
sion. The Moslem marriage can be distinguished from a purely 
customary marriage in that it was, and still is, in some 
territories in Nigeria, a religious institution the simple 
rules relating to the formation of which have, however, been . 
greatly modified or completely superseded by rules of customary 
law in certain respects. Nevertheless, in those places in 
Nigeria in which the Moslem religion is still dominant, the
k. The Marriage Act, s.33.
5. See Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, pp.171-2; A.hmadu Suka 
Journal of the Centre of Islamic Studies, (Ahmadu Bello 
Univ.) No.l at p.12.
Moslem marriage still retains some of its inbuilt religious
characteristics e.g. the rule relating to the "criteria of
equality of marriage" whereby a husband is required to be the ,
equal of his wife as regards religion, profession, trade, race 
6
etc. Furthermore, under the Moslem marriage, a.man has the 
legal right to have up to four plural wives at a time.
The third type of marriage, i.e. the customary marriage,' 
is a peculiarly indigenous institution. The rules for its 
formation and termination, though possessing some general 
characteristics vary,as to details according to the diversity 
of the systems of customary law within the country. The crea­
tion is also attended by long-winded ceremonies. To discover 
which of these ceremonial aspects have a legal significance is
not unattended with some controversial problems. This was well
7
appreciated by the old Supreme Court of Lagos in Re Sapara'
where Osborne, C.J. observed that there is
"difficulty in distinguishing its legal and
physical aspects, and between the legal essentials
of the ceremony as opposed to its concomitant and 
social factors."
Its general distinguishing feature from a Moslem marriage, 
besides the religious nature of the latter, is that there is 
no limit to the number of wives a man may have at one time.
But as polygamy is an institution which has various forms, 
it will be necessary to point out that the only form of poly­
gamy permitted under both the Moslem and Customary laws is the 
union of one man with one woman concurrently with two or more 
women under separate contracts of marriage. It therefore does
6, See below.
7. (1911), Ren.G.C.Rep. 605 at p.607*
not include, e.g., a polyandrous marriage whereby two or more 
brothers (the fraternal polyandry) or several unrelated men 
(the indefinite type) may have one or more wives in common.
The apparent inequality between man and woman in this respect 
is poignantly illustrated by such provisions of recorded 
customary law as that of the Borgu Native Authority which pre­
scribes that
"There shall be no.statutory limit to the number of 
wives a man may have at one time. It shall be an 
offence for a woman to have more than one husband 
at one time." 8
Of significance to Nigerian private international lav;, however,
is that the parties to each of the form of marriage discussed
above are clothed under the law with the status of husband and
wife.
In view of the manifold kinds of union permitted by law 
in Nigeria, to speak of a uniform set of rules of private 
international law applicable to them all will be wishful 
thinking. Also, as a result of the difference between the 
municipal laws of marriage and that of England, the conflict 
rules of which were introduced as part of the Nigerian lav;, it 
cannot be expected that the received conflict rules will be 
adequate,without modifications, to deal with the plethora of 
problems bound to arise in the Nigerian private international 
law of husband and wife. Of course, some of the English rules 
e.g. as to the recognition of polygamous marriages, as we have 
already observed, will have to be discarded as being unsuitable 
to the Nigerian social context. For as pointed out by
8. Native Authority (Declaration of Borgu Native Marriage Law 
and Custom) Order, N.A.L.N. 52 of 19ol.
150.
9Wolff, the rules relative to the conclusion, the conditions 
and the termination of marriage are so closely connected with 
morality, religion and the fundamental principles of life pre­
vailing in a given society that their, application is often 
regarded as a matter of public policy. It follows, he conclu­
ded, that the creation of harmony of laws which is the, 
ultimate objective of private international law is more diffi­
cult to achieve in the field of marriage and divorce than in 
any other branch of the law.
Our main concern will be to consider the conflicts prob­
lems involved in this field of lav;. Some solutions suggested 
by the received common law rules, and the rules provided by 
Nigerian statutes on this point, will also be examined with a 
view to making some suggestions for modification where neces­
sary. For this purpose, the three-fold conception of marriage 
will be classified into (a) Monogamous marriage (denoting a 
marriage contracted under the statute) and (b) Polygamous 
marriage (implying a marriage contracted either under the 
Moslem law or Customary law). Our attention in this respect 
will be directed to the choice of lav; rules regarding the 
following aspects of such marriages, both at the intranational 
and international conflicts:
1 . Uhat law determines the initial character of a 
marriage;
2. What law governs the incidents of marriage;
3. What law(s) governs the formal and the essential 
validity of marriage.
9. Martin Wolff, Private International lav;.- .(2nd ed.) p.313.
B. CHOICE OF LAW
1. WHAT LAW DETERMINES THE INITIAL 
CHARACTER OF A 'MARRIAGE
We have just seen that both monogamy and polygamy are 
features of the marital law in Nigeria and that the law gives 
to every Nigerian person the right to choose ,the system of 
law, whether Customary, Moslem or Statutory, with reference to 
which he will contract his marriage. Another basic point that 
should be borne in mind is that just as mutation of marriage is 
recognised to a limited extent under the domestic law, so also 
is the initial character of a marriage not indelible under the 
Nigerian private international lav;. The rule of mutation of 
marriage in Nigerian private international lav; would seem to 
have been based on the recognition of the fact that the law on 
marriage is not the same in the legal systems all the world 
over, and that justice to the parties make it incumbent on the 
Nigerian courts to adopt such a solution.'1'0 Therefore, before 
it can be ascertained whether a foreign marriage has changed 
its initial character at the time of the proceedings, it will 
be necessary to know what this initial potentiality was.
The term "initial character” , rather than "the nature” , 
of a marriage is used to discuss what system of law determines 
whether the form of ceremony employed by the parties to cele­
brate their marriage is the one appropriate for the formation 
of a monogamous marriage or a polygamous one. In this respect, 
we differ from most, writers on private international lav; in
10. The principle of mutation of marriage will be discussed 
fully below.
the common law world who employ the words "nature of marriage1 
to denote the original character of a marriage as well as what 
consequences flow from such a marriage, either, at its inception 
or thereafter."1"1 In our view, to talk about the nature of a 
marriage in this sense is to confuse the issues of the form of 
the contract, which merely operates as the vehicle on which the 
status of marriage is predicated, with the incidents or conse­
quences of such status. There is a fundamental problem of 
classification:as to whether a question relates to form, i.e. 
proper rites; or whether it concerns, e.g. the capacity of.a 
person to take a wife at all, or to take additional wife. The 
former only goes to the essence of the contract of marriage,
whereas the latter, according to Nigerian conflicts rules, is
12a question of incident of status of marriage, just as other 
normal incidents of marriage as the right of one party to be 
called a spouse, widow or widower of, the other; the spouses* 
right of co-habitation, or the marital property interests which 
one spouse has in the other’s assets. The regulation of these 
matters of incident may be ascribed to the lex loci celebrationis 
or the personal law, according to the conflict methodology, 
based on the social policy, of the individual system of law.
The applicable lav; governing such matters in Nigerian private 
international law will be considered shortly. ■
But as regards the solution of the problem, which law 
determines the monogamous or polygamous potentiality of a
11. See e.g. Dicey and Morris, op.cit.« 8th ed. p.276.
12. Asiata v, Goncallo (1900) 1 K.L.R. b2.
marriage at its inception, there is fundamental agreement by
almost all systems of private international law that there is
no other law applicable besides the lex loci.celebrationis.
This is also true of the Nigerian system. Indeed, a statutory
recognition of this principle is observed in section 18 of the
11Interpretation Act J which defines a monogamous marriage as
"a marriage which is recognised by the law of the 
place where it is contracted as a voluntary union 
of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others during the continuance of the marriage”.
1^In similar terms is section 2 of the Legitimacy Act which
provides that a Christian marriage is one
"which is recognised by the law of the place where 
it is contracted as the voluntary union for life of 
one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others” .
It becomes apparent from these provisions that the 
Nigerian courts need to look at the lex loci celebrationis in 
determining the initial character of a-marriage. These defi­
nitions do not, however, condition them to determine the con­
sequences or incidents of such marriage by the lex loci.. This 
is because the sections both speak of a valid menogamous 
marriage as one recognised as such by the law of the place 
where it was contracted, thereby making it possible for the 
courts to re-classify such foreign monogamous marriage in 
appropriate situations. The question therefore arises as to 
which law decides the incidents of a marriage, particularly the 
right of the husband to take an additional wife.
13. (Fed.) No. 1 of 196*f.
lb-. See Legitimacy Act, Cap.103 (Fed.); and also the Legiti­
macy Laws, Cap. 75?Fast, 1963 ec^ • ? Cap. 63, Northern,
1963 ed.; and Cap. 62, Nest, (1959 ed.).
15^ .
2. LA'i GOVCRBIHG TUB IHCIDEITT5 OF KARRIAOT3
It may be asked, as a preliminary enquiry, why it is 
necessary for the Nigerian private international law to con­
tain a choice of law rule for determining the incidents of a 
marriage since both monogamy and polygamy are permitted under 
the law. A short answer to this question lies in the fact that 
though monogamy and polygamy are. regarded as different forms 
of one basic institution of marriage, the rights accruing to 
the parties or third parties are different according to whether 
the marriage is monogamous or polygamous. First, we have 
noticed the basic difference that the husband in a monogamous 
marriage has no right to take another wife during the subsistence 
of the marriage whereas the husband' in a polygamous marriage 
has. But this is not all. As a general rule, the monogamous 
or polygamous character of a marriage, whether in its original 
form or in its converted form, determines which, out of the two 
hierarchy of courts in Nigeria (i.e. the Customary or the 
English-type courts) has original jurisdiction to adjudicate on 
the marriage. The monogamous or polygamous character of the 
marriage also determines, after its dissolution, the nature of 
the financial obligations of the parties. Finally, the rights 
of third parties, e.g. succession rights, differ radically 
according to whether the marriage of the deceased was monogamous 
or polygamous. These examples, the list of which is not ex­
haustive, clearly show that the ascertainment of the.law which 
determines the incidents of a marriage must have great signifi­
cance in this body of law.
The problem arises in its acute form if parties who are
subject to a system of law permitting polygamy perform their
marriage in a manner designed for monogamous marriages in a
15country where only monogamous marriages are permitted. In 
such situation, is it competent for the Nigerian courts, 
regardless of the monogamous form used, to give effect to such 
marriage but only as a polygamous marriage in accordance with 
the personal law of the parties? Of if a person, who was 
already polygamously married, left his wife behind in Nigeria 
and contracted a subsequent monogamous marriage abroad with 
another woman whose personal law may or may not permit plurality
-i z
of wives, what is the effect of the second marriage? Or
further, if parties who are domiciled in a Nigerian state,
where they contracted a polygamous marriage, go through a form
of monogamous marriage in a Christian country merely for the
purpose of obtaining a marriage certificate to facilitate the
17proof of the existing marriage, ' does the polygamous marriage 
become converted into a monogamous one or does it remain poly­
gamous? By reference to the law of which country should the 
question be answered? Should there be a difference of solution 
according to whether monogamy and polygamy are both permitted 
in the foreign country or whether only monogamy is allowed in 
such place?
It is interesting to observe that a good effect of
15. As occurred in Asiata v. Gone alio (1900) 1 N.L.R. *f2.
16. This was the question posed in Adegbola. v. Nolaranmi 
(1921) 3 N.L.R. 89.
17. As occurred in Ohochuku v. Ohochuku £L96o/ 1 N.L.R. 183.
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slavery on the. development of conflicts rules in Nigeria is 
that it has afforded the Nigerian courts the opportunities to 
consider this problem. But since the solutions provided by 
the two decisions on this point are inconsistent, it will be 
necessary to consider juristic views on the matter with a,view 
to determining which of these inconsistent decisions is right.
The determination of the appropriate law which governs 
the incidents of a marriage has, for a long time, hung on the 
question whether or not monogamy and polygamy are various 
forms of the same institution, and consequently, whether or 
not it is possible, despite the form employed to contract a 
marriage, for the incidents of monogamy to be substituted for 
polygamy, and vice versa, according to any mutation in the
personal law of the parties to the marriage. The two proposi-
18tions on this point were well put by Beckett when he wrote
that the first view that the lex loci celebrationis governs the
incidents of a marriage is based on the assumption that a
“polygamous marriage, though it shares the name 
marriage and has many results and incidents in 
common with monogamous marriage, is an essentially 
different institution, so different.that it is 
necessary to have regard to the actual ceremony and 
the lex loci contratus. not merely to ascertain 
whether there was a marriage’1,
19but also what the incidents of the marriage are. ' The alterna­
tive view, he continued,
“proceeds on the assumption that there is one 
institution - 'marriage1 - which includes mono­
gamous and polygamous marriage. The lex loci 
contractus only governs the form of the marriage.
... The 'incidents' ... are governed by the 
personal law of the parties, and the right or
18. “The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages Under English 
Law", kti 1-i.L.R. 3*+l at pp.352 and 356.
19. ibid., at p.356.
capacity of the husband to take a second wife is 
one of such incidents or essentials and depends 
on his personal law". 20
Consistently with the idea that monogamy and polygamy
are essentially different institutions, the preponderant
21opinion of learned writers on English lav/ takes it as well
established that the lex loci celebrationis immutably fixes
the incidents of. a marriage for life. Consequently, if a
person who is subject to a personal lav/ which permits polygamy
marries in England in a registry office, he contracts for
life a monogamous marriage and looses his right to take a
second v/ife. The fact that, he has never acquired an English
domicile is- immaterial. On the other-hand, if an English
domiciliary goes through a polygamous marriage in Nigeria
v/here polygamy is permitted, it has been suggested, on the
22authority of Re Eethell that the marriage is not only poly-
23gamous but invalid, J notwithstanding the fact that he never
takes more than one‘wife during his life time. In support of
2bthis contention is often cited a host of English decisions
20. “The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages Under English Law11, 
^  K.L.R. 3^1 at p.352. ' ““
21. Dicey and Morris, op.cit., 8th ed. p.276; Westlake, A 
Treatise on Private International Lav/, 7th ed. p.69; Wolff, 
op.cit., pp. .818-819; Beckett, ibid .“"p. 356; Morris, “Recog­
nition of Polygamous Marriages in English Lav/11, 66 Harv.
L.R. (19^3) 9ol at p.976; Sinclair. “Polygamous Marriages 
in English Law11-, 31 B.Y.B.I.L. (195^) 2 ^  at p.2^ +9;
Tolstoy, “The Conversion of a Polygamous Union into a Mono­
gamous Marriage11, 17 I.C.L.Q. (i960) 721 at p.72^; Eekelaar, 
“The Dissolution of Initially Polygamous Marria ges", 15
I.C.L.Q. (1966) 1181 at pp.ll£S3-llt&.
22. (1887) 38 Ch.D.220. There was no finding as to the domicile 
of the Englishman who married an African woman according to 
polygamous rites in Botsv/ana.
23. Dicey and Morris, op .cit., 8th ed. p.283.
2b. Chetti v. Chetti ^1909.7 P.67.5 'R. v. Hammersmith Marriage 
Registrar /191Z/1 K.E. 631+; R. v . Naguib /X91£/ 1 K.B.359;
-continued-
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25a recent analysis of which seems to have led to the agree­
ment, at least by some of the leading writers on English 
private international law,^ that these cases are not good 
authorities for the proposition that the lex loci celebra­
tionis is the appropriate law for determining the incidents 
of a marriage.
It must be pointed out, before leaving this point, that
few exponents of the lex loci rule are now happy to see a
slight modification of the rule for certain purposes. For
27instance, Dr. Morris welcomes a reversal of the rule in
28 29hyde v. Hyde in the recent case of All v. All. In the
latter case it was held that an English court could assume 
jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage which was potentially poly­
gamous at its inception, on the basis that by the time the 
husband instituted divorce proceedings on it in England, the 
marriage had become converted into a monogamous one by the
2b, (continued) __
Srini Vasan v. Srini Vasan P.67; Baindail v.
Ba.ind.ail /±9b6/ P. 122; Maher v. Maher /1951/ ? . 3^ +2; 
and surprisingly, Russ v. Russ /19&±7~V.315 which tends 
to support the view that the personal law governs the 
incidents of a marriage.
25. By Bartholomew, in 13 I.C.L.Q. 1022 at pp.1050-1058.
26. See Cheshire, on.cit.« 7th ed. p.266; Graveson, on.cit..
6th ed. p.261.
27. In 17 I.C.L.Q. (1968) at pp.101^-1015.
28. (1866) L.R. 1 P. & D. 130.
29. Z19667 2 W.L.R. 620.
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subsequent acquisition of a new domicile by the parties in 
England. But while welcoming the decision in this case Dr. 
Morris is still of the opinion that, though logical, it would 
not make sense to hold that the incidents of a marriage con­
tracted in England according to monogamous rites should be 
governed by any other law besides English, even
rlif the parties acquire or resume a domicile in 
some country where the law permits poly gamy11. 30
There is no doubt that what is still dominant in the
minds of these writers is the thought that if the proposition
is accepted that the personal law governs the incidents of a
marriage,
11 the effect would be to deny English matrimonial 
relief to English girls marrying Mohammedans in 
monogamous form in England11. 3 1
Now that the Law Commission in England is in the process of
op
making proposals for the abolition of the jurisdictionalJ as 
well as other^ limitations on the recognition in England of 
foreign polygamous marriages, such proposals, if accepted, 
will deny the proposition that the lex loci celebrationis 
governs the incidents of a marriage any foundation in logic 
and in reason.
30. 17 I.C.L.Q. (1968) p. 1015.
31. Dicey and Morris, op .cit.. 8 th ed., p.277*
32. See the Law Commissions Working Paper No.21 of 26/7/68, 
entitled “Polygamous Marriages1 Para.53. It is signifi­
cant to observe that this Working Paper was prepared by 
Dr. Morris, the general editor of the current edition of 
Dicey and Morris.,
33. Third Annual Report of the Law Commission, 1967/1968 
(No .15) Para.55.
l6o.
That notwithstanding, the number of writers who are not
prepared to allow chauvinistic considerations to affect the
solution of a problem of international dimensions is on the
increase. It is Professor Cheshire who first attacks the view
that the lex loci celebrationis should be applied to determine
the incidents of a marriage. In his opinion, such a solution
“is a flagrant contradiction of the fundamental 
principle that matters of status of husband and 
wife, are regulated solely by the law of domi­
cile, The operation of this principle cannot be 
disturbed ' merely because English ceremonials of 
marriage are available to those whose personal 
law recognises polygamy. Marriage is a univer­
sal institution that includes inter alia both 
monogamous and polygamous unions. These are not 
divergent conceptions, but are variant forms of 
the same genus and they each create the status 
of husband and wife"•
His submission, in view of this argument, is that the appro­
priate law by which to determine whether a husband has capacity 
to take a second wife is the law of the matrimonial domicile.
In view of Professor Graveson1s acceptance of the proposi­
tion that the initial character of a Christian marriage “may 
be changed by the person concerned changing his own domicile", y 
the caveat against the following view seems to have been 
removed in respect of the law which governs the incidents of a 
marriage:
“incidents of status which are or may be exercised 
to effect a transaction, such as marriage or adop­
tion, on which a change of status itself may be 
predicated, are governed by the same law as that 
governing the status of which the particular inci­
dent forms part, that is, in domestic status, 
generally the law of domicile"• 36
3^ -, Cheshire, on .cit.. 7th ed, p.267.
35. Graveson, on.cit.. 6th ed,, p.253*
3 6. Graveson, on.cit.« 6th ed., p,2**2; and also pp.260-261,
This appears a volte-face on the part of Professor Graveson in 
relation to the exclusive application of the lex loci celebra-
p n TO
tionis. as a result of recent English decisions.J
To conclude a consideration of the juristic view as
regards the law governing the incidents of a marriage, the
opinion of Professor Bartholomew must be stated. lie said:
“The function of the lex loci celebrationis in 
relation to marriage is the determination of the form 
of the ceremony. The rights and duties of the 
parties as married persons adhere to status, and it 
is surely a firmly established rule of Private Inter­
national Law that status is determined by the lex 
domicilii of the parties concerned, and therefore it 
would, seem logically to follow that the existence of 
husband's right to take an additional wife if he so 
desires should be determined by the husband's lex 
domicilii" . 39
The Position under the Nigerian Law
It is axiomatic that the view accepted in Nigeria is that 
whatever its form, the aspects of social life which a marriage 
is designed to regulate, and the status emanating therefrom, 
are the same. Indeed the Federal Republican Constitution 
speaks of marriages as including those contracted "under Moslem
37. See Graveson, op .cit., ^th ed . p.13*+.
38. e.g. Att.-Gen. of Ceylon v. Reid </196^7 A.C. 720; Cheni 
v. Cheni /19657 P.85 at p.90 where it was remarked by Sir 
Jocelyn Simon P. that "there are no marriages which are 
not potentially polygamous in the sense that they may be 
rendered so by a change of domicile_and religion on the 
part of the spouses"; Ali v. Ali ^19667 2 W.L.R. 620.
39. Bartholomew, "Polygamous Marriages" 15 M.L.R. (1952) 35 
at pAl.
**0. Cf. Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.cit.. pp.71-72.
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lav; or other Customary law11. . It is therefore least surpri­
sing that right from the coming into effect, of the political
entity known as “Nigeria”, mutation of marriage has been
1 + 2accepted as a concept of the Nigerian marital law as well . 
as a rule of private international law. Consequently, it 
would seem that the personal law of the husband at the time 
of the subsequent marriage ceremony governs the incidents of 
the earlier marriage, including the question of its mutation.
An answer to the question as to which law governs the 
incidents of a marriage was first attempted in 1900 in the 
case of Asiata v. Gonealio. J As will presently be shown, it 
is beyond doubt that the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Lagos was based on the view now current that the personal law 
of the parties at the relevant time has the most significant 
part to play in the determination of the husband’s right to 
take another wife. In that case, Alii Elese, a Nigerian of
*+1. Item 23, Schedule Part I, The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 19^3* See also, s.35 of the Marriage 
Act.
b2. For the limited circumstances under which a marriage can 
alter its initial character under the domestic law. see 
s.35 of the Marriage Ordinance* 188^, (No.l^ of 180*+), now 
re-placed by s.33 of the Marriage Act, Cap.ll55 Laws of 
the Fed. of Nigeria, 1958 ed. There, as we have indicated 
above, a marriage which is potentially (but not actually) 
polygamous may be converted into a monogamous one subse­
quently. But as the case of R. v. Princewell 51963:
.H.N.L.R. 5b has shown, the Nigerian domestic law is yet 
to accept the Ceylonese rule, recently established by the 
Privy Council in Att.-Gen. of Ceylon v. Reid C L9657 A.C. 
720, that in a country with different forms of marriage, 
based on diverse systems of law, a change of faith which 
implies a change also of personal law on the part of the 
husband, should affect his capacity to take an additional 
wife.
^3. (1900) 1 N.L.R. k-Z.
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the Yoruba tribe, was taken as a slave to Brazil. There he 
married Selia, an African freed woman-slave, first, in accor­
dance with Mohammedan rites- and later, by a Christian ceremony 
at a church. Two daughters were born of the marriage. Later 
the husband returned to Lagos with the wife, leaving the two.
n . M l
daughters behind in Brazil. In 1863, the first two Ordinances 
on monogamous marriages were passed. These were replaced in 
lBS^ f by the more comprehensive Marriage Ordinance, which, in 
addition to providing detailed rules for the celebration, and 
the general effects, of monogamous marriages, retrospectively 
validated some "Christian" (i.e. church) marriages already 
contracted in the Colony as a result of the evangelical activi­
ties of the missionaries. Then section 37 of the Ordinance 
provided:
"Any person who is married under this Ordinance, or 
whose marriage before the commencement of this 
Ordinance is declared by this Ordinance to be valid, 
shall be incapable during the continuance of such 
marriage of contracting a valid marriage under any 
native law or custom".
Subsequent to the passing of the 188U- Ordinance, Alii 
contracted in Nigeria a second marriage with a Nigerian woman, 
Asatu, in accordance with Moslem law. The wife of the 
Brazilian monogamous marriage was.still living. By Asatu he
The first Ord., No. 10 of 1863 > came into effect on 1st 
July 1863, and was entitled "An Ordinance to provide for 
the granting of Licenses for Marriage in the Settlement 
of Lagos and its Dependencies". The Second, The Regis­
tration Ordinance, No. 21 of l8639 merely authorised the 
establishment of a procedure for the registration of 
Births, Marriages and Deaths. There was no express 
provision as to whether the marriages in respect of which 
the Governor Was to grant Licenses and which were to be 
registered should be exclusively monogamous or "Christian" 
in character. But this could not have been in doubt 
since it is inconceivable that the Governor would have 
been authorised to deal with polygamous (tribal marriages) 
a year after colonization of. Lagos.
had one child, the plaintiff in the present case, who claimed
to be entitled with the two daughters of the first marriage in
succession to their deceased father’s estate.
Since the first monogamous marriage was not contracted
in Nigeria and was not one of the marriages validated.under
the Ordinance, the court was rightly of the view .that the
first question to be decided was whether the Mohammedan
marriage contracted in Lagos was legal so as to determine
whether the issue of the marriage was legitimate or not. This,
in turn raised the question whether the Brazilian monogamous
marriage was mutable so as to enable the husband to take an
additional wife, and if so, which law governs its mutability.
In the Divisional Court, Rayner, C.J. simply held that
the second marriage contracted in Nigeria was invalid. But on
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the second
marriage was a valid Mohammedan marriage. As regards which
law governs the mutability of the marriage celebrated according
to Chtistian rites in Brazil, it will be instructive to quote
at length some extracts of the judgment given by each of the
Supreme Court judges. According to Griffith, J.,
“There can be no doubt that the Christian marriage 
between Alii and Selia was legal, and in Brazil all 
the legal incidents of marriage would have attached 
to such a marriage. There undoubtedly Alii could 
not legally marry another wToman while Selia remained 
his wife. N0r could he, while Selia was his wife, 
have legally married any other woman in any other 
Christian country. But this is not a.Christian 
country, and by native law (including the Mohammedan 
law) a man can legally have several wives. Such 
polygamous unions would not of course be recognised 
in Christian Countries, but here they are of everyday 
recognition. It is clear from the evidence that Alii, 
was a bona fide follower of the prophet, and as such 
was legally entitled to marry several wives. In such 
circumstances why should his previous Christian
16?.
marriage render illegal his subsequent marriage by 
hohammedan rites. Suppose a Turk in England 
marries a Turkish lady by Christian rites, would 
that render illegal in Turkey a subsequent marriage 
by Mohammedan rites? I should think not. The case 
before us is stronger, as the parties to it were 
ex-slaves dragged against their will to a Christian 
country, whilst to make it clear that they were not 
altogether satisfied with the Christian ceremony, 
they first went through the form of a Mohammedan 
marriage. For the purpose of this case, Lagos is 
as much a Mohammedan country as Turkey, and as we 
ought to apply the Mohammedan law in deciding as to 
the legality of this marriage, I am of the opinion
that the marriage with Asatu was. legal h5
In his judgment, Griffith, J., did not forget the 
interest of the first wife . For he argued that it may be 
considered contrary to justice that Selia, having contracted 
for monogamy should be deprived of the incidents of that 
marriage. But it was clear, he said, that the contract which 
a Christian marriage would ordinarily imply was clearly not 
implied in the case under consideration as Selia not only 
went through the Mohammedan ceremony first, but did not appear 
to have raised the slightest objection to her husband’s subse­
quent marriage with another woman; whilst after the husband’s 
death she accepted the validity of the subsequent marriage by
requiring the child of the marriage to make, together with her
own daughters, a joint conveyance of the husband’s property.
In a concurring judgment Speed, C.J., was more succint. 
He said:
”1 do not admit that the parties in this case 
contracted a Christian marriage at all. They
^5. (1900) 1 N.L.R. h2 at pp.
were Mohammedans, and they merely for local reasons 
went through the marriage in Christian form“. ' *+6
In other words, that the Brazilian marriage was a valid poly­
gamous marriage which was celebrated in a monogamous form.
The territorial as well as the non-territorial connection 
which made the Lagos law the relevant one for the determination 
of the legal incidents of the monogamous marriage, including 
its mutation, was provided by the concurring judgment of Morgan, 
J., when he remarked that the husband and his plural wives 
“were all Mohammedan natives of this country having their domi-
L|_7
cile here". '
From these concurring judgments, it becomes clear that 
all the judges did not deny the fact that the marriage contrac­
ted by the parties in Brazil was one, to borrow the words of 
the Interpretation Act,
“which is recognised by the law of the place where 
it is contracted as a voluntary union of one man 
and one woman to the exclusion of all others during 
the continuance of the marriage** .
nonetheless, the initial character of the marriage did not
deter them from classifying the marriage as a polygamous one
which enabled the husband to take another wife in Nigeria,
according to his personal law.
In their comments on this case, Messrs Easunmu and
Salacuse state that “the judgment showed a lack of appreciation
kg
of the issues involved*1. On the contrary, it must be submit­
ted that these learned authors demonstrate by the above statement
*+6. As i at a v. Gone alio (1900) 1 N.L.R. *f2, at pp. *+3 to M+. 
^7 . Ibid., pM5.
*+8. Kasunmu and Salacuse, op .cit.. p.98.
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a singularly naive idea of what the case was all about. Their 
analysis of the case was not only wrong: the reason ascribed
for the decision is not borne out by the facts of the case.
For example, they were of the opinion that the classification ' 
of the marriage celebrated in Brazil was not necessary to the 
decision since, according to them, the second marriage contrac­
ted in Nigeria would be valid whether or not the Brazilian 
marriage was monogamous or polygamous. This view was based 
on the erroneous assumption that the Nigerian Mohammedan 
marriage was celebrated before l8Qb when the law
“did not prevent one who was married monogamously 
from marrying another woman under customary law, 
nor was conversion of marriage known then1 . ^9
On the contrary, the judgment of Griffith J., made it plain
that the Mohammedan marriage contracted in Nigeria took place
501 subsequent to the passing of the Marriage Ordinance, 188*+“ , 
when it became unlawful for a person who contracted a monogamous 
marriage under it to contract a subsequent marriage according 
to customary law. Moreover, it has been shown above that 
section 35 of the Ordinance was a provision on conversion of 
marriage.
Secondly, and more serious, these authors were of the
view that the operative facts on which the judgments were based
were as to- whether a second mcncjgamous ceremony solemnized in .
Brazil by the parties converted their first Mohammedan marriage,
also contracted in the country, and what law decided the ques-
51tion of the conversion. Whereas there is no room for doubt
*+9« Kasunmu and Salacuse, op .cit.. p.9&*
50. Asiata v. Goncallo (1900) 1 N.L.R. k2 at p.^ +3*
51. Kasunmu and Salacuse, ibid.
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that the Mohammedan ceremony performed by the husband and his 
first wife in Brazil was regarded by all the judges as of no 
legal significance in Brazil since it was a Christian country.
Bor example, Griffith J., prefaced his judgment with the 
following remarks:
521 The question here is whether a Christian marriage 
between native Mohammedans in a country to which 
they were taken as slaves renders invalid a subse­
quent marriage here by the husband during the 
subsistence of the first marriage.1 52
Then he wrote:
“There con be no doubt that the Christian marriage 
between Alii and Selia was legal.“ 53
Thus regarding the Christian marriage as the first and the only
legal one contracted in Brazil, he continued to associate the
Christian marriage with legality not less than six other places
in the two-page judgment which he gave in the case.
Speed, Ag. C.J., said:
“I have seen and considered the judgment of my 
learned brother with which I entirely agreed’1.
Then, he too observed:
“I do not admit that the parties in this case 
contracted a Christian marriage at all. They were 
Mohammedans, and they merely for local reasons, 
went through the marriage ceremony in Christian 
form."
Explained in other words, what the judge was saying was that he 
did not believe the parties wanted the incidents of monogamy to 
attach to a marriage, which to all intents and purposes, was 
meant to be polygamous and which, for want of a valid Mohammedan
55ceremony in Brazil, was celebrated in a monogamous form.
52. Emphasis.supplied.
53. Asiata v. Goneall6 (1900) 1 N.L.R. b2 at p. ^ 3*
5*+. Ibid. at p. 43. '
55* Contra. Salacuse, “Birth, Death and the Marriage Act: Some
Problems in Conflict of Laws", in The Nigerian Law Journal, 
Vol.l, 59 st p.63. The learned author was of the view .that
by^GrJffS£hCjf*'s °Piniou was a rejection of the one expresse<
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Otherwise, Speed Ag. C.J. would not be agreeing entirely with 
the judgment of Griffith J. but fundamentally' disagreeing with 
it.
The same observations may be made about the concurring 
56judgment of Morgan, J.
From this analysis of the case, it will be seen that 
57Asiata v. Gonealio cannot be an authority for the proposition
as to which law determined the conversion of a customary marriage.
into a monogamous one, when all the circumstances justifying the
conversion occurred in the same territorial district, as claimed
by Messrs Kasunmu and Salacuse. Rather the case determines
what law governs the mutation of a monogamous marriage when the
parties thereto, subsequently acquire or resume a domicile in a
country where polygamous marriage is permitted. The rationes
decidendi of the case are not obscure as has been stated by Mr.
58Salacuse. They are, (a) that mutation of a monogamous 
marriage by the subsequent acquisition or resumption of domicile 
in a country where polygamy is permitted is a rule of Nigerian 
private international law; (b) that the right of the husband 
to take an additional wife is an incident of marriage and (c) 
that such matter of incident is governed by the lex domicilii 
of the parties at the time of the second ceremony.
A slightly different situation to the one in Asiata v.
59 t, 60Gone alio occurred in Adegbola v. Folaranmi twenty-one years
later. In that case, a Nigerian, Harry Johnson, contracted in
56. (1900) 1 N.L.R. at p.45. 57. Ibid.
58.op.clt., p.63.
59. (1900) 1 N.L.R. kZ.
60. (1921) 3 H.L.R. 89.
Nigeria, a valid marriage which was potentially polygamous with 
a Nigerian woman, Oniketan, according to customary law rites.
The plaintiff was the legitimate child of the marriage. There­
after, Johnson was taken as a slave to the Nest Indies where, 
curing a stay of about *+0 years, he contracted another marriage 
with Mary according to Christian rites. Three years after his 
marriage in Trinidad, Johnson returned to Nigeria with Hary and■ 
both established a matrimonial home in Lagos. In 1900, Johnson 
died intestate thereby leaving Mary to manage his properties,
Mary herself died in 1918. By her'will, she devised all the 
properties to the defendant. The plaintiff claimed as the 
legitimate child of the deceased to succeed to the intestate 
estate of Harry Johnson according to customary lav/.
Implicit in the whole issue was again the nature and the 
effect of the marriage celebrated according to Christian rites 
in Trinidad. If it was monogamous, then the succession fell to 
be governed by the general law; whereas if it was polygamous, 
customary law would apply. And preliminary to any question of 
classification was the one as to whether the marriage could ever 
have been valid in view of the subsistence of the potentially 
polygamous marriage of Harry Johnson. A full Supreme Court 
(comprising of different judges from those that decided Asiata’s 
case) affirmed the decision of the Divisional Court and held 
that notwithstanding the non-production of a marriage certifi­
cate in respect of the Trinidadian marriage, it was a valid 
monogamous marriage which must be recognised as such in Nigeria. 
Faced with the uneasy task of holding that the monogamous 
marriage was validly contracted during the subsistence of a valid 
potentially polygamous marriage, the learned judges wriggled out
of the difficulty by presuming that at the time of.the second 
marriage in Trinidad, Johnson must have thought that he and his 
customary lav; wife "were absolved from all obligations to ^each/ 
other" and that he was free to marry again. As it happened, and 
to the knowledge of all the judges, however, Oniketan was not 
only alive, both at the time of the second marriage and at the 
time of Johnson's return to Nigeria, but also continued to stay 
at the family home of the husband with the child of the customary 
law marriage, never taking another "husband". But on the pre­
sumption that the customary lav/ marriage had been validly dis­
solved, the court bastardised .the child■of the valid polygamous 
marriage and held that he had no right to inherit his deceased 
father's estate. It is needless to state that this particular 
aspect of the decision had invited a lot of criticism.^
By classifying the marriage celebrated according to 
Christian rites in Trinidad as monogamous, there is no doubt 
that the judges must have proceeded on the following bases;
(a) that the subsequent celebration of a monogamous marriage 
with another woman in Trinidad by Harry Johnson, during the 
subsistence of his potentially polygamous marriage, abrogated 
the status of husband and wife previously created betv/een him 
and Oniketan by their Nigerian lex domicilii; (b) that the
incidents of this foreign monogamous marriage were immutably and
inescapably fixed by the form of celebration according to the 
lex loci celebrationis and that Harry Johnson's subsequent 
acquisition, or resumption, of domicile in Nigeria v/as irrele­
vant. It is also obvious that no reference was made to the
6l. Coker, Family Property Among the Yorubas (2nd ed.) p.30*+; 
Obi, Modern Family Lav/ in Southern Nigeria, p.183. As 
pointed out by Coker, intention alone is not sufficient to 
dissolve a marriage at customary lav/. "To dissolve a 
marriage, an act in law is necessary, however formal or
trivial such act is".
decision in Asiata1s case which constituted a binding authority
on the court, if the doctrine of precedent had any value with
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the old Supreme Court. Adegbola v. Folaranmi can, therefore, 
be criticised on the ground that it is difficult to reconcile 
with prior authority.
But apart from that, the question is, should the marriage 
have been classified as monogamous and with invalidating effect 
on the status of the child of the customary marriage? Harry 
Johnson, on his arrival in Nigeria, not only'.-visited his cus­
tomary law wife, but allowed the child of that marriage to visit 
him and liary in Lagos. Assuming that Mary was not aware of 
the previous marriage at the time of her marriage with Johnson 
in Trinidad, was she not conscious of the position three years 
later when she arrived in Lagos? Could her acquiescence for 
2b years in the renewed association between Harry Johnson, his 
customary law wife, and. the child of that marriage, not lead, to 
the presumption that the Christian marriage was in fact intended 
to be polygamous? Had Nigeria ceased to be a "polygamous
6 b-
country" in 1921 as it was stated to be in Asiata v. Gonealio 
in 1900? If we assume that Harry Johnson lost his Nigerian 
domicile as a result of his enforced residence as a slave in 
Trinidad, did he not resume it when he returned to Nigeria and 
lived there for 2b- years prior to his death? . A short answer to 
the inquiries is that Harry Jo|mson, having been found by the 
Supreme Court .to have contracted a valid marriage which was
62. (1921)'3 N.L.R. 89.
63. Ibid . at p.90.
6b-. (1900) 1 N.L.R. b-2.
still subsisting at the time of the. second marriage, had no 
capacity to contract any other valid marriage, except an 
actually polygamous one, whatever the form of the ceremony em­
ployed.
Even the courts of most European countries- where polygamy 
is not permitted would not have reached, under their conflicts 
rules, the same decision as the one arrived at by the Supreme
65Court of Lagos in Adegbola v. Folaranmi. had they been seised 
of the case. At worst, on the principle of universality of 
status, only the second marriage performed according to Christian 
rites would have been declared void, in so far as it was con­
tracted during the subsistence of a valid, albeit potentially 
polygamous, marriage; being a polygamous marriage contracted 
in Nigeria according to the Nigerian personal law of the parties 
at the time of its celebration.^ Indeed the Western Australian
65. (1921) 3 N.L.R. 89.
66. For English law, see Baindail v. Baindail £L9b6/ P.122;
Srini Vasan v. Srini Vasan £L9b6/ P.67*, Mehta v, Mehta
ll9b$/ 2 All E.R. 690; Sinha Peerage Claim / 1 9 W  1 All 
E.R. 3^ 8.1 Shahnaz v. Rizwan /196b-/ 2 All E.R. 993; Ali 
v. Ali /I966/ 2 IJ.L.R. 620; Imam Din v. National Assistance 
Board £L9d77 2 Q.B. 213; Alha.ii Mohammed v. Knott 
2 W.L.R. 1HW.
Canadian law. In Kaur v. Ginder (1958) 13 D .L.R. (2D) b-65, 
a girl contracted a potentially polygamous marriage with 
a British Columbian domiciliary■in India, according to 
Hindu rites. Later she went through another ceremony of 
marriage, according to monogamous form, in Washington, 
with another man. It was held that the Indian marriage
created a valid status recognizable in British Columbia
and accordingly operated as a complete bar to her re­
marriage with another man during the subsistence of the 
Indian marriage.
American law, the conflicts rules of.almost all the American 
states recognise only a de facto monogamy, regardless of 
the fact that it was created by monogamous or polygamous 
rites; provided that the form employed is valid according 
to the lex loci celebrationis. A subsequent marriage 
contracted by whatever form during the existence of an 
earlier Carriage is void. See Polydore v. Prince (1837)
1 Ware b-02; Fed Cas. No. 11257; Williams v. Oates (l8b-5)
-continued-
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courts might have been disposed to declare the two marriages 
valid as polygamous ones, and their issues legitimate for pur­
pose of intestate succession, under certain conditions, on the
67
authority of Hague v. Hague.
Commenting on Adegbola v. Folaranmi^  Obi^ has suggested 
that the Supreme Court of Lagos should have applied the common
66. (continued)
27 H.C. *+39; Loyal v. Cudhay Packing Co. (1922) 195 la. 
759; 190 I'T.VJ. *+27, esp. at p.42b; Re Dalip Singh Bir!s
Sstate (19^8) 188 Pac..2d. ^99. Indeed, if the last (a 
Californian) case is representative of the attitude of 
American law to polygamy, one may,state with Bartholomew,
13 I.C.L.Q. (196m-) 1022 at p. 1068 et seq., that what 
public policy does not permit in America at present appears 
only to be the exercise by the husband of the rights 
associated with a de facto plurality of wives, e.g* the 
right of co-habitation with more than one wife. Bor in 
the last esse, it was held that both wives of a Pakistani 
who died in California could succeed to his intestate 
estate in California. In his judgment, Adam, J., re­
marked: “Public policy would not be affected by dividing
the money equally between two wives, particularly since 
there is no contest between them and they are the only 
interested parties", ibid. at p. 502. See also Restate­
ment Second, of the Conflicts of Laws. (Tent. Draft No. )^ 
of April 1957; s. 128 and s. 132, Comment b.
French Law. As pointed out in Chapter 1, an actually poly­
gamous marriage, if valid according to the personal lav/s 
of the parties at the time they were celebrated, would be 
recognised in France so as to entitle each of the plural 
wives to assert in the country her full marital rights.
See the decision of Civ. Jan. 1958, D. 1958, 265; .and 
also, Von Landauer in 13 I.C.L.Q. at p.22.
67. /I9637 W.A.R. 15; affirmed by the High Court of Australia, 
(1962) 108 C.L.R. 230; The facts of the case were that the 
deceased, Abdul Haque, was at all times domiciled in India 
although he had resided in VJestern Australia for about 30 
years except while he was on periodic visits to India. In 
September 1951? Abdul entered into a marriage, in Western 
Australia, with Azra who was domiciled in Pakistan. The 
ceremony of marriage was according to Moslem rites. There 
were two children of this marriage. At the time of the 
Western Australian marriage, Abdul already had a wife, Bibi, 
and two children by her, living in India. In India, in 
195^5 Re purported to dissolve his marriage with Azra by 
pronouncing three talaks according to Moslem law. Before 
his death, Abdul had made a will which the court found to
be void. The question for determination in the case was as- 
to who, out of the two wives and four children, were en­
titled to succeed on the intestacy of Abdul.
It was held, per Wolff C. J., in the Supreme,Court of
-continued-
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law rule recently enforced in the English case of Chard, v. Chard. ^  
In that case, it was held that the second monogamous marriage 
contracted in the erroneous belief that the spouse of a first 
marriage (also monogamous) was dead, was void ab initio on the 
discovery of the existence of the spouse of the first marriage.
Thus applying this'rule to Adegbola’s case, Obi contends that 
the second marriage of Harry Johnson which was contracted in 
'Trinidad should have been held void. With this view, we must 
disagree. It is submitted that such a solution can only be 
justified by someone who regards the problem from the view-point 
of the English domestic law. Such view disregards the private 
international aspect of the case. Since polygamy is permitted 
in Nigeria, and since mutation of marriage is a concept of the
67. (continued) Western Australia that:
1. Abdul was validly married to Bibi according to the law 
of his domicile and that the marriage was potentially poly­
gamous .
2. His second marriage, also according to the law of his 
domicile, was lawful. Its celebration in Western Australia 
in a form not authorised by the law of that state was not 
fatal since the ceremony conformed to the personal laws of 
both parties and since the marriage would be recognised in 
India and Pakistan where Abdul and Azra were each domiciled 
at the time of the marriage.
3. That the talak divorce effected in India in 195*+ was 
valid since it was in accordance with the personal law of 
the parties.
b. Consequently, that the wife of the first marriage, 
Eibi, her two children and. the two children of Azra, the 
second wife, all succeeded on the intestacy of Abdul to all 
his movable properties in W. Australia.
68. (1921) 3 N.L.R. 89.
69. op.cit., p.183.
70. Z~9567 P.256.
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Wigerian law, it is our opinion that though the Trinidadian
marriage had been celebrated according to Christian rites, it
should have been classified as a polygamous, one, thus enabling
the wife and children (assuming that there were any) of. that
marriage to succeed on the intestacy of the deceased together
with the wife and children of his earlier marriage. Such a
solution is not only just; it would also have been consonant
with the expectation of all the parties. Moreover, it would
have been based on the proposition.that.the incidents' of a
marriage are governed by the personal law of the parties, a
71proposition which has the support of Asiata v. Conealio.
Me may conclude this section by drawing attention to the
fact that the solution reached in Asiata’s case is substantially
72the one adopted in the Canadian case of Connolly v. Woolrich
71and the Mestern Australian case of Hague v. Hague, the one in
7 if
force in Holland as a result of the Dutch-Indonesian relations,
75and. the one favoured by the American law. Thus in the Canadian 
case, Monk, J., drew a distinction between the role of the lex 
loci celebrationis and that of the lex domicilii as regards the 
determination of the incidents of a marriage. Connolly was born 
in Lower Canada where he had his domicile of origin. At the 
age of 17, he married an Indian girl of the Cree tribe in the
71. (1900) 1 N.L.R. b2.
72. (1867) 11 Lower Canada Jurist, 197.
73. ZI963.7 T*J.A.K. 15; (1962) 108 C.L.R. 230. The case was
discussed in n.67 above.
7*+. See R. D. Kollewi.jn,. “.Conflicts of Mestern and Non-Western 
Law” in b I.L.Q. at pp.322-323.
75. Supra., n.66.
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:orth Test Territories of Canada according to tribal rites.
The marriage was performed in the tribe, at which Connolly was 
resident at the time. The spouses cohabited for about 30 years 
in the tribe before they both returned to Lower Canada. There, 
Connolly left his Indian wife and purported to contract a 
marriage with another woman according to monogamous form. In a 
succession suit, the validity of the Cree tribal marriage was 
challenged on the footing that it was potentially polygamous and 
was a marriage which could not be validly celebrated by a person 
of a different race.
Monk, J., held that notwithstanding the fact that the 
initial character of the marriage was polygamous according to 
the laws of the Cree tribe, it was a marriage that would be 
recognised in Lower Canada. But as regards the right of the 
husband to take a second wife in Lower Canada, Monk, J., treated 
it as an incident of the marriage to be governed by the law of 
Lower Canada, the lex domicilii. He therefore held that the 
second marriage celebrated according to Christian rites in 
Lower Canada was void. This decision was based on the finding 
of fact that, though resident in the North West Territories for 
about 30 years, Connolly never lost his domicile of origin.
We have indicated above that the English law is tending 
towards this approach as could be discovered from recent deci­
sions of the English courts. For instance, the decision of 
Cumming-Eruce, J., in Ali v. Ali/u lends support to the mounting 
juristic view in favour of the lex domicilii of the parties 
governing the right of the husband to take a subsequent wife.
76. /19667 2 W.L.R. 620.
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In Ali’s case, it was held that a potentially polygamous marriage 
was converted into a monogamous one by the husband's subsequent 
acquisition of a domicile of choice in England. This, therefore, 
enabled the court to assume jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage
on the ground of the husband’s adultery with another woman,
after the acquisition of an English domicile. If the incidents 
of a marriage is immutably fixed at the outset, by or through 
subsequent events occurring at the lex loci celebrationis, it 
is difficult to explain how the potentially polygamous marriage 
between Mr. and Mrs. Ali came to be classified as a monogamous 
one except on the ground that the proposition that the lex loci 
celebrationis determines the incidents of a marriage has never 
been part of the English conflicts rules, or if it was, has now 
been rejected
ri Q
On the basis that Adegbola v. Folaranmi is a bad law, 
the conclusions reached on the authority of Asiata v. Goncallo^^ 
may be stated as follows*
1. The initial character of a marriage is determined by 
the form of ceremony according to the law of the place 
where the marriage was celebrated.
2. The right of a husband to take an additional wTife is
governed by his personal law at the time, of the sub­
sequent ceremony. Hence
77. Cf. Professor Jackson, uMonogamous Polygamyl/ in ^0 Aust. L.J. 
1^8 at pp. l^-l^O, where he states, on the authority of
Ali v. Ali. that in the final result it was the English law 
of domicile of the Alis which decided the incident of the . 
marriage.
78. (1921) 3 h.L.R. 89.
79. (1900) 1 IT.L.R. k2.
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(a) A marriage which was celebrated in a monogamous 
form according to the law of the place of 
celebration may become polygamous by the subse­
quent acquisition or resumption of a domicile 
in a country where polygamy is permitted.
(b) A marriage which was celebrated in a polygamous 
form according to the law of the place of cele­
bration may become monogamous by the subsequent 
acquisition or resumption of a domicile in a 
country where only monogamy is permitted.
3. TEE LAW DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A MARRIAGE .■
(a) Evaluation of the two rival basic principles
There are two basic rival principles known since the era 
of the statutists governing the requirements of marriage in 
private international law. The first principle, accepted by 
most legal systems of the world, distinguishes between the forms 
and the essentials in the choice of the law governing the vali­
dity of the marriage. This is based on the theory that marriage 
creates not merely a contract between the parties thereto,.but a 
personal status, which is in the interest of the countries to 
which the parties belong to regulate and protect. According to 
this principle, all matters of form, which has been defined as 
Mthe external conduct required by the parties or of third^?fpe-n 
cially public officers, necessary to the formation of a legally
Sovalid marriage”, are left to the determination of the lex loci
1. Rabel, The Conflict of Laws Vol.I (2nd ed.) p.22*+.
l8o.
celebrationis. Matters which constitute the intrinsic condi­
tions of the marriage, e.g. the absence of relationship within 
the prohibited degrees of consanguinity, affinity and adoption, 
non-age and consent of the parties to the marriage, are submit­
ted for determination by the personal laws of the parties.
Even though a marriage is validly celebrated abroad according to 
local form, the personal lav/s of the parties, determined either 
y nationality, domicile, religion or ethnic identity, prescribe 
conditions with which the marriage must conform before it can 
be regarded as valid. These matters of effective limitation 
are, in the words of Professor Graveson,
"regarded as vital to the maintenance of an accep­
ted standard in the matrimonial and family relations 
of any given society." 81
It follows, therefore, that the purpose of the subjectl°of the 
essential requirements of marriage to the personal law is to 
ensure that the creation of a contract of marriage, which the 
state recognises by the conferment of its domestic status of 
husband and wife, wherever made, is not seriously out of line 
with the thinking behind the state's municipal law.
The second principle which originates in the contract 
theory, extends the theory to a contract creating status: 
consequently, it makes no distinction between the formal and 
essential requirements of marriage. Both matters of form and 
essentials are submitted to the law of the place where the con­
tract of marriage was made, i.e. the lex loci celebrationis. The 
English courts applied this principle until the middle of the
8l. Graveson, The Conflict of haws (6th ed..) p.262.
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19th century before it was abandoned in favour of the first 
principle. This is the basic rule in the United States of
0-5
America although as pointed out by several American Authorities
an exception is made in most cases to the general rule by both
the common law rules and legislative prohibitions of the state
in which the parties may be domiciled (immediately after the
marriage) as regards such matters as non-age, incest, bigamy or 
81+
miscegenation. This is done so as to give effect to the 
stringent public policy of the state where the spouses are domi­
ciled and the result is that a marriage otherwise validly 
celebrated according to the lex loci celebrationis may be refused
recognition if it offends the personal law of the parties.
85Host of the countries adopting this principle also recognise 
exceptions to the general rule that a marriage validly contracted 
at the place of celebration is valid everywhere. For example, 
the Montevideo Convention of 19*+0, signed by a group of Latin- 
Arnerican countries^ provides in its article 13 that
82. Scrimshire v. Scrimshire (1752) 2 Hagg. Con. 395; Dalrymple 
v « Dalrymple (lBll) 2 Hagg. Con. 5*+; Jones v. Robinson 
(I8l5), 2 Phill. Ecc. 285.
83. See Restatement Second. Para. 121 (Tent. Draft No.V of 195%) 
Goodrich, Handbook of the Conflict of Laws (M-th ed. by 
Scoles) p.228.
Qb. See for example, Goodrich, op.cit.. pp.232 et seq.
85. Notably the Philippines, Argentina, Guatemala, Paraguay, 
Peru, Costa Rica, Denmark and Switzerland. For a detailed 
operation of this principle in each of these countries, see 
I, Rabel, op.cit.. pp.267-280.
86. Uruguay, Colombia, Bolivia, Argentina, Peru and Paraguay.
“The capacity of persons to contract marriage, the 
form of the act byywhich. it is contracted, the fact 
that the act did take place, and its validity, are 
governed by the law of the place where it was per­
formed,”
but went on to enumerate certain impediments on account of which 
the signatory states may refuse to accord recognition to a 
marriage validly celebrated according to the lex loci celebra­
tionis . These relate to age, relationship within degrees of 
consanguinity and affinity, bigamy, etc. The effect is that 
what the first principle achieves by positive rule is attained 
by way of exception by the second principle. The result is 
that scarcely is there any system of private international law 
in which the personal law of the parties does not have a say in 
the validity of their marriage.
There is no doubt as to which of these two principles 
governs the validity of monogamous marriages in Nigerian private 
international law. The position in relation to polygamous 
marriages will separately be considered later in the light of 
the above discussion.
(b) Monogamous Marriages
(i) Formal validity of marriage
Although there was lack of direct judicial or statutory 
confirmation on this point in Nigeria before March 1970* there 
can be no doubt that as a consequence of the reception of the 
English common law in Nigeria, the almost universal two-fold 
rule of determining the formal validity of marriage by the lex 
loci celebrationis and the essential validity by the lex
183.
domicilii is as much part of the Nigerian law as well as English 
law.8? ' V
Thus, as early as 1361, the House of Lords1 decision in
88 .Brook v. Brook has finally settled.the choice of law rule
governing the requirement.of a, monogamous marriage. In that
case the law was authoritatively stated as follows:
“There can be no doubt of the general rule that 
’a foreign marriage, valid according to the law of 
a country where it is celebrated is good, everywhere1.
But while the forms of entering into.the contract of 
marriage are to be regulated by the lex loci contrac­
tus , the law of the country in which it is celebrated, 
the essentials of the contract depend upon the lex 
domicilii, the law of the country in which the parties 
are domiciled, at the'time of the marriage, and in 
which matrimonial residence is contemplated. Although 
the forms of celebrating the foreign marriage may be 
different from those required by the law of the country 
of domicile, the marriage may be good everywhere. Eut 
if the contract of marriage is such, in essentials, as 
to be contrary to the law of the country of domicile, 
and it is declared void by that law, it is to be re­
garded as void in the country of domicile, though not 
contrary to the law of the country in which it was 
celebrated.1 89
Statutory force has now been given in Nigeria to the common law
rule that the lex loci celebrationis determines the formal
validity of a marriage by section 3 (1) (c) of the Matrimonial
90Causes Decree, 1970. This sub-section provides tnat a marriage
87. See, as to the general statement that the rules of English 
private international law apply in Nigeria, Arlnze v. Arinze 
Q.966J N.M.L.R. I?? and Benson v. Ashiru [19&TI N.M.L.R. 383*
88. (1861) 9 H.L.C. 193.
89. Brook v. Brook (1861) 9 H.L.C. 193 at p. 207, per Lord
Campbell.
90. Decree No. 18 of 1970 (A federal enactment) contained in
Extraordinary Federal Gazette ITo. 15, Vol. 57 of 20/3/70.
which takes place after the commencement of the Decree, i.e.
17th March 1970, shall be void if it is
"not a valid marriage under the law of the place 
where the marriage takes place, by reason of a 
failure to comply with the,requirement of the law 
of that place with respect to the form of solemni­
zation of /monogamous/ marriages".
But as the distinction between form and essence is not 
absolute, under this approach, the question as to whether a 
particular requirement is an essential or a formality may raise 
some neat problems of classification, especially in border-line 
cases, as the experience in English conflict of laws has shown.
In English lav;, matters of essential validity of a marriage 
comprise age, consent of the parties themselves, fraud, mistake, 
duress, and statutory prohibitions against marriage within cer­
tain degree of consanguinity, affinity or adoption;' while 
matters as to the form of the ceremony of marriage itself, e.g. 
the publication of banns or giving of due notice, and the
91presence of a priest, registrar or a party to the marriage are
92
classified as formalities of the marriage.
English law differs, however, from the legal systems of 
many European countries by classifying parental consent as a 
formal requirement of marriage.  ^ But since tne Nigerian
91. Apt v. Apt /191+7A P*127 followed in Ponticelli v. Ponticelli 
Z19587 P.20^.
92. See Graveson, op.cit., (6th ed.) p.263.
93. Simonin v . Hallac (i860), 2 Sw. & Tr. 67> Ogden v . Ogden 
/l908/ P.*+6; See also Collett v. Collett /1962/ 3 U.L.R.
280 at p.28J. ;
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municipal law is substantially based on. the English law, it is 
hardly surprising that the above English categories of formali­
ties sad essentials would seem to be consonant with the sprit of
the Nigerian municipal law. Thus, section 33 (2) of the Marriage
Act provides that a monogamous marriage shall be void if both 
parties knowingly and wilfully acquiesce in its celebration 
under the following circumstances:
(a) In any place other than the Registrar’s office or 
a licensed place of worship, except otherwise 
authorised, by licence; ■,
(b) Under a false name or names;
(c) Without a Registrar’s certificate or a licence duly
issued;
(d) Ey a person who is not an authorised minister of 
religion or a registrar of marriages.
It was further provided by section 33(1) of the Act that
”A marriage may lawfully be celebrated under this 
Act between a man and the sister or niece of his 
deceased wife, but save as aforesaid, no marriage 
in Nigeria shall be valid which, if celebrated in 
England would be null end void on the ground of 
kindred or affinity".
This section has now been replaced by the Matrimonial Causes
Oli.
Decree, 1970.J Sections 3 and 5 of the Decree provide that a 
marriage that takes place after the commencement of the Decree,'
i.e. 17th March, 1970, shall be void on any of the following 
grounds:
(a) Existence of a prior marriage by either of the partie
(b) Prohibited degrees of consanguinity, or affinity;
(c) Lack of consent as a.result of duress or fraud;
63. No. 18 of 1970 (a Federal enactment).
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(d) Mistaken identity as to the other person, or as to 
the nature of the marriage contract;
(e) Mental incapacity to understand the nature of the 
marriage contract;
(f) Non-age;
(g) Insanity or other mental defectiveness, epilepsy, 
presence of venereal disease in a communicable form, 
or pregnancy of the wife through a person not her 
husband, at the time of the marriage.
A curious omission in both the Marriage Act and the Matrimonial
Ceuses Decree is the vital requirement as to the age of marriage.
Finally, the consent of a parent or guardian to the marriage of
a person below the age of 21 is made a necessity by section 18
of the Marriage Act, but the provision as to parental consent is
less imperative since its non-observance does not vitiate a
95marriage otherwise valid under the Act.
Two points emerge clear from the above provisions of the
Marriage Act and the Matrimonial Causes Decree. Firstly, the
enactments separate invalidating acts affecting the ceremony of
marriage from those affecting the intrinsic requirements of the
marriage. Secondly, if, unlike most systems of law, the absence
of parental consent has no invalidating effect on a marriage
contracted under the Nigerian Act, it is difficult to discover
under what basis such requirement can be regarded as an essential
96of a marriage under the municipal lav;,
95. Agbo v. Udo (19^7) 18 N.L.R. 1?2.
96. The "typical attitude" writes Prof. A. Phillips in the Sur­
vey of African Marriages and Family Life, at p. xxxv "of 
Africans towards statutory marriage, as disclosed by a 
survey of the whole field ... is one of resistance to any 
attempt to impose this form of marriage upon them as an 
obligatory requirement." Perhaps the only explanation that 
could therefore be given for dispensing with the consent of
parents or guardians for the validity of a marriage under
the Act was to facilitate the formation of monogamous 
marriage even in the teeth of parental opposition to such 
marricges curing the colonial period.
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But whether or not this municipal classification of paren­
tal consent as merely a ceremonial aspect of a marriage should be 
adopted for purposes of Nigerian private international law is a 
different matter. As previously stated, most European laws, 
except the English conflict of laws, classify consent of parents 
or guardians for a marriage of parties who have not reached a 
certain age as coming under the general rule regarding the capa­
city of the parties to marry. Much more, under all systems of 
customary law in Nigeria and in Africa as well, the opposition 
of a father to the marriage of his minor child or in some places, 
that of an adult child, renders such marriage completely void.
For the Nigerian courts to carry forward the municipal classi­
fication into the Nigerian private international law with the 
result that parental consent should be regarded as a matter of 
form to be governed by the lex loci celebrationis, will not only 
produce a great hardship but cause a lot of injustice. Thus, by 
way of illustration, we may suppose that A, a Kenya man domi­
ciled in Kenya, married in Lagos a Nigerian woman, B, domiciled 
in the Lagos State. At the time of the marriage, A was 17 years 
old while B was aged 16. The marriage took place without the 
knowledge either of his parents or of her parents. It may be 
further supposed that by the law of Kenya, a marriage contrac­
ted without parental consent by a male person who is below the 
age of 18 is a complete nullity.^ After the marriage the 
parties went to settle in Kenya.
If a Nigerian court is to determine the validity of the 
marriage, two approaches are possible. The first is to classify
97. This will, in fact, be the law of Kenya on this point if 
the recommendation of the Commission for the reform of the 
laws of marriage and divorce in Kenya is accepted.
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parental consent as a formal requirement of the marriage as in 
the domestic law. The second is to say that such municipal 
classification need not be extended to a conflict of laws case 
and to classify it as a substantive requirement of the marriage 
as under the law of Kenya. By adopting the first approach, the 
court will have determined the validity of the marriage as 
regards the requirement for parental consent by the lex loci 
celebrationis, i.e. the Nigerian law on monogamous marriage, 
whereas the adoption of the second approach will result in the 
court regarding such provision of the Kenya law as relating to 
the capacity of the husband to marry and therefore governed by 
the lex domicilii, which is also the matrimonial domicile of 
the parties. Consequently the foreign statute requiring the 
consent of the husband’s parents would have been construed as 
in the country of its enactment, with the result that the 
marriage will not only be void in Kenya but equally of no legal 
significance in Nigeria. Under the first approach, however, 
even if the marriage is invalid in Kenya it will still be 
regarded as valid in Nigeria because absence of parental consent 
does not vitiate a marriage celebrated in Nigeria by the Nigerian 
woman under the Act. Therefore, a subsequent marriage
celebrated in Nigeria by the Nigerian woman either under the 
Act, Moslem or customary law will not only be invalid but 
bigamous as well.^ The result of classifying parental 
consent as a mere formality of marriage will be the 
introduction of the unsatisfactory phenomenon - that of
98. See on this point, s.370 of the Criminal Code of Southern
Nigeria as interpreted in H. v. Princewell 1963 .IH.N.L.R. 
5*+. Presumably this interpretation will also govern the 
similar provision of the Criminal Code of Northern Nigeria, 
^•38^.
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limping marriages - i.e. when the parties are regarded, as married 
in one country but unmarried in the other, into the system of 
Nigerian private international law.
The facts of the above hypothetical case are. substantially 
the same with that of the English case of Ogden v. Ogden^  where 
Sir Gorrell Barnes, F. regarded the requirement for parental 
consent stipulated as an absolute requirement by the French lex 
domicilii of the husband as a formal one which, as a consequence, 
had no effect under English law, the lex loci celebrationis. It 
is submitted that the decision in Ogden v. Ogden, apart from the 
fact that it has only a persuasive effect on the Nigerian courts, 
must be considered in the historical context from which it arose. 
In that case, although Sir Gorrell Barnes paid lip service to 
the binding effect of Brook v. Brook, a case which established 
the rule that the essentials of a marriage are to be governed by 
the lex domicilii, a close reading of the judgment in Ogden's 
case will reveal that he was not particularly happy about the 
role allocated to the law of domicile in Brook's case. Thus he 
stated:
"The English courts have not been very ready to admit 
a personal law of status and capacity dependent on 
domicile, and travelling with a person from country 
to country, although there has been, perhaps, less 
unwillingness in later years to give effect to the 
lex domicilii to some extent." 1
The unfavourable view he took of Brook's case is illustrated by
his statement that it had not been accepted in America and that
2
it had been criticised by some American decisions. Sir Gorrell's
99. /19087 PA6.
1. Ogden v. Ogden /19087 P.^6 at p.58.
2. Ibid.. pp. 66 and 77.
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argument throughout the case was concerned with justifying the 
.principle of lex loci celebrationis as the law governing the 1 
requirements of marriage (formal as well as essential). To have 
classified parental consent as an essential requirement of 
marriage which is to be determined by French law under such cir­
cumstances would have been contrary to his assumption that 
Brook’s case, even though a House of Lords’ decision, was based 
oh a wrong statement of the lav;. The ensuing chaos-which' the
decision in Ogden’s case has caused has evoked diverse criti- 
3cism.
Various methods have been suggested for dealing .with.the 
problem of divergent classification in private international
if
law. As regards the consent of parents or guardians as a . 
requirement for the validity of a marriage, one solution proposed, 
is to "define the notion of formalities in a universally accept­
able sense" and so also classify by implication what is omitted 
as "essentials". Since this solution is an Utopia still to be 
reached by the legal systems of the world, an immediate solution 
must be found for the current problem of divergent classification.
A second one, on which there is a certain degree of uni­
formity of opinion among writers in the common law world, is to 
submit the question of whether a particular requirement of 
marriage e.g. that of parental consent, is an essential or a mere
3. Dicey-Horris , op.cit.. p.238; Cheshire, op.cit., pp.*+8-51; 
Uestlake, op.cit.. Para.25; Hughes, "Judicial Method and the 
Problem in Ogden v. Ogden" bb L.O.R. (1928) 217; Beckett,
15 B.Y.B.I.L. (1938) M-6, at p.80; Falconbridge, 53 L.Q.H.
235 at p.2^7; Falconbridge. Essays in Conflict of Laws.
(2nd ed.) pp.7^-77.
b. For a detailed discussion about the several approaches to the 
problem, see Dicey-Horris, pp .23-29.
5. I, Eabel, p.225. . . . . .
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formality to the personal laws of the parties.^ Thus according 
to this suggestion, if the requirement for parental consent is, 
by its terms and social context in the law of one country, 
regarded as a matter of capacity to marry, and in the law'of 
another country is regarded, as a matter of formality, a marriage 
contracted between persons having the laws of both countries as 
their leges domicilii must satisfy the more stringent provision 
for parental consent for its intrinsic validity. In other words, 
a foreign provision relating to parental consent would have been 
elevated to the category of essential of marriage in a conflict 
of law situation if such was its import according to the foreign 
law even though this requirement is no more than a mere formality 
in the domestic law. Reason and logic would seem to demand such 
a solution and it is accordingly submitted that this approach 
would be the ideal solution for the characterisation of parental 
consent in the Nigerian private international law.
(ii) Essential validity of marriage
The effect of a uniform law on interstate conflicts
It has been observed above that it is a principle well
received into the Nigerian private international law that the
essential requirements of marriage, or as often put, the capacity
of the parties to enter into a marriage, is governed by the "lex
7domicilii" of the parties. But before a detailed discussion is
6. Dicey-Morris, pp.237-239; Graveson,.p.265 et seq.; Falcon­
bridge, Essays in Conflict of Laws (2nd ed.) p.81; Cheshire, 
p.^9j though he differs as to the determination of the 
personal law that should be applied. See below.
7. See the extract from the judgment in Brook v. Brook quoted 
above.
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embarked upon on the meaning of this term, it will be necessary 
to make a brief observation on the relevance or otherwise of 
this principle in interstate conflicts in Nigeria.
As previously pointed out, the effect of regionalisation 
in Nigeria is that for purposes of private international law,
each of the Nigerian states is a foreign country in the courts
8of the other. Eut it was also observed in chapter two that the 
enactment of the Marriage Act by the Federal Parliament in 
exercise of its constitutional powers has necessarily resulted 
in the law relating to monogamous marriages having a universal, 
operation throughout Nigeria. Furthermore, the same conflict 
rules apply in all the states of the country. The only logical 
conclusion that could be drawn from this situation is that a 
uniform law on monogamous marriage has rendered obsolete all con- 
flictual problems (including a distinction between essentials 
and formalities of marriage) between the Nigerian states. Con­
sequently, a marriage validly celebrated according to the provi­
sions of the Act anywhere in Nigeria is valid as to form and 
essentials if the parties are domiciled in any of the states of 
Nigeria.
International Conflicts
Three solutions claim for consideration in the nlex
domicilii1* that might determine the essential validity of a
marriage in international conflicts. As pointed out by a foreign
9and impartial judge in an Australian case,' English law would
8. Chap. 1, pp.5^-60.
9. Miller v. Teale £L95it75 Argus L.R. 1109 at p. 1113, per
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seem not to have
'‘reached a final conclusion as to the choice of law 
governing general capacity .to marry and the choice 
of law governing particular impediments or prohi­
bitions.1 .
The key problem in this connection is the uncertainty as to 
whether reference to the lex domicilii is ultimately to be made.
(i) to the antenuptial leges domicilii ^ of the husband 
and wife, or
(ii) to the matrimonial domicile of the parties or, 
alternatively, to the lex domicilii of the 
husband at the time of marriage.
The cases do not speak with one accord and there is wide dis­
agreement between English text writers, a controversy in which 
foreign learned, writers have joined.. Few of the English cases 
reveal an insular approach which the adherents of .one view claim 
as anomalous and which the protagonist of the other view hail 
as championing their school of thought.
The position in Kigeriq. is still a state of flux as the 
Nigerian courts have not been called upon to make a settled 
determination on the q u e s t i o n . I t  will, therefore, be neces­
sary, firstly, to consider these divergent juristic views; 
secondly, to indicate which of the solutions proposed has the 
preponderant support of judicial authority, before, a considera­
tion is made of what is the most logical solution the Nigerian 
courts could, adopt.
10. Eut see below as regards the lav; governing the validity of 
a polygamous marriage'.
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(1) The Antenuptial Leges Domicilii of the Parties
The “traditional and still prevalent1 view is forcefully
stated in one of the leading textbook on the subject as
“Capacity to marry is governed by the law of each 
partyfs antenuptial domicile.*1 11
This general rule is however stated as being subject to four
exceptions only one of which we are here concerned with. This
provides that
“The validity of a marriage celebrated in England 
between persons of whom one has an English, and 
the other a foreign, domicile is not affected by 
any incapacity which, though existing under the 
law of such foreign domicile, does not exist under 
the law of England.“ 12
This is also the view of Prof. Graveson who appears to have
adopted a purely positivist approach in stating that, on the
basis of English judicial authority, the modern rule is that
“The essentials of a marriage are governed by the 
law of the domicile of each party at the time of 
the marriage.” 13
We shall have cause to return to what is believed to be his
preference in the ultimate solution of which law determines
the essential validity of a marriage.
(2) The Matrimonial Domicile of the Parties or the
lex domicilii of the Husband at the time of Marriage
Professor Cheshire, on the other hand, maintains with 
forcible argument, not only on the basis on what the law should
11. Dicey-Morris, p.25*+.
12. Ibid., p.269. This exception is based on the English case 
of Sottomayor v. De Barros (Ho.2), (1879) 5 P.D.91**
13. Graveson, p.269.
195.
be but that the rule deducible from the English decisions is
that the essentials of marriage are governed by the law of the
matrimonial domicile of the parties* The “correct” doctrine is
stated by him as follows:
“The basic presumption is that capacity to marry is 
governed by the lav/ of the husband's domicile at 
the time of the marriage, for normally it is in the 
country of that domicile that the parties intend to 
establish their permanent home. This presumption, 
however, is. rebutted if it,can be inferred that the . 
parties at the time of the marriage, intended to 
establish.their home in a certain country and that 
they did in fact establish it there within a reason­
able time.”
Among other English text writers,-the doctrine of the matrimonial
15 16domicile has the support of Dr. Schmithoff and Foote. The
basic argument underlying the theory is that
“whether the intermarriage of two persons should be 
prohibited for social, religious, eugenic or other 
like reasons is a question that pre-eminently, if 
not exclusively, affects the community in which the
parties live together as man and wife,”
- a view which had previously been expressed by Lord Erougham in
17hr mender v. Farrender in the following classical language:
“A connection formed for cohabitation, for mutual
comfort, protection and endearment, appears to be 
a contract having a most peculiar reference to the 
contemplated residence of the wedded pair; the 
home where'they are to fulfil their mutual promises, 
and perform those duties which v/ere the obi acts of 
the union, in a word, their domicile.” lo
As pointed out by Anton, ^  v/hen the theory was first evolved, its
force lay almost exclusively, apart from the statement of Lord
Ik, Cheshire, p.277.
15. English Conflict of Laws, pp.312-313* .
16. Private International law (Vth ed.) p.567; (5th ed.) p.38 .^
17. (1835) 2 Cl. & Fin. ^88.
18. Ibid., at p. 536.
19. Private International Lav/, p.'278.
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—  20  21 Campbell m  Brook v. £rook and the authority of Savigny, on
its practical merits. The doctrine has since gained a “measure
of retrospective authority” by reason of few English decisions
and an array of obiter dicta of the English judges, all of which
were cited in support by Professor Cheshire.
22
Thus in De Reneville v. De Reneville , Lord Green said:
"The validity of a marriage so far as regards the 
observance of formalities is a matter for the lex 
loci celebrationis. But this is not a case of 
forms. It is a case of essential validity. Ey 
what law is that to be determined? In my opinion 
by the law of France, either because that is the 
law of the husband’s domicile at the date of 
marriage or (preferably, in my view) because at 
that date it was the law of the matrimonial domi­
cile in reference to which the parties may have 
been supposed to enter into the bonds of marriage."
The judgment of Eucknill, L.J., proceeded on similar lines:
"To hold that the law of the country where each 
spouse is domiciled before the marriage must decide 
as to validity of the marriage in this case might 
lead to the deplorable result if the laws happened 
to differ that the marriage would be held valid in 
one country and void in the other country. For this 
reason I think it essential that the law of one 
country should, prevail, and that it is reasonable 
that the law of the country where the ceremony of 
marriage took place and where thb parties intended 
to live together and where they in fact lived 
together should, be regarded as the law which controls 
the validity of their marriage." 23
It must be pointed out that the case was concerned with a nullity
petition by the wife on the grounds of the impotence and the
wilful refusal to consumate the marriage on the part of the
husband. These the Court of Appeal classified as matters of
20. (l86l), 9.H.L.C. 193? an extract of which is,quoted above.
21. A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (II. Guthrie’s Transla­
tion) 1869. P.2M-0. ' ' : ■ ”
22. Z 1 9 W  P. 100 at p. llif.
23. Ibid., at p. 121.
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essential validity of the marriage to be governed'by the law of
the French matrimonial domicile of the parties.
To like effect is the obiter dictum of Denning, L.J., (as
2bhe then was) in Kenward v. Kenward where he instanced the case
of an Englishwoman domiciled in England who married a man of a
polygamous race in his homeland by the ceremony of his country,
1 intending to live with him there, well knowing 
that she is entering into a marriage that is 
potentially polygamous1’.
He then gave his view as to what law.should determine the intrin­
sic validity of such marriage by saying that
"the substantial validity of that marriage depends 
on the personal law of the husband and not on the 
personal law of the wife. The marriage is valid by 
the law of that country and is, I should have 
thought, valid here.”
Finally, Sachs, J., in Fonticelli v. Ponticelli J observed obiter
in his judgment that
1 It is surely a matter of some importance that the 
initial validity of a marriage should, in relation 
to all matters except form and ceremony (to which 
a uniform general rule already applies), be con­
sistently decided according to the law of one 
country alone - a point of view which seems to be
supported by the judgment of Eucknill L.J., in De
Reneville v. De Reneville.”
The above statements led Professor Cheshire to conclude that if
the court of appeal in England has occasion to pronounce on the
law that should determine the essential validity of. a marriage,
it will definitely come in favour of the law of the matrimonial
domicile of the parties.
Professor Graveson, while disagreeing with Professor
Cheshire that the doctrine of matrimonial, domicile does not
2b. 19517 P. 12k at p. Ik-5,
25. £L9587 P. 20b at p. 215.
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represent English law, the former’s objection does not extend 
as far as to a disapproval of the doctrine for future application. 
Indeed, 1 the future may justify its acceptance", he wrote in 
1938,
"but past decisions adduced in its support are at 
most, with one or two very doubtful exceptions, 
only equivocal for one theory or another." 2o
Uhile admitting that the doctrine of matrimonial domicile is not
new to the common law world and that it had been employed to
determine the rights of spouses in each other’s property both
in England and America, he observed that
"as a theory of law to govern the validity of
marriage the doctrine of matrimonial domicile, like 
the English doctrine of ’proper law’ has much to 
commend it." 27
He pointed out that the proposition "set forth with such skill
by Dr. Cheshire is the saner and sounder rule" and that it is
more favourable than the domiciliary control of the capacity of
the parties to contract a marriage.
Professor Graveson, however, objected to the.theory of
matrimonial domicile at Its inception principally on grounds of
its definition which Prof. Cheshire gave in the first edition
of his work as "the domicile of the husband at the time of
28marriage," i.e. intended home of the parties after marriage.
Prof. Graveson argued that although the situation of the matri­
monial domicile of the parties being different from that of the
husband is rare indeed, yet this need not necessarily be so in
29
all cases as an English case had. shown. The intended matrimonial
26. Graveson, "Matrimonial Domicil and the Contract of Marriage", 
20 Jour. Comp. Leg. (1938) 55 at p. 67. '
27. Ibid., at pp. 66-67.
28. Cheshire, (1st ed. 1935) at pp. 15*+ and 392.
29. Colliss v. Hector, (1875) L.R. 19 Eq. 33*+.
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home may be that of the wife or a domicile in some other third 
country. He therefore submitted that to determine the essentials 
in marriage by the law of the country where the husband is 
domiciled at the time of marriage, which may not constitute the 
actual domicile of the parties after marriage, is objectionable. 
In his own words,
"The objection is not against a conception which per­
mits of the application to present facts of a law 
under which the parties about to marry intend to live 
their married lives. It is against the description 
and application of such a law as the lav/ of the domi­
cile of the parties when in fact the parties are not 
domiciled within the jurisdiction of that law so that 
it may rightfully claim to control their personal 
acts." 30
He went on to point out that the conception of matrimonial 
domicile as then defined by Prof. Cheshire was not predicated, 
upon the factual residence, and also not coupled with the neces­
sary animus manendi, of both parties, especially the woman5 
that until a person acquires a new domicile under the common 
lav/ rules, to classify a country in which he intends to settle
permanently in future as his domicile - by whatever name 
/a
qualified - is misnomer. And finally that the doctrine admitted 
the possibility of the co-existence in one person of two opera­
tive domiciles at the same time, a situation which is not per­
mitted under the law. Having gone so far in objecting to the 
description of matrimonial domicile, he remarked that
"It appears to be of first necessity to select one 
lav/, as the advocates of the matrimonial domicile 
have done, to govern capacity to marry. Further, 
it is clear that such selected lav/ should be that 
of a system truly and universally common to the 
parties." 31 '
He therefore concluded by suggesting that
30. 20 Jour. Comp. Leg. (1938) 55 at p. 58.
31. Ibid., p. 67.'
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”the name of matrimonial domicile, being a legal 
misdescription, should be changed to that of 
marital (or matrimonial) residence”
and that matrimonial domicile should be reserved for use only to
describe the domicile of the' married pair 'when, and not before,
32they are married, and have acquired, a common domicile.
Otherwise, he said, matrimonial domicile as then defined by 
Frof. Cheshire would be tantamount to ua domicile of hope, of. 
desire, of sincere intention and a domicile of the uncertain 
future.” The adoption of these suggestions, he hoped, would be 
advantageous in several aspects, chief among which is that the 
doctrine will ensure simplicity and certainty in the determina­
tion of the law that governs the essential validity of marriage.
Apparently, these objections have been met by Prof, 
Cheshire. For while the first and second editions of his work 
defined the matrimonial domicile of the parties as. the place
33where the parties intend to establish their matrimonial nome, 
subsequent editions had been modified to take account of these 
criticisms. Although the term ”intended matrimonial home” is 
still currently being used, it is emphasised by him that the law 
of the intended matrimonial home should not be applied to deter­
mine the essential validity of a marriage unless and until the 
parties, after their marriage, in fact establish a domicile there 
within a reasonable time.^ In other words, the law of the 
matrimonial domicile only applies as such when both parties
32.23Iour. Comp, Leg. (1938) 55 at p. 69.
33. Cheshire, (1st ed.) pp. 15*+ & 392; (2nd ed.) p.'221; cf. 
p. 269, 297, 307, 316 and 277 in the 3rd to 7th editions 
respectively.
3^. Cheshire, pp. 277-278.
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establish according to the common law rules a new domicile at 
such a place.
It is interesting to note that 10 years later, after the
theory of matrimonial domicile has been so modified, Prof,
Graveson suggested that
"much can be said in favour of the principle of . 
referring the essentials in marriage to the proper .. 
law of the marriage by analogy to the general law 
of contracts"
and that the dicta of Lord Green and Bucknill, L.J., in the 
case of De Keneville v, De Keneville quoted above "constitute a 
starting-point for new and welcome developments in the law.^^
Kis support for the doctrine of matrimonial domicile in the new
form as the ultimate solution for control of essentials in
marriage in English law appears not to have waned.
Jurisfcic Support for the law of Patrimonial Domicile in
America and, other Countries
We commenced our discussion on this part by pointing out that 
what the English law achieves by positive rule, i.e. by determin­
ing the essential validity of a marriage by the lex domicilii 
of the parties, is attained by a rule of exception in America.
That despite the general American rule that a marriage valid 
where celebrated is valid every, where, the lex domicilii of the 
parties determines in the ultimate analysis whether such marriage 
is intrinsically valid since the marriage has to satisfy prohi­
bitions upon marriage imposed by the law of the domicile of the 
parties. Where the parties did not have a common domicile at the
35. Graveson, uhecent Developments in Nullity Marriages" in 12 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer.(19^8), 135.at p. 190.
36. Graveson, Conflict of Laws (6th. ed.) p. 279*
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time of marriage, which continues as the matrimonial domicile of
the parties after marriage, the American law has shown greater
persistence than English law in sustaining the validity of the
marriage if it complied with the prohibitions of the law of the
common domicile of the parties immediately after marriage. .
"No American case has been found invalidating an 
otherwise valid marriage in which the forum’s only 
contact was as the domicile of but one party at the 
time of the marriage." 37
38
Thus it is stated by the learned editor of Goodrich that
"On principle, it seems clear that to be sufficiently 
concerned with a marriage to declare it invalid under 
its local policy, a state should have more 'substantial 
contact with the marriage than solely as the domicile 
of one of the parties at the time of marriage. Because 
marriage is an enduring relationship at the heart of 
the family structure in society, it is the state in 
| which the parties live as a family that has the most
! substantial interest. Living together as a family
I within a state seems necessary to give a state' suffi- ’
| cient interest to impose upon the parties a require-
| ment other than those already satisfied elsewhere."
ii
| A similar view is' expressed by Taintor when he stated that
[ “the state whose laws should, be looked to in order to
discover a public policy strong enough to require a 
declaration that a particular marriage is void for a 
vice of substance is that in which the parties will 
live as man and wife - the intended family domicile.
Ho domicile at the time of the ceremony has, as such, 
a sufficiently strong interest to justify the applica­
tion of its laws to determine whether or not the 
parties are of such qualities, or in such relation­
ship, that their • marriage should be declared void., nor 
to determine that their mrriage should be declared 
valid if the status is one which offends a strong 
public policy of the intended family home." 39
However, the American Second Restatement of the Conflict
L.f)
of Laws seems to have departed from the theme of this doctrine;
37. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (hth ed. by E, F. Sc.oles) p. 239.'
38. Ibid.
39. Taintor. "Marriage in the Conflict of Laws1/. 9'Vand. L.R. 
(1956) b07 at pp. 611-612. See also the same author "What 
Law Governs Status of Marriage" tri >9 6.U.LR. 353 at pp. 370-371.
ho. Restatement Second (Tent. Draft No.h of 1957) pp. 9^> 98 <1 99*
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for having provided that a marriage valid where celebrated is' 
valid everywhere, it then concentrates on the state having a 
paramount interest in the intrinsic validity of the marriage. 
This state it defines as a state where, at least, one of the 
parties was domiciled at the time of the marriage and where both 
parties intend to make their home thereafter.
This conception of the “state halving paramount interest*1 
as defined in the second Restatement has been vigorously criti­
cised by Professor Ehrenzweig as lacking support in authority, 
and objectionable on policy grounds in that it
“would deny validating effect to the law of the 
state of the spouses* first (intended or actual) 
domicile if that state was not also the state of 
either party’s prior, and thus continued domicile.1 bl
Having admitted that the doctrine of the intended matrimonial
domicile might on occasion result in the validity of a marriage
being governed by the lawr of a place 'where the parties have
never been, he concluded that the best solution would be
“to give validity to any marriage valid under the 
law of the parties’ first actual postnuptial 
domicile.” b2
Furthermore, in considering the amount of credence that should 
be given to the Restatement Second on this point in America,, it
kl. Ehrenzweig, “Iliscegenation in the Conflict of Laws: Law and
Reason versus the' Restatement Second” in Cornell L.(-). "6^9 
at p. 672~ ' ’
*+2. Ibid., at p.&Th. . It must be pointed out, however, that
Professor Ehrenzweig in formulating his “rule of validation" 
for the validity of a marriage supports only in a remote way 
his statement that the law of the first actual domicile of 
the parties should govern the intrinsic validity of the 
marriage. For in his conclusion, the rule of validation is 
stated as follows: '“A marriage is.valid if it is valid
according to the law of the state where the marriage took 
place, or where at least one of the parties was domiciled at 
the time of the marriage, or where the parties were domiciled, 
at the time the suit wTas commenced; provided only that ... 
’the will and purpose of the parties.to unite in marriage 
clearly appears’ and that the marriage is not.offensive to 
an overriding policy of the forum.” Thus it will be seen 
that unless "where the parties were domiciled at the time 
suit was commenced" is construed as the first actual
-continued-
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must be remembered that the Restatement is still in a tentative 
draft. Even in its final form, it is not more than a logical 
setting down of what are considered to be the more authoritative 
conflict rules applicable throughout the American States It 1
is not a code of laws and in fact has no binding force, but is
merely of persuasive value. It would seem that the view of the
above American writers is more representative of the law that
governs the intrinsic validity of marriage in America, i.e. the
law of the matrimonial domicile of the parties immediately 
1+1+
after marriage.
In concluding the juristic view on this matter in the 
common lav/ world, it may be pointed out that the doctrine of 
matrimonial domicile had. been advocated by Dr. Farran for testing 
the essential validity of a marriage in the Sudan.
Evaluation of the English Cases
The first case in this respect is the House of Lords’ 
decision in Brook v. Brook. In that case a domiciled English­
man married in Denmark his deceased wife’s sister, also domiciled 
in England while both were on a temporary visit to Denmark. Such 
a marriage was' valid under the Danish lav/ but at that time void
1+7
in England on the ground of affinity. In the court below,
■^2. (continued) postnuptial domicile of the parties, no further
reference was made to the first actual postnuptial domicile
of the parties in the rule formulated.
Graveson, op.cit.. p. 29.
hb. See also, Cook, Logical and Legal Basis of the Conflict of 
Laws, p. *+99.
^5* Farran, Matrimonial Lav/s of the Sudan, pp. 209-210.
^6. (1861) 9 R.L.C. 193-
U-7. (1858) 3 Sn. & G. >31.
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Stuart, V ,C., held that the marriage was void and adduced three
reasons for holding the marriage invalid. First, that.the
public policy of England prohibited the marriage; secondly, that
the Marriage Act, 1835 was of a personal nature and followed the
person all over the world and thirdly, that England was the
country where the contract of marriage was to have its permanent
effect. In the House of Lords, most of the Law Lords ' also
held that the marriage was void by force of the English Marriage
Act, It was left for Lord Campbell to provide the relevant
principle governing the essential requirement of the marriage
such as relationship within the prohibited degrees of affinity.
SoThe judgment of Lord Campbell has already been quoted above.
In it he described the lex domicilii that should govern such
essentials as
“the law of the country in which the parties are 
domiciled at the time of marriage, and in which 
the matrimonial residence is contemplated.”
This judgment thus constitutes the foundation for the theory that
the law of the matrimonial domicile governs the capacity of the
parties to marry.
Added support is given to this view by the citation made
51by Lord Campbell of the case of IJarrerider v. Warrender in 
justifying the importance to be attached to the law of the 
matrimonial domicile in the control of essentials in marriage;
S-8. Brook v. Brook (1858) 3 Sm. & G. *+8l at 527-529.
*+9. Lord Cranworth, Lord St. Leonards and Lord Uensleydale.
50. Supra, p. 183.
51. (1835) 2 Cl.. & Fin. b8Q.
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as a result he expressed a dbubt whether the marriage' in Brook's
case would have been held valid even in Denmark since the parties
were domiciled in England at the time of marriage and England
was to be their matrimonial residence. Consequently, he went.
on to amplify the principle by stating that
"The principle being established that the incidents 
of the contract of marriage celebrated in a foreign 
country are to be determined according to the law 
of the country in which the parties are domiciled 
and mean to reside, the consequence seems to follow 
that by this law must its validity or invalidity be 
determined. 52
Approaching, therefore, Lord Campbell1s .judgment with an un­
biased mind, it cannot be disputed that the decision supports the 
theory that the law of the matrimonial domicile of the parties 
controls the essential validity of their marriage if the country 
in which the parties are domiciled at the time of the marriage 
continues as their matrimonial domicile after the ceremony of 
marriage. But it would seem not to offer any guidance in a 
situation where the antenuptial domicile of the parties does 
not constitute their matrimonial domicile after the ceremony. 
Perhaps this accounts for why judges in subsequent decisions 
found it difficult, as the ensuing discussion of other cases 
will show, to accept the rather restricted ratio decidendi of
Erook's case as applicable to all diverse situations.
53Hette v. Ilette represents the first case in which the 
parties were domiciled in different countries before the cele­
bration of their marriage. In that case,,a native of Germany 
was naturalised in England and became,a domiciled British sub­
ject. After the death of his first wife, and while on a visit 
to Germany, he married his deceased, wife's half-sister,' who was
53. (1859), 1 Sw. & Tr. bl6.
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a German national domiciled in Germany. , It was argued that since 
England was the contemplated matrimonial domicile of both the 
parties, the capacity of the parties to contract the marriage 
should be determined by the law of England and Brook*s cas^ -was 
oitea in support. The judge followed Brook v. Brook in classi­
fying the Marriage Act, 1835 as one of a personal nature which 
applied to British subjects domiciled in England, The marriage, 
valid by German law but prohibited by the English Marriage Act, 
was held to be void. Sir Cresswell Cresswell was not specific 
on the point raised by the counsel as to whether English law 
applied as the matrimonial domicile of the parties after 
marriage or because it was the antenuptial domicile of the hus­
band, except in one of the two contradictory statements to this 
effect contained in his judgment. In the first he stated that
1 there could be no valid contract unless each was 
competent to contract with the other [_and7 the 
question rests upon the effect of domicile". 55-
In the other, he observed that the husband
"remained domiciled in this country, and the 
marriage was with a view to subsequent residence 
in this country1 -
words suggesting that Sir Cresswell Cresswell was applying the
principle later enunciated by Lord Campbell in Brook’s case.
One must accordingly agree with Prof. Cheshire that the decision
does not settle the controversy as to whether the essential
validity of a marriage is to be determined by the antenuptial
domicile of each of the parties or the matrimonial domicile.
But in Sottomayor v. De Barros (No. 1), the Court of
Appeal made a decisive.break with the doctrine of the matrimonial
55-. Mette v. Mette (1859) 1 Sw. & Tr. 5-16 at 5-23. 
55. (1877) 3 P.D. 1.
domicile and held that the essential requirements of,a marriage 
should be determined by the law of domicile of each of the' 
parties at the time of the marriage. The parties in the case 
were Portuguese subjects domiciled in Portugal, They were first 
cousins, who contrary to the prohibition imposed by Portuguese 
lav; on marriage between first cousins, celebrated a marriage in 
England . Such marriage was allowed under English law. They 
retained their Portuguese common domicile after marriage, ' 
although they resided in England for some years before they 
shifted their residence to Portugal. In fact at the time of 
marriage both parties were minors and consequently had no capa­
city to establish a matrimonial domicile in England. In a 
petition by the wife praying for the annulment of her marriage,
the Court of Appeal reversing the judgment of Sir Robert
56Phillimore in the court below, held the marriage null and void.
The principle applicable was stated by Cotton L.J., in the
foilowing t e rms.
"The lav; of country where a marriage is . solemnised 
must alone decide all questions relating to the 
validity of the ceremony by which the marriage is 
alleged to have been constituted: but as in other
contracts, so in that of marriage, personal capacity 
must depend on the law of the domicile; and if the 
laws of any country prohibit its subjects within 
certain degrees of consanguinity from contracting 
marriage, and stamp a marriage between persons within 
the prohibited degrees as incestuous, this, in our 
opinion, imposes on the subjects of that country a 
personal incapacity, which continues to affect them 
so long as they are domiciled in the country where 
this law prevails, and renders invalid a marriage 
between persons both at the time of their marriage 
subjects of and domiciled in the country which im­
poses this restriction, whenever such marriage may 
have been solemnised.1 57
56. (1876) 2 P.D. 81.
57. (1877) 3 P.D. 1 at p.5.
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Cotton L.J. however observed that the/decision should not be 
taken as laying down a general principle and that the opinion in 
the appeal
11 is confined to the case, where both the contracting 
parties are, at the time of their marriage, domi­
ciled in a country the law of which prohibit their 
marriage". ■
Earlier on, the case had been referred to the Queen's 
Proctor who raised the question of fact that both the husband 
and wife appeared to have acquired a domicile in England at the 
date of marriage. The case was therefore remitted to the Divorce 
Division in order that the question raised by the Queen’s
58
Proctor should be determined* In Sottomayor v. De Earros (Ho*2)
Sir James Hannen found as a fact that the husband had. acquired
an English domicile of dependence in 1861 before the marriage
was celebrated in England in 1866. Applying the'dictum of
Cotton L.J. in the first Sottomayor’s case that "no country is
bound to recognise the laws of a foreign state when they work
injustice to its own subjects" the lower court held the marriage
valid since it wras valid by English law7. To achieve this end,
however, Sir James Hannen had to base his decision on the ground'
that capacity to marry is governed by the law of the place of
celebration - a principle which is clearly untenable since the
59House of Lord's decision in Brook v. Brookyy and which is also 
incompatible with the Court of Appeal’s decision in the first 
Sottomayor*s case.
On the basis of the decision in the second Sottomayor1s 
case, an "inelegant" and "anomalous" exception was created to 
the principle that, the essential validity of marriage should be
58. (1879) 5 P.D. 9 U
59. (1861) 9 H.L.C. 193.
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determined by the antenuptial leges domicilii of the parties.
For continuity of thought it will be necessary to repeat this
insular doctrine as formidably set out in the leading text of
English authority on Conflict of Laws. Thus■according to Dicey- 
60iorris ?
“The validity of a marriage celebrated in England 
between persons of whom one has an English, and the 
other a foreign, domicile is not affected by any 
incapacity which, though existing under the law of 
such foreign domicile, does not exist under the lav; 
of England.“ 6l
This principle which had been followed in a subsequent case of
Chetti v. Chetti “has acquired world-wide notoriety". In
6^the words of Falcoabridge the rule is
“unworthy of a place in a respectable system of the 
conflict of laws which ... should attempt to deal 
with converse situations according to a single 
principle without showing undue partiality for the 
domestic lav; of the forum or for domestic party" .
According to Prof. Cheshire this exception makes nonsense of the
65 'dual domicile rule.
(iii) Conclusion
From the above analysis of the English decisions having an 
authoritative effect in Nigeria, it will be clearly seen that the 
authorities are lacking in clarity and consistency about the lav;
60. Dicey-Morris, p. 25b.
61. See also Graveson, p. 273.
62. Z1902/ P. 67 at pp. 3l et seq.
63. Cheshire (7th ed.) p. 285; Graveson, “Matrimonial Domicil 
and the Contract of Marriage". 20 Journ. Comp. Leg] 0-93$5 
55 at p. 65; Foster. “Some Defects in the English Rules of 
Conflict of Laws". 16 bVy.B.I .L. Tl~935) GM- at p. 66; 
Falconbridge, Essays on Conflict of Laws (2nd ed.) p.711; 
Label, op.cit., Vol.I. p.281.
6*+. Ibid.
65. Cheshire, p. 285.
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that determines the essential validity of marriage,' As a result
of the association of the domicile of the parties at the time of
marriage with the matrimonial domicile 'after the' ceremony which.
permeates Lord Campbell’s judgment in Brook v. Brook, that case
would seem to be consonant only with the rule that the law of
the matrimonial domicile of the parties determines the essential
validity of their marriage if the common antenuptial domicile
continues as their matrimonial domicile. Mette- v. Kette seems
equivocal since Sir Cresswell Cresswell based his decision on the
grounds that both the law of the matrimonial domicile and the law
of domicile of each of the parties at the time of marriage are
relevant. The decision in the first Sottomayor’s case undoubtedly
proceeded on the basis that the essential validity of marriage
should be controlled by the antenuptial lex domicilii of each
of the parties but the Court of Appeal expressly limits the
principle established in the case to situations where the parties
have a common domicile at the time of their■marriage. In the
second Sottomayor‘s case, the principle of the lex loci cele-
brationis which had been rejected 18 years earlier by the house
of Lords was resorted to to achieve a chauvinistic rule of
exception which has evoked a world-wide criticism.
It* is true that subsequent decisions in England, viz.
Pugh v. Pugh^  and He Paine^  have declared an open support for
the view that capacity to marry must be tested by the lex
domicilii of each party. These cases, however, are only of
63
persuasive effect on the Nigerian Courts. Moreover, the doctrine 
66. Zl9?l7 P.>82; ^I95i7 2 All E.R. 680.
87. /I9^07 Chj_ ^6. See also Padolecchia v. Padolecchla /19687
P. L19687 2 M.L.R. 173 end R. v.. Brentwood Superintendent
Registrar of Marriages, Ex parte Arias /196b/ 3 All E.R. 279.
68. See.Chap. One.
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of matrimonial domicile does not conform with the provisions of
the Carriage (Enabling) Act, i960, an English statute which, in
elimination of a previous statutory restriction, provides that
a marriage between a man and his divorced wife’s sister, aunt or
niece, and also between a woman and her divorced husband's
69brother, uncle or nephew, should be valid. Having removed 
this impediment on marriage between such class of people, the 
Act at section 1(3) provides a choice of law rule which stipu­
lates that such marriage shall be invalid
“if either party to it is at the time of the 
marriage domiciled in a country outside Great 
Britain, and under the law of that country there 
cannot be a valid marriage between the parties."
Although the above statutory choice of law rule is limited 
to the prohibited, degrees of affinity and does not purport to 
determine the applicable law for other essentials in marriage, 
it must have gone a long way in resolving the controversy as to 
the law which determines the essential validity of marriage. 
Indeed it will appear illogical to limit its application to such 
a narrow confine. This much is conceded by Prof. Cheshire whose 
justification for the retention of his criticism of the dual 
domicile rule lies in the hope that the English private inter­
national law relating to capacity to marry will ultimately be 
clarified in favour of the matrimonial domiciliary law of the 
parties. However, it is obvious that this statutory choice of 
law rule, being contained in an English statute enacted after 
1900 and which was not incorporated by reference as part of the 
Nigerian law, does not apply in Nigeria.
In view of the inconsistency of the English judicial 
authorities on this point at the time of the reception of the 
common law in Nigeria, the fact that post-1900 decisions of the
S. 1(1).
English High Courts which support the. dual domicile rule are 
only of persuasive effect in Higeria and the inapplicability in 
Nigeria of the statutory choice of law rule contained in the 
English Marriage (Enabling) Act, i960, it is submitted that the 
way is open for the Nigerian courts when framing their own 
choice of law rules to choose which doctrine it would adopt for 
testing the essentials in marriage.
In arriving at a decision on this point, the following 
factors, it is submitted, must be taken into consideration. No 
doubt, the dual domicile rule secures the interests of the two 
countries of domicile of the parties. when they are different.
Eut strictly applied, the maximum validity of marriages and 
uniformity of result are difficult to achieve. The rule may 
also frustrate the expectations of the parties and the community 
of the country in which they live as husband and wife if a 
marriage is celebrated with a view to establishing a matrimonial 
home in such country and such intention is promptly carried into 
effect. Its adoption in England has necessitated the establish­
ment of a corrective doctrine to overcome the patent objection
to applying a foreign incapacity unknown to English municipal 
70law. All these defects of the dual domicile rule would seem 
to suggest that the doctrine of matrimonial domicile, in the 
sense of an immediate post-nuptial domicile of the spouses, is 
better suited for determining the capacity of the parties to 
marry.
70. Dr. Morris has suggested that as a result of s.1(1) of the 
Marriage (Enabling) Act, i960, the English courts should 
now be able to eliminate this corrective doctrine. See 
Dicey & Morris, p.270. Eut if, as explained, by Ilahn-Freund 
in 39 Tr. Gr. Soc. 395 at pp.53-57y the exception is an 
instance of the English Public Policy preventing the applica 
tion of a foreign law otherwise applicable, the elimination 
of this exception may be difficult to achieve. Indeed this 
suggestion appears to have been given substance in Cheni v. 
Cheni ^196^7" P.85 at p.93, where Sir Jocelyn Simon stated 
that tne. Court has a judicial discretion to refuse to give
-continued-
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It will be pertinent to observe in this connection that
such considerations would seem to have led the Supreme Court of
71Kenya in the case of Re Howison's Application' to express its 
preference for the doctrine of matrimonial domicile in deter­
mining the capacity of a Scottish girl, domiciled in Scotland, 
to enter into a potentially polygamous marriage in Kenya with 
a man domiciled in Kenya. In that case, Rudd* J., having fully 
considered the divergent juristic views on this point, observed 
that the trend of modern judicial development will justify the
marriage being held valid in accordance with the law of Kenya,
72the matrimonial domicile.
On the other hand, an exclusive application of the law 
of the matrimonial domicile for the control of essentials in 
marriage fails in one particular respect. For example, we may 
suppose that H domiciled in country X married W domiciled in 
country Y, both intending to establish a matrimonial home in 
country Z. The marriage was valid according to the law of X but 
invalid by the law of Y. In the meantime, the parties are tem­
porarily resident in Nigeria where the essential validity of 
the marriage arose for determination. In such circumstances, 
it is well accepted by all the protagonists of the theory of 
matrimonial domicile that neither logic nor reason supports the 
application of the law of country Z, the intended matrimonial 
home. Professor Cheshire, however, suggests that in such a 
situation “capacity to marry is governed by the law of the 
husband's domicile*1 i.e. the law of country X. This suggestion 
is untenable since it disregards the law of the country of
70. (continued) recognition to a foreign incapacity if such 
recognition will be unconscionable.
71. ^19527 E.A. 568.
72. Ibid., at p. 575.
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domicile of the wife, the interest of which is equally as
important as that of the husband. The logical solution would be
to apply the antenuptial leges domicilii of both parties.
It seems clear that somewhat similar line, of reasoning
led the Koyal Commission on Ferriage and Divorce in England to
adopt the doctrine of matrimonial domicile as only an alternative
rule to govern the essentials in marriage. For according to
unanimous report of the Commission in this respect
“There are circumstances in which it would in our 
opinion be unfair to apply the personal law or laws 
of the parties at the time of the marriage ... \Ie 
think that ... the validity of a marriage should in 
the last resort depend on the law of the country in 
which the matrimonial home has been established, 
because the status of marriage pre-eminently affects 
society in the country where the parties live together 
as husband and wife. That country represents what has 
been called the ‘true seatcf the marriage relation’, 
and it seems socially ■ undesirable that a union which 
is there regarded as not detrimental to the community 
should be pronounced void, merely because one or other 
or both of the parties were formerly connected with a 
country in which a different view prevails.” 73
The Commission, therefore, recommended that
“where a marriage is alleged to be void on a ground 
other than that of lack of formalities, that issue 
should be determined in accordance with the personal 
law or laws of the parties at the time of the marriage 
(so that the marriage should be declared void if it is 
invalid by the personal law of one or other or both of 
the parties); provided that a marriage which was 
celebrated elsewhere than in England or Scotland should 
not be declared void if it is valid, according to the 
law of the country in which the parties intended, at the 
time of the marriage to make their matrimonial home and 
such intention has in fact been carried out.” 7%
In making an exception preventing the law of the matrimonial
domicile being applied in respect of marriages celebrated in
75England, and Scotland, the Royal Commission was influenced by the 
possibility of.a marriage celebrated■in these two countries, in
73. Cmd. 9678 (1956) para. 889. ■
Ibid., Para. 891 and p. 395. Emphasis . supplied. 
75. Ibid.. Para. 890.
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contravention of their positive prohibitions against marriage, 
being validated under a foreign matrimonial domiciliary lav;.
The same objection levied against the decision in 
Sottomayor v. De Barros (No. 2) is equally'applicable here. The 
recommendation, if accepted, will still result in an insular, 
principle in that it ensures that the positive prohibitions 
imposed by the English or Scottish lav; regarding marriage are 
enforced by the English Courts in applying the lav; of a foreign 
matrimonial domicile of the parties, when'the marriage took ■ 
place in England or Scotland; whereas a foreign incapacity on 
one or both of the parties must be ignored by English lav; when 
England or Scotland is the matrimonial domicile of the parties 
regardless of the fact that such marriage was celebrated, in a 
country whose impediments were not complied, with.
If theory be allied to common sense and a desire to make 
principles work, we should follow the Royal Commission's recom­
mendation in making the doctrine of,the matrimonial domicile an 
alternative proposition for determining the capacity of the 
parties to marry. Vie should, however, disagree' with that report 
in restricting the doctrine to marriages celebrated outside 
Nigeria and therefore state the rule of substantive validation 
of marriage in the following, terms:
The essential validity of a marrige is governed by 
the personal lav; of each party at the time of marriage; 
provided that a marriage should not be declared void if 
it is valid according to the law of the country in which 
the parties intended at the time of marriage to establish 
their matrimonial home and such intention has in fact 
been carried out.
c. POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
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If in classifying the legal requirements of marriage into 
formalities and essentials, the two being cumulatively governed 
by different choice of lav; rules, many problems of a conflic- 
tual nature are encountered in respect of monogamous marriages, 
the consideration of the intra-national or international validity 
of polygamous marriages is beset from the outset with difficult 
problems of a more perplexing nature.
Although polygamy, whether actual or potential, is a form 
of marriage known to more than half of the world’s population, 
it does not enjoy universal recognition among nations of the 
world as a monogamous marriage. Most countries to whose public 
policy recognition of this institution was initially abhorrent, 
despite their increasing recognition of it for certain purposes, 
still prohibit its celebration within their national boundaries 
and deny its validity for all purposes if so celebrated. It is 
doubtful if this attitude will change with time.
Even in Africa and Asia where the institution of polygamy 
is predominant, the rules for its formation and dissolution are 
ever-changing, not often precisely defined, and consequently, 
not easily ascertainable as already noted. They vary not only 
from country to country but also from community to community 
within the same county. Hence a significant difficulty for the 
Nigerian private international law,'if the formalities of. poly­
gamous marriage are to be governed by the lex loci celebrationis 
as the usual rule, lies in the fact that the ceremonies of this 
form of marriage, unlike those of monogamous marriage, are not 
uniform. Also, its formation is almost exclusively the concern 
of the parties and their.respective families. Hence the apt
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description of the marriage as, more of an alliance be tween two
family groups than a union■between two parties.
In sharp contrast to this is the identity in formal.
characteristics of a monogamous marriage. Thus to give an
instance of this identity, the solemnization of a monogamous .
marriage follows almost the same sequence of ceremonies in all
the world over. As a rule, an attendance before an officiating
registrar of marriages, or a duly authorised minister of religion,
preceded by such preliminaries as filing of due notice or publi- .
76cation of banns, settles the formal aspects of such marriage.
77This universal mode of celebration, as pointed out.by Schmithoff, 
accounts for the easy delegation of the formalities of mono­
gamous marriage to the lex loci celebrationis since there is less 
theoretical difficulty in testing the formal validity of such 
marriage by the law of the country where it was celebrated. As 
an added advantage, this proceedure facilitates the easy proof 
of the marriage, besides the fact, though less significant, 
that it also makes for the easy determination of the country 
where the marriage was celebrated and which law should be 
applied to govern the formal, validity of such marriage.
Since this uniformity in the mode of marriage licensing 
is lacking in respect of polygamous marriage in Nigeria and most 
other countries permitting polygamy, the determination of the 
appropriate choice of law rules for testing its validity must 
involve some modification so as to take account of this peculiar 
problem of polygamous marriage. In this respect, brief mention 
must be made of the fact that owing to the diversity of customary
76. An obvious exception to the general statement is the “common 
law1 marriage.
77. A Textbook of the English Conflict of Laws (3rd ed.) pp..306
and 317.
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laws on marriage even within a single state in Nigeria, it is 
considered unnecessary to differentiate between intra-national 
and international validity of polygamous marriage. Eut before we 
proceed to consider the appropriate choice of law rules, it will 
first be necessary to state the legal requirements of the 
marriage with a view to classifying them into formalities and 
essential.
(i) Legal Requirements of a Nigerian polygamous marriage
The following are, in brief, the legal requirements of a 
polygamous marriage under the municipal law, although as will be 
discovered later on, the effect of some of them on the validity 
of the marriage is not the same under the different systems of 
customary and moslern law operating within the country .
(1) Age of Marriage: This may be determined by reference
17 o
to calendar years. Eut by far the most universal
criterion for determining whether a person has
attained marriageable age in the warm climate of
Nigeria is puberty of the person, though in practice
he usually waits until a more mature age before con-
79tracting a marriage. ' As can be.expected, no 
uniformity exists in this respect.
73. As in all jurisdictions in Eastern Nigeria where by virtue
of s.3(1) of the Eastern Nigeria Age of Marriage Law, 1953,
the age of marriage is fixed at 16. Also, the Declarations 
of Native Lav: and Custom of Idoma (N.A.L.N.63 of 1959)?
Borgu (N.A.L.N.52 of 1962) and the Eiu federation (N.A.L.N.
9 of 196*+) each stipulates 12, 13 and lb years respectively.
79. Puberty is the criterion for determining the age of
marriage under the Moslem law which is operative in most
jurisdictions in Northern Nigeria, and also according to 
the Declaration of'the Tiv Native Law and Custom on Marriage
and Divorce; Ma’aji Isa Shani, Digest of Maliki Family Law,
p.3; and N.R.L.N. 1^9 of 1955.
220.
(2) Parental Consent: As a rule, the consent of parents 
or a guardian is a legal prerequisite to the marriage 
of an infant, whether male or female. However, in 
the Mestern and the Mid-Western states, the court
i ay dispense with such consent on the part of the 
female party who is above the age of 18 if consent
0 0
is unreasonably withheld by her parents or guardian.
After majority or shortly before, the male party may
marry without the consent of his parents or guardian
since, if he is economically independent, he is able
to provide the necessary dowry or bride-price (for
8l
which see below). In the case of an adult woman, 
especially under the Maliki school of Islamic law 
applying in most jurisdiction in Northern Nigeria, 
the fact of her majority does not necessarily dis­
pense with parental consent which is invariably 
signified by the acceptance by her parents or guardian 
of the dowry or bride-price payable on her marriage.
(3) Consent of Parties: This had no legal significance 
under the traditional law, the fact that the suitor 
and his parents were agreeable to the woman's 
parents, rather than to the woman herself, being the 
determining factor. There is no doubt that this 
situation strikes at the root of marriage. Hence 
consent of parties has now attained the position of
80. Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children Adoptive Bye-laws, 
s.5 (W.R.L.N. *+56 of 1958) which has been adopted by over
30 District Councils in the Western State and few others in 
the Mid-Western State.
81. He Sapara (1911), 1 Hen. G.C.Rep. 605 at pp.607-8; See also 
the declarations of Native Law and Custom on Marriage and 
Divorce referred to in note 78 above.
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a'legal requirement of a polygamous marriage in most
82jurisdictions in Nigeria.
(b) Payment of Eride-Price or Dowry; As has already been
observed, this time-honoured legal requirement of a
polygamous marriage is inseparably bound with parental
consent. Its.non-payment not only makes the marriage
invalid, its non-acceptance also signifies the total
opposition of. the woman's parents to the proposed
marriage between the parties. .In most jurisdictions,
81the payment is usually in cash J coupled with or in 
substitution for some symbolic articles such as , 
clothing, foodstuffs or kolanuts. Although the 
cash payment may be waived by the person.legally 
entitled to receive it, nonetheless, something sym­
bolic must still be paid before the validity of the 
marriage can be sustained.
(5) Prohibited Degrees of Relationship: Like all systems
of Marriage law, a further legal, prerequisite of a 
polygamous marriage is that the parties must not be 
within certain degrees of consanguinity, affinity, 
adoption or other relationships. Although' this 
impediment to marriage is often not clearly stated ^
82. Savage v. Macfoy (1909) 1 Ren.G.C.Rep. 5ok; Kasunmu & 
Salacuse, op.cit.. at pp.75-78; Obi, op.cit.. p.l6k.
83. For example, the Marriage, Divorce and Custody■of Children 
Adoptive Bye-laws of. the hestern State provides for cash 
payment of £35 at the maximum, ■ while the Limitation of Dowry 
Law, 1956 of Fastern Nigeria stipulates a maximum payment
of £30.
8k. Kasunmu & Salacuse. op.cit.. p.79.
85. See however s. 13(b) of Has tern Nigeria Adoption Law, 1965 ' ■ 
which provides that since an Adoption Order creates under 
the Law a relationship of parent and child between the 
adopter and the child, the parties' there to' are deemed to 
be within the prohibi toe degree of consanguinity for pur­
poses of narricige.
as in a monogamous marriage, the degree of relation­
ship within which a person may not marry is generally 
believed to be more extensive than such impediment 
relating to monogamous marriage, for example, under 
the Moslem Maliki law, a foster relationship is re­
garded as having created an absolute impediment to a 
marriage between the relatives by blood or affinity 
of the foster mother, on the one hand, and the foster 
child and his issue on the other.°u
(6) Symbolic Delivery of the Wife; Until the High Courts
87' decision in he Soluade and Leckley it
was generally believed that the formal handing over
of the bride to the bridegroom's house was not more
than a ceremonial feature of a customary marriage
which had no legal significance. But in that case,
Aines, J., held that symbolic delivery or the “giving
away" of the bride, as it is often termed, is a legal
requirement for the validity of a polygamous marriage
88in Lagos, farlier on, Osborne, C.J., in Re Sapara,u° 
following his decision in Savage v. Macfoy had 
classified the ceremony of, as he termed it, “the 
accompaniment of the bride to the house of her 
husband" as only a social feature of customary marriage 
in the same category as “the reception of the bride
86. Ma'aji Isa Shani, Digest of Kaliki Family Law, p.*+.
37. (19^3), 17 N.L.R. 59.
36. (1911), 1 Ren. G.C. Rep. 605.
89. (1909), 1 Ren. G.C. Rep. 5oU
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on her arrival at the house5' or "the presentation of
QO
gifts to her companions".'' According to the Chief 
Justice, "the actual legal essentials of native 
marriage are as laid, down in Savage v. Macfoy, viz. 
first, the consent of the girl and her family, and
secondly, the presentation and ’acceptance,of the
91 'ano" i.e. the bride-price. To these must be added
such requirements as the "native prohibited degree .
of consanguinity" to which the Chief Justice adverted 
92in his judgment and age of marriage as we have seen 
above.
When it is recalled that Osborne, C.J., statements 
in Savage v. Macfoy and. Re Sapara were also concerned 
with the ascertainment of the legal requirements of a 
customary marriage in Lagos, Re Soluade and Eeckley 
might be considered, as -wrongly decided since it 
failed to follow previous decisions of the Supreme 
Court. The fallacy of such argument, however, lies 
in the fact that while the statements of the law in 
the two Supreme Court's decisions were obiter, Re 
Soluade and Eeckley was the only case so far in which 
the legal significance of the ceremony of leading 
away of the bride had been raised as an issue. It 
thus constitutes a better authority than the two 
Supreme Court's decisions.
While such ceremony exists in most other systems
90. Re Sapara (1911) I Ron. G.C. Rep. 605 at pp.6lO-6ll.
91. Ibid ., at p. 608.
92. Ibid . , at p. 612.
of customary law of marriage in Nigeria, its legal
effect in those jurisdictions is still a matter of
conjecture among legal writers.
As regards the Yorubas of Western Nigeria,
Dr. Coker would seem to regard the formal handing
over of the bride as irrelevant to the validity of
the marriage  ^while Dr. Elias, on the other hand, .
takes a different view. He states that the payment '
of the bride price is the deciding factor,
"but its settlement does not clothe the con­
tract with legal validity ... it is the formal 
handing over of the' girl to her husband at his 
abode that really completes the marriage." 9^
This is also the view of Dr. Obi whose statement of
the law among Southern Nigerian systems of customary
law is that the
"final essential for a valid, customary marriage 
is what may be called the 'giving away1 of the 
bride, for want of a better term". 95
In similar vein is the view of Alhaji Suka who
states that as a result of modification of Moslem
law by customary lav; in Northern Nigeria, the lav; now
"demands that although the marriage has been 
duly tied by the Imam and witnessed by the 
public at large, the wife does not become his 
until he goes or sends his relatives to bring 
the wife to the matrimonial home." 96
93. Coker, Family Property Afaiong the Yorubas (2nd ed.) pp.262
and 272. See also A.iisafe, Lav/s and Customs of the Yorubas,
p.55. " : —
9*+. Elias, Nigerian Legal System, p.297.
95. Obi, op.cit., p.180.
96. Alhaji Suka, I Journal of the Centre of Islamic Legal 
Studies,- Ahmadu Dello Univ., Zaria, No. I, p.13.
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In other jurisdictions, however, it has been
settled beyond doubt that a symbolic delivery of the
bride to the bridegroom's house has no legal effect
whatsoever for customary marriage. Thus, for example
the Declaration of Idoraa customary law relating to
marriage and divorce provides that
"A marriage shall be deemed to be contracted 
upon presentation to the father or guardian 
of the customary betrothal gift: Provided
that his explicit consent is given at the 
time of presentation.1 97
Similarly provided are the Declarations of Eorgu and 
Biu customary laws of marriage/"0
(7) Registration: The policy consideration underlying
the statutory innovation in most jurisdictions in 
Nigeria in relation to the registration of a custo­
mary marriage is basically the same.^ Except in 
one jurisdiction, registration.of customary marriage 
is merely designed to facilitate the proof of such 
marriage. Even though all the statutory provisions 
prescribe penalties for its non-registration, its 
non-observance does not affect the validity of the 
marriage which is considered already valid as from 
the time of its conclusion provided all the legal 
requirements considered above had been complied with.
97. N.A.L.N. 63 of 1959, Schedule s.b.
98. N.A.L.N. 52 of 1961, Schedule s/, N.A.L.N. 9 of 196*+,
Schedule s.3(1).
99. See Registration of Marriage Adoptive Eye-Laws Order of 
Western Nigeria, 1956 (N.R.L.N. h of 1957) which has been
adopted in most District Councils in the Western State; The
Hadeija Native Authority (Reporting of Marriages) Rules, 
(K.S.N.A.L. hi of 1967); Eorgu Native Authority (Reporting 
of Marriages) Rules, ( .A.L.II. 72 of 1967) and the Igala 
Native Authority (Reporting of Marriages) Rules (C.N.S.N.A.L, 
N.5 of 1968).
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In fact, the period within which particulars of such 
marriage must be registered or 1 reported" for regis­
tration varies from seven to thirty days.
A provision which has a different resultant 
effect on the validity of the marriage is the Tiv 
Declaration of customary law on marriage which states 
that
“A marriage according to Tiv Native law and 
custom between members of the Tiv tribe who are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Tiv Native 
Authority is valid if ... the marriage has been 
registered by a native court." 1
In so far as the marriage is invalid unless it is
registered, registration in this jurisdiction becomes
a legal prerequisite to the validity of the marriage.
It will be pertinent to point out in conclusion of our
discussion on legal requirements of a polygamous marriage that
ither impediments of such marriage affecting a party subject to
: oslem law are those relating to "equality of marriage". Under
the Moslem law, a husband is required to be the equal of his
wife as regard, race, religion, general character (whatever that
lay mean), trade or profession. But as pointed out by Shani in
2
his Digest of Maliki Family lav; this is not an absolute impedi­
ment to marriage e.g. like payment of bride-price or parental 
consent. The effect of the breach of any of the criteria of 
carriage equality is no more than affording the wife or her 
larriage guardian a right to apply for the dissolution of the 
larriage.3 A close analogy would appear to be found in a voidable
1. N.R.L.N. 1^9 of 1955. Schedule s.2(e).
2. (Ahmadu Bello Univ. Saria) p.7.
3. Anderson, op .cit., p.206 seems to have incorrectly stated 
that these impediments make the marriage null end void.
monogamous marriage whic . y be avoided on the ground of impo­
tence or non-consumation of the marriage* In both cases, the 
.rriage is perfectly valid until avoided. These so-called 
1 essentials" of a Moslem marriage must therefore be distinguished 
from the ones considered above.
(ii) Classification of legal requirements
As we have just observed above, the legal requirements of 
a polygamous marriage in Nigeria possess some common factors 
with those of a monogamous marriage. A comparison of the 
marriage requirements reveals however that they differ consider­
ably in certain respects. The key question now to be considered 
is whether the legal requirements of a polygamous marriage in 
iigeria are such in its contemporary development as to justify 
a scientific classification into formalities and essentials.
This point is not merely academic since a polygamous marriage 
like a monogamous one may be void for lack of form or other 
requirements of marriage touching the essence of the marriage, 
e.g. lack of age or consanguinity or affinity. It will be neces­
sary therefore to examine the theories of classification evolved 
by authorities in this field so as to discover which of these 
theories is applicable for the characterisation of the legal 
requirements of a polygamous marriage.
The first of the theoretical approaches to making a dis­
tinction between the formalities and essentials of a marriage 
may be described as 1 the resultant effect" theory. Foote states 
the theory in the following terms:
"mhe difference between essentials and forms in such 
a matter would naturally seem to be that between 
prohibitions which forbid and prohibitory directions
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which merely impede the marriage.1 
in other words, if the non-observance of a particular requirement 
of marriage renders the marriage absolutely void (absolute 
impediments), such requirement should be regarded as going to 
the essence of the marriage, whilst a prohibition which does not 
invalidate a marriage contracted in violation of it (directory 
impediments) should be classified as formalities. This mode of 
classification is not often insisted upon in modern times. Eut 
whatever force the theory may have, it is our submission that it 
is wholly inapplicable to a customary marriage since, in effect, 
a violation of any of the requirements listed above has a fatal 
effect on the validity of the marriage in the jurisdiction where 
it applies.
A second theory is that espoused by Dr. Sykes which contem­
plates the separation of the contract of marriage from the 
ceremonial or ritual aspects.^ According to this test, if a 
requirement pertains to the contract of marriage, it should be 
categorised as an essential; whilst if it appertains to the 
ceremony of marriage, whether it merely postpones or avoids it, 
it should be regarded as a formality of the marriage. Despite 
the superficial attractiveness of this approach, it completely 
breaks down as a test for determining the vital question as to 
whether the consent of parents or other individual prescribed by 
all systems of customary law is an essential or a formality, 
for in dealing with parental consent, Dr. Sykes resorts to the
k. Foote, A Concise Treatment on Private International Law,
(5th ed. by H. L. Bellot 1925) p. 123.
5. See also Feckett, "Classification in Private International 
Law" 15 B.Y.B.I.L. (193*0 *+6 at p.60; Schmitthoff, op.cit.,
p.318; Eabel, Vol.I, p.263.
6. Sykes, "The 'formal Validity of Marriage", 2 I.C.L.Q. 78.
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resultant effect theory which he had vigorously criticised in
determining whether a requirement for parental consent pertains
to the essence of the marriage contract or relates only to the
ceremonial aspect of it. Thus he observes that
1 if a marriage law states that the parties shall 
not marry unless the consent of parents shall be 
obtained or that a marriage between certain per­
sons shall be void unless such consent be 
obtained ... It seems to be clear that such a 
requirement does go to essentials, it affects the 
quality of the offer and acceptance, it makes the 
contract conditional instead of being absolute.
On the other hand, if the consent requirements are 
not absolute*'
this should relate to formalities.'7 This approach, appears an
improvement on the first theory but by far the best of these
solutions seem to be that recently adopted by Lord Kerriman in
8the English case of Apt v. Apt. the functional test.
On the authority of that case, the test is stated by
Professor Graveson as follows:
"Whether or not any requirement of marriage is an 
essential or a formality depends on the degree of 
intensity of the public or social interest which 
it embodies and expresses. Those matters which are 
regarded as vital to the maintenance of an accept­
able standard in the matrimonial and family rela­
tions of any given society ... will be regarded as 
essentials of the marriage ... while matters of 
less social interest ... will be treated as pure 
formalities" . 9
Applying this test, the following requirements of a polygamous
marriage may, for purposes of the municipal law, be regarded as
the essentials of the marriage viz. Age, Parental consent,
consent of the parties, consanguinity or affinity and bride-price
while such requirements a-s the installation of the bride in the
7. Sykes, I.C.L.Q.78 at pp.86-87. . .
8 . Z19^Z7 P.127, Z u W  P .83 (C.A.).
9. Graveson, o i.clt., 6 th. Sd., p.262.
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husband's house and registration of the marriage, where appli­
cable, may be classified as formalities of marriage.
(iii) Formal validity of a polygamous marriage
It has been submitted that only symbolic delivery of the 
trice and registration of the marriage may logically be regarded 
£s the formalities of a polygamous marriage under Nigerian con­
flicts rules. In other words, that a polygamous marriage does 
contain certain legally recognised formalities as does a.mono­
gamous marriage. To proceed, however, from this hypothesis and 
state that the formalities of a polygamous marriage must comply, 
exclusively, with the lex loci celebrationis will not always be 
satisfactory in its practical application. It may be here re- 
callec that celebration of a marriage in a polygamous form is 
act permitted in most countries of Western civilization. For 
example, it is stated in Dicey and Morris^0 that a
1 iarriage celebrated in Ungland in accordance with 
polygamous forms and without any civil ceremony as 
required by English law is invalid, whatever the 
Gomic$l of the parties".
While this difficulty may be overcome by the rule of mutation, 
i.e. by adopting a civil form of ceremony for the conclusion of 
the first of an actually polygamous marriage, so that the poly­
gamous character of the marriage is determined by the Nigerian 
personal law of the parties, this expedient in respect of sub­
sequent marriage by the same man will undoubtedly entail a 
conviction for bigamy. Besides, the policy of the Nigerian law 
should not be to advocate or encourage the breach of other
10* op .cit.« 8th ed., Rule 3*+> p.280. See also s.6a of the
Australian Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959-1965, the effect of 
which appears to be inconsistent with the, decision of the 
Australia High Court in Hacue v. Iague /19627 103 C.L.R.230, 
where it was held that a polygamous marriage celebrated in 
Australia according to a polygamous form prescribed by the 
personal laws of the parties at the time of celebration is
valid, notwithstandin: that the Australian marriage was a
socono one bv the male polygamist.
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countries* laws apart from the personal inconvenience such
breach will bring for the party concerned.
iioreover, the establishment of ferriage officers in respect
of polygamous marriages in igerian consular offices or embas- 
11
sies abroad, on the basis that insufficient facilities exist 
"or the conclusion of polygamous marriages abroad, desirable as 
this will be, would not seem to justify delegating the formali­
ties of a polygamous larriage to the law of a foreign country not 
permitting polygamy. No doubt, the authorities of the country 
of solemnisation may not object to the celebration of such
marriage in the country if it is between parties whose personal
1 i* 12law or laws allows polygamy, nevertheless, by the rule or 
fiction of public international law that such foreign parties 
have contracted such marriage in extraterritorial territory, the 
law applied for determining the formal validity of such consular 
marriage will be exclusively Nigerian law and not the lex loci 
celebrationis.
Secondly, as regards foreign countries permitting poly­
gamy, the nature of polygamous marriage formalities, requiring 
as it often does, the involvement of family members of the 
parties (except in few countries like Tanzania and Southern 
... odesia where the registration of a polygamous marriage consti­
tutes the only formality of such marriage) would seem to make it 
impossible for foreign parties resident in such countries without 
their respective family members to employ such marriage formali-
11. Kenya has recently adopted this approach. See the Ferriage 
(Amendment) Act, 1966, Ho.26 of 1966. The Act was recently 
discussed by Cretney. '‘Some Problems in the Ferriage Laws of 
Kenya** ,3‘f.A.L.J. (1967) 1
12. For example, in Australia, a polygamous marriage celebrated 
between persons whose personal laws permit polygamy before 
a consular officer is regarded as valid, notwithstanding 
the invalidity according to the law of Australia where the 
marriage is celebrated. For the position in England as 
similarly stated, see, Foster in 65 Recueil des Cours, p.M+4-.
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13ties in contracting their marriage.
Rven in Kigeria, the position of customary marital laws 
would seem not to permit foreign parties whose personal law or 
laws permit polygamy to comply with the formalities of such 
marriage without sacrifice of principle. For according to case 
law and the unanimous opinion of legal writers on this point, 
tle essence of the requirement of symbolic delivery of the 
’ rice to the husband1s house which, under the test applied above, 
will constitute one of the formalities of customary marriage in 
: Algeria, is that the female party is led at night-fall by members 
of her family to the husband's h o u s e , o r  alternatively, the 
handing over may be made at the house of the female party by 
leubers of her family, the husband and/or his relatives going 
there to receive her. ’J One question may be asked in tnis con­
nection. Can the family members' involvement in this respect 
• e dispensed with when the parties are foreigners whose relatives 
are not present in the forum? There is no direct authority on 
this point but comnonsense and justice would seem to demand a 
positive answer to the question posed. International or even 
: tranational transactions cannot, it is submitted, be based on 
an idea of family cohesion which underlies this ceremonial aspect 
of a customary marriage.
As regard registration which constitutes the second formal
13. See e.g. Cotran, Restatement of African Law, Vol-.l, The
Law of larriage and Divorce in Kenya, for the bewildering 
variety of marriage ceremonies in the country.
ik. Re Soluade and Eeckley (19^3) 17 K.L.R. 59.
15. Rlias, higerian Legal System, p.292.
16. Obi, op .cit., pp.l80-l8l.
requirement in one locality in Nigeria, it is only required when 
the two parties are "members of the Tiv tribe who are subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Tiv Native Authority".1'7 It becomes 
obvious that the requirement is not obligatory on parties all 
or one of whom is not a member of the Tiv tribe, even though 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Native Authority.
Owing to the peculiar nature of the formalities of a 
polygamous marriage ancl the lack of universal support for its 
formation under most systems of municipal law as have been 
observed above, it is submitted that the only way by which 
parties could at present contract a polygamous marriage outside 
the state in which they live with their family members, is for 
them to consent to become husband and wife,preferably in the 
presence of witnesses. This was the rule under the Kaliki school 
ic lav/ obtaining in most states of Northern Nigeria, 
before it was modified by the indigenous customary law. Thus, 
under the kaliki version of the Moslem lav/, the only requirement 
imposed for the celebration of a Moslem marriage is that the 
parties should be mutually agreed to become husband and. wife, 
provided that such voluntary agreement is duly publicised, i.e. 
concluded in the presence of at least two witnesses. Often 
than not, such agreement is ideally oral. There is no legal 
obligation for the intervention of a public official although
1 P
such marriage is in practice concluded by a religious leader.
Nien the system of registration of polygamous marriages, which 
is now discretionary on the part of the parties in most juris-
17. N.R.L.N. 1*4-9 of 1955, Schedule s.2.
18. Shani, op.clt., pp.2-3; See also, Ahmadu Suka, 1 Journal
of the Centre of Islamic Studies, (Zaria, Ahmadu Eello Univ.)
No. 1, p.13.
23^.
dictions in Nigeria, is perfected and made imperative, then it 
c ruld be provided that such marriages celebrated in this form 
abroad should be registered at the place where the parties are 
domiciled in Nigeria.
"litii this situation in mind, the choice of law rules 
jverning the formal validity of a polygamous marriage may be 
framed as follows:
A marriage celebrated in accordance with polygamous forms 
shall be valid as regards formalities if:
(a) Its celebration conforms to the requirements pre­
scribed by the law of the place of celebration with 
respect to the solemnization of such marriage; or
(b) Its celebration was in accordance with the form of 
solemnization prescribed by the law of domicile of 
each party at the time of the marriage, or the law 
of the place in which the parties intended at the 
time of the marriage to establish their matrimonial 
home and such intention has in fact been carried 
out."1'
19. A near analogy to rule (b) is contained in Art. 10(3) o£ 
the Ethiopian Code of the Conflict of Laws, cited from 
Secler, The Conflict of Laws in Ethiopia. (Addis Ababa, Haile 
Sellassie I Univ. 1965), and Art. 13 of the German Code,
EG!GB. Under these two articles, the lex loci celebrationis 
is only an alternative to the personal law of each of the 
parties as regards the law which governs the formal validity 
of marriage. In respect of the German provision, see 
further, Cohn in Nanual of German Law, Vol.II (London, 
H.M.S.O. 1952) p.23.
Another similar rule to the one suggested in (b) above, 
is the conception of common law marriage, which operates in 
almost all common law countries. Under this rule, a mono­
gamous marriage is considered validly celebrated if it was 
contracted according to the common law i.e. by the parties 
merely agreeing to be husband and wife, in a place where 
there is no local form of solemnizing a marriage, or where 
there is insuperable difficulty in employing the form 
obtaining in the local jurisdiction. See Cattersll v. 
Catterall (18^7) 1 iob.Icc.J80; Limerick v. Limerick (1863) 
32 L.J.P.92; Phillips v. Phillips (1921) 38 T.L.R.lJO;
'-olFe-.den v. '..'olfenden P.61; £L9U/ 2 All S.R.539;
-continued-
235.
(iv) Essential validity of a polygamous marriage
The Statutory Choice of Law Rules
As the introduction to this chapter has explained, there 
are several systems of customary law in the Nigerian federation. 
Consequently, the customary law relating to the formation of 
marriage varies from one ethnic locality to the other. This 
variety as to details is often not between one state and another. 
It may be within a single state of Nigeria. An example of 
these diversities has been noticed in our statement of the 
requirement concerning the age of marriage, which starts at 
puberty in several jurisdictions and progresses in an ascending 
order to 16 in some other places. Another instance is that in 
some ethnic localities, the prohibited degree of marriage extends 
to several generations whereas in others, a marriage may be
19. (continued) Isaac Penhas v^ Tan Soo Eng /195/7 A.0 .30*+; 
'hczanowska v. Taczanowski '19$]/ P.3.01, and also, the two 
Australian cases of Fokas v. Fokas /1952/ S.A.S.R. 152 and 
Naksymec v. 1 ■laksymec /l95*+7 W .lr. Tl'T. S.M .) 522 where it was 
stated that the doctrine of the common law marriage should 
be applied, to determine the formal validity of marriage 
only when it is recognised by the lex domicilii of the 
parties at the time of the marriage, or the lex domicilii 
of the husband alone at the relevant time, if it is differ­
ent from that of the wife. In Fokas v. Fokas, Myers, J., 
remarked: "I cannot see any justification for adopting the
English common law as the criterion of the /formal/ validity 
of a marriage in a foreign country between persons who are 
neither ! ritish by Nationality or domicile nor subject to 
the law of any part of the British Commonwealth. It oould 
indeed be most unjust to do so.1 The view expressed in the 
two Australian cases is shared by some writers on private 
international law in the common law world, e.g. Beckett,
^8 L.Q.R. 3^1 op.386 and 367; Sinclair, 31 B.Y.B.I.L., 
2^8^at p.25*+; Kendes da Costa, 33 Aust. L.J. (1959) 72 at 
pp.80 et seq., and in 7 I.C.L.Q. p.217. Indeed, as far 
back as 1932, it has been suggested by Sir Eric Eeckett that 
the English private international law should, by analogy, 
adopt the doctrine of the common lav; marriage for sustaining 
the formal validity of a marriage contracted in polygamous 
forms in England, if the parties to such a marriage are 
subject to a system of law which permits polygamy. But 
contra: Dicey and Morris, op.cit., 8th ed. p.281; see
also, -orris, 66 I-Iarv. L.R. 96I at p. 982.
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20validly contracted between a half-brother and his half-sister, 
furthermore, a prohibited degree of relationship within which a 
person may not marry in one locality may be totally unknown in 
the others, for example, the impediment on marriage between 
persons within foster relationship existing under Moslem law in 
parts of the hrthern 'igerian states. In view of this diversity 
of marital and other customary laws, it is not surprising that 
most of the former Regions of I igeria have deemed it necessary 
to enact choice of lav; rules that should be applied where the 
factual situation of a transaction has some significant connec­
tion with more than one system of customary law within I.igeria. 
These statutory choice of law rules have been extended to the 
new states created out of the former Regions by the Constitu­
tional instrument creating the states, with the result that the 
rules become part of the laws of such states.
These statutory provisions are primarily directed to 
customary courts, except in the Western and the Mid.-Western 
states where the High Courts are expressly directed to apply the 
sane choice of law rules provided for the customary courts. If 
the statutory choice of lav; rules are adequate for determining 
the intranational validity of polygamous marriages, there would 
seem to be no reason why they should not be adopted by the High 
Courts for private international law purposes not only because 
all the High Courts are enjoined by general provisions in the 
high Court Laws to apply customary laws but also of our submis­
sion in chapter one that one of the factors which the superior 
courts should take into consideration in developing higerian
20. For example, as in the Skoi Customary lav;, see below.
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private international law is that customary law is part of the 
substantive sources constantly remaking the body of this 
branch of the law. These statutory choice of law rules are not 
the same in all the Nigerian states. Therefore in considering 
their adequacy with regard to the essential validity of poly­
gamous marriages, it will be necessary to discuss them according 
to the group of states operating uniform rules.
The Western, the Mid-Western and the Lagos States
The relevant provision in this group of states is section
21
20(3) of the Western Nigeria, Customary Courts Law, 1959. As 
regards the Western and the Mid-Western states, it is provided 
that where the High Courts of these two states decide that cus­
tomary law is applicable in a conflictual situation, the courts
22should apply section 20 of the Customary Courts Law. But in
the Lagos state, the application of the section is confined to
23the Customary Courts in certain parts of the state. J
Section 20(3) of the Western Nigeria, Customary Courts 
Law is couched in the following terms:
11 (a) in any civil causes or matters where -
(i) both parties are not natives of the area of
jurisdiction of the court; or
(ii) the transaction the subject of the cause or
matter was not entered into in the area of the 
jurisdiction of the court; or
21. Cap. 31> Laws of Western Nigeria (1959 ed.). The Law was 
made applicable to the Mid-Western State by the Mid-Western 
Region (Territorial Provisions) Act, No.19 of 1963> s.2; 
and to the Lagos State, by the States (Creation and Transi­
tional Provisions) Decree, 1967* s.1(5) and the Lagos State 
(Applicable Laws) Edict, No.2 of 1968.
22. See the High Court Law, Cap.¥f, Laws of Western Nigeria, 
(1959 ed.)- s.12 00.
23- By the Lagos State (Applicable Laws) Edict, No.2 of 1968.
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(iii) one of the parties is not a native of the area of
jurisdiction of the court and the parties agreed
or may be presumed to have agreed that their obli­
gation should be regulated, wholly or partly, by 
the customary law applying to that party,
the appropriate customary law shall be the customary law
binding between the parties.
(b) in all other civil causes and matters the appro­
priate customary law shall be the law of the area
of jurisdiction of the court.1
Some of the terms used in this enactment need some explana­
tion. Ey section 2 of the Customary Courts Law, “cause" is 
defined to include "any action, suit or other original proceeding 
between a plaintiff and a defendant and also any criminal pro­
ceeding". "Hatter" is defined to include "any .proceeding in a 
court not in a cause". Therefore, a "civil cause or matter" as 
used in section 20(3) denotes any action, suit or other original 
proceeding between the parties to a civil case, as opposed to a 
criminal one. Consequently, the phrase "civil cause and matter" 
embraces such matters as a nullity suit brought by one spouse to 
annul a customary marriage for failure of the other to observe 
a marriage prohibition or requirement; a divorce cause; an 
action in tort; and a proceeding to enforce a contract, etc.
Land and succession matters are excluded from the ambit of 
section 20 (3) since they are separately provided for in section 
20 (1) and (2) of the Law.
A "native" for the purpose of the Law, is defined by sub­
section 6 of section 20 as a person who is a member of a commu- 
lity indigenous to the area where a customary court exercises 
its jurisdiction. Therefore, a non-native means a person who 
is not a member of a community indigenous to the area of juris- 
iction of the court, however, excluding persons who are not
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2*+ •■' igerians" since a customary court has no power to adjudicate
2^
over persons wno are not Iigerians. Whether the High Courts, 
ii applying section 20 of the Customary Courts Law, will consider 
themselves bound by the provision of section 17 of the Law as 
regards non-exercise of adjudicatory powers over persons who are 
lot 'lgerians is not clear.
With the above definitions and explanations, the only 
effect of section 20 (3) which may be regarded as clear are as 
follows:
In any civil action, suit or proceeding
(a) ./here one or all the parties are natives of a community 
indigenous to the area of jurisdiction of the court, 
the applicable lav; shall be the customary law of such 
ethnic community: Section 20 (3) (b).
(b) Where the parties agreed or may be presumed to have 
agreed that their obligations should be regulated, 
wholly or partly, by the customary law of the party 
who is not a native of a community indigenous to the 
area of jurisdiction of the court, 1 the customary law 
applying to1 the non-native shall be applied . Section 
20 (3) (a) (iii).
(c) In two other cases,
(i) Where both parties are not natives of a commu­
nity indigenous to the area of jurisdiction of 
the court, or
2b. A 11 Nigerian11 is defined by s.2 of the Western Nigeria,
Customary Courts Lav;, as a person whose parent or parents 
were members of any tribe or tribes indigenous to Nigeria
and the descendants of such persons.
25. Western Nigeria, Customary Courts Lav;, s.17.
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(ii) Where the transaction the subject of the action, 
suit or proceedings, was not entered into in
the area of jurisdiction of the court,
then, in such situations, the courts must apply
1 the customary lav; binding between the parties11. 
Section 20 (3)(a)(i) and (ii)
Thus while it is clear that the customary law of the area 
3f jurisdiction of the court applies in situation (a) and that 
the parties may agree, or be presumed to have agreed, on the 
relevant "foreign1 customary law in situation (b), the section 
is silent as to how the "customary law binding between the
parties" in the two situations listed in (c) should be ascer­
tained. It must be pointed out at once that domicile and
nationality are not relevant tests since a customary court in
this group of states has not the power to apply common law con­
cepts or provisions of a statute which it has not been expressly
p ^
authorised to apply. Nonetheless, the category of connecting 
factors is not close. The test may be one of religious adherence 
of the parties concerned, or their membership of an ethnic com­
munity outside the area of jurisdiction of the court. On the 
analogy of the rule contained in (a) above, it would seem that 
the test of "ethnic identity" should be applied. However, if 
the community of which the parties are members are different, 
and different solutions are provided by the laws of such comrnu- 
iities for the resolution of the matter in dispute, then the 
section offers no guidance and the courts are left to devise 
appropriate choice of customary lav; rules.
These statutory provisions, as has been shown, are formula­
ted with reference to civil causes and matters, however, excluding
26. bio ., s .19.
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Le.no and succession suits. The section therefore constitute the 
choice of law rule applicable in actions concerning, for example, 
nullity of marriages, divorce, contract, tort, etc, A perti- 
lent question that must be asked in this connection is whether 
the provision is equally applicable to an issue, e.g. validity 
of aarriage, which arises as an incidental matter in a suit as 
distinguished from a main cause of action. It will perhaps be 
artificial to resort to such fine distinctions in interpreting 
this clause, but it must be pointed -out, as the first objection 
to this provision, that the position would have been clearer were 
the provision made with reference to an issue rather than in 
relation to a cause of action.
A second and more serious objection is that the courts are 
required to apply a subjective test in all cases in determining 
trie law binding between the parties. For according to section 
20 (3)? sub-section (a) of the Customary Courts Law, v'hen one of 
the parties is not a native of the area of the court's jurisdic­
tion and the parties agreed, or are presumed to have agreed that 
the customary law of the non-native should regulate their obli­
gation, then the appropriate lav; shall be the customar„ law binding 
between the parties. The enactment of this statutory choice of 
law rule must, therefore, be presumed to have been made on the 
fundamental assumption that parties to a transaction must always 
act reasonably. As regards the validity of a customary marriage, 
the rule invests parties with an unlimited freedom in choosing 
the lav; of the place with reference to which the validity of 
their aarriage muet be tested. In other words, if the parties 
to a marriage decide not to act reasonably, (indeed, to adopt 
the statement of one jurist, love and hate know no legal bars)
2*+2.
a subjective interpretation of the lav/ binding betv/een the 
parties v/ill, in most cases, give statutory licence to parties 
to contract their arriage in evasion of the prohibitions of 
the domestic law however stringent they may be. The rule there­
fore appears to have ignored the social interest of the state in 
regulating and maintaining the institution of marriage.
In illustration of the undesirable consequence of this 
rule, the following hypothetical case v/ill be considered:
W. an Ekoi woman, subject to the Ekoi customary lav/, is
a half-sister of E, a Yoruba, subject to the Western
igeria Customary law. H. and W . contracted a marriage 
in an Ekoi town according to the customary lav/ of that 
place. Three months later, the parties settled in 
Ibadan in Western Eigeria. Ey the Ekoi customary law 
the marriage is valid since there is no legal bar to a 
marriage between a man and his half-sister.^ Eut 
under the Yoruba customary lav;, the marriage is void 
on ground of consanguinity. Two years after their 
marriage, H. was killed in a motor accident in Ibadan 
as a result of the negligent driving of X. W. sued in 
the Western Nigeria High Court on behalf of herself and 
the child of the marriage under the State's Torts Law 
for compensation for the v/rongful death of H. As 
regards her own claim, it was necessary to determine 
the validity of her marriage to H.
We may assume that it was conclusively proved that the parties 
had in contemplation the Ekoi customary lav; as the lav/ governing
27. See T. A. Talbot, In the Shadow of the Bush; I description
of the Skoi of Southern f'igeria. London, Heinemann, 1912,
p.11C.
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the validity of the '.arriage. ° Since one of the parties is 
iot a native of Western Nigeria, the woman being an Ekoi, and 
the arriage transaction was made outside the court's jurisdic­
tion, section 20 (3)(a) of the Western Nigeria Customary Courts 
Law :akes it imperative for the High Court to determine the 
validity of the marriage by the law binding between the parties, 
hut in determining the law binding between them, the court is 
required to adopt a subjective test. Therefore, since the 
parties agreed to regulate their marriage transaction by the 
Ekoi customary law, that law is the customary law binding between 
them. The marriage should therefore be held valid even though 
it was contracted in contravention of the Western Nigerian law 
concerning prohibited degree of consanguinity. This is irres­
pective of the fact that the Western Nigerian law is the personal 
law of the husband at the time of the marriage and the law of 
the community in which the parties established their matrimonial 
home immediately after the marriage.
It is submitted that such absurd result which makes non­
sense of the legal requirements of customary marriage could not 
nave been in the contemplation of the legislature when the law 
was enacted. Yet, as regards this provision, Park remarked that
it uis exhaustive and. complete in itself" and is adequate "for 
29ail cases" ' With this view, we are bound to disagree. Since 
It is the desirable intention of the legislature to lay down 
choice of law rules for the guidance especially of customary 
courts whose judges are generally not expert lawyers, it is
28. Of course, it is quite possible that they contemplated 
nothing explicitly at marriage.
29. Park, Sources of Nigerian Law, pp. 127-128.
suggested that a better :eans of doing this would be to provide 
lew choice of law rules that will govern each class of case in 
ntranational conflicts in substitution for the present omnibus
rhe applicable to all cases.
 ^ e I-stern Nigerian States1 Provision
The provision of the Eastern Nigeria Customary Courts (No.2) 
Edict^ is substantially the same as the Western Nigerian provi­
sion. Without going into specific details as to the circum­
stances under which the provision should apply as in the case 
of the Western and Kid-Western rule, it too provides that
1 the customary lav; prevailing in the area of the juris­
diction of the court or binding between the parties1’
should be applied where a transaction before the court has con-
aection with more than one system of customary lav;.
A great flaw in the above statutory choice of lav; rule,
if it is to be applied to determine the validity of a customary
rriage, is that it is too general and vague. So vague that
the propagation of the test of "law binding between the parties"
would appear not to be more than the substitution of judicial
discretion for legal rules. It may be here recalled thet it was
Savigny who first stated that the function of the conflict of
laws was
"to ascertain for every legal relation that lav; to 
which, in its proper nature, it belongs or is subject." 31
hut instead of defining specific points of contact which will
be used to determine the law governing the validity of marriage
as other systems of conflict of laws, the provision offer a
• in ^  7  -Lyuvjj o  V »  / •
31. Savigny, oo.cit., s.3^ +8
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general test of the law binding between the parties. So until 
the courts eventually establish a new rule for determining the 
'.rase “the law binding between the parties11, the applicable 
law governing the validity of a customary marriage would not be 
predictable, lie may consider for instance the case of
II. a mini, subject to the Edo Customary law, who married 
a Calabar girl, who is subject to Calabar customary 
law. The Marriage was celebrated in Eenin-City accord­
ing to Edo Customary law. At the time of the marriage,
. was 20 and . was 15. By the Age of arriage Law 
applying in the South Eastern State, the marriage is 
void, it having been contracted 1 by persons either of 
whom is below the age of 16" But according to Edo 
customary law the marriage is valid. The parties are 
now residing in the South Eastern State where the 
validity of the marriage arises for determination in a 
nullity suit taken on appeal to the High Court of that 
state.
In. the above hypothetical case, the law applicable is also the 
customary law binding between the parties. But unlike the 
.esteri Higerian provision, what test should be applied to 
determine the lav; binding the parties is not provided, by the 
1. stern Nigeria Customary Courts Edict applying in the state. 
Shall the test be the objective one of abstract reasonableness? 
Jr is it the subjective one of discovering the customary law of 
which place the parties, in fact, submitted the validity of 
their marriage; in this case the Edo customary lav; which we 
may assume was conclusively proved to have been agreed by the 
parties? However, it is inconceivable that the Southern Eastern
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state court will hole as valid a marriage contracted, in contra­
vention of its Age of 1 arriage Law, by a woman who was not only 
subject to the lav; of that state at the time of her marriage 
hut who also continued to live there after the marriage. The 
fact that the marriage was celebrated outside the state would 
lost certainly be considered insignificant. That is more 
likely is that the High Court will seize on the ambiguity of 
the phrase “the law binding between the parties1 to lay down 
new choice of law rules that should govern the essential validity 
of customary marriage having connection with more than one 
system of customary law. In which case, such a solution would 
have given strength to our contention that the provision of the 
Customary Courts Edict is not more than an illusory and in­
sufficient guide.
•~nhe ~rorthern Nigerian States
It now remains to consider the provisions of the six
Northern Nigerian states. First, it must be pointed out that
since the creation of the six states out of the former Northern
:egion of Nigeria in Kay 1967? each of tile states has re-enacted,
32with slight modifications, the Native Courts Lav;, 1963“" as its
3 3
own -rea Courts Edict. a striking feature of the new Edicts is 
their identity as to sections and substance on choice of cus­
tomary law rules and other matters. Consequently, it will not
32. Cap. 73, Laws of Northern Nigeria, 19&3 ec? •
33. See, The Area Courts Edict, No.l of 1967 of the North-Western
State
1 1 " n , No.2 of 1967 of the North-Central
State
" 1 1 u , No.l of 1968 of the North-Eastern
State
" 1 “ » , No.2 of 1967 of the Kwara State
“ 1 " , No.2 of 1967 of the Kano State
u “ “ !l , No.1* of 1968 of the Benue-Plateau
State.
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be necessary to refer to more than one of the Edicts in discus­
sing their provisions on this topic.
Two sections of the North-Western State, Area Courts Edict, 
1967 c^ re relevant to the choice of the applicable law.
Section 20 (1) of the Edict provides that, subject to the
provisions of section 21, an Area Court, i.e. a customary court, 
shall, in "civil causes and matters", administer
(a) the customary law prevailing in the area of 
jurisdiction of the court; or
(b) the customary law binding between the parties.
At section 21 (1) of the Edict, it is provided that in "mixed 
civil causes, other than land causes", the governing law should 
be ascertained as follows:
"(a) the particular customary lawJ which the parties 
agreed or intended, or may be presumed to have
agreed or intended, should regulate their obliga­
tions in connection with the transaction which are 
in controversy before the court; or
(b) that combination of any two or more customary laws 
which the parties agreed or intended, or may pre­
sumed to have agreed or intended, should regulate 
their obligations as aforesaid; or
(c) in the absence of any agreement or intention or 
presumption thereof -
(i) the particular customary law; or
(ii) such combination of any two or more customary 
laws, which it appears to the court, ought, having 
regard to the nature of the transaction and to ail 
the circumstances of the case, to regulate the 
obligations of the parties as aforesaid,
but if, in the opinion of the court, none of the 
paragraphs of this sub-section is applicable to any 
particular matter in controversy, the court shall 
be governed by the principles of natural justice, 
equity and good sonscience."
The following remarks must be made about the above provi­
sions in considering their import. Section 20 deals with what
3^ +. The words “native law and custom" are used in the text to
describe customary law.
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may be termed all "unmixed civil causes" while section 21 deals 
with what the Sdict calls all "mixed civil causes" other than 
_and causes. "Cause" and "matter" have the same definition as 
in the Nestern Nigerian provision. In effect "civil causes and 
matters" as used in section 20, or "civil causes" as employed in 
section 21, mean no more than actbis, suits or other original 
proceedings between parties to a civil case, as opposed to a 
criminal case.~'y
A "mixed cause" is defined as an action, suit or proceeding 
in which two or more parties are normally subject to different 
systems of customary law. Therefore, an "unmixed civil cause" 
is defined by implication as an action, suit or other procee­
ding in a civil case between parties who are subject to the same 
system of customary law.
In the light of these definitions, the effect of section 
20 (1) is that the governing law in a suit, action or proceeding, 
v ;.ere the parties are subject to the same system of customary 
lew, is either the customary law prevailing in the area of 
jurisdiction of the customary court, or binding between the
V Q
parties. As the case of Osuagwu v. Soldier  ^ has shown, the 
test for determining whether the parties are subject to the same 
system of customary law, and if so which, is that of "ethnic 
identity" of the person concerned. Thus according to the principle
35. Area Courts Edict, N0rth-Nestern State s.2.
36. 1959.' (M.N.L.H.39. The relevant part of the judgment of
brown C.J. in which he was concerned with the interpretation 
of an identical version of the above provision, which was 
contained in the Northern Region, Native Courts Law, 195b,
s.20 (1), irs as follows: "Ne suggest that where the law of
the court is the law prevailing in the area but a different 
law binds the parties, as where two Ibos appear as parties 
in the Moslem court in an area where Moslem law prevails, 
the native court will - in the interests of justice - be 
reluctant to administer the law prevailing in the area, and 
if it tries the case at all it will - in the interests of 
justice - choose to administer the lav/ which is binding 
between the parties".
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established in that case, if two members of an ethnic group 
dispute, in an action, the essential validity of their customary 
larriage on the ground of consanguinity or non-age, the govern­
ing law will be the customary law of the ethnic community of 
w! ich they are members. If they are members of a community 
indigenous to the area of jurisdiction of the court, then the 
predominant system of customary law in existence in such area^ 
applies to the action as "the law prevailing in the area of 
jurisdiction of the court1' . But if the ethnic community of the 
parties is outside the area of jurisdiction of the court, then 
the law of such "foreign" community applies as the law "binding 
between the parties".
In short, the choice of law rule contained in the identical 
provisions of section 20 (1) of the Area Courts Edicts is to the 
effect that in any action, suit or other proceeding, where the 
parties are members of the same ethnic community, a customary 
court seised of the action in a IT0rthern Nigerian state must 
apply the customary law of the ethnic community of which they 
are members. The provision as regards the application of "personal 
lav/" may be criticised, first, on the ground that it is an 
omnibus one which is applicable to all "civil causes and matters", 
and secondly, because it does not apply, like the provisions of 
the other groups of states, to an issue which arises as an 
incidental natter in a cuase, as distinguished from such cause 
of action. But despite these short-comings, the section as 
interpreted by the High Court, is useful in determining the 
essential validity of a polygamous marriage whenever it arises 
as a cause of action, e.g. nullity suit. In this respect, the
37. h. v. Ilorin Native Court, ex p. Aremu (1953) 20 .L.R. ihk.
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section accords with the orthodox rule of private international 
law that the personal law of the parties determines whether or 
not their marriage is intrinsically valid.
It has also been stated by the High Court that the provi­
sions of sections 20 (1) and 21 (1) on choice of law should be
O Q
operated together.Also, since it has been decided by the 
igh Court, on appeal, that ethnic criterion should be used to 
determine the system of customary law applicable, the effect of 
section 21 (1), which deals with the situation where the parties 
are subject to different systems of customary law, becomes clear. 
'Thus, in a conflict of laws situation as when members of two 
distinct ethnic communities inter-married and the essential 
validity of their marriage falls for determination, a customary 
court in each of the six Northern Nigerian states has the 
choice of any of the following systems of law to determine the 
matter:
(a) the particular system of customary lav; agreed by the 
parties; or
(b) the particular system of customary law implied by,
or imputed to, their conduct in the transaction which 
is the subject of the controversy before the court; or
(c) a cumulation of two or ;ore systems of customary law 
agreed by the parties; or
(a) a cumulation of two or more systems of customary law, 
implied by, or imputed to, their conduct in the trans­
action which is the subject of the dispute before the 
court; or
(e) the particular system of customary law which the
court thinks is just, having regard to the nature of 
the transaction in dispute, and to all the circum­
stances of the case; or
3d. v sum ■ v'a v. dqioier 1959 n . . l ; . .  j e ..
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(f) the cumulation of any two „or more systems of customary 
law which' the court thinks are just, having regard to 
the nature of the transaction in dispute, and to all 
the circumstances of the case; or
(g) if the matter is still unresolved after the court 
has considered the above rules, then the court 1 shall 
be governed by the principle of natural justice, 
equity and good conscience1*.
Two general comments that may be made about the above
rules are as follows: The first is, that even though section
21 (1) is designed to deal with the situations where the parties
tre subject to different systems of customary law, yet, it 
refrains from laying down the tests which the courts should apply 
in making a cumulative application of two or more laws to a 
given situation. Secondly, it seems to have been envisaged, 
that in a conflict of laws situation, more than one system of 
laws may have to be applied; and. there may be circumstances 
■:here the applicable law may be applied, either objectively or 
subjectively.
from these observations, the clear object of the section
is not to lay down one specific rule of inter-local conflicts
that should be applied to a variety of causes, like marriage,
divorce, contract, tort, etc., as in the case of the provisions
of the other states. Rather, the object of the Edicts seems to
be the laying down of some comprehensive directives, leaving it
to the courts to work out, from case to case, and in conformity
with their idea of justice, the situations where a particular
customary law or a combination of two or more systems should be
39applied, either objectively or subjectively. These general
39. for instsnce, the legislature of the former Northern Region 
of Nigeria had itself provided a choice of law rule that 
should be applied in the field of succession; See s.30?
Northern Nigeria, Land Tenure Law, Cap.59 (1?63 ed.).
directives would seem to be more advantageous in the circum­
stance than the unsatisfactory position in the hestern, the Hid­
es tern and the Eastern states, where a single choice of law 
rule is provided for all diverse situations. Unfortunately, 
there has been no reported case as to how the courts will apply 
these general directives to determine the essential validity of 
a polygamous marriage. Eut one thing is clearer now than before, 
how that a customary court in the Northern Nigerian states has 
power to apply principles of English common law, the most 
likely result of this new power will be that if there is already 
in existence a decision of the High Court on inter-state 
conflicts, such decision Would be used, by analogy, by the 
customary courts to determine a similar point of inter-local or 
inter-communal conflicts.
We have endeavoured to show that the Western and the 
Ec stern Nigerian Laws are either inapt or too vague to be of 
any assistance in determining the law that should govern the 
essential validity of a polygamous marriage. Indeed, it is our 
contention that such an omnibus provision, indicating a single 
choice of law rule for a wide variety of situations cannot 
achieve any perfection on all the matters, covered. We have 
also attempted to show that apart from section 20 (1) of the 
.rea Courts Edicts of the Northern Nigerian states, the provi­
sions of the Edicts as regards mixed situations, are not more 
than general directives for the guidance of the courts without
bo. See s.20 (3) of the North-Western, Area Courts Edict, No.l 
of 1967. This provision has the effect of nullifying the 
statement iade in the G*h*ftacase of Cha tson v. Iobill (19^7) 
12 .A .0 .A. 101, which has the support of Park, op .cit., 
pp.116-117, that these statutory rules, and not rules of 
private international law, should be applied by the High 
Courts when they are confronted with problems of inter­
local conflicts.
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laying clown any specific rule for any particular situation. 
Consequently, the rest of this part will be concerned with some 
suggestions as to which law should be applied by both the High 
Courts, the Customary Courts and all other courts in Figeria, to 
govern the essential validity of a polygamous marriage. In this 
particular respect, we see no justification for making any dis­
tinction between intra-national and international conflicts in 
view of our earlier submission that, in the field of marriage, 
intra-national or inter-state choice of law rules should 
normally set the pattern for private international law in its 
wider sense.
k. CASH FOR REFORM
lluch emphasis is often placed on the fact that a polygamous 
marriage in Figeria, and indeed in Africa as a whole, is in 
effect a contract, that is, that it is a multi-partite trans­
action in which the consensus is not between the man and the 
woman but an agreement between the respective families 'of the 
nan and the woman; that, no doubt, this contractual aspect of 
a polygamous marriage is further illustrated by the requirement 
that the payment of money or money’s worth should be made by 
the man or his family to the woman's family before a valid 
marriage can be constituted. In view of this peculiar nature 
of polygamous marriage, it has been suggested that the rule of 
validation of a polygamous marriage cannot but be a dissenter
Li
from the conflicts orthodoxy of the European law. Influenced
*+1. G.R.J. Eackwill, "Southern Rhodesia Hative Law; Conflict
of Laws in Relation to the Guardianship of Children after
Divorce" in P.. .L .J . Vol.! (1961) 71 at p.72.
£5^ .
by tl is “contract theory11, it has been stated by Hackwill, for 
ex9. pie, that the validity of a polygamous marriage should be 
determined according to that system of law under which the 
parties purported to marry. According to him, the applicable 
law will, in most cases, be the personal law of the bride which,
: t is claimed, often dictates the ceremony of marriage especially 
j1 those systems of law where the payment of bride-price con- 
stitutes an essential requirement of the marriage.
It is submitted that this argument about the purely con­
tractual nature of a polygamous marriage is fallacious. Accord- 
ing to Osborne C.J. in Savage v. Ilacfoy, “Marriage” whether
onogamous or polygamous "is something more than a mere contract, 
and creates a definite status.” This principle cannot be dis­
turbed merely because a polygamous marriage does not usually 
require the approval of some state official as in monogamous 
• rriage. Mhat is necessary is that such status must have come 
into effect by the operation of law. The way in which the law 
brings it about is immaterial. Otherwise there would be no 
legal justification for the conferment of the status of husband 
. id wife on parties to a common law marriage celebrated without 
the intervention of an ordained priest or a registrar of 
marriage.
furthermore, as pointed out in discussing the statutory 
choice of law rules, it will be wrong in principle to determine 
the essential validity of a marriage at the behest of whatever 
lew, out of many, parties to such marriage map decide to submit.
In fact, there would seem to be no logical reason- why the 
private international rule suggested for determining the essen­
tial validity of a monogamous marriage should not be capable of
^2. Ibid.
**3. (1909) 1 Ren. G.C. Hep. 50h at p.pOS.
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being employed to determine the validity of a polygamous marriage, 
both at the intranational and inter-national levels, for poly- 
; amous marriages, the rule of validation may be stated as
follows:
A polygamous marriage is valid as to essentials if it
complies with the personal law of each party at the
time of marriage; provided that a marriage should not
be declared void if it is valid according to the law
of the place in which the parties intended at the time
of marriage to establish their matrimonial home and
such intention has in fact been carried out.
"The application of the personal lav/s of the parties for the
regulation of their polygamous marriage is not a new approach in
b'igerian private international law, as instanced by the decision
kk
of the ole Supreme Court of Lagos in Savage v. Macfay. The 
statement of Osborne C.J. in that case only stands discredited 
on the ground that the learned Chief Justice considered the 
lex domicilii originis as the most appropriate law for deter­
mining the capacity of a person to enter into such marriage.
Savage v. Macfoy was concerned with a succession suit in 
which the validity of a polygamous marriage alleged to have 
existed between Claudius Macfoy and Susannah Savage was raised. 
Claudius Macfoy was born in Sierra Leone where some of his 
ancestors had settled after they had been rescued from slavery, 
his domicile of origin was Sierra Leone. Subsequently he came 
to Lagos where he had his primary education. After several 
visits to other parts of Africa, he finally settled in Lagos 
where he acquired a domicile of choice. Later on, he went 
through a form of polygamous marriage according to the Lagos
■rh. (1909) 1 Ren. C-.C. Rep. ?0U
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customary law with a Christian girl, Susannah Savage, also 
domiciled in Lagos. This marriage was at all times potentially 
polygamous, i.e. Macfoy never took another wife during his life­
time. There were two children of the marriage before the death 
of Macfoy on June 25, 1906. The action was brought by the 
plaintiff, Susannah Savage, on behalf of herself and the 
children of the marriage, claiming that they were entitled to 
the real and personal property of the deceased as against the 
defendants who were brothers of the deceased. The court felt 
bound to determine the validity of the marriage between Macfoy 
and Savage so as to enable it to arrive at a conclusion as to 
whether or not Susannah Savage was in fact the lawful widow of 
the deceased and whether the two children of the marriage were 
legitimate.
Osborne C.J., found as a fact that all the essentials of a 
customary marriage were present in the union between the parties 
but nonetheless held the marriage invalid. Two reasons were 
given for the invalidity of the marriage. One was achieved by 
the employment of the doctrine of public policy. Resorting to 
the legal theory that the point of paramount importance in any 
given case is to discover whether there is any statute applicable 
to the case, the judge found a useful discovery for the purpose 
on hand in the Lagos Supreme Court Ordinance, section 19 of 
which, in effect, provided as followss Customary law is appli­
cable to “any person11, especially in a transaction or dispute 
involving a native of Nigeria and a non-native when the non­
application of customary law will result in substantial injustice
k*
to either party. J The court, having held that “any person1 as
*+5. An almost identical provision is contained in the High Court
Laws of the States.
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used in the section excluded a person who is not a native of 
'igeria, clearly recognised that to deny a woman who was regarded 
iy customary law, and the community in which she lived as a 
wife, the right to share in the intestate property of her husband 
c mounted to substantial injustice but got round the application 
? the section by saying that it did not apply to "a contract 
-■f polygamous marriage when expressly repugnant to the English 
law ... on grounds of public policy" and cited the English case
1+6:d / yde v. - yde in support.
The second reason is better stated in the words of the
learned Chief Justice himself. He said,
"He ^Claudius Macfoy/ came from Sierra Leone where 
polygamy is unlawful ... The mere fact of Macfoy 
having made Lagos his domicile of choice would not 
necessarily make him subject to or given Z,sic7 the 
benefit of native law and custom, and his ordinary 
relations would be governed by English and not 
native lav;" , 7
and added that
"no effect will be given in this court, whatever 
views native tribunals may take in such matters, to 
a polygamous union' which would not bg recognised as 
valid by the laws of the domicile of^J origin of 
either party." ^9
A similar view that a person whose domicile of origin pre­
cluded from contracting a polygamous marriage could still not 
enter into such narriage even after acquiring a domicile of 
choice in Nigeria was contained in the obiter dictum of Hedges J.,
*+6. (1866) L.R. 1 P. & D. 130.
W .  (1909) 1 Ren. G.C. Rep. 50Lf at p.?08.
!i3. fhe report of the case contains “domicile or origin of either
party" but a careful reading of the case clearly shows 
"domicile of origin ..." is what is meant by the C.J. The 
words "domicile or origin" must have been one of the several 
reporter’s errors in the case.
(1909) 1 Ren. G.C. Rep. 50>+ at p.508.
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5oin Honseca v. Passman. ^here was no reference to Savage's 
c:-se in the Fonseca's decision but it is beyond doubt that the 
decision in the former case must have influenced Pledges, J., in 
expressing this view. That view, therefore, stands or falls with 
Savage v. Macfoy.
It is submitted that Savage v. Macfoy was wrongly decided 
on the basis that the two reasons given by Osborne, C.J., for 
is decision did not represent common law. Mith respect, we 
iiay even say the decision is incompatible with, common sense.
In fact it is difficult to conceive a more bizzare mis-statement 
of the English common law rules of private international law as 
they existed at the time of their reception in Nigeria even 
assuming that the judge had no alternative but to follow them 
slavishly, heedless therefore to say that the wall of separa­
tion between monogamy and polygamy had, to greater extent, 
broken down in all common law countries.
The case of I-Iyde v. Hyde which the learned Chief Justice 
cited as authority for arriving at his decision that a poly­
gamous marriage contracted in Nigeria - a predominantly 
polygamous society - between two Nigerian domiciliaries is 
invalid on grounds of public policy does not support his judg­
ment. Hyde's case was concerned with a husband's petition for 
divorce on ground of his wife's adultery. The husband was an 
Englishman by birth. In 185-7 when he was about 16 years of age, 
he joined a congregation of Mormons in London and was soon after­
wards ordained a priest of that faith. In London he met and 
became acquainted with the respondent who, like her parents, 
was a Mormon. They later became engaged. In 1850, the respondent 
and her mother went to Salt Lake in the territory of Utah in the
50. </195k7 . i.L.R. 5-1.
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United States of America and in 1853 the petitioner joined them 
there. In the same year they were married in Utah, the
marriape being celebrated by the president of the Mormons who
was also the governor of the territory. They cohabited as man 
and wife in Utah for about three years. Later on, the peti­
tioner went on a mission to the Sandwich Islands leaving the 
respondent at Utah. On his arrival at Sandwich Islands he 
renounced the Mormon faith and openly preached against it. As 
a result of his activities at this place, a sentence of excom­
munication was pronounced against him, and his wife declared free
to marry which she did shortly afterwards. In 1857) the
etitioner returned to England. It is not clear whether the 
husband was domiciled in Utah curing his three years residence 
in that territory. In fact, no allusion was made to his 
possible domicile in Utah throughout the judgment of Lord 
lenzanee. Only in the head note to the case was it stated that 
Mr. Hyde resumed his domicile in England on his return there in 
1857.
Lord Penzance refused to adjudicate on the petition on the
ground that the marriage was a polygamous one. His main reason
for refusing to assume jurisdiction over the marriage was that
"the matrimonial law of this country is adapted to the Christian
51larriage, and it is wholly inapplicable to polygamy" . About' 
half of Lord Penzance judgment was devoted to explaining the 
?anciful estimates of the judicial difficulties involved for an 
English court to assume jurisdiction on a polygamous marriage.
In emphasising the point that the marriage was being refused 
recognition solely for the purpose of divorce jurisdiction the 
judge in conclusion of his judgment said:
51. (1866) 1 L.PU P. & D. 130 at p. 135.
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"This court does not profess to decide upon the rights 
of succession or legitimacy which it might be proper 
to accorc to the issue of polygamous unions, or upon 
the rights or obligations in relation to third persons 
which people living under the sanction of such unions 
nay have created for themselves. All that is intended 
to be here decided is that as between each other they 
are not entitled to the remedies, the ad judication, or 
the relief of the matrimonial law of England." J2
The first point that emerges from the facts and the decision
in lyde v. Hyde is that the principle enunciated in that case
relates to the degree of recognition that should be given to a
polygamous marriage by English law. The validity of the marriage
according to the law of the Territory of Utah was not in question.
In several passages in his judgment, Lord Penzance assumed that
the marriage was a perfectly valid polygamous one in the country
53where it was contracted.
Secondly, it is obvious from the statement of Lord Penzance
quoted above that his decision was not based, on the ground that
the recognition of the polygamous marriage would be contrary to
English public policy, but on the ground that English matrimonial
law is geared to monogamous marriages and is wholly inapplicable 
ql|-
to polygamy.y
From the above analysis of the case of Hyde v. Kyde, it 
will be clearly seen that for Osborne C.J., to hold on grounds 
of public policy as he did in Savage v. Macfoy that a polygamous 
marriage contracted in Nigeria by two Nigerian domiciliaries is 
an illicit intercourse and that the female party to it is a 
feme sole is obviously going much further than to hold that the 
matrimonial remedies of the English courts are not available to
52. (1866) 1 L.R. P. & D. 130 at p. 138.
53. See also He Bethell (1887) 38 Ch.D.220 where Stirling J.
held that a marriage between an Englishman and an African 
woman in a Barolong tribe was a marriage in the Barolong 
sense only, even though it was refused recognition in England.
51*. Cf. Morris, "The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages in
English haw"5~66 Tarv . L.lev. 961 at p . 967 and Eecke11, 
rf6 L.E.'R.' 3^1.
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such parties. Also, it will have been observed that the point 
arising for determination in Savage v. Macfoy. i.e. the right of 
the female party to succeed to the intestate estate of the 
husband was expressly left open by Lord Penzance. Since Hyde's 
case was not based on grounds of public policy of "English law"
- by English law, it may be conceded that the Chief Justice 
meant the received common law operating in Nigeria and not the 
law in England - it becomes clear that the concept of public 
policy applied in Savage v. Macfoy was of the court*s own 
creation.
While it is true that in the sphere of domestic as well as 
foreign law, the courts of a country can withhold their support 
from transactions inimical to the public welfare or the morality 
of the society as a whole, the crucial question here is whether 
the canon of exclusion should be that of an extraneous law 
received as part of the Nigerian law and which applies rela­
tively to a minority of the population of the country. In 
other words, should the doctrine of public policy in Nigeria 
invariably reflect the attitudes of the received law with the 
result that whenever an institution of the indigenous law is 
inconsistent with the notion of "English" public policy, it 
should be struck off? Or should public policy in Nigeria be 
based on the harmonisation of the precepts of these two systems 
of law on the ground that public policy varies from country to 
country" depending on the social interest or institutions the 
country considers best to protect? To give a negative reply to
55. For a comparison of the concept of Public Policy in English, 
and other foreign laws, see Graveson, Comparative Aspects 
of the General Principles of Private International Law, 
pp.38-^75 D. Lloyd. Public Policy^ —
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tl e last inquiry will not only defeat the purpose of the recep­
tion of the English law in igeria i.e. to supplement the 
customary lav; existing in the country before the advent of the 
■critish, but will also amount to starting from the wrong postu­
late of the superiority of the received lav; to that of the
indigenous population - a view has no logical basis to sustain
56it. For as pointed out by Kollewijn
“whether a legal system is good or not can only be 
considered in connection with a group of persons 
to be governed by it,1’
fhether the institution of polygamy is to be confined to certain
people within Nigeria is a policy matter to be decided by the
legislature. Since the statute contemplated the possibility of
foreigners entering into such marriage, it is not competent for
the judge to employ the elusive concept of public policy to
invalidate a legal relation which is in keeping with the deep-
rooted tradition of the community. Public Policy
1 should only be invoked in clear cases in which the 
harm to the public is substantially incontestable, 
and does not depend upon the idosyncratice infer­
ences of judicial minds." 57
The application of public policy to invalidate the customary 
marriage becomes difficult to justify when it is observed that 
besides the exceptional rule which permitted customary lav; to be 
applied in a transaction between a Nigerian native and a non- 
Nigerian where substantial injustice will result to either party 
by the non-application of such lav;, Osborne C.J., found as a fact 
that Macfoy was not only domiciled in Lagos but was sufficiently 
identified with the native community so as to enable his
56. Op.cit., pp.31^-315.
57. Fender v. St. John Nildmay /193^7 A.C.l at p.12.
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children, including those born out of "native-wedlock" , to be
legitimetised by acknowledgment under customary law. As to the
entitlement of such children to succeed, to their deceased
father's estate, the judge held
"I am perfectly clear that the ordinary rule applies 
... in this case the native law of succession." J8
Me accordingly gave the children their entitlement under cus­
tomary law. If Macfoy was able to claim the benefit of customary 
law to legitimatise his illegitimate children by acknowledgment, 
the question must be asked why public policy prevented him from 
contracting a marriage under the same law. From this, it must 
be clear that the application of public policy to invalidate 
the marriage was an undesirable attempt by the Chief Justice to 
promote through judicial channels the spread of Western civili­
zation.
A second and equally important criticism of the decision 
In Savage v. Macfoy is that the Chief Justice accorded more 
reocognition than necessarily permitted by the common law rule 
of private international lav; to the domicile of origin in 
molding that capacity to marry is to be determined by the law of 
domicile of origin when such domicile had been superseded by 
one of choice. For despite the tenacity of the domicile of
origin and its capacity for revival, it has been long established
59
by the Iiouse of Lords in Udny v. Udny that
"when another domicile is put on, the domicile of 
origin is for that purpose relinquished, and remains 
in abeyance curing the continuance of the domicile 
of choice. "
Once it had been found by the Chief Justice that Macfoy had
5o. (1909) 1 Ren. G.C. Rep. 50k at p. 508.
59. (1869) L.R. 1 Sc. cc Div. ^ 1  at p. R58.
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abandoned his Sierra Leone domicile of origin and acquired a 
new domicile of choice in Lagos before his marriage, there is no 
principle or authority to support his finding that the law of 
;ierra Leone, and not the law of Lagos, must determine his 
capacity to enter into a polygamous marriage.
Despite these shortcomings of the decision in Savage v. 
acfoy, it is submitted that some significance should be accor­
ded to the case as authority for the law determining the validity 
of a polygamous marriage between a foreigner and a native of 
. igeria. An obvious advantage of the decision in the case is 
its recognition that the personal laws of either party must 
determine the validity of a polygamous marriage between them.
The principle that the personal lav/s of the parties deter­
mine the validity of a polygamous marriage has been accepted in
.ana and Southern Rhodesia. Thus in the Ghanaian case of
6 o:r, vies v. Rand all, a man born and domiciled in Sierra Leone
ic rried in Ghana a G lanaian worn an domiciled in Ghana. The 
larriage was celebrated according to Fanse Customary lav; to 
whieh the woman was subject. The parties lived together in 
Ghana, the husband never losing his domicile of origin in Sierra 
neone where he visited from time to time. The husband later 
ied intestate in Ghana. The plaintiff, the sole surviving 
child of the marriage, claimed a share in the deceased father’s 
estate. As a preliminary issue it was necessary to determine 
whether the plaintiff was the legitimate child of the deceased 
which in turn depended on the validity of the marriage between 
his parents.
Charles,J., found no difficulty in identifying the marriage
60. ^1962.7 1 C-.L.R. 1.
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as a polygamous one the validity of which must be determined by
t) e antenuptial lex domicilii of the parties i.e. by the law of
Sierra Leone and Fante customary law of Ghana. The judge was
unable to sustain the validity of the marriage on the ground
that there was insufficient evidence about the law of Sierra
Leone as regards the capacity of a person domiciled there to
contract a valid polygamous marriage, '.."hat is surprising is
why the learned judge did not presume that the law of Sierra
Leone was, under such circumstances, the same as that of Ghana
in accordance with the common law rule of private international
lav; introduced into Ghana in 187^ and which the court may apply
6lon a doubtful point by virtue of the Interpretation Act.
The principle that a polygamous marriage must comply with
all the requirements prescribed by the personal laws of the 
parties before it can be considered valid was also adopted by
62
the Southern Rhodesia Dative Appeal Court in Rhodia v. nandala
6
and Leya and John Phiri v. Lasauso Banda. both of which were 
custody cases in which the validity of the marriage between the 
parents was raised.
In conclusion, the above survey clearly shows that a poly­
gamous marriage is not differently regarded from a monogamous in 
some jurisdictions in Africa and that the self-same rule devised 
for testing the essential validity of a monogamous marriage is 
equally applicable for the determining the validity of a poly­
gamous marriage. But as a result of the inadequacies of the
61. (C.A.^) of i960, s.17.
62. p > 2 7  3.R.U. 179.
63. Z195'o7 S.R.N. 605.
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dual-domicile rule noted in considering the law that governing
the essentials of a monogamous marriage,
it is submitted that a polygamous marriage which is 
not valid according to the personal law should not 
be declared void if it is valid by the law of the 
place where the parties intended at the time of 
marriage to establish their matrimonial home and 
such intention was in fact carried out. 6*+
Lastly, one problem that arises for consideration in 
adopting this approach relates to the payment of bride-price or 
dowry which is a prerequisite of a polygamous marriage in all 
tl e jurisdictions in Ligeria and most systems of law in Africa.
For whatever the social purpose or the theoretical justification 
for this institution, it must be realised that in a conflict of 
±aw case it cannot be regarded as more than a monetary transac­
tion which requires the consensus of the parties before it can 
be effectively resolved. Thus, for example, immense problems of 
great complexity will arise if the determination of this require­
ment is delegated to the personal lav/s of the parties where 
(a) the personal laws of the parties stipulate different 
amounts as bride-price or (b) one law provides for its payment 
and the other does not. A cumulative application of the personal 
1aws of the parties in such situation is impossible. In this 
respect, four solutions each of which is equally arbitrary may 
be posited. The applicable law may be
i. the lav; providing for a higher amount of bride-price,or
ii. the law stipulating for the payment of a lower amount,
or
iii. the law of the husband, or
iv. the lav; of the wife.
In view of the arbitrariness of these solutions, it is submitted
6*+. Cf. Art. 11(2) Ethiopian Code of the Conflict of Laws, in
Secler, op .cit., pp.166-167.
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that the most appropriate law for regulating this requirement 
of customary marriage will be the law agreed or presumed to have beeii 
arreed by the parties i.e. on the analogy of the proper law of 
contract. y It will therefore be necessary to divorce the 
requirement of briae-price or dowry from other requirements of 
polygamous marriage and subject it to a different rule of 
validation, he have already noticed that the payment of bride- 
price is a dying institution since the waiver of its payment 
does not vitiate the marriage. When the institution is finally 
abrogated, the rule proposed for its validation in conflictual 
cases will also wither away.
65. Cf. Shahnaz, v. Rizwan /196£7 1 Q.l. 390.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DIVORCE
Introduction
According to the scheme of this work, a discussion about 
the dissolution of marriage will be limited to that of 
absolute divorce, not only because the conflict rules concerning 
divorce are, to a certain extent, equally applicable to other 
areas of limited divorce such as judicial separation or nullity 
of voidable marriage, but more important because it is in 
respect of absolute divorce that problems of a conflictual 
nature are mostly being experienced at present in Nigeria.
The conflict of laws problems relating to divorce will be 
examined from three angles. First, we shall consider the 
basis of the courts' jurisdiction in divorce, i.e. the connec­
tion which parties to a divorce suit are required by law to 
have with a legal district in Nigeria, or possibly with the 
country as a whole, before the court of such place could grant 
£ divorce decree to the parties; secondly, we shall discuss 
the problem of choice of law, i.e. what system of law is appli­
cable to such suit; and thirdly, the recognition of foreign 
divorce decrees, i.e. under what conditions are divorce decrees 
of foreign courts to be recognised as decisive in terminating 
the status of marriage existing between the parties. But before 
each of the above aspects of divorce is considered in respect of 
monogamous and polygamous marriages, it will be necessary to 
elaborate on the question raised in chapter one concerning the 
“choice of courts".
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A. CKO ICS OF CObRTS
The problem discussed, under this head differs from the 
normal practice in private international law where choice'of 
courts implies choice of the judicial system of a particular 
country which is competent to order the dissolution of marriage 
laving a foreign complexion. The term 1 choice of courts1 is 
rather used to indicate which particular system of court in 
' igeria, out of the two hierarchy of courts - the customary and 
the "English" type courts operating in each of the Nigerian 
states, possesses adjudicatory powers to grant a divorce with 
extra-territorial effect.
The question of choice of courts does not arise in respect 
of a divorce suit involving parties to a monogamous marriage 
whatever their nationalities. Only the High Court of a state 
has adjudicatory powers to dissolve such marriage. The problem 
mere envisaged relates exclusively to the dissolution of poly­
gamous marriage contracted by non-Nigerians, since if the 
parties are Nigerians, the appropriate court to dissolve their 
polygamous marriage is the customary or native court. A dis­
cussion on this point may be commenced by considering the follow­
ing hypothetical case:
Suppose one of the Sudanese parties to a polygamous 
marriage contracted in the Sudan or even in Nigeria 
wants to institute divorce proceedings in Nigeria. To 
which court, the customary or the High Court should he 
or she resort for legal redress?
It will be well to remember that all natters relating to 
polygamous marriage, including its conflictual aspects, are 
within the competence of each state in Nigeria. Consequently, it
270.
will be hardly surprising to observe that lack of complete uni­
formity exists between the solutions provided by each of the 
states as regards this problem.
In the Lagos, the Mid-destern and the 'destern states, the 
jurisdiction of the customary courts over persons does not 
embrace individuals who are non-Nigerians. The relevant provi­
sion imposing this restriction is section 17 of the Customary 
Courts Law of Western Nigeria which, as a result of the two 
recent delimitations of boundaries of the former Western Region 
of Nigeria, becomes applicable to the customary courts in the 
x^ agos and the Mid-Western states.1 The section provides in 
terse terms that "A customary court shall have jurisdiction 
over all Nigerians." The clear effect of this provision, there­
fore, is that when the parties are not Nigerians or when only 
one of them is a non-Nigerian, a customary court in any of these 
states must not assume jurisdiction to dissolve a polygamous 
marriage between them.
A similar provision limiting the jurisdiction of customary
courts to Nigerians exists in the Eastern Nigerian Customary
2
Courts (No.2) Edict of 1966 which now applies in all the states 
carved out of the former Eastern Region of Nigeria. But follow­
ing the lead given by section 18 of the Northern Nigerian Native 
3
Courts Law, this Edict gives in addition the Eastern Nigerian 
customary courts, like their counterparts in the Northern Nigerian 
states, jurisdiction over non-Nigerians who consent to the 
exercise of such jurisdiction either expressly or impliedly (by
1. Supra, chapter 1, note -2-h P- ST*
2. No.29 of 1966, s.11 which replaces s.23 of the Eastern
Nigerian Customary Courts Law, Cap.32 of 1963.
3. See now ss.l1* and 15 of the Area Court Edict of each of the
six Northern Nigerian States.
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c previous institution of any proceeding in such a court). The 
effect of these provisions, therefore, is that a non-Nigerian 
who so desires may commence his or her divorce suit in any 
customary or native court in the Eastern and the Northern 
Nigerian states.
But even as regards these states, the consent provisions 
would seem not to be more than a mere palliative which will 
seldom appeal to most foreigners. Nor some of the general 
characteristics of the customary courts in these states are that
If
legal representation is not allowed before them, the law they 
apply is predominantly customary law, and the language by 
which court proceedings are conducted is the local one° which is 
generally not understood by foreigners besides the fact that 
these languages differ from court to court depending on which 
particular tribe the court is situated. In view of these handi­
caps on the part of non-iigerians and the courts themselves, it 
is conceivable that the opportunity proviced by these "consent 
provisions" will seldom, if ever, be taken by foreigners. Indeed 
we think that such less formal tribunals would be quite unsuited 
for trial of issues of private international lav/ for which high 
judicial qualities are essential, especially at the outset when
Except in all the "Grade A" and few "Grade B" customary 
courts in the Western state which are manned by qualified
common law lawyers.
5. The term "customary law" is here and henceforth in this 
chapter used as including moslem lav/ which is applied as 
customary law in all the Nigerian states. See the Nigerian 
Republican Constitution, 1963* item 23, the Exclusive 
Legislative List which speaks of "moslem lav/ or other cus­
tomary law", and s.2 of the Northern Nigeria Native Courts 
Lav/, 1963 which provides that "Native law and custom includes 
moslem law".
6. Ncnce the necessity for whole statutes e.g. the Criminal 
Procedure Code i960, of Northern Nigeria to be translated 
into ausa language before its provisions could be under­
stood. by most customary court judges.
272.
we are breaking new grounds and asking the judicial system to 
create a whole jurisprudence which will govern important matters 
for many years to come. 7or in this field, issues of fact and 
of law are often more complicated and more difficult than many 
actions of a purely domestic nature. This leads to a considera­
tion as to whether the High Court is competent to assume juris- 
diction in respect of such polygamous marriages.
To start with, all the state High Courts, except the Lagos 
high Court where, originally, there were no customary courts, 
wave an appellate jurisdiction on appeals as a matter of right, 
either directly or through a subordinate court, from the cus­
tomary or native courts on any matter of customary law. Conse­
quently, all the High Courts are impelled by express statutory 
7
provisions to apply customary law including customary matri­
monial law. They, however, have no original jurisdiction on any 
wtter which is subject to the jurisdiction of customary courts 
relating to marriage, family status, guardianship and succes-
8 , A
sion. (No such limitation is placed on the Lagos High Court,
obviously because there were no customary courts in the state.
It would seem that the Lagos High Court has original jurisdiction
over a polygamous marriage whether between Nigerian or Non-
9Nigerian parties).
7. Eastern Nigeria High Court Law, s.20; Northern Nigeria High
Court Law, s.3^ ; Western Nigeria High Court Law, s.12;
High Court of Lagos Act, s.27.
8. Eastern Nigeria High Court Law, s.l^ f; Northern Nigeria High
Court Law, s. 17(1); Western Nigeria High Court Law, s.9(1);
See also Omorodion v. Eashoro £L960/, W.N.L.R. 27.
9. The position as regards all the states’ Magistrates’ Courts, 
including their counterparts in the Northern Nigerian states, 
the District Courts, is clear. They are given specific 
powers over certain matters none of which includes matri­
monial causes relating to either monogamous or polygamous 
marriage. (See ss.l^-lp of the Lagos Magistrates’ Courts Act, 
1958; ss.19-23 of the Western Nigeria, ss.17-26 of the
■histern^Nigeria Magistrates’ Courts Laws of 1959 and 1963 
respectively, ana. ss.13-16 of the Northern Nigeria District
-continued -
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In view of the fact that the jurisdiction of customary 
courts in some states, viz. the Lagos, the Mid-Jestern and/ 
fe stern states, oes not extend over non-Nigerians, and since 
jurisdiction over non-dagerians can be assumed by customary or 
xative courts in the other states only with the express or 
implied consent of the parties, and in so far as all the states1 
high Courts are only prevented from assuming original jurisdic­
tion in letters which are subject to the jurisdiction of cus­
tomary courts, the inescapable conclusion that could be drawn 
fro. these states' enactments is that the High Court of each 
state is given original jurisdiction to dissolve polygamous 
marriages contracted by non-Nigerian parties presumably because 
of complicated issues of fact and of law that might arise in 
such suits. This is however made subject to the discretionary 
right of the parties in the Has tern and the Northern Nigerian 
states to institute divorce proceedings in the customary or 
lative courts. Some support for this interpretation is afforded 
by toe Nest African Court of Appeal's decision in Toriola v. 
hrewa. In that case, a similar provision contained in the 
repealed Magistrates' Court Ordinance11 which stipulated that 
the Magistrates' Court should not exercise original jurisdiction 
on any matter which was subject to the jurisdiction of the old 
motive courts relating to marriage, family status, guardianship
9. (continued) Courts Law, 1963.) Although it is provided by 
each of the above enactments that the Governor of each state, 
on the recommendation of the Chief Justice, may authorise a 
Magistrate or District Court to exercise additional juris­
diction on matters specified or later to be specified, this 
as far as can be gathered, has hot been done in any of the 
states.
10. (19^9) 12 M.A.C.A. 505.
11. Cap. 122, Laws of Nigeria (19*+8 ed.)', s .19 (d).
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and inheritance, was construed as giving the Magistrates* Courts 
jurisdiction on other matters which fell outside the jurisdic­
tion of the native courts. According to Verity, C.J.,
“it is patent that in regard to this class of case the 
Magistrate is given jurisdiction by the substantive 
enac tment”
anc his jurisdiction is only excluded “where any such case is
12
within the jurisdiction of a Native Court".
A difficulty about this contention, however, emanates from
the language of the respective state's enactments concerning the
jurisdiction of the High Court. Unlike the repealed Ordinance
wh:’ch gave specific adjudicatory powers to the Magistrates1
Courts on certain matters, all the High Court Laws further
provide in identical terms that the jurisdiction of the High
Court of a state shall be the same and be exercisable as those
“vested in or capable of being exercised by Her Majesty's High
13
Court of Justice in England", of course, subject to any local
enactment to the contrary. Since the various High Court Laws do
lot in express terms give original jurisdiction to the courts to
adjudicate on polygamous marriage involving non-Nigerians, i.e.
since the enabling effect of these enactments is only negative
and not positive, could it be argued that in so far as the
Nigerian High Courts are enjoined to exercise their jurisdiction
in conformity with that of the High Court in England and since
the latter court has no jurisdiction to dissolve or grant matri-
lonial remedies to parties to a polygamous marriage, even if
1*+such marriage is only potentially polygamous, the Nigerian High
12. (19^9) 12 M.A.C.A. 50? at p. 507.
13. For the Eastern Nigerian States, see the Eastern Nigeria 
High Court Law, s.11(1); the Lagos State, High Court of 
Lagos Act. s.10; the Northern Nigerian States, High Court 
Law, s.13(1); the Western and the Mid-Western States,
Nestern Nigeria Iligh Court Law, s,8.
Ik. Hyde v. Hyde (1866), L.R. 1 P. & D. 130.
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Courts should also decline jurisdiction in respect of such 
marriage? It is submitted that such argument is so absurd as 
not to merit any serious thought for the following reasons.
In the first place, unlike the position in England, poly­
gamy is permitted by law in Nigeria. It is therefore not a 
foreign institution to which the Nigerian courts are not accus­
tomed and to which limited recognition should be accorded. 
Secondly, all the Nigerian High Courts, unlike their counter­
parts in England, are empowered to apply customary law. It 
therefore cannot logically be maintained on the ratio decidendi 
°f --.yde v. Hyde that the matrimonial law the Nigerian courts are 
bound to apply “is adapted to the Christian marriage and that it 
is wholly inapplicable to polygamy11. Thirdly, even in Christian 
countries where polygamy is not permitted, the rule established 
in Hyde's case has now been recognised as producing hardship and 
injustice. It is largely for this reason that section 3 of the
Australian Matrimonial Causes Act, 19^5 ados a new section 6A
/ P e t
to a previous 1959 of the same name providing that the 
Australian High Courts should, as from February 1966, assume 
jurisdiction and grant all matrimonial remedies to parties to 
potentially as well as actually polygamous marriages; provided 
that in the case of an actually polygamous marriage, such 
remedies should only be made available to the husband and the 
first of his plural wives. Such liberalising attitude has also 
been noted in respect of the courts of other countries where 
polygamy is not allowed. Recently, the Law Commission in 
England published a Working Paper on Polygamous Marriages in 
which, the rule in Hyde v. Hyde was severely criticised. The 
view of that Commission which is still provisional, if adopted, 
will have the effect of abrogating the rule in Hyde's case and
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give the English High Courts jurisdiction on potentially and
15actually polygamous marriages. For in the words of the Com­
mission,
"our proposals will be designed to adjust our lav/ so 
as to take account of the social problems presented 
by marriages at present unrecognised for many pur­
poses because they are actually or potentially
polygamous." 16
At this age when rules of private international law in 
countries where polygamy is not permitted, are being modified 
with a view to mitigating the harshness of previous conflict 
liethodology which left parties to a polygamous marriage bereft 
of matrimonial rights and remedies in the courts of such 
countries, it will certainly be unreasonable for the High Courts 
in "igeria where polygamy is lav/ful to invoke this archaic rule
to deprive foreigners of the self-same rights and remedies
which are being purveyed to Nigerian citizens by the customary 
courts. The High Courts in Nigeria can bend their administra­
tion of justice to various matrimonial lav/s as a result of the 
existence of such lav/s in Nigeria. They can apply Moslem lav/ 
to Moslems and customary lav/ to people living under the sanction
of such law. English courts at present have not much of such
flexibility.
It is accordingly concluded that the adjudicatory powers 
of the Nigerian High Courts on polygamous marriages contracted 
by foreigners are not ousted because their jurisdiction is made 
exercisable in substantial conformity with that of the English 
High Court. As regards the Lagos, the Western and the Mid-
15. See Para. 53 of the Working Paper No. 21 of 26/7/63 of the 
Law Commission entitled "Polygamous Marriage11. It is 
interesting to note that this Paper was prepared for the 
English Law Commission by Dr. J. H. C. Morris, the general 
editor of Dicey and Morris, Conflict of Lav/s.
16. Third Annual Report of the Law Commission, 1967/68 (No.15),
Para.55.
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..ostern states where the customary courts have no jurisdiction 
c t all over foreigners, it will be nothing but a denial of 
justice for the High Courts to refuse to adjudicate on poly­
gamous marriages contracted by non-Nigerians. Similarly, in 
view of the above-mentioned difficulties on the part of 
Toreigners who might otherwise wish to institute divorce procee 
dings in the customary courts, it would be clearly inequitable 
for the High Courts of the other states to regard the consent 
provisions as giving exclusive jurisdiction to the customary 
courts.
It remains to add that all the above theoretical argu- 
nents which the High Courts are bound to face in future would 
have been avoided, had each state High Court Law contained a 
simple provision giving the courts unlimited original jurisdic­
tion in all matters, except those subject to the jurisdiction 
of the subordinate courts, without qualifying such provision 
with a rider compelling them to exercise their jurisdiction in 
all matters in conformity with that of the High Court in 
England. To base the adjudicatory powers of the High Courts of 
country like i igeria, whose legal system admits of a differ­
ent institution like polygamy, on that of another country 
(England) where such institution is treated differently, is 
bound to lead to many combinations and permutations of diffi­
culty in most branches of the law, not least, in the field of 
Nigerian private international law. Most former British 
Colonial territories in Africa whose Acts contained, of neces­
sity, similar provisions had. modified such provisions to take
17account of their different legal institutions.
17. ->ee e.g. The Ghana Courts Act (C.A. 9) 19&0, s.29.
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E. EASES OF JURISDICTION OF TLB NIGERIAN COURTS
(1) • ■IVQRCE JURISDICTIO'' IN ENGLAND
It will help in approaching the bases of divorce jurisdic­
tion in “igeria if we bear in mind that
"the jurisdiction of the High Court of a state in 
relation to matrimonial causes, shall ... be
exercised by tne court in conformity v/ith the lav; 
and practice for the time being in force in England." 18
Niis identical provision of the State Courts (Federal Jurisdic­
tion ActXy and the High Court of Lagos Act^ (both Federal 
enactments) relates to the dissolution of monogamous marriages, 
a subject which, as has been explained above,^ is within the 
exclusive competence of the Federal Government. Since the 
ac judicatory power of the High Court is not confined to the 
cissoli tion of monogamous marriages but extends to the dissolu­
tion of polygamous marriages in certain respects, there would 
seem to be no reason why the same jurisdictional rules governing 
the dissolution of nonogamous marriages should not be applied to 
polygamous marriages as well provided the rules are adequate for 
Loth purposes. But first, to know the private international 
rules applicable to the dissolution of monogamous marriages in 
'igeria, it will be necessary bo consider the position in. England.
In England, before the passing of the Matrimonial Causes 
Let, 1857 which effected a fundamental change in the lav; by 
transferring jurisdiction in matrimonial causes from the eccles­
iastical courts to the secular courts, the doctrine of the
16. See the Postscript for the present position of the law on
this point in Nigeria.
19. s A.
20. s.16.
21. Chapter 2.
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cannonical courts was that of indissolubility of marriage. An 
ecclesiastical court had always been competent to grant a 
decree of divorce a mensa et thoro which separated the parties 
from 1 bed and board". But this did not give any of them the 
right to remarry. The only means by which a party to a valid 
marriage could avoid the vows of matrimony was for him or her 
to promote in the House of Lords, after he or she had obtained 
a divorce a mensa et thoro from an ecclesiastical court, a 
Private Bill for divorce a vinculo. The net result was that 
Duly the Parliament could decree an absolute divorce.
But by 1857} the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts 
in matrimonial causes wTas transferred to the secular Court for 
Livorce and Matrimonial Cuases which, by virtue of the Supreme 
Court of Judicature Act, 1873 became part of the English High 
Court. Also by the Act of 1857 ? the civil courts were given 
jurisdiction not only to entertain suits for judicial separation 
and nullity of marriage but also to grant a decree of absolute 
divorce. For a time after this Act, the English courts vacilla­
ted as to what attitude they should adopt on divorce jurisdic-
22tion. Thus in Fatcliffe v. Ratcliffe and Tolle.aache v.
Collemache the parties’ domicile in England at the commence­
ment of the suit was demanded as basis of divorce jurisdiction.
2b..hereas in Brodie v. Erocie the test of bona fide residence in
25Cngland was held sufficient. In Niboyet v. !iboyet, the 
question was still in doubt. In that case, the husband who 
resided in England for several years as a French Consul retained
22. (1859) 29 L.J.P. & M. 171.
23. (1859) 1 Sw. & Tr. 557.
2b. (1861) 2 Sw. & Tr. 259.
25. (1878) p.d. l.
i
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his domicile of origin in France. The wife, an English woman 
who before her marriage was domiciled in England, petitioned the 
court on ground of adultery committed by the husband in England. 
'Erie husband appeared under protest and alleged, that the English 
court had no jurisdiction to grant the divorce since his domicile 
was French and only the court of domicile had exclusive juris­
diction to grant divorce decree. This argument was rejected by 
the Court of Appeal which was of the opinion that the ecclesias­
tical courts would have granted a divorce a mensa et thoro on 
the jurisdictional base of residence of the parties in England 
irrespective of their foreign domicile. This test, it was hdd 
by the majority of the Court of Appeal, should be applied as the 
basis of jurisdiction for absolute divorce. Since the parties 
:ere resident in England, the court accordingly ordered the dis­
solution of the marriage.
In a powerful dissenting judgment, Brett, L.J., disagreed 
with the majority’s view that the local basis of the ecclesiasti­
cal court’s jurisdiction for divorce a mensa et thoro should be 
adopted for the general jurisdiction of the High Court in cases 
of absolute divorce. He pointed out that the 1857 Act which 
empowered the civil courts to give relief on principles conform­
able to those applied by the ecclesiastical courts expressly 
excluded absolute divorce from being governed by such principles. 
For this, the Lord Justice was of the view that a new principle 
must be found and this he stated in the following terms:
"the only court which, on principle, ought to enter­
tain the question of altering the relation in any 
respect between parties admitted to be married, or the 
status of either of such parties arising from their 
being married 011 account of some act which by law is 
treated as a matrimonial offence is a country in which 
they are domiciled at the time of the institution of 
the suit." 26
26. (1878) b P.D.l at pp. 13-1^.
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\s could be observed, this reasoning was based, on the theory 
that civorce is the antithesis of marriage and that the law that 
created the status of marriage should also abrogate the status, 
hut even then, Brett, L.J., would seem to have gone much 
further than necessarily permitted by the status theory of 
divorce in his view that only the dissolution of a marriage by
o n
the court of domicile will advance the status theory.^  
however, he concluded that the decision of the court below which 
declined jurisdiction because England was not the country of 
domicile of the parties should be affirmed.
Erett, L.J.'s, view that domicile is the only source of 
divorce jurisdiction was unequivocally asserted in 1895 by the
28^rivy Council in Le Mesurier v. Le Kesurier .*~° In that case,
the husband, a civil servant in Ceylon, resided for more than
nine years in that country. Since he was working in an official
capacity in Ceylon, he retained his English domicile. A divorce
suit was instituted by him in Ceylon. The case ultimately came
on appeal from the Supreme Court of Ceylon to the Privy Council
where it was held that the Ceylonese court had no jurisdiction
to grant a divorce decree since the husband was still domiciled
in England. Lord hatson in delivering their Lordships' opinion,
after a review of previous cases, laid down the principle that
1 according to international lav/, the domicile for the 
time being of the married pair affords the only true 
test of jurisdiction to dissolve their marriage." 29
Of course this was a decision on the Eoman-Dutch law of Ceylon.
It has, however, been accepted as establishing the common lav/ on
this question.
27. See below.
28. (1895) A.C. 517.
29. (1395) l.C. 517 at p.5W).
But as pointed. out by Cook,'jC even in 1895 it was quite
clear that there was nothing like a precept of international
law which permittee the exercise of divorce jurisdiction only
by the court of the country in which the parties were domiciled.
-his judicial error has recently been put right by the House of
31Lords in me yka v. Inc yken where it was stated by Lord Reid
that
"from the wording of the judgment /in Le l-lesurier's 
case7 it seems to me that in laying down this test 
their lordships must have thought that they were 
keeping in line with practice in other civilised 
countries*, but in fact they were not ... So far as 
I have any knowledge of the matter the position 
appears to be (and to have been in 1895) that most 
European countries attach more importance to 
nationality or sometimes residence"
32as basis of divorce jurisdiction. In criticising the Privy
33Council for having misconstrued the authority of von Bar33 on
3*+this point, similar statements were made by Lords Pearce and
35..ilberforce3y in me yka v. Inc yka.
A corollary to the principle of domiciliary jurisdiction 
was also finally established by the Privy Council thirty years 
later in A.G. for Alberta v. Cook,33 an appeal from Alberta, 
Canada. In the case it was held that in determining, the domi­
ciliary jurisdiction for divorce proceedings, domicile of the 
arried pair means, in effect, the domicile of the husband. 
Although this decision like the one in Le Ilesurier’s case ex­
pounded the law of a foreign country, in the latter case that of
30. Cook, op .cit., p.5-60.
31. Z~96Z7 3 W.L.R. 510.
32. ^19627 3 V.L.R. 510 at p. 523.
33. Bar, op .cit., Para. 173 at p. 3^2.
3n ZJ96£7 3 ” .L.R. 510 at p. 537.
3?. /JS&lf 3 U.L.R. 510 at p. 551.
36. <£192£7 A.G. Wfci
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Alberta, it too was accepted without question as stating the
lav/ of England, Thus by these two decisions the Privy Council,
as the apex ol Commonwealth judicial system, effectively sowed
the seed of discontent which germinated and spread its branches
to all the Commonwealth countries. The Courts of these
countries found it difficult, as a result of the doctrine of
precedent, to uproot it. But almost immediately after each of
these decisions, the respective legislatures of these countries
embarked on a gradual process of demolition of the principle of
37domiciliary jurisdiction in divorce.
As a result of the concept of unitary domicile of husband
and rife, it was not long before this common law principle
produced some hardships especially on the part of the deserted
rife. For this hardship the English judges devised a remedy by
acknowledging the sufficiency of the pre-rnarital domicile of the
wife for divorce jurisdiction in cases where she had been
deserted by her husband, who subsequently acquired, a new domicile
in another country. Thus in Stathatos v. Stathatosa woman
aaving an English antenuptial domicile married in London a Greek
lan domiciled in Greece. After the marriage the parties lived
together in London for about three years before they went to
.thens. Later a state of friction arose between them and the
wife returned to England. Immediately afterwards, the husband
obtained a nullity decree in Greece since according to the Greek
law, the marriage celebrated in England, was void because it was
not performed by a Greek Priest. At that time the nullity
39decree obtained in Greece was of no effect in England. y So
37. See below, note + it- 38, p p l p 7 P>6.
39. ~t seems clear that a nullity decree pronounced by the court
of the country where the parties were domiciled even in 
situations as above will now be recognised by the English 
ousts: Gee G -vesen v. ..<3ministrator of Austrian Property
/192'j7 A.G.6hi a.nd Lie : asTa v. Le kassa /1939/ 2 'All h.R.lp0.
28>+.
according to English law the wife was still married and even 
though the marriage had been annulled in Greece, her domicile 
was still the sarnie as that of the husband. Therefore according 
to the principle established in Le Lesurier’s case only the 
reek court, i.e. the court of domicile of the husband, had the 
sole jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. In a divorce peti­
tion presented by the wife in Ingland, the court was squarely 
faced with the principle of domiciliary jurisdiction. This
difficulty the court surmounted by holding that since the court
of the husband’s domicile had deprived her of all claims upon 
her husband, she had a right to resort to the court of the 
country where she was domiciled before the marriage for a divorce
decree which was accordingly granted. In De Montaigu v. De 
1+0. ontaigu, similar reasoning led Sir Samuel Evans to assume 
jurisdiction 011 basis of a deserted wife's antenuptial domicile 
in England to dissolve the marriage between her and her husband 
who was at the time of the suit domiciled in France. As in the
' ta thatos‘ case the marriage in this case has been declared in­
valid by the French lava of domicile of the husband.
The principle established in these cases was short-lived, 
having been severely criticised in A.G. for Alberta v. Cook by
l+l
the Privy Council, it was not followed in subsequent decisions. 
The result was that the hardship of the deserted wife continued 
and it was left to the English Parliament to make several infrac­
tions of the principle of domiciliary jurisdiction in order to 
mitigate such hardships.
The first Parliamentary demolition of the foundation which
bo. £[9137 P.W+.
bl. v. E. Z.19227 P. 206; Herd v. Herd gL93&7 P. 205.
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underlay the rule occurred by the enactment of the Indian and
Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Acts 1926-19^-0. These lets,
which were later extended by Order in Council to other British
colonies and territories where there were sizeable numbers of
1+2ritish subjects, provided that the High Court of such country 
should entertain divorce suits by persons who were British 
subjects, domiciled in England or Scotland, if the petitioner 
was resident in such country at the commencement of the suit and 
such country was where the parties last resided together before 
the institution of divorce proceedings. To give effect to the 
status theory of divorce and hence ensure that the decrees 
 ^ranted by the courts of these colonial countries enjoy inter­
ns, tional recognition, the Acts further provided that the sub­
stantive law to be applied should be the lex domicilii of the 
parties and not the lex fori, though this choice of law was 
made referrable to the English law alone, since as pointed out 
by the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, the colonial 
courts were thought “to have little or no practical experience 
of Scots law". In other words, the British Parliament agreed 
with judicial authority that the dissolution of the status of 
larriage should be the exclusive concern of the personal law of 
the parties. But to achieve this end, it saw nothing wrong in 
separating the question of jurisdiction from that of choice of 
law. The latter continued to be governed by the lex domicilii 
of the parties whereas the former was for convenience delegated
k2, Kenya, Uganda, Tangaynika, Hong Kong, Strait Settle­
ments, Jamaica, Ceylon. There seems to be no authority for 
the view that these Acts were extended to Nigeria, but 
contra Cheshire, or.cit. (7th ed.) p.3^2.
h3. Cad. 9678 Para. 866, p.229 (1955).
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to the court of the country where the parties were resident.
This, in our view, appears the most remarkable breakthrough in 
international validity of divorce ever made by English law, but 
which, regrettably, has not been carried through in the domestic 
law on divorce jurisdiction in England as will be presently 
shown.
A second legislative incursion into the principle of 
domiciliary jurisdiction in divorce deals solely with the hard­
ship of the deserted wife and extends the basis of the English 
Court*s jurisdiction in favour of such wife. The first enact­
ment which modified the rigidity of the domicile rule was 
contained in section 13 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937.
This provision was repeated as section 18 (l)(a) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 and is now re-enacted as section 
*+0 (l)(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965. Thus according to 
this statutory rule, an English court has jurisdiction to 
entertain a divorce petition presented by a wife whose husband 
had deserted, or being an alien, such husband had been deported 
from the United Kingdom even though he had acquired a foreign 
domicile, provided that the husband was domiciled in England 
immediately before the desertion or deportation. In doing this, 
the British Parliament followed with modifications the initiative 
already taken in some common law countries whose statutes had 
provided that a wife who was deserted by her husband may bring
W .  For Australia see, New South Wales Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1899, s. 16; Queensland Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act, 
1923» s.35 South Australia Matrimonial Causes Act, 1929? 
s.^3(1)5 Tasmania Matrimonial Causes Act, 1919? s.3? 
Victoria Marriage Act, 1928, s.755 and Western Australia 
Matrimonial Causes and Personal Status Code, 19^8, s.lM-, 
replacing an earlier Divorce Amendment Act, 1911? s.6;
New Zealand Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1928, 
s.12(1); Canada Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1930, s.2.
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proceedings for divorce in the state or province in which the 
husband was domiciled prior to the desertion. In the Australian 
stctes, the statutes proceeded in terms of continuing the wife’s 
''omicile while the Canadian Act made it a condition that the 
v'ife must be resident after desertion for two years in the 
province where she was deserted before she could institute 
divorce proceedings. The English statute neither gives the wife 
c separate domicile for divorce nor requires her to reside for 
any given length of time after desertion by, or deportation of, 
the husband. Tor purpose of convenience, therefore, it is 
proposed to describe the basis of the English courts’ juris­
diction under this rule as the "last common domicile of the 
parties”.
Finally, the jurisdiction of the courts in England was 
further extended in 19*+9 by section 1 of the Law Reform 
( iscellaneous. Provisions) Act. It was realised by the British 
Parliament that a woman domiciled in England prior to her 
marriage might marry a foreign domiciliary and reside with:! 
him in his foreign country. If her husband committed a matri- 
’onial offence and then deserted her, she might return to 
Ligland. But in England she could not obtain divorce and would 
have to find the country in which the husband had his new 
omicile - which might be impossible to locate. To meet such 
situation, J the Act gave the English courts jurisdiction to 
dissolve the marriage if the wife is resident in England and has 
ordinarily been resident there for a period of three years 
immediately preceding the commencement of the proceedings and
b5. See Reports of the House of Commons Debates on the Law Reform 
(miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, 19^9/ v o l a t  p.2519*
But the Bill as finally passed made it possible for any 
woman whose husband is domiciled abroad to come to England 
and obtain a divorce after three years residence. See below.
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the rushand is not domiciled in any part of the’United Kingdom, 
the Channel Islands or the Isle of Kan. This rule is now con­
tained in section 9-0 (l)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 
- a re-enactment of section 18 (l)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes 
let, 1950, which in turn was an incorporation of section 1 of 
the 191+9 Act.
To recapitulate, it may be stated thqt, as a general 
principle, the basis of divorce jurisdiction in England is the 
doLiicile of the husband. The principle of domiciliary juris­
diction is, however, so weighted down by statutory exceptions in 
favour of the wife that the domicile rule has almost lost its 
practical significance, except for the husband who cannot even 
counter claim for divorce unless domiciled. These then are the 
rules which the Nigerian High Courts are to apply by virtue of 
section A of the State ourts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act and 
the high Court of Lagos Act, both of which provided that the 
jurisdiction of the High Court of a state in divorce sue other 
:;ictrimonial causes shall be exercised in conformity with the law 
'ad practice for the time being in force in England.
2. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE APPLICATION OF THE 
Cl GLISH RULES IN NIGERIA
(a) Domicile
We have discovered in chapter one that each of the Nigerian 
states is a separate legal district or territory for purposes
of private international law. It has also been pointed out in 
the second chapter that despite the uniformity of law on matri­
monial causes relating to monogamous marriages, domicile as
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basis of jurisdiction in matrimonial causes is, by virtue of
section 101 (l)(f) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, to be
?ixec within a state just like in other matters of personal
status and that the position in Nigeria differs radically from
that in other countries as Australia, Canada and South Africa
..here the two-dimensional concept of domicile has been accepted.
Consequently, in Nigeria, a divorce suit founds a conflict of
laws problem not only when the parties are foreigners but also
when they come from a different legal territory within the
country. The net result is that for interstate and international
conflicts, the general rule is that the court should decline
divorce jurisdiction unless the parties are domiciled within
the geographical area of the state in which the court operates.
This principle operates in each of the states as Federal common
lav/ since formation and dissolution of monogamous marriages are
matters within the exclusive competence of the Federal Parliament.
Of course, it is beyond dispute in Nigerian law, like the
English law, that the
“domicile of the wife follows that of the husband and 
that the wife cannot have a domicile different from 
that of the husband while the marriage lasts" . 9-6
Indeed “a divorced, woman retains her former husband's domicile
9-7until she changes it". Little wonder then that an attempt by 
a deserted wife to establish a separate domicile for divorce 
purposes in the former Northern Region of Nigeria as opposed to 
the domicile of the husband in the former Eastern Region of
9-8. igeria met with a woeful failure.
9-6. Nachi v. Kachi (i960) L.L.R. 103 at p. 109-; Adeoye v.
Aceoye 1962: N.N.L.R. 63.
9-7. Adeyeni v. Ad eye mi (1962) L.L.R.70.
L^ * r^inze v. .rinse 0-966] N.N.L.R. 155.
290.
An unresolved problem in the concept of unitary domicile
of husband and wife in Nigerian law is that of spouses to a
polygamous marriage. The principle has, however, been held
applicable to a polygamously married man and his two wives by
the Sudanese High Court in Sudan Government v. Zahra Aman Hamid
9-9and Sue an Government v. Gumga Yassin Mohamed, so that each of 
the wives takes the domicile of the husband on marriage. The
50Court of Appeal for East Africa in Maieksultan v. Sherali Jera.1
held that a Mohammedan wife acquired upon marriage the domicile
of her husband with the result that only the court of Uganda,
the domicile of the husband, had jurisdiction to grant a divorce
decree. A petition presented by the wife in Tanganyika was
therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since the parties
were not domiciled in that country. Similarly, in the Kenya
91case of he Kowison's Application, it was stated, obiter, that
the wife of a potentially polygamous marriage acquired upon
marriage the domicile of the husband with the result that the
common matrimonial domicile of the spouses governed the essential
validity of their marriage. Finally, the Native Appeal Court of
92Southern Rhodesia in Thom v. P.aina unanimously held that where 
a man domiciled abroad contracts a polygamous marriage with a 
woman domiciled in Southern Rhodesia, the woman takes the domi­
cile of the husband and must be prepared to accept the personal 
law of the husband and if possible return with him to his country 
of domicile.
No doubt, these foreign decisions are only of persuasive
5-9. £l96l7 S.L.J.R. 207.
?0. £19557 E.A.C.A. 15-2.
51. £19527 E.A. 568.
52. A 95£/ S.R.3. 295-.
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authority on the Nigerian courts; nevertheless, they show that
there is nothing fundamentally wrong in applying the principle
of unitary domicile to the husband and wife of a polygamous
marriage provided that it is recognised that when the unity of
the carriage is no more real or non-existent, as when the parties
are living separate and apart, the wife of a polygamous marriage
53as well as of a monogamous marriage should be allowed to 
acquire a separate domicile for purposes of matrimonial causes.
Not surprisingly, the principle of domiciliary jurisdic­
tion in divorce has operated unfairly on parties to a divorce 
suit in Nigeria as was the case in England before the Parliamen­
tary extension of divorce jurisdiction in favour of the wife.
But in igeria, the hardship is not exclusively that of the 
wife whose husband deserts in one lav; district to settle in 
another jurisdiction in Nigeria or in a foreign country. The 
problem is more concerned with the wife who dutifully accompanied 
her husband from one state, usually the state of domicile of 
origin, to another Nigerian state where the parties established 
a matrimonial home but where they could not establish a domicile 
of choice, irrespective of several years’ residence in such 
place, because of the excessive rigidity of the concept of 
domicile which, as we have seen, communal orientation has 
carried to rather intractable lengths. The hardship of the 
parties, especially the wife in this respect is her inability, 
after her husband had committed almost all the matrimonial 
offences under the law, to obtain a remedy at the new matrimonial 
home because the husband, has not, and possibly could not, 
acquired a domicile of choice there as a result of the hierarchi­
cal and collectivist concept of the extended, family which, as
53* hs suggested in chapter 2.
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5>+we i&.ve seen, makes it difficult for a person to prove that 
he has made an intentional severance with his domicile of 
origin. In short, the principle of domiciliary jurisdiction has 
virtually given the husbands, once they depart with their wives 
"rom their domicile of origin to a new jurisdiction in Nigeria, 
licence to take advantage of their matrimonial wrongs.
he have noticed some examples of these cases of hardship 
on the part of wives in our discussion on the concept of domi­
cile in Nigeria. Thus, in the N0rthern Nigerian case of Okonkwo .
v* the parties were resident in N0rthern Nigeria for about
three years. The petitioning wife was, however, unable to 
prove that her husband had. changed his domicile of origin from 
another legal district in Nigeria to Northern Nigeria where the 
action was brought. The Chief Justice of Northern Nigeria said:
"I am satisfied that the respondent /husband/ did 
commit adultery with Mkonyere Ini. But I am unable 
to give a decree, because in my view the case has
not been shown to lie within the jurisdiction of
this court.1
56In -^d eye mi v. Adeyemi. the husband was domiciled in 
destern Nigeria but resident in Lagos where a divorce suit was 
instituted by the wife on the ground of adultery. According to
the findings of the judge,
"the uncontradicted evidence of the petitioner and 
her witness appears to me to establish adultery 
between the respondent and the woman named beyond 
any question".
Yet regardless of the parties’ residence in the Lagos state for 
over fourteen years, the learned judge was forced to dismiss the 
wife’s petition because of lack of domiciliary jurisdiction.
5*+. See chapter 2.
55. I960 .N.N.L.R. 80.
56. (1962) L.L.R. 70.
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57In Adeoye v. Adeoye. a W0rthern Nigeria High Court case,
the husband in a monogamous marriage was domiciled in Western
;igeria but had been resident in NQrthern Nigeria for about
eight years. He not only committed adultery with, another woman
but in fact admitted that he had purported to legalise the
illicit union with the second woman by marrying her in another
Nigerian state according to customary law. In other words, the
evidence of the husband not only constituted an admission of
adultery but also an admission that he had committed a criminal
58offence under the Nigerian Marriage Act by marrying another
woman under customary law during the existence of a monogamous
larriage with the petitioner. Since it was found that he still
retained his domicile of origin in Western Nigeria, the court
.eld that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition
presented by the wife on grounds of adultery and cruelty.
Other cases abound in which the principle of domiciliary
jurisdiction had prevented the courts from reaching a just
59decision in individual cases. ' We may however conclude the
catalogue of hardships suffered by wives in Nigeria as a result
of this principle by giving the facts and decision in another
boLagos case of Mac hi v. Mac hi ,u ' The facts as found by De 
Lestarig, C.J., were as follows: The parties had their domicile
of origin in Eastern Nigeria but had been resident in the Lagos 
state for the past sixteen years. There, in i960, a divorce 
suit was instituted by the wife against the husband on ground of
57. (1962) N.N.L.R. 63.
58. s.W8 . It would seem that such an act also constitutes the
offence of bigamy under s.37° Southern Nigeria Crimi­
nal Code and s.38^ of the Northern Nigeria Penal Code. See 
_i. v. Prime ewell 1963 ' .N.L.R. 5*+.
59. e.g. behenou v. Lchendu (1962) L.L.R. 101 and Vrinze 
Rrinze Cl9681 W. .L.R. 155.
60. (i960) L.L.R. 103.
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desertion. Some time in 1956 the husband left the matrimonial 
lone and took away with him all his belongings, telling the wife 
to go her own way. Since then, i.e. over four years, he neither 
supported the wife and the four children of the marriage nor 
returned to them, being abandoned in this way without means, it 
was not surprising that the wife, having met a man who was pre­
pared to support her end her children, went to live with him. 
hie had two children by that man, and wished the court to exer­
cise its discretion in her favour so that she could marry him.
It appeared that the husband was as anxious as the wife to put 
in end to a family unity wjiich had certainly become odious in 
that he entered an appearance but did not defend the suit. In 
view of this total disintegration of the marriage, the Chief 
Justice was of the view that a decision better calculated to 
advance the happiness of the parties was to pronounce a formal 
wreck of the family unity by granting a decree. He said,
“I would be prepared on the evidence to find deser­
tion proved and to exercise discretion in favour of 
the petitioner11. 6l
Hut his hands were tied by the rule in Le Hesurier's case which 
ives exclusive jurisdiction to the court of domicile and which 
the '‘Court must apply1 by virtue of section 16 of the High Court 
jf Lagos Act, Though resident for sixteen years in Lagos, the 
wife's petition was dismissed since the husband was not domiciled 
in that legal territory.
In all the above cases, all the parties were Nigerians 
domiciled within some legal territory in Nigeria. The substan­
tive law applicable to the dissolution of the type of marriage 
contracted by all the parties is the same throughout Nigeria,
6l. (i960) L.L.R. 103 at p. 10b.
. ;-ether at the state of domicile or that of residence. This is 
by virtue of federal Acts which unified the law relating to the 
'.issolution of monogamous marriage throughout the country, 
furthermore, all the matrimonial offences proved by the wives 
to the satisfaction of the respective courts occurred at the 
state where not only the parties, but also their witnesses were 
resident. Hence it was more in the interest of the parties, 
as well as their witnesses and also the respective courts, for 
the suits to be brought at the court of the state, i.e. that of 
residence, where there is relative ease of access to the court 
and where the cost of securing the attendance of witnesses is 
minimal.
7rom all practical and theoretical considerations, it 
therefore becomes apparent that the strict adherence to the 
principle of domiciliary jurisdiction in Nigeria, at least for 
1 iterstate conflicts, lias become a matter of mechanical applica­
tion of English conflict rule. It seems not to have been 
realised by the Federal Parliament which brought this absurd 
situation about arid the judges who apply the rules to produce 
such palpable injustice, as instanced by the above cases, without 
raising a dissenting voice against it, that substantive law has 
a greater importance to the parties and the community as a whole 
than questions of jurisdiction, important as the latter might 
be in private international law. As aptly pointed out by 
Professor Graveson,
"One cannot justify the preponderance of the question 
of choice of jurisdiction over choice of law or vice 
versa without some attempt to assess first the rela­
tive importance of the two questions. Procedure 
admittedly provides the frame for substantive lav/ and 
fixes its pattern; but it is the substantive law 
which determines the right of individuals, even though 
such rights can only be enforced through procedural 
machinery, substantive law is thus the end to which
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procedure is the means, and certainly in popular 
thought parties are more concerned that any dispute
between them should be determined on the merits
according to the substantive law properly applicable 
rather than that this court or that court should 
have exclusive jurisdiction." 62
In other words, the pertinent question being posed here concern­
ing divorce jurisdiction is, does it matter at all where the 
maci inery is put in motion provided that the correct law is 
applied? In view of uniformity of law on matrimonial causes 
relating to monogamous marriage in Nigeria, what is the point 
in causing an unnecessary hardship to the parties by requiring
them to go to their state of domicile in order to obtain a
divorce decree which could have been given on identical terms 
by the courts of the state where they are resident, more so when 
it is remembered that the pattern of these cases is that the 
state where the parties are resident constitutes the obvious 
forum conveniens for all concerned?
Viewed from the sociological aspect, in all the cases 
considered above, all the petitioners were wives who would have 
found it difficult to combine the cost of litigation with that 
of travelling to the state of domicile of the husband to start 
a divorce proceeding. This is due to the vast geographical 
extent of Nigeria^ involving great distance between some of the 
states, the fact that the country is still an agricultural 
society where women are generally dependent on their husbands, 
and the absence of any system of legal aid for divorce or other 
civil proceedings. Taking into consideration all these factors,
63. According to the 1952/53 Census, the area of Nigeria is
about 35^,669 square miles. This area roughly equals the 
“size of France, Belgium and the United Kingdom put 
together". See the Eritish Govt, fhite Paper. Cmd. 6599 
of 19li-5. p.l.
62. Graveson, “Choice of Law and Choice of Jurisdiction in the
liglish Conflict of Laws1 23 I .Y.B.I .L. (1951) 273? at p. 236.
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it is our view that the test of divorce jurisdiction even 
assuming that there is diversity of matrimonial laws, should be 
such as to ensure the application of the law of domicile to the 
parties at the state where they may be resident rather than 
requiring them to go to the court of domicile to obtain divorce. 
Lut before this point is developed further, it will be necessary 
to examine how far, if at all, the extension of divorce juris­
diction consequent on the adoption of the English enactment on 
this point has eased the hardships created by the rule that 
domicile affords true test for divorce jurisdiction.
(b) Statutory Extension of Divorce Jurisdiction 
in Proceedings by a Wife.
i. Last common domicile of the parties
The first of the exceptions to domicile as basis of
divorce jurisdiction is now contained in section b-0 (l)(a) of
tie English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965. It provides that
the English court shall have jurisdiction to entertain 
proceedings by a wife, notwithstanding that the husband 
is not domiciled in England (a) if the wife has been 
deserted by her husband, or (b) the husband has been 
deported from the United Kingdom under any law for the 
time being in force relating to deportation, provided 
that the husband was immediately before the desertion 
or deportation domiciled in England.
An important point to note in considering the operation in
igeria of the above and the next provisions of the Act is that
whenever any Act of /the United Kingdom/ Parliament 
is extended or applied to Nigeria or to a State, 
such Act shall be read with such formal alterations 
not affecting the substance as to names, localities, 
courts, offices, persons, moneys, penalties and 
otherwise as may be necessary to make the same appli­
cable to the circumstances.1 6b-
6b-. Interpretation Act, s.l5? Cap. 89, Laws of the federation
of Algeria, (1956) ed. ihis section, as well as few others, 
is preserved by trie schedule to the Interpretation Act, No.1 
of 196b-, which repealed most sections of the earlier Act.
There has not been any judicial decision on how this 
clause of the section should operate in Nigeria. The provision, 
however appears clear enough so that its construction presents 
no difficulty. There are two conditions either of which must 
nave occurred before the court in England could assume juris­
diction to dissolve the marriage on a petition brought by the 
wife. These two will be treated separately in their operation 
in Nigeria.
Desertion
As regards the position in England, the first arm of this
statutory rule gives jurisdiction to the English court on a
wife’s petition if she was deserted by her husband in England,
uere both parties must have been domiciled before the desertion,
irrespective of the husband's acquisition of a new domicile in
another country. It seems clear that desertion as used, in this
context has the ordinary dictionary meaning of 1 abandonment" and
does not mean that the husband must have been guilty of the
69matrimonial offence of legal desertion for three years. y Secondly
65. bee Wolff, op .cit., (2nd ed.) p.371*. But contra. Dicey and 
Morris, on.cit (6th ed.) p.300 and Kasunmu anc Salacuse, 
Nigerian Family Law, p.121, where it was stated that the 
husband must have been "guilty of desertion" before the court 
of the last common domicile of the parties could assume 
jurisdiction on the wife's petition. These words do suggest 
that these learned writers construed the word "desertion" as 
used, in the Act to mean legal desertion. It is however 
suggested that this interpretation seems not to follow. 
Otherwise, the purpose of the provision becomes frustrated 
if a wife who has been abandoned by her husband in one juris­
diction where the parties were domiciled immediately before 
the abandonment, were to wait for a period of three years 
before she could, commence proceedings on a matrimonial 
offence, e.g. adultery or cruelty, committed by the husband 
either at the country of the last common domicile of the 
parties or in a foreign country where he is now domiciled.
The few English cases, viz. Zanelli v. Zanelli (199-8),
69- T.L.L.556 cue Sealey v. Gall an /195.37 P. 13 5 ? In which 
this provision had been applied do not present such problem. 
Bug the Australian view of a somewhat similar provision 
contained in its Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959 seems to
-continued -
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since each of the countries in the political affiliation known
as the Uni ted Kingdom is a foreign country to each other in
a inch domicile should be fixed, the fact that a husband on
c eserting his wife acquires domicile in Scotland or Northern
Ireland would not preclude the English court from assuming
jurisdiction on the wife's petition on a ground arising in
lu;land before his departure or subsequently'at the new domicile.
fids, as we shall observe, constitutes an important distinction
etween this and other provisions of the section.
By analogy, since each of the Nigerian states is a
separate legal district in which domicile, even for purposes of
66, urisc. ic tion in matrimonial causes, " should be fixed, it would 
:ppear that a desertion from one state where the parties were 
domiciled before the husband's desertion, to the other where he 
subsequently acquires a new domicile will give the court of the 
dormer state jurisdiction to entertain proceedings by the wife. 
Thus, for example, suppose il. and N. were domiciled in the 
'astern state of Nigeria. The husband deserted the wife at 
this state and acquired a new domicile in the Kwara state. By 
virtue of this rule, the court of the dies tern state would be 
competent to assume jurisdiction on the petition presented by
65. (continued) support the contention that desertion as used 
in the English Act means simply abandonment. Section 2h(l) 
of the Act provides that “For the purpose of this Act, a 
deserted wife who was domiciled in Australia either immedi­
ately before her marriage or immediately before the desertion 
shall be deemed to be domiciled in Australia". In Buckner 
v. '■ uckner .L.R. h^SS, the Supreme Court of New South
'./ales, in considering whether it had jurisdiction on a wife's 
petition based on cruelty and drunkenness, held that the 
phrase "a deserted wife" in the provision means a wife whose 
husband, has wilfully abandoned or whose conduct has com­
pelled the wife to live away from him. And that the phrase 
does not mean a wife whose husband has been guilty of the 
matrimonial offence of desertion for a given period. This 
view, it is submitted, is compatible with the English provi­
sion. Bee now avas v. avas /T96QjJ 3 All S.R. 677.
s.101 (l)(f) of the deriffs and Civil Brocess Act.
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the wife, e.g. on the ground of adultery committed by him
i.efore his desertion. There would be no need for her to follow 
the husband to the new state of domicile before she could insti­
tute divorce proceedings, h^e position would be the same if, 
instead of acquiring a new domicile in a Nigerian state, the
husband, acquired such domicile in a foreign country like Sierra
67Leone or England.
The rule does not apply in the following situations. H. 
and 1. were domiciled in the Kivers State but they have been 
resident in the Lagos State for the past five years without 
losing their Rivers domicile. H. subsequently deserted the 
wife in the Lagos State and resumed his domicile in the Rivers 
Itate. The Lagos Court has no jurisdiction under this rule 
since H. was not domiciled in the State immediately before 
desertion. Consequently, any divorce suit brought by the wife 
in this State must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
H. who was domiciled in the Mid -hestern State married W. 
in the Benue-Plateau State where VI. was domiciled before the 
narriage. Both IT. and. T. resided in the Eenue-Plateau State 
for some years after the marriage. Afterwards H. deserted W. 
in the Lenue-Plateau State and acquired a new domicile in the 
Lestern State. The wenue-Plateau State Court has no jurisdic­
tion under this rule since the husband was not domiciled at that 
state immediately before his desertion. Only the court of the
Lid-Testern State has jurisdiction even though T. may never have
68been there before.LU
Neither does the rule meet the case of a Nigerian wroman 
who married a foreigner and lived with him in his foreign country
67. Cf. Zanelli v. Lanelli (19^ 8), 6h T.L.R. 556.
68. Leon v. moon (T9627 275.
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of domicile and was there deserted. If the court of such country
was no jurisdiction under such circumstances, the woman cannot
resort to the court of her pre-marital domicile in Nigeria for
matrimonial relief because the husband was not domiciled there
at the time of desertion. It does not matter that the wife has
o knowledge of the whereabout, and hence the domicile, of the
nusband. ' Little wonder, then, that the learned editor of
70wicey and Morris wrote of this provision that
1 it does not cover a number of situations which 
judges had in mind when they suggested that an 
exceptional jurisdiction might be available to 
deserted wives."
Deportation
As regards the second condition that the husband must have
been deported from the United Kingdom and immediately before
such deportation he must have been domiciled in England, such
condition is obviously satisfied in Nigeria if the husband was
deported from the federation, the federation of Nigeria being
equated with the United Kingdom for this purpose. In such
situation, it would seem that the court of the state in which
the husband was domiciled immediately before the deportation has
jurisdiction to entertain a divorce suit instituted by the wife.
But unlike the situation in the United Kingdom, the
federal Government in Nigeria has the power of compulsory removal
71of an alien from one Nigerian state to the other. Since 
section 15 of the Interpretation Act empowers the courts to read 
any English Act specifically adopted in Nigeria with such formal
69. But see below under "Residence".
70• ot>.cit. (3th ed.) p.300.
71. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963,
Schedule Part I, item 12 of the Exclusive Legislative List
read with s.27 of the Constitution.
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cIterations not affecting the substance as to names, localities 
etc. ana otherwise as may be necessary to make it applicable to 
chc circumstances, the question might be raised as to whether 
the words underlined do permit the equation of the federal 
Government's power of "compulsory removal from one territory to 
another" with deportation so that a wife whose husband has been 
so compulsorily removed would be entitled to present a divorce 
petition at the state in Nigeria where the husband was domiciled 
immediately before the compulsory removal. Since the hardship 
envisaged on the part of the wife in both situations is the same,
I.e. the abrupt termination by the Government of the domicile 
of the parties in the state whose court would have had exclusive 
jurisdiction, and hence making it necessary for the wife to 
seek out the proper jurisdiction abroad, it would seem that the 
remedy provided in the case of deportation of the husband from 
the federation of Nigeria as a whole is equally applicable to 
the case where the husband was compulsorily removed from one 
state of the federation to the other. It is therefore submitted, 
not without some hesitation, that this interpretation is not 
lore than a formal alteration of the word "deportation" so as to 
make it applicable to the circumstances obtaining in Nigeria as 
provided by the Interpretation Act.
ii. Residence of the wife in a State for three years.
The second statutory extension of divorce jurisdiction in 
favour of the wife is provided for by section ^0 (l)(b) of the 
Matrimonial Act, 1965 . ,J-"his clause gives jurisdiction to the
court in divorce and nullity proceedings
303.
when the wife is resident in England and has been 
ordinarily resident there for a period of three years 
inmediately preceding the commencement of the procee­
dings, and the husband is not domiciled in any part 
of the United Kingdom or in the Channel Islands or the 
Isle of Man.
The first case to consider the operation of this excep­
tional basis of divorce jurisdiction in Nigeria is Adeoye v. 
deoye,^ that case, the wife petitioned the northern
igerian high Court for the dissolution of her marriage to the 
respondent on grounds of cruelty and adultery. She alleged that 
both she and her husband were domiciled in the former Northern 
legion of Nigeria. On failure to prove that her husband had 
changed his domicile of origin from he's tern Nigeria to Northern 
Nigeria, it was argued on her behalf by her counsel that not­
withstanding, the court had jurisdiction to entertain divorce 
proceedings on basis of the wife's continuous residence in 
or them "igeria for more than three years by virtue of section 
m  (l)(b) of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 which the 
court was bound to apply as part of the Nigerian lav. Nith ’ 
this contention the learned judge disagreed. The judgment in 
the case however, shows some confusion as to whether the clause 
was considered by the judge as totally inoperative In Nigeria or 
that it could only be applied in certain circumstances which 
were not present in the case.
In considering the question, Skinner, J., (as he then was) 
observed that two distinct conditions must be fulfilled in 
England before jurisdiction could be assumed under the section, 
first, that the wife must be resident and have been ordinarily
72. 1962 N.il.L.R. 63.
73* See now s.ho (l)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 19&5*
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resident in England for at least three years. He was prepared 
to equate England in the context of the Act with a legal district 
in Nigeria, in this instance, the for .er Northern Region of 
Nigeria. Secondly, the husband must not be domiciled in any 
part of the United Kingdom, or in the Channel Islands or the 
Isle of Nan. Although.the judge was prepared to equate United 
Kingdom with the federation of Nigeria, he, however, observed 
that Channel Islands and the Isle of Nan constitute specifically 
distinct territories of the United Kingdom which have no equival­
ent in "igeria. Consequently, he stated that the clause could 
not apply in Nigeria. On the other hand, he acknowledged that 
the position might be “otherwise where a husband is domiciled 
outside Nigeria1 and the petition by the wife is brought at the 
state where she has been ordinarily resident for three years.
These rather conflicting views make it impossible to say 
whether the judge was excluding the application of the clause 
as part of the Nigerian law or merely stating that it only 
applies when the husband is domiciled outside the federation of 
. igeria and the wife is ordinarily resident within a Nigerian 
state for three years.
7k
he t lat as it may, later decisions In Odun.io v. Odun.io 
75and -rinse v. Nri,ire' have clarified tue position and held that
the rule no doubt applies in Nigeria but that it could only be
invoked to entertain divorce proceedings by a wife who has been
resident for three years in a Nigerian state provided that her
husband is not domiciled in any part of Nigeria. Thus in
76Eecker v. Becker. a German wife, resident in the Lagos State,
7k. (1965-) L.L.R. 5-3.
75. [1966] N.L.L.R. 155.
76. (1965-) Unreported, Nigeria Nxpress, Xan,l5-, 1965-; cited
from Nasunnu and Salacuse, op.cit., p.125.
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was domiciled in Germany. She instituted divorce proceedings
in respect of her marriage with the respondent. It was held by
ti e magos high Court that it had jurisdiction on the basis of
ter residence In the state for more than three years.
Finally, on the authority of the recent decision in 
77- ■ avas v. ayas it would seem that the wigerian courts would be
able to entertain proceedings for divorce by a wife whose 
husband is domiciled outside Nigeria even if her three years' 
ordinary residence began before her marriage. In that case it 
mas held that the three years' residence rule is not restricted 
to residence in England after marriage.
If the objection to section 5-0 (l)(a) of the Act is that 
it does not go far enough, the three years' rule provided as 
basis of divorce jurisdiction by section 5-0 (l)(b) of the Act 
goes so far as to attract wives having no previous connection 
with Nigeria. Since a stay always intended to be transient, at 
.Least if continuous for three years, must be regarded as suffi­
cient under this rule, the provision could create each of the 
igerian states a “divorce mill11 especially in favour of our 
francophone neighbours, where following the French law, divorce 
could only be granted by the court of nationality of the parties. 
Inceed, as regards its operation in England, this exceptional
basis of divorce jurisdiction was severely criticised by Sachs, J.,
7 8
in Tursi v. Slur si where, in commenting on the predecessor of
the present Act (i.e. section 18 (l)(b) of the matrimonial Causes 
Act, 1950), he observed that the provision constitutes “a 
departure of a far-reaching nature" from normal rules of private
77. Z19627 3 u.l.r. ^37.
78. /I9587 P. 5W
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international law concerning divorce jurisdiction and .that not
unnaturally it has invited adverse comments from authorities on
this subject in many countries. •
"It provides that women of all countries can, after 
three years1 residence here, obtain a divorce under 
the law of this country irrespective of their domi- ■ 
cile and irrespective of the'fact that their husbands 
have never visited this.country and have never had the 
remotest link with it. Its provision are thus cal­
culated to attract to this country women who have been ■ 
born, brought up, married and lived in the country .of 
their husband’s domicile, and to whom continued 
application of the matrimonial law of that country 
might not seem unduly unreasonable. It lays down 
that the courts of this country are thus to give 
decrees of divorce that, as in the present■case, would 
not necessarily, be recognised in'the- country of domi- ■ 
cile, and may also not be recognised in many other 
civilised countries." 79 ,
These criticisms arise because in creating statutory exceptions
to the exclusive domiciliary jurisdiction in divorce, the Act
at section b-0 (3) also provides that the English domestic law
m e  not the personal law of the parties should be applied. Thus
in creating a wider basis of divorce jurisdiction the Parliament
fails to provide for the application of the lex domicilii of the
parties as in the case of the Indian and Colonial divorce Juris-'
diction Acts of 19l6-196L0.
Secondly, whether "ordinary residence" means something, in
addition to or something, less than'residence, pure and simple,
is still a subject of controversy in English lav;. In Hopkins v.
Honkins,^0 Pilcher, J., held that residence for three, months.out
of ^ngland by a wife, out of the three years required under the
provision, precluded the court from assuming jurisdiction under
n Si
the sub-section. Uher.eas in Stransky v. ktransky, ' Karninski, J.
79. Ibifl. at p. 60. 80. /19517 P. 116.
81. ^195^7 P.teS at p.^37; See also, Lewis v. Lewis ZW567
1 J « J_! » it •  ^0 0 .
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..eld that absences of the wife from England £°r about 15 months 
on business with her husband would not necessarily break the 
period of ordinary residence of the wife in England. It would 
therefore seem that no assistance could be had from the English 
judicial authorities on this point at present.
furthermore, these several statutory bases of jurisdiction 
contain a major defect. Stated in terms of their applicability 
in Nigeria, the rules enable only the wife whose husband is not 
domiciled in a legal territory in Nigeria, for one reason or the 
other, to bring proceedings to dissolve the marriage between 
her and the busbard. But neither of the rules confer on such 
husband the right to bring a cross-petition or seek relief by 
way of an answer.  ^ Thus for example, suppose that a Nigerian 
woman marries a foreigner whose domicile is in a foreign country 
and both have resided for more than 3 years in a Nigerian state. 
If the woman brings a divorce proceedings against the husband 
on a ground which the husband successfully defeats, the court 
of such state has no jurisdiction to entertain a cross-petition 
by the respondent husband even though such cross-petition could 
nave established a valid ground for divorce. Since the parties 
would then still be married even though a valid ground, exists 
on which the marriage could have been dissolved, the precise 
hardship purported to have been removed on the part of the wife 
would still be promoted by the refusal of the court to enter­
tain jurisdiction on the cross-petition by the husband.
b'ith these provisions may be contrasted a similar provi­
rion of the Canadian hpvorce Act of 1968 which, after giving a
married woman the right to acquire a separate and independent
83domicile for purpose of jurisdiction in matrimonial causes,
32. hevett v. Levett and C mth /JS)52J P.156 (C.A.); iVussell v.
j-ussell me -oebuck £1952/ P.375.
83. s. (1).
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empowers the Canadian courts to grant to the respondent spouse,
whether husband or wife, who is domiciled outside Canada, the
relief that might have been granted such spouse
“if he or she had presented a petition to the court 
seeking that relief and the court had. had. jurisdic­
tion to entertain t ie petition under the Act.1’ 85-
2 i other words, the artificial restriction developed in' Anglo-
-igerian divorce proceedings that the court could only exercise
extraordinary jurisdiction on the basis of the petition presented
a wife, to the exclusion of any cross-petition by the husband,
is considered unnecessary under the Canadian Divorce Act. Con-
sequently, a husband domiciled outside Canada who opposes a
petition presented in Canada by his Canadian-domiciled wife,
will be able to cross-petition for divorce if the ground alleged
85by the wife proves unavailing.
Of course all these imperfections of the English law 
relating to the courts' jurisdiction in divorce are specifically 
adopted as part of the Nigerian law by virtue of the federal 
statutes which empower all the state High Courts to exercise 
their jurisdiction in conformity with the law and practice for 
the time being in force in England. Moreover, since the 
statutory extension of divorce jurisdiction in England is con­
cerned. with providing a solution for the problem of a unitary 
country, it is not surprising that the English solution has not 
entirely corrected the sort of hardship consequent at present 
on the principle of domiciliary jurisdiction at the interstate 
level, "ith the exception of section *10 (l)(a) of the 1965 Act
85-,, Canadian Divorce Act, 1968, s.5(3)
85. This is also the position under s.k- of the South African
Matrimonial Causes Jurisdiction Act, 1935*
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y- ich gives jurisdiction to the courts on a petition by a 
deserted wife, or if our suggestion that compulsory removal of 
• :l alien from one state to the other be equated with deporta­
tion for the purpose of this section is accepted, so that the 
court of the state where the husband was domiciled before he 
was compulsorily removed will be able to entertain proceedings 
by the wife, the adoption in Nigeria of these provisions con­
stitutes a partial palliative for international conflicts, in 
that the rules mostly assist a wife whose husband is domiciled 
outside Nigeria. They provide a remedy for a problem which has 
lot arisen in Nigeria but leave untouched the hardships noted in
86 87such cases as Okonkwo v. Eze.u Machi v. Machi," Adeyemi v.
Ed eye mi. Adeoye v. AdeoyeUy/ and. similar cases. Hence the 
oi ly people who had benefittet from the adoption of these provi­
sions in Nigeria are foreigners like the parties in Becker v.
90decker. As regards conflict of jurisdiction between the 
'igerian states, the rigour of domiciliary principle remains 
unabated. Thus, if a married woman whose husband is domiciled 
in neighbouring Dahomey crosses the border to the Lagos state 
and resides there for three years, the court of that state 
would have jurisdiction on her divorce petition regardless of 
the probability that such decree might not be recognised in 
Dahomey. But if such woman comes from any part of Nigeria 
hundreds of miles away, e.g. the Kano state, where the husband
06. I960: .N .N .L.R. 80.
17. (I960) L.L.R. 103.
88. (1962) L.L.R. 70.
89. 1962 ,N.H.L.R. 63.
90. (1965-) Nigeria Express, Jan. 15-, 1965-.
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is domiciled, her residence in the Lagos state for however long, 
th facts that it is relatively more difficult for her (because 
of distance) than the Dahomian lady to bring proceedings in the 
court of domicile and that any decree granted by the Lagos state 
will certainly be accorded recognition in the Kano state, 
will be of no moment to the Lagos court.
ho doubt, this sort of situation constitutes the high 
water mark of lere conceptualism and reveals in a glaring manner 
the inappropriateness of foistering unmodified the jurisdic­
tional rules of a unitary country on one that is a federation.
3 i enacting these rules, the British. Parliament did not consider 
for a moment their possible application abroad. Thus, for 
example, in answer to a question raised by a member of the 
1 3 tec Kingdom Parliament that the predecessor of the rule now 
contained in section ^0 (l)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1965 should, be extended to Scotland, the Lord Advocate pointed 
out that its applicability in that country had not been “
“fully considered or discussed by responsible bodies 
in Scotland and that ... until that procedure has 
been followed, it was not possible to give any view 
as to whetiier or not it was desirable to provide a 
counterpart to the provision of the English clause 
for Scotland." 92
lot until the natter was remitted, to the Standing Committee for 
Legal Beform in Scotland which considered the question and sig­
nified its acceptance to the proposal was a provision giving the 
Scottish courts jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage on the basis 
of the wife's residence in Scotland for three years was inserted 
as section 2 of the Law Refor (Miscellaneous Frovisioa$ Act, 
l9*+9.
These obvious imperfections of the domicile rule and the
91. See below.
92. House of Com''ons Debates, 19ll-8-1+9, Vol.1+66 p.2?06 et seq.
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limited effect for interstate purposes in Uigeria of the statu­
tory extension of divorce jurisdiction in favour of the wife 
would suggest that a more rational solution should be found to 
correct the hare injustice which the present bases of divorce 
jurisdiction have produced. It remains to add that if, as 
su/gested above, the Nigerian law is brought into line with 
that of other countries which allows a wife living apart from
her husband to acquire a separate domicile for purposes of
93jurisdiction in matrimonial causes all the problems of deserted 
wife half-heartedly solved by the statutory extension of divorce 
jurisdiction will be susceptible of a simple solution end make 
the application in Nigeria of the English enactments otiose. A 
wife, living apart from her husband, whether as a result of his 
desertion, deportation, compulsory removal from one state to the 
other, voluntary or judicial separation would be able to acquire 
a separate domicile either at the interstate or at the inter­
national level for purposes of founding the jurisdiction of the 
court in divorce and other matrimonial causes.
3. SUGGESTION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIGERIAN LAW 
ECLATING TO DIVORCE JURISDICTION
(a) National Domicile as Basis of divorce Jurisdiction
It has been explained on the chapter on Domicile that a 
solution which has been adopted for interstate conflicts, after
93. These countries are too numerous to be listed here. Eut see
Legal Status of harried Aomen (United ations Publication 
'To. ST/SOAPS’ 19^) pp.lO-lU. Since the publication of 
this document, the following countries in the common law 
world, besides the United States of America where such prin­
ciple has been applied for quite a long time, have adopted 
this principles Australia, Patrimonial Causes Act, 1959*s.2k 
Canada, Divorce Act, 1963, s.6(1); New Zealand, Patrimonial 
Proceedings Act, No.71 of 1963, s.3 .
See also s.8(3) of the Kenya Draft Eill on Law of Domicile
which is yet to be implemented.
As, regards t.^ e, position of the law on this point in Nigeria see the postscript.
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several experimentations, in some federations in the Commonwealth 
is bo replace the concept of state or provincial domicile by a 
national domicile as basis of divorce jurisdiction so that 
spouses who establish domicile in the federation as a whole, as 
opposed to domicile in a particular state or province, are en­
titled to institute divorce proceedings anywhere in the federa-
olf. ,
tion.' I'hus for international competence of the courts, domicile 
is provided as the jurisdictional base, but for internal com­
petence it is considered necessary in each of these countries to 
qualify the concept of national domicile by imposing a further 
state or provincial residential qualification before such spouses 
are able to commence divorce proceedings in a particular state 
or province in the federation. In Australia, the residential
requirement necessary is at least six months, while in Canada and
95South Africa, it should not be less than a year’s residence.
The idea of residence as a condition for access to the court 
of a state o r province, as the case may be, is probably imposed 
rot necessarily to prevent forum shopping since there is uni­
formity of matrimonial law in each of these federal countries 
but presumably to ensure that a spouse does not take an unfair 
advantage of the other by starting a divorce suit in some distant 
place within the federation where he or she is certain the action 
could not be defended without serious financial hardship or loss 
of employment to the other spouse. In other words, residential 
qualification would seem to have been imposed so as to prevent
tiie concept of National domicile as basis of divorce jurisdiction
96being used as an instrument of abuse and vindictiveness.'
95. Though in Canada, actual residence in a province for at 
least ten months is deemed as constituting the requirement 
of a year’s ordinary residence.
96. Tee e.g. Proceedings of the Canadian Special Joint Committee
of the hricle anc the louse of C01 :• ons on uivorce, No.24 of 
2C'A/67 at p. “1^ 65.'
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In view of the superficial attractiveness of the concept 
of rational domicile as basis of divorce jurisdiction in a 
federation, this solution has been suggested in the form of 
obiter dicta by individual judges in Nigeria so that a person 
who is domiciled in Nigeria would be able to commence divorce 
proceedings anywhere within the country even though for purposes 
of other matters e.g. succession which is a state matter, his 
domicile will still be located in a state as at present.J 1
Isolated statements by academic writers in support of this view
98iiave also been observed. Iio one, including the present 
writer, will cavil at the demise of the unitary concept of 
domicile for all purposes in a federation if a two-dimensional 
concept will produce justice and remove the sort of hardships 
observed in the cases considered above.
But as the experience in other federations has shown, the 
concept of national domicile as basis of divorce jurisdiction 
is better designed to work well when there is a uniform federal 
law operating throughout the federation on a matter for which 
the concept is being employed. And such law is applicable to
all and sundry who may be domiciled within such federal country.
;1 e effect of this is that wherever within the country a divorce 
suit is commenced the application by the court of the lex fori 
will coincide with the lex domicilii, i.e. choice of law problems 
will conveniently be swept under the carpet. This, to a certain 
extent, will no doubt be true if the concept of national 
domicile for purpose of jurisdiction in matrimonial causes is 
adopted in Nigeria since there is a federal law applying throughout
97. Udom v. 2) L.L.R. .12 per Coker, J.; Ch v.
Odd so [19651 • -.h.N. 196 per iatayi-Williams, J.
98. See Graveson, 0;;. c i t., (6th ed.) p.18.85 Kasunmu and 
Salacuse, op .cit., pp.115-118; and Obi, op.cit.. p.212.
the country but governing the dissolution of monogamous carriages 
contracted only by a limited class of persons in the country. 
Squally true is the fact that side by side with the law govern­
ing the dissolution of monogamous marriages is another relating 
to the dissolution of polygamous marriages. The preceding 
chapter has explained that there is diversity as regards details 
of such customary matrimonial laws. It is one system in the 
.'estern state, another in the Kano state, another in the Eenue- 
Ilateau state and so on - even if we ignore local variations 
..it..in some of such states. E’or example, the Tj.v Declaration 
of customary law on Divorce is radically different from that of 
the Idoma. The former contains specific grounds for divorce, 
while the latter empowers the courts to grant divorce without 
specifying any grounds. Like most systems of Nigerian austomary 
law, divorce in Idoma area is permissible when the marriage has 
utterly broken down. Yet both these civorce laws operate within 
separate localities of the same Eenue-Plateau state. To make 
the situation complex, it has been shown that in certain states, 
the oily court having adjudicatory power over the polygamous 
marriage of non-Nigerian parties is the High Court since the 
customary courts have no jurisdiction over such parties. And 
that in the other states even where consent jurisdiction is given 
to the customary courts, it has also been shown that the juris­
diction of the High Courts is not ousted and that only the High
Courts are better able to deal with problems of private inter-
99national law that are bound to arise in such cases.
Kith the dualistic system of matrimonial law in Nigeria 
(involving monogamy and polygamy) where one system i.s uniform
throughout the country and the other heterogenous« and where the
99. above.
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Igii Court of a state is competent to assume .jurisdiction in 
natri ionial causes relating to both types of marriage in conflic- 
situations, the submission of divorce jurisdiction to a 
co: ...on igerian domicile will, at best, be an inadequate remedy 
and, at worst, an uncritical adoption of a solution adopted by 
other federations without relating such solution to the peculiar 
circumstances obtaining in Nigeria. Unless the High Courts 
would be expected, to operate two-dimensional concept of domicile, 
c national domicile being the basis of jurisdiction for the dis­
solution of monogamous marriages and a state domicile being the 
jurisdictional base for the dissolution of polygamous marriages, 
in a single system of Nigerian private international law of 
us band and wife, the adoption of a national domicile as basis 
of divorce jurisdiction will still present the courts with the 
rather intractable problem of how to determine which of the 
diverse systems of customary law existing in Nigeria should 
regulate the dissolution of polygamous marriage over which they 
;d juoicate. In other words, since the jurisdiction of the court 
would be found on domicile of the parties in Nigeria, what other 
point of contact should be employed to determine the applicable 
system of customary law.
An illustration will elucidate the point we are trying to
make.
Suppose a Ghanaian couple, domiciled in Ghana where 
they contracted, a monogamous marriage came to Nigeria 
to settle. They lived, first, in Eenue-Plateau state 
for five years. But for the past 12 months they have 
established a temporary residence in Ibadan, western 
. igeria, where the wife instituted a divorce procee­
dings in the High Court on ground of adultery of the 
husband with another woman.
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Under the concept of national domicile as basis of divorce 
jurisdiction, there seems to be no doubt that such parties would 
e held to have acquired domicile in Nigeria so as to enable the 
:lgh Court to assume jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. The 
problem of choice of law would not arise in view of uniformity 
of law relating to the dissolution of monogamous carriage in 
'peria.
But let us suppose that instead of the marriage being 
monogamous, it is polygamous. And instead of adultery being 
the ground for divorce, it is incompatibility of temperament.
/e may also assume that the parties are not Moslems. Under the 
concept of national domicile as basis of divorce jurisdiction, 
the Western Nigerian High Court would still be able to entertain 
the suit. However, the problem to be tackled by the court is 
mether to decree a divorce on the ground alleged, i.e. incom­
patibility of temperament. In the first place, it is self- 
evident that the court would consider it inappropriate to apply 
the uniform matrimonial law relating to the dissolution of 
monogamous marriages to divorce of a polygamous marriage when 
there are other more appropriate divorce laws i.e. customary 
'ivorce laws, applicable to the suit. But the vital question 
is, which customary law? Incompatibility is not a ground for 
'ivorce under the Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children 
Adoptive Eye-laws Order which is now the basic customary divorce 
law in Western Nigeria. On the other hand it would be absurd 
for the court to dismiss the petition. Since the parties are 
“domiciled in Nigeria11, it logically follows that they are 
subject to Nigerian divorce laws for the dissolution of their 
polygamous marriage. The most appropriate, thing to do would 
seem to be for the court to find out Whether any system of cus­
tomary divorce lav; in Nigeria contains such divorce ground. If
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the court looks hard enough, it would discover that the Tiv 
■ustomary divorce law contains such a ground."*" Eut what should 
be the connecting factor for determining such law.
Since the parties are "domiciled in Nigeria", domicile
becomes impossible as a second test. Cf course, it may be argued
that domicile is the first of a cumulative test for indicating
the personal law of a person under the common law, the second
being determined either by religious adherence or other criterion
2
like ethnic identity. Thus when the parties are Moslems,
adherence to the Moslem religion may be adequate as a second
test for determining the personal law to govern the dissolution
of their polygamous marrisLge. Fortunately for this purpose, it
might be claimed that there is only one school of Islamic law,
i.e. the Maliki school, obtaining in Nigeria. But religious
adherence will not help in this kind of situation since the
parties are not Moslems. Moreover, the Tiv customary law is
not a religious one but a secular tribal law. The parties are
foreigners who could not be linked with any particular tribal
locality in Nigeria. Perhaps a possible suggestion might be the
"mode of life" test adopted by the Northern Nigerian states^ for
k
determining whether a person is subject to "English law# or 
customary law. Eut as pointed out by writers on customary law,
1. See Tiv Declaration of Customary Law relating to Marriage and 
divorce, M.R.L.N. lb-9 of 1955, Schedule s.5(d).
2. See Bamgbose v. Daniel /I9557 A.C.107 (P.C.); Kellewijn 
Conflict of he stern and Non-Me stern Laws. b- I.L.Q.307, cited 
with approval by Graveson, "Recognition of Foreign Divorce 
Decrees" , 37 Tr. Gr. Sec. lb-9 at p.
3. S.15, Northern Nigeria Native Courts Law, 19$3 which has now 
been re-enacted in each of the six Northern Nigerian states 
as \rea Courts Edict.
b-. The term "English law" is here used to describe either the
received common law of Sngiand 0r English statutes of general 
application in Nigeria.
' 5. See e.g. Keay and Richardson, Native and Customary Cjurts__of
Nigeria, p.176.
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the concept is so vague and elusive that it often involves such 
j ponderables as a person’s social mores, educational or profes­
sional status, ability to speak a particular language, etc. 
liven then, it has been categorically asserted in a number of 
cases that there is no appreciable difference between the mode 
of life of the various communities in Nigeria.0 Therefore, while 
the node of life test may be adequate to determine whether an 
individual is subject to English law or customary law within a 
single legal district where both laws operate, it emerges clear 
that the employment of this test as a second connecting factor 
to determine which out of the various Nigerian customary laws of 
divorce should govern the dissolution of a polygamous marriage 
contracted by non-Nigerians will be difficult to operate if 
divorce jurisdiction is based, on national domicile of the parties 
in Nigeria.
The main objection, therefore, to national domicile as basis 
of divorce jurisdiction in Nigeria stems from the failure of the 
proponents of such view to take into consideration the following 
facts which perhaps make the Nigerian situation a unique one 
calling for a special consideration. That customary law is 
equally an important part of the legal system of each state of 
I igeria anc consequently, there exists dualism of divorce laws 
in each of the legal territories in the country. That while there 
is uniformity of law on matrimonial causes in relation to mono­
gamous marriage, the law in respect of such causes as regards 
polygamous marriage is diverse. That on both of these types of 
larriage, the high Court of a state is competent to assume
6. .1. oo v. Nano ative Authority 1957 , ,N.T.L.R. 129;
ha.iiyan v. Isa - c 1958, N. .1 119; Ogo.ia v. Ad a maw a
'ative Authority "1958' .IH.N.L.R. 35*
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jurisdiction under Nigerian private international lav;. And 
that while national domicile as basis of jurisdiction to dis­
solve a monogamous marriage will make choice of law irrelevant, 
the adoption of such concept as the jurisdictional prerequisite 
for the dissolution of polygamous marriage will be fraught with 
acute problems of choice of law since there is no uniformity 
of lav; as regards the dissolution of such marriage.
On the other hand, under the concept of state domicile, 
it may be reasonable to conclude that the parties in the above 
hypothetical cases would be held to have acquired a domicile of 
choice in the Eenue-Plateau state. Also, under the present lav/, 
the Western state High Court would certainly decline jurisdic­
tion, whether to dissolve the monogamous marriage or the poly­
gamous one, since the parties are domiciled in the Eenue-Plateau 
state and only temporarily resident in the Western state. None­
theless, the retention of the concept of state domicile yields 
a more predictable choice of law test as to the customary lav; 
of which state is applicable to the dissolution of the poly­
gamous marriage. But to correct the hardship of the interstate 
level, of the principle of domiciliary jurisdiction, there 
seems to be no reason why jurisdiction in divorce should not be 
given to the courts of other states besides that of domicile.
Phis point was recently considered, in another context, by
n
the blouse of Lords in the case of Iricgyka v. Indyka where Lord
•eio, in pointing out that domicile is not intrinsically an
indispensable prerequisite to divorce jurisdiction, observed:
“It would be quite wrong to exclude domicile as test, 
but once we get rid of the idea that there can only 
be one test and that there can never be jurisdiction 
in more than one court, it seems to me to be very 
much in the public interest that there should be some 
other test besides that of domicile .“
7. Usi>2j, 3 vI.L.R. 510 at p. 526.
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In our view, his Lordship's statement is even more apposite to 
the unsatisfactory interstate position in Nigeria where, as 
shown above, citizens of Nigeria who have never lived a day out 
of the federation are unable to obtain divorce because of 
domiciliary jurisdiction.
The next -question now to be considered, therefore, is 
. ow, by retaining the concept of state domicile, not only as 
basis of divorce jurisdiction but especially for choice of law 
purposes, we can ensure that anybody domiciled in a state of 
Nigeria would be able to institute divorce proceedings in any 
other Nigerian state where he lives, regardless of the fact that 
his domicile is not within such state and, at the same time, make 
sure that any decrees granted by some courts besides "that of 
domicile will have extra-territorial effect outside Nigeria.
(t) Residence, the Status Theory of Divorce and Choice of Law
As pointed out above, the stated common law policy is that
divorce is the antithesis of marriage and that the law that
created the status of marriage should also abrogate the status.
Thus, according to Lord Penzance in Wilson v. Wilson0
"Different communities have different views and laws 
respecting matrimonial obligations, and a different 
estimate of the causes which should justify divorce.
It is both just and reasonable, therefore, that the 
differences of married people should be adjusted in 
accordance with the lav/s of the community to which 
they belong." 9
Nut where, it may be observed, the common law system as a whole
appears to have gone wrong is that emphasis in private inter-
8. (1872), L.R. 2 P. & D. 5-35 at p. ¥*-2.
9. ^ee also the judgment of Brett, L.J., in Niboyet v. Niboyet 
(1878) h P.D.l at pp. 13—14- quoted above.
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national law of divorce is strictly on the jurisdictional 
approach. In the attempt to achieve a complete harmony between 
choice of jurisdiction and choice of law, the common lav; has not 
completely weaned itself from the medieval English law approach 
whereby choice of jurisdiction invariably meant the choice of 
:he particular municipal law obtaining at the place where juris­
diction is assumed. Consequently, Nigerian judges, like their 
contemporaries in the other common law countries, are mostly 
concerned with the question, which court has jurisdiction to 
decree a divorce with extra-territorial effect. Once jurisdic­
tion has been assumed, the problem of which is the most appr- 
priate lav; is resolved in favour of the lex fori."^ Of course, 
where the court assumes jurisdiction on the basis of the 
parties* domicile at the forum, there is no denying the fact 
that the lex fori will coincide with the personal la.v; of the 
parties.
One exception to the idea of linking jurisdiction with 
choice of lav; in divorce has been noted in the case of the 
Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Acts of 19.26-HO. A 
second exception in the common law world, occurred in the 
Australian Matrimonial Causes Act, 1 9 ^ 5 . Before the Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1959 unified matrimonial laws in the. Australian 
federation and provided that the concept of national domicile 
should be the basis of divorce jurisdiction in the country, the 
inadequacy of linking jurisdiction with choice of the applicable
10. For example, s.*+0(2) of the English matrimonial Causes Act, 
1965 which constitutes the choice of law rule in divorce of 
monogamous marriage in Nigeria, provides that where the 
court assumes jurisdiction on basis other than that of 
domicile, the issue should be determined in accordance with 
the lex fori.
11. Matrimonial Causes Act, No.22 of 19^ +5? s.12. The whole of 
the Act has vow been repealed by s A  of the Australian
Patrimonial Causes Act, 1959.
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law, thereby giving exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the 
state where the parties were domiciled, was acknowledged and 
remedied. Instead of allowing choice of jurisdiction, exclu­
sively at the forum comlcilii, to carry with it the automatic 
application of the law of such jurisdiction as the personal law 
of the parties, the Australian Eatrimonial Causes Act, 19^5 
separated the state having jurisdiction to entertain divorce 
proceedings from the state whose substantive lav/ should be 
applied. In respect of any person domiciled within a state or 
territory of Australia, the Act, while preserving the common law 
principle of domiciliary jurisdiction, upheld, as an additional 
test, residence of the parties in an Australian state for a 
period of at least 12 months as basis of divorce jurisdiction.1  ^
But in compliance with the status theory of divorce, the Act 
went on to provide that the court of the state of residence 
should apply the substantive law of the state where the party 
instituting divorce proceedings is domiciled.^ In other words, 
the court of the state where the parties were resident should 
grant divorce only on a ground recognised as sufficient by the 
law of the state where the parties were domiciled at the com­
mencement of the proceedings.
Apart from these two legislative actions, neither legis­
lature nor judiciary in the common lav/ world is sympathetic
lhtowards this approach. Yet according to the better view, the
12. Ibid.., s.10.
13- Ibid. ■> s.11.
1*+. See Cook, one it. pp .1+63-1+67, Graveson, 17 K.L.E. 509 j
: .Y.E.I.L. Vol.28 (1951) at p.279j 37 Tr.Gr.Soc.1^ 9, at
p.169; Conflict of Laws (6th ed.) p.307; Prevezer, 7 
Current Legal Problems (195*0 p.llB; Cov/en, A me rican- 
Australian Private International Law (1957) p.57; Cheshire. 
6l L. 1.Rev. (191+5) 352 at p .371; Report of the o^yal Com­
mission on harriage and Divorce (1955) Smd.9678, paras. 
327-839; I.K. Sinclair, 30, B.Y.E.I.L. at pp.529-530; 
Llpstein, 2 Ottawa L.Eev. (ho.1J (1968) *+9 at pp.53 and 70.
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essence of the status theory of divorce is not that the court 
but the law of domicile i.e. at cor.ition law the personal law of 
the parties, should govern the dissolution of their marriage.
Thus, as the above enactments have shown, the principle of resi­
dential jurisdiction is not incompatible with the status theory 
of divorce provided that the personal law of the parties is 
applied. Indeed, commenting on the sufficiency of the Australian 
Act, Cowen said:
“why, as a matter of common law, it was found neces­
sary to reserve exclusive jurisdiction to the forum 
domicilii has never been clearly explained. There 
seems to be no good reason why jurisdiction could not 
have been assumed by a court having personal jurisdic­
tion over both parties, subject to the application of 
the lex domicilii as a choice of law rule.1 15
In most civil law countries where the status theory of
divorce is also maintained, there is a fundamental divergence of
approach from that of the common law. ° First, it must be 
remembered that in most of these countries, matters of personal 
status are, as a general rule, governed by the principle of 
nationality as opposed to that of domicile as in the common law 
world . When one or both of the parties are nationals of the 
country in which divorce proceedings are commenced, the conti­
nental courts assume jurisdiction on basis of the nationality
17of such party or parties and apply the lex fori. No doubt, 
when jurisdiction is assumed on this basis the lex fori will 
coincide, as in the common law, with the personal law of the 
parties. But unlike the common law, jurisdiction of the court 
of nationality is not exclusive. In addition, the civil law
15. Zelman Cowen, op.cit., p.57*
lo. For a detailed discussion on the bases of the continental
courts’ jurisdiction, see I Babel, op.cit., pp.Lt-25-1+53.
17. Ibid., pp A59-*t6l.
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countries have long exhibited no lack of ingenuity in discover­
ing grounds for exercising divorce jurisdiction when neither of 
The parties is a national of the country in which divorce procee­
dings are co : eneed. -hey indulge in liberal assumption of 
jurisdiction on basis of the parties' residence at the forum, 
however, being conscious of the inherent unpleasantness of 
" -xtrimonlura claudjeans" (limping marriages), they apply the 
personal law i.e. the lex patriae, of the parties or that of the 
husband (when the nationalities of the parties are different), 
itiier exclusively "with ordre public as a powerful and almost 
omnipresent corrective" as in France or cumulatively with the
lex fori as in Germany. Thus, for example, there are certain
19instances under which the German Code ■ of Civil Proceedure 
directs the German High Court (Landgericht) to assume jurisdic­
tion on residential qualification where the parties to divorce 
proceedings are not nationals of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
To start with, the German courts will only assume jurisdiction 
if the lex patriae of the husband will recognise a German 
divorce decree. Thus by way of illustration, since the English 
or presumably, a Nigerian court would recognise a decree based 
on three years' residence of the wife in a foreign country  ^a 
German court would assume jurisdiction on bs{sis of the wife's cr
the spouses' residence in Germany, if the husband is a United
21kingdom national or a citizen of Nigeria. If this condition 
is satisfied, then according to the Code of Civil Proceedure,
lb. See Donald von Landauer, 13 I.C.L.Q. (196*0 at pp. 21-25;
See also Wolff, op.cit., pp.372-373*
19. S.606b ZPO; See also Palandt, Kommentar Zum BGB, 1968
kunehen Zum EGBGB 17, Anm.6.
20. See Travers v. Holley /195^ 7 P.2*f6.
21. Cohn, 7 I.C.L.Q. (1958) 637 at p.6**-*+ et sec.
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the court of the following places in Germany is competent to 
dissolve the marriage.
(a) The court in the area where the spouses have, or
had their last, common habitual residence, or if
this does not exist
(b) The court in the area in which either the defend­
ant or the plaintiff had, or has, his or her habitual
residence.
Dr. Cohn  ^observed of these rules that they give the German
courts jurisdiction in many cases in which the parties have 110
substantial connection with Germany, but to ensure international
recognition of decrees granted by the courts, the Cod.e2  ^provides
that the applicable law shall be the lex patriae of the husband
at the time divorce proceedings are commenced. However, divorce
according to the personal law can only be granted by a German
Jourt if the divorce is also possible according to German law.
A similar solution as the German doctrine of cumulation,
:s it is often called, was recently proposed for England and
25Scotland by the Royal Commission ofi Marriage and Divorce. The
2a. Manual of merman Law. London, E._ .3.0. 1952, Vol.II, pp.22-23.
23. 3GDGE, s.17. As a result of Art.3 of the German Constitution
which provides for equality of men and women, it has been
suggested by Prof. Kegel in his work, Internationales 
Frivatrecht. 1965-, Munchen, Berlin, p.291 that Art.1/ of the 
Code should be repealed and the following choice of law rules, 
inter alia, be substituted
(a) the law of the common nationality of both parties, or
(b) the law of the last common nationality if still upheld
by one of the parties, or
(c) the lav; of common habitual residence of the parties, or
(d) the lav; of the last common habitual residence of the
spouses which is still retained by one of the parties, etc
25-. ss 5-9-51 The G. For this statement of the German law, we are
grateful to Miss 1 .A. W’agenfeld, a German Scholar , -who not
only provided the relevant German authorities cited above 
but also translated them into the 'English language. From 
the above statement, it also appears that the position of 
the German law on this point has not changed much, if at all, 
since the publication by Cohn of the Manual of German Law.
Vol.II in 1952. (Gee section on German Private International
25. Cmd. 9678 of 1955. Law)
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first problem contended before the Commission and accepted by
it was that undue hardship resulted from a rigid adherence to
2 6
domicile as basis of divorce jurisdiction. The Commission
was of the opinion that domicile should continue as the main 
27basis ' but considered that there should be some relaxation of
';he strict requirement of domiciliary jurisdiction in order to
I; ring the lav; in conformity with that of other European countries.
It welcomes residence as basis of divorce jurisdiction but not
vhthout balancing such jurisdiction with the choice of lav; rule.
I.i criticizing the present statutory extension of jurisdiction
based on residence of the wife in England, it observed that a
decree granted on such basis stands little chance of being
recognised in foreign countries especially at the country of
28domicile or nationality of the husband. This, according to 
the Commission, is because the English courts in exercising 
jurisdiction under the several statutory exceptions are required 
bi statute not to pay any regard to the personal law of the 
parties but to apply the lex fori. Indeed, as recently pointed 
out by Lipstein, the problem involved in assuming jurisdiction 
on these statutory exceptions is not that of non-recognition 
alone, but also fundamentally affects the capacity of the 
husband whose marriage had been dissolved by English courts on 
tne basis of the wives' residence in England, to contract other 
marriages, even under the same English lav; which determines 
capacity to marry by reference to the personal law of each of the 
parties. Tor if the divorce decree is not recognised by the
26. Ibid.. Para. 793.
27. Ibid . Para. 815-
2b. Ibid. Paras. 822 and 828.
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personal law of the husband, it naturally follows that such law
29would deny aim capacity to contract a second marriage. '
Therefore, to deal with the problem of the deserted wife 
which the present English statute (and also Nigerian lav;) 
remedied rather unsatisfactorily, the Commission recommended 
that a wife who is living separate end apart from her husband 
should be allowed to claim a separate domicile for the purpose 
of establishing the court’s jurisdiction to entertain divorce 
proceedings
Lastly, the Commission saw n o rational justification for 
perpetuating, without having a subsidiary rule, the principle of 
domiciliary jurisdiction which forges a link between jurisdic­
tion of the court in divorce and the choice of the lex fori as 
the applicable law. There should, the Commission recommended, 
be additional jurisdiction to grant a divorce on basis of 
residence in the following circumstances so as to assist those
persons who have to live in a country for some time but who have
?1no intention of becoming domiciled there:'"
i. When the petitioner is in England at the commence­
ment of the proceedings and the place where the 
parties to the marriage last resided together was
England, or
ii. When the parties to the marriage are both resident 
in England at the commencement of the proceedings.
But to ensure that any decree granted by an English court on 
basis of residence of either one or both parties is recognised
29. Eee Lipstein, 1 recognition of Foreign Divorces: Retrospects 
and Prosp ects1 2, Ottawa Law Review, ' o .1 (196b) 49 at
pp.vp-yb.
30. Cmd. 9678 (1955) para.825.
31. Ibid . para. gsi.
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by the personal lav/, the Commission further recommended that the 
courts should not grant divorce when they assume jurisdiction 
under residential qualification unless
(a) the personal law or laws of both parties recognise
as sufficient ground for divorce a ground sub­
stantially similar to that on which a divorce is 
sought in England, or
(b) the personal law or lav/s of both the parties would
in the circumstances of the case permit the peti-
2^tioner to obtain a divorce on some other ground.'"'
Thus, there are two choice of law approaches contained in the 
above recommendation of the Boyal Commission. The first is the 
principle of cumulation or of coalescence i.e. the English 
court should not apply grounds recognised by the lex fori if 
unknown to the personal law. The other is the doctrine of ex­
clusive application of the personal lav/ i.e. the English court 
should apply grounds recognised by the personal law even though 
unknown to English lav/.
This novel recommendation is of special interest because 
it constitutes the first concerted effort by a judicial and
juristic body, acting as law reformers of the English private
33international lav; of divorce, to achieve a wider basis of 
jurisdiction in relation with choice of law rules that might 
entail application of a foreign system of law. The Commission's 
recommendation has not been implemented in England, but it is 
submitted that the problem confronting the kigerian law in this
32. Cmd . 9878, paras. 827-839? 8ee also, the Royal Commission's 
Draft Code (Jurisdiction) and Recognition of Divorce at 
5.39“+.
33. But as regards jurisdiction of former Colonial Courts, see 
the Indian and Colonial Jurisdiction Acts, 1926-191+0.
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respect is obviously so pressing as not to justify delaying for 
r length of time the introduction of choice of law rules into 
tie field of interstate validity of divorces.
(c) Conclusions
With the dualism of divorce laws in Nigeria and the diver­
sity of one of its components, the question that should engage 
tie attention of the high Courts and the law makers alike should 
not be which court has exclusive jurisdiction to decree a 
divorce, but how a wider basis of jurisdiction can be achieved 
aid, at the same time, ensure that any decree granted by the 
courts of other states besides that of domicile will have extra­
territorial effect. In view of the hardships resulting from 
strict adherence to the principle of domiciliary jurisdiction, 
the only means, it is submitted, to achieve this objective is 
b^  sxiifting emphasis from strict jurisdictional approach to more 
of choice of law. In other words, to give jurisdiction to the 
court of a state having personal jurisdiction over the parties 
but to require it to apply the personal lav/ of such parties.
In adopting this approach, it should be borne in mind that 
there seems to be few, if any, other countries in the world, 
esid.es 7"igeria, which operate a federal system of government 
- implying separarate legal territories - and. at the same time 
.ave a dualistic system of divorce laws, and on both of which 
the high Courts are competent to adjudicate in conflictual situa­
tions . This rather unique position calls for a special treatment 
involving the untying of the Nigerian law from the conflict 
methodology of the English lav/, a unitary system of lav/, thereby 
putting it on the same basis as that of the civil lav/ countries 
and the Australian Matrimonial Causes Act, 19^5.
It is gratifying to note that this is the approach adopted 
by each of the former Regional legislatures in dealing with the 
jurisdiction of the customary court's in dissolving the poly­
gamous marriages contracted by T'igerian parties. Nigerian, 
parties from a Mforeign1 jurisdiction in Nigeria need not acquire 
domicile of cnoice, or identity themselves with a new community 
:> i which they live, before they could commence divorce procee­
dings. The court of the area where t :,ey reside is required, to
assume personal jurisdiction to dissolve their marriage but to
lit
apply the 1 law binding between the parties1 .
First, it is suggested, that the concept of state domicile 
should be retained, not only as basis of divorce jurisdiction as 
it is the position at present, but more importantly as a test by 
v. ' ch the law governing the dissolution of a marriage can be 
determined. The jurisdiction of the court of domicile should, 
however, not be exclusive as it is at present.
Secondly, to remedy in advance the problem of the deserted 
wife (which has not arisen in Nigeria but which may present a 
lajor difficulty in the future) a married woman, living separate 
and apart from her husband should be allowed to acquire an inde­
pendent domicile so as to found the court's jurisdiction to dis-
itk
solve her m a r r i a g e In exercising jurisdiction on basis of
3lK See s.20 of the hestern Nigeria Customary Courts Law, Cap.31 
(1959 ed.); s.15(a), Fas tern Nigeria Customary Courts (No.2)
Foict, No.29 of 1§66; ss.20 & 21 Northern Nigeria States
rea Couits Fdicts. Cf. Qsuagwu v. Dominic Soldier 11959 
N. .L.R.39. Dor this purpose, consistently with the
principle of unitary domicile between husband and wife, the
law binding between the parties should be the personal law
of the husband, unless the parties are living separate and 
apart when, as suggested above, the wife should be free to
have a different law for matrimonial causes.
35. A rule, which is slightly different from the one proposed,
has been enacted in Nigeria. See Nostscript.
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the wife's separate domicile in a state, there seems to be no 
logical reason to engraft an artificial restriction on the 
' usbanc who is domiciled in another state or foreign country to 
ring a counter-claim or cross petition if the wife's petition 
roves unavailing.
These two rules will apply both at the interstate' and 
:hil:.rnational levels, and once adopted, will make otiose the 
glish statute extending the jurisdiction of the courts in 
.?; vour of the wife. Inc. with the abrogation of the enactments 
Importing the English statutory bases of jurisdiction into 
igeria, all their imperfections noted above will be swept away. 
Finally, for interstate conflicts only, ana in respect of 
persons domiciled in any state of Nigeria, an additional basis 
of divorce jurisdiction should be given to the courts, making it 
possible for the court of the state in which the parties are 
resident at the comencenent of the suit to dissolve their 
rrriage. Consistently with the status theory of divorce, it 
will be necessary to provide that the court of the state having 
personal jurisdiction over the parties on basis of their resi­
dence there should apply the "English” or customary law of the 
state where the parties are domiciled, depending on whether the 
marriage is monogamous or polygamous.
kith regard to the dissolution of monogamous marriages, 
t is choice of law determinant will be a mere theoretical solu­
tion and will not be operated in practice because of the unifor­
mity of federal law relating to divorce of monogamous marriages 
throughout the country. In all cases in which jurisdiction is 
: su led on basis of residence of the parties at the forum, the 
lex fori will invariably b& the same as the lex domicilii so 
long as monogamous marriages and matrimonial causes relating
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thereto continue to be a federal subject. ‘The position would be 
similar to that under the various Legitimacy Laws^u the identity 
3l which has made choice of law, as regards interstate conflicts, 
unnecessary. Provided a person is domiciled within a state of 
igeria, it matters little whether the legitimacy law of a 
orthern Nigerian state or that of the Uestern state is applied 
as choice of law rule for the regulation of his statutory legi­
timacy. The great advantage making this innovation worthwhile 
in Nigerian private international law of divorce is that it will 
■lake impossible such unjust decision reached e.g. in Mac hi v. 
ac -l-;( where jurisdiction to dissolve a Nigerian marriages which, 
was conclusively proved to be beyond repairs was declined 
recause the parties who had resided in the Lagos state for 16 
years were found to have retained their domicile of origin, in 
the former Mastern Region of Nigeria. Under the proposed, juris­
dictional base, the residence of such parties even for less than 
a year will enable the Lagos court to assume jurisdiction.
The significance of introducing choice of law rules into 
the field of divorce vrill be usefully felt in connection with 
the dissolution of polygamous marriages contracted by foreigners, 
since as we have seen, customary divorce lav/s are not uniform 
within Nigeria. If additional jurisdiction is taken on basis of 
residence of the parties in a state, then the customary law of
the state of domicile of the parties would be applied, as the
substantive law for dissolving the marriage. In other words,
o o
whatever ground or reason ° for divorce that is provided by that
36. e^e ss.3 and 9 of the Legitimacy Laws.
37. Suora p . DM? 3>.
36. e.g. Declaration of Eiu Native Law and Custom Relating to 
Marriage and divorce M.A.L.N. 9 of__1961+, Schedule s. 11(1),
Lav/s of Northern igeria, 1^6^. "I:i any divorce proceedings
instituted in Court by the husband for any reason other 
than desertion by the wife ..." 'This typical, albeit
-continued-
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law will be used to dissolve the polygamous marriage by the 
court assuming jurisdiction on basis of residence.
Since this solution will be limited to interstate conflicts, 
there seems to be no cogent reason for applying the continental 
doctrine of cumulation, dependent upon a synthetical process 
which embodies both the application of the lex fori and the 
personal law. Indeed, it is rather inconceivable that the con­
ception of public policy which is the foundation of the doctrine
of cumulation in private international law would be allowed to
39come into full operation within the interstate sphere. Lore- 
over, besides some matters of detail, the policy consideration 
underlying the dissolution of polygamous marriages throughout
Ll o
igeria is fundamentally the same. Except in few localities, 
the strict proof of divorce grounds is not necessary. Unlike 
the position with regard to monogamous marriages, the courts have 
10 alternative but to dissolve or give judicial backing to a 
polygamous marriage which has irretrievably broken down or which 
ias been unilaterally repudiated by the husband, the reasons for 
:’ivorce being merely taken into consideration in awarding custody 
of the children or determining the amount of bride price
3d. (continued) recorded, customary law contains no divorce
grounds but proceeded on the basis that a polygamous marriage 
could be dissolved on any reason establishing the total 
disruption of the marriage.
39. Most writers are critical of the employment of public policy 
in interstate cases. See e.g. Nutting, Suggested Limita­
tions of the Public Policy Doctrine. 19 Linn.L.Rev. (1935")
196; Goodrich. Conflict of Laws (^th ed. by Scoles) p .b ; 
Zelman Cowen, American-Australian Private International Law. 
p.G; Nr. Justice J.K. Eeach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement 
of Vested Rights. 27 Yale L.J. (191B) 6^6 at p.662 where he 
stated that differences between the American States “relate 
to minor morals of expediency, and to debatable questions of 
internal policy. It would be an intolerable affectation of 
superior virtue for the courts of one state to pretend that 
the mere enforcement of a right validly created by the law 
of a sister state would, be repugnant to good morals, would 
lead to disturbance and disorganisation of the municipal lav; 
or would be of such evil example as to corrupt the jury or 
the public ... as between this Union of states forming one
-continued-
33“+.
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repayable. Consequently, the exclusive application of the
personal law of the parties would in no way infringe the stringent
public policy of the state granting divorce on basis of residence.
Finally, it will be worthwhile to consider briefly the
alleged difficulty of proof of the lex domicilii, i.e. the
personal _aw, when jurisdiction is assumed on basis of the
parties' residence in one state to dissolve the marriage between
domiciliaries of another state. This is the main criticism
1+2offered by Davies and Inglis against the adoption of choice of
law in divorce proceedings. Since residence as basis of divorce
jurisdiction would be limited to the interstate sphere, this
ifficulty does not arise in Nigeria. To start with, it has
teen repeatedly stated that there exists uniformity of divorce
law in relation to monogamous marriages throughout the country.
Secondly, even in respect of polygamous marriages, on which there
is diversity of divorce laws, this difficulty has been removed
by section 73(1)(a) and (b) of the Evidence Act. According to
the provision of this Federal Act which is of undoubted validity
throughout the federation, the following facts need not be
1+1+
proved before any court established in the federation:
39. (continued) nation, the only tolerable assumption must be
that the laws of each state are well adapted to do justice 
and promote morality within their respective limits."
0^. e.g. the liv Declaration of Customary Lav;, F.R.L.N. l*+9 of
1955 and the hestern state of Nigeria Marriage, Divorce etc.
Bye-Laws Order, N'.R.L.N. of 1958.
1^. See Kasunmu and Salacuse, op .cit., pp.127 and 175.
k 2 . In "Divorce, the Royal Commission and the Conflict of Laws".
6 Am.J.Comp .Lav; (1957) 215 at pp.219-222.
*+3. Cap. 62, Laws of the Federation of .'igeria, (1958 ed .)
M+. However excluding the Customary and Native Courts, see s.l(^) 
of the Evidence Act. This is another instance of inadequate 
regulation of conflictual situations in Nigeria which must 
not be allowed to continue.
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1 . A n  laws or enactments and. any subsidiary legisla­
tion made thereunder having the force of law now or 
heretofore in force, or hereafter to be in force, in 
any part of Nigeria.
2. All general customs, rules and principles w rich have 
been held to have the force of law in the Federal 
Supreme Court or former Supreme Court of Nigeria or 
by the Nigh Court of the State and all customs which 
have been duly certified to and recorded in any such 
court.
Lie effect of this provision is that any decision made on custo- 
lary divorce law by the court of one state in Nigeria need not 
be regarded as a foreign law that must be proved by expert evi­
dence in another state. Similarly, any enactment or subsidiary 
legislation declaring customary divorce law, e.g. the Western 
:igeria Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children Adoptive Eye- 
Laws Order and the Declarations of Customary divorce laws of the 
7iv, Eorgu, Diu and Idoma areas, shall be admissible as evi­
dence of thb law of such state by the other state. From the 
above provision, it becomes clear that the ascertainment of the 
customary divorce lav; of one state in the other becomes com­
paratively simple. Moreover, when the policy of incorporating 
customary laws into written form, which is gaining momentum 
presently in some of the states, is stepped up in the others, 
the problem of proof of customary law will be simpler still; 
since all that would be required when this goal is attained 
throughout the country is for the court of the state assuming 
divorce jurisdiction on basis of residence to consult the statute 
or subsidiary legislation of the state of domicile in order to 
ascertain the ground or reason for divorce that is applicable.
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s-. r . ^ R S T ^ i  AND INTNRNA^IONAL VALIDITY 0? 'TIGNRIA?T 
DIVORCE DNCRNES BASED ON RESIDENCE
The sole reason for having a strict rule of jurisdiction
in divorce proceedings is to ensure that a decree granted by the
court of one country will be recognised in the others. As ■
1+5
aptljr put by Lord ./atson in Le Mssurier v. Le Hesurier, the
lex fori nay permit the assumption of divorce jurisdiction on
an exceedingly wide range of grounds, but it does so at the risk
of non-recognition abroad. In pointing out why domicile should
be insisted on as basis of divorce jurisdiction, he observed that
"//hen the jurisdiction of the court is exercised 
according to the rules of international law, as in the •, 
case where the parties have their domicile within its 
forum, its decree dissolving their marriage ought to 
be recognised by the tribunals of every civilized 
country." ko f
hence if there is relaxation in the rules of recognition by
foreign countries, such relaxation must be reflected in the
rules for assumption of divorce jurisdiction by the courts of
1+7the forum since "both topics are branches of the same tree". ‘
The aim of this section, therefore, is to show that a divorce 
decree granted on basis of residence as suggested above, will 
have equal validity at the interstate and international planes 
as one decreed, by the forum domicilii end that strict adherence 
to the principle of domiciliary jurisdiction in divorce ought to 
xiave been supplemented by one that links residential' jurisdic­
tion with choice of law immediately Nigeria became a' federation.
In so far as mutual recognition-between the Nigerian states 
is concerned., this 'issue has been, resolved by the Sheriffs and
k5. (1695) a .g . 517.
l|L6. Ibid. at p.527. ^ee also p.539-
k-7 . Nann, 111 hecueIT cos Conrs (196k), -at p.75*
337.
Lj-g
Eivil Process Act, the relevant provision of which is analo- 
ous to the full faith end credit provisions of article IV, 
section 1 of the United States Constitution and section 118 of 
cl e Australian Constitution as implemented by section 18 of the 
country's State and Territorial Lav/s and Records Recognition 
_ct. The effect of the Nigerian Act in relation to recognition 
o,V divorce between sister-states will be fully considered 
s ortly, but in anticipation of a detailed discussion on this 
point, it may be briefly stated that the purpose of the Act is 
to compel the recognition of the judgments of the high Court and 
; - Magistrates1 courts of one state by the others. So if 
residence is provided as additional basis of divorce jurisdic­
tion, there is no doubt that the decrees of the court of the 
state where the parties are resident would be recognised by 
that of the state of domicile of the parties or any other state 
court in Nigeria.
Plowing from this mutual interstate recognition of divorce 
decrees in Nigeria is the position at the international level, 
t least as far as the common law countries are concerned. 
Initially at common law, the narrowness of the principle of 
domiciliary jurisdiction was matched by a similar rigid approach 
to recognition of foreign decrees. But some years after the 
decision in Le 'Agsurierls case, a logical extension to domicile
: s the rule of recognition was made. In Ar nit age v. Attorney-
Llq f 7
General 1 y the principle was established in England that a
divorce decree obtained in the country where the parties were not
domiciled will be recognised in England if it is considered valid
LbS. 8ee sections 10Lb, 105 and 112. 
m. Z19067 P. 135.
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by the law of the country where the parties were domiciled at 
t; e co:..;e lceiiient of the proceedings. In that case, an American 
citizen was teuporarily resident in Ax.gland but domiciled in the 
state of hew York. Fe married in England an English lady. Some 
. rs later, the parties entered into a deed of separation and 
shortly afterwards the wife left England for the state of South 
. lota in the United States, her main object in doing so being 
to institute divorce proceedings there. After residing in South 
Dakota for more than 9° days, she instituted divorce proceedings 
on the ground of desertion against the husband. A divorce was 
ranted to the wife by the South Dakota Court. In considering 
hat effect should be given tosuch decree in England, Sir Gorell 
Lames found as a fact that the South Dakota divorce would be 
recognised in hew York where the husband and wife were domiciled 
(in tne English sense) at the time of the action. The court 
therefore held that since the marriage had been dissolved by a 
decree recognised by the lei: domicilii of the parties with the 
result that they had ceased to be husband and wife according to 
their personal law, the decree should, be recognised in England .
Commenting on the 1 considerable importance" of this rule, 
in so far as divorces granted by the courts of federal terri­
tories are concerned, the learned editor of Dicey and Morris 
observed as follows:
"If a divorce is obtained in one state or province 
of these countries at a time when the husband is 
domiciled (in the English sense) in another state or 
province of the same country, and if the divorce is 
required to be recognised throughout the country, 
either by Constitutional law or by Act of /Federal/ 
Parliament, then it must be recognised in England." JO
JO. Eicey and orris, op.cit. (8th ed.) p.3H.
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esices the point that this common law principle has been
51followed in Scotland, it has also been accepted, either as
judicial authority or recognised by statutes, in some Common-
52 51 - 5kwealth countries, viz. Australia, Canada, J hew Zealand^ and
55 mjouth Africa.' -1 e same result has been reached in some States 
56in merica. Moreover, it is inconceivable that other countries 
having the common law as the basis of their private inter- 
n tional laws will find it difficult to accept a rule which, 
after all, “is a logical outcome of the status theory of divorce1 
and provides that the validity of divorce is a matter for the 
law of the domicile. Our conclusion is that there is no doubt 
cnat a decree granted on the basis of residence of the parties 
within a Nigerian state, since it would as a matter of course be 
recognised at the other Nigerian state where the parties are 
domiciled, would similarly be recognised certainly in the Common­
wealth, couth Africa, the United States of America and probably 
in other countries outside the common law world operating the 
concept of domicile as basis of the personal law.
51. ^ee e.g. I erin v. Per in (1950) 3.L.T.51J McKay v. halls
(1951) S.i A?.o.
52. ^ee Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959? s.95 (*+) .
53. -cvllie v. Martin /193l7 3 Mr .‘J .Rj+65j_ . alker v. Malker /1950.7 
N D.lTR. 25H Jones v. Jones /19607 2^ D.L.R. (2D) 5^5.
5k. Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1963, s.83 (2)(c).
55. Guam: enhe ini v . Rosenbaum (1961), (k) 3.A. 21 (A) .
56. E.G. New York, See Mali v. Cross. 231 N.Y. 329, 132 IT.E. 106
(1921); Dean v. Dean, 2kl N.Y. 2k0, lk9 N.E.8:kk (1925);
Gould, v. Gould, 235 N.Y. lk ^1925). In the latter case, the
lev/ York Court recognised a French divorce decree granted to
the American parties who were resident in France but domi­
ciled in New York. The French court applied the New York law 
on divorce as the lav; of nationality of the parties following 
the French court's practice that each of the American States 
is a separate country for determining the lex patriae of 
American citizens. See on this ooint, Donald von Lanfauer,
13 I.C.L.q. (196*+) at p.33.
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It must be conceded, however, that the adoption of resi­
dence, li iked with choice of law rule, to achieve a wider basis 
of divorce jurisdiction in Nigeria would not operate as a com­
plete solution for the problem of recognition abroad of Nigerian 
'ivorce decrees. In the first place, there is a general agree- 
ent that a divorce decree granted in Nigeria to parties who are 
- tionals of Nigeria will be recognised by the civil law 
countries, both in Africa and the continent of Europe, where the 
rinciple of nationality is being operated to determine matters 
of domestic status. Eut it is unlikely that such decree would 
be recognised in a civil lav/ country if it was granted to 
lationals of such country. Suppose, for example, an Egyptian 
married couple who are nationals of the United Arab Republic, 
acquired a domicile of choice in the Lagos State, but were 
resident in the Kano State. If the Kano State High Court assumed 
jurisdiction on basis of the parties' residence in that State 
i id applied the Lagos law as the lex domicilii of the parties, it 
Is almost certain that such decree will not be recognised by the
Egyptian court of nationality of the parties since according to
57the civil Code of Egypt divorce is governed by the lex patriae 
of the husband. Of course, such decree would still not be 
recognised in that country if, instead of the divorce being 
granted by the State of residence, it was obtained in the Lagos 
State where the parties were domiciled at the commencement of 
the proceedings.
Until the difference of opinion between the countries 
employing nationality and those relying on domicile as basis of 
personal law is resolved, there seems to be no way out to this
57. 19^9, Art.13 (English Translation by Perrott, Fanner and
Marshall).
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58r .bier, except perhaps by International Convention*' It is
59vei* sub " . that tnis theoretical difficulty should not 
re vent the introduction of a much needed reform into the law on 
vorce jurisdiction in .igeria in view of the hardships being 
caused to people by fcithful adherence to the principle of 
o .iciliary jurisdiction in interstate conflicts.
C. RECOGNITION IN NIGERIA OF FOREIG DIVORCE DECREES
The problem of how far divorces granted in accordance with 
the law of legal districts other than that of the forum should 
recognised as decisive of the status of marriage between the 
. arties has a two dimensional aspect in the Nigerian private 
:i ternational lav/. The first deals with recognition by one 
igerian State of a divorce decree and other ancillary, orders,
.r. obligation of support or custody of children, granted by 
uther igerian State i.e. interstate recognition of divorce 
■ ;crees. The other concerns the question of recognition by a 
state in ‘“igeria of divorces obtained under the law of a country 
, tsice Nigeria, i.e international recognition of divorces. Each 
of the two aspects of this topic will be considered separately.
1. INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE
In considering what reform should be made as regards the 
:uses of the courts1 divorce jurisdiction, it has been pointed
See e.g. The Nague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces 
ano heual Separations of October, i960 in id I.C.L.j. (1969)
p.c5o at sec .
59. In the sons: pf people from the
countries resident, either temporarily or permanently in 
'igeria:, is rather insignificant. Compare Tables 17 and 18 
of Nigeria, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1963? p.26.
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out that the question of mutual recognition of the judgments 
of the courts of one State by the courts of like jurisdiction 
: .1 the others has been provided for by the Sheriffs anc Civil 
.rocess Act,DL This Federal statute is of undoubted validity 
throughout the federation but applies only to the judgments of 
the high Courts and the kagistrates1 Courts. ~ For this purpose, 
t-.o judgments of the Federal Supreme Court, given on appeal from 
the Court of Appeal or the 'high Court of State is deemed to be 
the judgments of the high Court of the State from which the 
:ppeal emanates and is entitled to recognition by the High Courts
fi ?of the other States.
Sections 10*f of the Act provides that a judgment^ given 
’ ^ the court of one state, if it is to be enforced in any other 
igerian State, must be registered in the court of like juris- 
,Fiction in the State in which the judgment is to be enforced.
’or purposes of registration, it is necessary for a certificate 
of judgment made in the appropriate form, containing the parti­
culars of the judgment and issued, by the registrar or other 
fficer of the court which gave the judgment, to be produced by 
ti e person in whose favour the judgment was given. Upon produc­
tion of such certificate to the recognising court, the officer 
of such court must register the judgment “forthwith" in the
uO. Cap.189, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1958 ed.) ss.LO^ 
and 105.
61. 5.e. it excludes the judgments of Customary or Native Courts.
62. Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, s.112.
63. Jhich is defined in section 95 of the Act as including a 
judgment, decree, or order given or made by the court in a 
suit whereby any sum of money is made payable or any person 
is required to do or not to do any act other than
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'igerian Register of Judgments. The language of this provision 
would, seem to make it clear that the officer to whom the certi­
ficate is produced has no discretion to refuse to register the 
judgment for any reason. Indeed, as regards section 21 (1) of 
the Australian Service and Execution of Process Act, 1901-1950 
on which the Algerian Act was based, it has been held by the
6 kPull Court of Pew South Tales in Ax Parte Peaglase that where 
; certificate of a judgment is produced to the proper officer in 
another Australian State, that officer is bound to register the 
judgment and has no discretion to inquire into the validity of 
;ne judgment, finally, from the date of registration the certi­
ficate becomes the record of the recognising court and has the
65same force and effect as a judgment of that court. "
Thus even in the absence of a Full Faith and Credit provi­
sion in the Algerian Constitution, the relevant provisions of 
the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act has dispensed with the ques­
tion, as far as the superior courts are concerned, whether 
recognition of a sister state divorce should be predicated upon 
roof of proper jurisdiction in the original court. In other 
sores, a divorce decree granted by the 'High Court of a State, 
•ether pertaining to a polygamous or monogamous arriage, would 
lecessarily enjoy equal validity in the courts of the other 
itetes without the recognising court re-examining, as at common 
law, the facts which gave the original court jurisdiction to 
grant a divorce decree.
The state of affairs brought about by the provisions of 
this Act would seem to explain why no reported case has been
6k. (1903) 3 S.A. (U.S.A.) 680; 20 U.U. (U.S.A.) 226.
65. Sheriffs end Civil xrocess let, s.105 (2).
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found in which a dispute as to the recognition by the High Court
>r the hagistrate1s Court of the judgments or divorce decrees
66of the courts of the other State has been raised.'' ' The posi­
tion in Nigeria, with regard to interstate recognition of
judgments therefore compares favourably with the situation in
67_ ustralia which commentators in other federations in the
68co . on law world have praised in an extra-ordinary way.
66. hie case of Gooccnilc v. Onwuka /196l7 All .L.R. 163 is not 
in point since the decision in that case was concerned with 
the joint effect of the repealed Reciprocal ‘Enforcement 
Ordinance, Cap.75? Laws of the Federation of higeria (1953
ed) and ss.lOH- and 105 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
67. For example in the Australian case of karris v. Harris /19h'jJ 
Viet .L.R.kb, it was held that a 'Tew South Hales divorce 
decree which was final and conclusive should be recognised
in Victoria even when it wTas clear, according to findings 
of the Victorian Court, that the parties were domiciled in 
Victoria at the date of the proceedings; whereas the Hew 
South Wales Court had assumed jurisdiction on basis of the 
parties' domicile in lev/ South Wales. The decision in the 
case was reached by reference to s.l8 of the Australian 
State and Territorial Laws and Records Act, 1901-1950 which 
provides, like the Nigerian Act, that the judgments of any 
state in Australia, if proved or authenticated as required 
by the Act, should have the same effect in all Courts in 
Australia as they have in the state of origin. The provi­
sion of this Act is further reinforced by s.9^ of the 1959 
Australian Matrimonial Causes Act.
at. S.g. United States of America. See Justice Jackson, "Full 
Faith and Credit - The Lawyers1 Clause of the Constitution*1 
in Colum.L .Rev . (19^ "5)" "l &t ~p .3^ ; C00k , op .cit.~ p .96;
Cf. Griswold, Ljvorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce 
Decrees - A comparative Study" in 65 Harv.L.Rev. (195l) 193 
at pp.220-223. Such favourable comments by American writers 
on the Australian approach is due to the fact that in the 
United States, the obligation imposed by Art.IV, s.l of the 
American Constitution, to accord full faith and credit to 
the judgments of one state by the others is subject to a 
judicial qualification. According to the decision of the 
Supreme Court of America, in ‘A ill jams v. Narth Carolina 
(No.2) (19*+5) 325 U.S. 226, when divorce jurisdiction is 
based on domicile of the parties in one state, the fact 
that the court decreeing the divorce found that the parties 
wrere domiciled within the forum at the time of the action 
will not preclude the court of the state recognising the 
decree from ascertaining whether the parties were in fact 
domiciled in the state where the decree was granted. If it 
found that they were not, recognition will be refused to the 
divorce decree.
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A great flaw in the provision of the Sheriffs and Civil 
Process Act,as we have already pointed out in Chapter one, is 
that it does not apply to the judgments or decrees of the 
astomary Courts,' ' despite the provision of the Nigerian Con­
stitution which empowers the Federal Authority to provide 
.achinery for the mutual recognition of the judgments of “any 
court of law" in Nigeria. As regards this defect, it has also 
been suggested in the same chapter that there should be no 
discrimination against the judgments of the Customary Courts 
which, according to general agreement, determine the rights and 
duties - and hence the matrimonial rights and remedies of the 
preponderant majority of people in Nigeria/0 On this point, 
nothing more needs be said here that to reiterate our suggestion 
tin t the provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act 
should be extended to cover the mutual recognition of the judg- 
ents of the Customary Courts interstate in Nigeria so as to 
bring the position in line with that obtaining between the 
superior courts.
6-; . Supra p. fos. .
70. Recent figures are not readily available, but to show what 
a very small percentage of cases come before the superior 
courts as compared, with the Customary Courts even in 19^9- 
1950 when the number of the Customary Courts was not as 
great as it is at present, attention may be drawn to the 
following figures.
In 19*+9, the Supreme Court {there being no high Court 
in Nigeria at that time) and the Magistrates' Courts 
tried in Western Nigeria as then constituted 11,607 crimi­
nal and 2,988 civil cases as compared with 3^,000 criminal 
and 70,000 civil cases dealt with by the Customary Courts 
of that area. See Report of the Native Courts (Western 
Provinces) Commission of Nncuiry, Lagos, Govt.Printer,
1952, paras. 89 and {o.
About the same year, there were 17,932 criminal and 
5,6-27 civil cases determined by the Supreme Court and the 
Magistrates1 Courts in Eastern 'igeria as against 6-0,000 
criminal and 75,000 civil cases tried by the Customary 
Courts of thet Area. See Report of the "stive Courts 
(' vr s t e rn ' .e r: j or) Com 1 s s ’ 0:1 of Nnq ui r y, Lagos, Govt .Printer, 
1953? para.Ipoc.
Fee also pars.111 of the Report of the Native Courts 
( .'arthorn , ::jv1 .ces) Co. ission of Enquiry. Lagos, Govt.
-continued-
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Another problem of recognition interstate on which neither 
Constitutional law nor any Federal or State enactment is helpful 
concerns extra-judicial divorces. In most states in Nigeria, 
dissolution of polygamous marriages can be effected not only by 
the courts bqt also by the acts of the parties without the 
intervention of the courts. Of course, an extra-judicial 
'ivorce is as effective under the law of the State permitting 
such node of dissolution as a "'’ivorce decreed by the courts.
The :et.Aoc s by which an extra-judicial divorce may be effected 
A 11 be considered under the following categories; (a) Unilateral 
repudiation by the husband, and (b) Consensual agreement between 
the parties.
Unilateral repudiation of the wife by the husband was
almost a common method of terminating a polygamous marriage under
IN e traditional customary law in the rare cases where efforts of
A c family members to preserve the marriage had failed. However,
the establishment of regular courts coupled with the necessity
to obtain ancillary reliefs, especially the custody of children
of the marriage, would seem to have made this method of divorce
mess popular. Another deterrent is the rule in some customary
laws providing for the forfeiture of the bride-price or dowry
repayable by the wife on divorce if the husband should decide to
71end. the marriage unilaterally. Moreover, recent statutory
72modification of customary law in some States' has made extra-
70. (continued) Printer, 1952, which stated that the greater 
majority of cases arising from that Region were tried by 
the ative Courts. According to this report, nearly 25,000 
civil cases were tried between 196*9-1950 in Northern 
Nigeria end out of this figure 66 per cent of such cases 
were concerned with matrimonial causes. See para.6-68.
71. See Kasunnu and Salacuse, Op.cit., p.173.
72. e.g. Mestern "igeria, See The Marriage, Divorce and*Custody 
of Children adoptive Dye-Laws Order, .R.L.H. 6-56 of 1958; 
tee Iso the M.v Declaration of Customary Lav/, N.R.L.N. 16-9 
of 1955; Idone Declaration of Customary Law, Schedule s.9,
• »oo ox 9 59 •
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judicial divorces virtually impossible in such States. Eut 
- -C or the Maliki law obtaining in most States of Northern 
Mg via, a Moslem i ms banc3 still has the right, which is seldom
n
exercised ,‘ to repudiate his wife for any reason whatsoever or
even without just cause. This method of terminating a Moslem
arricge is known as Talaq and it may partake of different 
7*+hrus.' This is also the position under some systems of
79customary lav; e.g. the Eiu Declaration of "dative Law on Divorce.
By far the most common forms of extra-judicial divorce, 
:syecially under Moslem law, are those based on mutual consent 
of the parties. The first of the two types of consensual tar­
s' :ation of a Moslem marriage is known as the MMOL* whereby a 
wife* e.g. as a result of her aversion to her husband, may obtain 
a release from the larriage by the payment to the husband of a 
financial consideration or by a return of the dowry paid on her 
_ .elf at the time of the marriage. The necessity for the 
husband's consent before a valid divorce could be obtained by the
■ ;ife was recently emphasised by the northern Nigerian Sharia Court
76S Appeal in Abdu Maf'ilace v. Kabi where it was held that the 
court has no power to impose a divorce on the husband if he 
refuses to give his consent to the termination of the marriage on 
the payment of Khul1 by the wife. A second form of extra-judicial 
ivorce by agreement which is the variety of the Khul1 is known
73- See Anderson, Islamic Lav; in Africa, pp.209 and 213;
Alhaji Suka, "Conflict of Islamic Lav; and .Customary Lav; of 
family Relations in Northern Higeria", 1 Journal of the 
Centre of Islamic Stuoies, Zcria, Ahmadu Bello Univ.(No.1) 
at p.17.
7*+. See Anderso n, op .cit., pp.213-2lh$ -^ Ihaji Suka, op .cit.,
pp. 17-18; "a'aji Shani, Digest of Maliki family Lav;,pp.13-16
75. MA.L, . 9 of 1969-, Schedule s.8(b) and (c), Laws of Northern 
Nigeria 1969-, Vol.II.
76. 3CA/CV17/19615 cited from the Journal of the Centre of
Islamic Legal studies Vol.l (ITo.l) at p.3-5.
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s ^ 0 iAAA 1A. This is achieved by a mutual- release by both 
spouses from the obligations of the marriage.^  A slightly dif­
ferent version of these two modes of Islamic divorce is not un- 
enown to some systems of customary law in Southern Nigerian
states."°
Arith the above situation in view, it becomes readily 
apparent that since these unilateral and mutual divorces are
 either granted by, nor ever required to be registered in, the
courts before they become effective, they cannot be enforced 
interstate under the provisions of the Sheriffs and’ Civil Profess 
et, even if that Act is extended, as suggested above, to the 
judgments of Customary Courts. The danger therefore arises that 
these extra-judicial divorces, legally valid under the law of Ue, 
State permitting them, may be refused recognition in another 
3t,te where such unilateral or bilateral dissolution is no 
longer permitted. The best solution, it is submitted, that could 
be devised for this sort of problem would be to have a Pull Faith 
end Credit provision in the Nigerian Constitution, or any Federal 
statute, compelling mutual recognition of such extrajudicial 
divorces interstate in Nigeria. This provision may be couched 
in terms of Full Faith and Credit being given by the courts of 
one State to the Laws, Judgments, Decrees, Orders or any Act 
recognised by law, of the other States. Such clause, besides 
continuing the mutual recognition of judgments of courts witfcin 
higeria, would also permit recognition of extra-judicial divorce
among the States as uan act recognised by law“ in cases where
such dissolution is permitted by the personal law of the parties.
77. For a detailed discussion on this point, see Ma'aji Shani,
hipest of Naliki Family Law., pp. 13-16; Suka, Journal of the 
Centre of Islamice Legal Studies, Vol.l, pp.17-18.
7m. lee Nasi* m u  : nc nal&cuse, or .cit. , pp.172-175; Obi, op.cit. .
pp.36^-365.
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i. r.:XOG!TTIO!; OF ? OBIIGI’ DIVORCES
This topic is one on which, unlike the bases of the Courts’ 
jurisdiction in divorce and other matrimonial causes, there is 
10 comparable enactment authorising the Nigerian High Courts to 
adopt principles conformable to those being currently applied by 
the high Court of Justice in England. Nonetheless, the High 
Court of a State must of necessity take into consideration the 
Snglish private international law rules on recognition of foreign 
divorce in formulating their own rules of recognition not only 
Lecause of the close relationship existing between English 
jurisdictional rules which the Nigerian High Courts apply and 
the English rules of recognition.
In ^mgland, rules for recognition of foreign divorces are 
of judicial creation. The British Parliament has found it un­
necessary to encroach on the power of judicial legislation of 
the courts in this respect. Hather, this power continues to be 
exercised from time to time both by the Court of Appeal and the 
house of Lords in England to take account of changes in the 
j’iglish domestic law on jurisdiction and contemporary develop- 
a its in the private international laws of other countries.
We have noticed that common law principles, if established 
iii England before 1st January, 19C0, have authoritative effect 
in '. igeria, however, subject to the inherent power of the 
Nigerian courts to modify such rules to take account of local 
circumstances. If enunciated in England after this date, such 
rules have a persuasive influence on the Nigerian Courts as any 
other common law decisions. A key difference therefore between 
the operation in 'Nigeria of the English jurisdictional rules on 
divorce and the common law rules on recognition of foreign
350.
divorce is that while the former cannot be modified with regard 
to their intrinsic substance, the latter is not so inhibited.
- t is needless to stress that this unsatisfactory position will 
ake it almost impossible for the ITigerian courts to relate their 
jurisdictional rules v/ith their rules of recognition - a 
proposition which is the foundation of private international law
„ „. 7Q
01 civorce'y - unless a decisive break is made with the'English
P) i*v
law on divorce jurisdiction.0^
The problem of recognition of foreign divorce has not 
. risen in ligeria. But this ought not to deter us from con­
sidering the problem in view of the great investment opportuni­
ties open to foreigners in I'igeria, making it possible for such 
persons who had settled or are merely resident in the country to 
enter into legal relations which may involve determination of 
the validity of divorces granted to them by the courts, or effec­
ted by then: under the laws, of foreign countries, furthermore, 
one of the consequences of the technological developments of the 
present era w ich has given rise to speed and ease of transport 
is that many Algerians are now resident, either temporarily or 
lor a long duration, in foreign countries. It is not inconceiv­
able that the question of recognition of divorce decrees granted 
to then particularly under the present somewhat lax jurisdiction 
of some of such foreign courts will soon arise for determination 
by the l igerian courts.
In case legislative activity is considered, necessary in 
this field, a discussion about the rules of recognising foreign 
divorces will be prefaced with the observation that the same
79. e.g. he I esurier v. Le lesurier (1895) 1.C.517; Ind.yka
v. Ind.yka /l967/ ~/7l .R. 910 at p .”557 (per Lord 1 ilberforce) 
Dnc also at p. 535? Grave son, o~c .cit., (6th ed .) pp. 310-311; 
'ann, 111 -ocueil des lours (196k) p.75.
80. fee now the Postscript.
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dichotomy of legislative competence noticeable in all facets of
\c tri lonial lav/ in ligeria is equally noticeable in the field
of recognition of foreign divorces. That is to say, the federal
V i; .ority is constitutionally competent to deivse rules for the
recognition of foreign decrees dissolving monogamfeus marriages
while each State is the sole arbiter of what rules should govern 
°f
the recognition/foreign decrees or acts dissolving polygamous
.arriages. Thus if legislation becomes necessary e.g. to
implement an international convention on recognition of foreign
divorces, or to nod ify the common law rules on this matter as 
32
*mi ew Zealand, a joint activity by both the federal and 
States' authorities will be necessary; otherwise a unilateral 
enactment by the 'Federal or the State authority will only apply 
to the type of marriage which such authority is constitutionally
competent to deal with.
(a) The Position Before 1953
It is unnecessary to dwell too much on the common lav; 
rules of recognition of foreign divorce decrees before 1953.
’he law was so consistent and well settled for over a century 
that no foreign divorce could be recognised as valid in England 
..liess it has been granted by the court of the country in which 
t ie parties were domiciled at the corm encement of the divorce
ol. Constitution of the Federal Republic of 'igeria, 1963? item 
23 and k5 of the Exclusive Legislative List.
32. '.'here, before the decision of the house of Lords, in Indyka
v. Indyka /I9627, 3 M.L.V. 510 established nationality or
citizenship as one of the tests for recognising foreign 
divorces, the ew Zealand Matrimonial Proceedings Vet,
1963, s.32 Cl)(b) (it) had adopted the same test, thereby
.■edifying the common lav/ on this point.
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proceedings.0  ^ Later a logical extension of this rule was nade
to the effect that a foreign divorce pronounced by a court other
the.n th.. t of domicile would be regarded as valid if such decree
would be recognised by the courts of the county where the parties
gk
v.ere domiciled at the time of the suit. ‘ This period was the 
heyday of the status theory of divorce when the narrow and. 
rigid rule for assumption of divorce jurisdiction was matched 
with a similar rule of recognition and both reflected the 
common law attitude that matters of personal status are governed 
exclusively by the lex domic H i  j , i.e. the personal law.
Inseparably linked with the theory that the validity of 
divorce is determined by the personal law is another rule that, 
in considering the uestion whether recognition should be given 
to a foreign divorce, the English courts should not concern 
themselves with what ground was used by the foreign court to 
dissolve the marriage. 4s far as they are concerned, the ground 
for divorce may well be one which is not permitted by English
Q r*
law. ..hat is material to recognition is that the divorce 
should nave been granted by the court of domicile, or if 
grantee! somewhere else, must have been capable of being recog­
nised by the court of domicile.
ho doubt, these two rules of recognition should have 
•' ual validity in Ligeria since the Uigerian High Courts them­
selves exercise divorce jurisdiction on the basis that domicile
-3. Conway v. Leazley (1831) 3 I agg.Ecc.639 at 656; 162 Eng.
hop.1292 at pp. 1297-8; Tollemache v. Tollemache (135.9) 1 
Sw.Tr. 557; h al ne r v. I-alner~ (1659) 1 3w.Tr. 551} Chaw v. 
Could, (i860) L.n.3 .l75p] Harvey v. Fsrnie (lo82TTTApp.
Cas.^S; Le I'esurier v. Le hesurier ^189^/” ’ .0.517*
o1!-. hr ml tag e v. ttorney-General £19067 P.135.
65. Pemberton v . rugbies /I89^7 1 Ch.761; _3ee also Ihezger v.
ozger /l93Z/ i -195 - ter v. Eater /19067 F.209 esp. at
p.217.“ “
is the test for determining matters of personal status, besides 
t o point that the rule in Le hesurier!s case is a common law 
?’ule received in Ligeria as part of the common law of England 
as at 1st January, 1900 while the two-pronged rule established 
1 . ' r lita- 0 v. attorney-General, though decided in England in 
--906, is a logical extension of the rule that the validity of a 
divorce is to be governed by the personal law of the parties.
An important qualifiestion on the principle that domicile 
is the foundation for recognising foreign decrees is that 
1though a divorce decree granted in accordance with the law of 
'ouicile effectively terminates the status of marriage between 
the parties, the decree does not necessarily preclude a fresh 
determination being made by an English court as regards
ciliary rights, e.g. custody or guardianship of the children 
)f the marriage, granted in such decree by a foreign court.
Liy foreign order to this effect may be varied or discharged at 
b 3 discretion of a court in England.^" The pragmatic explana­
tion given for the doctrine that rights created by a foreign 
court in ancillary orders to a divorce, should not be allowed to 
ve an absolute sway in England, even if its divorce is recog- 
ised, should also provide a cogent reason why the practice of 
the Algerian courts in this respect should not be different.
In England, foreign law is not applied in natters concern­
ing guardianship and custody proceedings because of the close 
connection between these matters and the welfare administration. 
Similarly in ITigeria, all the courts, whether the English type 
courts or the customary courts, are required by statutory
36. See bicey £-nd Morris, op .cit. „ (8th ed.) pp.326-330.
s7* 7bid.; See also Lipstein, 6 I.C.L. y. (1959) 506 pp.513-51^ 
Lahn-Ereund, Growth of Internationalism in English Lrivate
Jiteme.bio mal I-sw, (i960) p.65.
enactments to pay regard to the interest and welfare of the 
o' ild as the first and paramount consideration in any procee­
dings relating to his custody and guardianship. Hence a 
igerian court has the right, either of its own motion or upon 
the application by any interested party, to vary or discharge in 
the interest of the child, an order previously made by a court 
in respect of custody or guardianship of the child. In view of 
these wide discretionary powers of the courts to vary or dis­
charge their own custody or guardianship orders, if such varia­
tion or discharge will be in the interest of the child, it is 
difficult to see how a Nigerian court will not consider it a 
duty to give similar treatment to the orders of foreign courts 
if it is in the interest and welfare of the child to vary or 
discharge them.
how far a f oreign maintenance order or permanent alimony 
granted to a spouse in a divorce decree granted by a foreign
competent court will be strictly enforced in Nigeria can only
89e surmised. The Federal maintenance Orders Act x is not in 
. aint since it applies to few countries with which Nigeria has 
ode a reciprocal arrangement for enforcement of such orders.
-Iso it is limited in scope. Section 3 of the Act provides that 
an order lade against a person in England, Northern Ireland or 
the Republic of Ireland^0 for the periodical pay ient of sums of
88. Nee e.g. s.2k of the Infants Law of the Nestern and the Hid— 
Nestern States, Cap.^9? Laws of Nestern Nigeria (1959 ed.); . 
s.23 Customary Courts Lav;, Ca.p.31, Laws of Nestern Nigeria 
(1959 ed.); s.25, Customary Courts Law, Cap.32, Laws of
N. stern ’ igeria (1963 ed .); s.23 of the Area Courts Edicts 
of the Six ‘Northern Nigerian States.
89. Cc.p.llN, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1958 ed.).
90. The Act came into effect on 23rd June, 1921 when the Repub­
lic of Ireland and N0rthern Ireland constituted a* unified 
country, hence it would seem to apply to both countries
after tney separated in 1922.
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money for the maintenance of his wife or other dependants may 
l enforced in Nigeria if registered in a Nigerian court. From 
the date of registration, such order has the same force and
ffect as an order granted, by the court in Nigeria where it was
91
: stereo. and is enforceable in like manner as if it were an
92oraer for the payment of a civil debt recoverable summarily.''
' t emerges clear from this provision that if the order is final
A conclusive, it cannot be varied or discharged. Only when
the order of the foreign court is provisional can it be varied
jr rescinded by a ' igerian court and then, after the case had
been remitted to the foreign court which,made the order for the
93purpose of enabling it to take further evidence on it. J That 
the Act is not designed for reciprocal enforcement of a mainten- 
: ice order granted as ancillary relief to a o ivorce decree is 
clearly shown by its provisions. In.the first place, it applies 
to the orders made by the High Courts as well as to orders made 
. agistrates1 Courts. (It may be recalled that the Magistrates1 
Cuurts do not grant divorce decrees at least in Nigeria and 
b .land). It speaks of a maintenance order granted to the "wife" 
and other dependants of the husband. Dependants are defined by 
reference to the law of the country where the order was rnade^  
but there is no such reference to the law of which country the 
word “wife" is to be interpreted. Thus when the parties had 
already been validly divorced e.g. in Dngland or Northern 
Ireland where they were domiciled at the time of the proceedings,
91. Maintenance Orders Act, s.3.
92. Ibid. s.7 (2).
93. Ibid. s.6 (6).
91!-. Maintenance Orders Act, s.2.
356.
trie wife would cease to be a wife from the time a divorce decree
was made and become an ex-wife of the husband when enforcement
of the order is sought in ..igeria. In fact the language of
. ole Act lakes it glaring that the sole purpose of the enact-
lent is to meet the situation where the spouses are still
isrried and jointly resident in England, Northern or Republic
of Ireland when the order was mace and the husband subsequently
95became resident in igeria.^ ' It does not contemplate a situa­
tion where the marriage had been validly dissolved by the court 
of domicile in either of these countries.
3e that as it may, it will be surprising, in view of the 
great disparity between standards of living and scales of 
values in the different countries of the world, if a Nigerian 
court does not consider it desirable in the interest of common 
sense ana justice to vary the maintenance order or permanent 
alimony made by a foreign court if the rate of payment exceeds 
c maximum socially desirable or statutorily permitted in the 
country «
If the above contention is correct, we would have come to 
an important distinction between interstate and. international 
recognition of ancillary orders made in divorce decrees, since 
as has been pointed out, a decree or order of the court of one
>5. Ibid., esp. at ss.5 and 6.
;6. Suppose that the wife of a man earning about £25 per week 
while lie was in England was granted, a maintenance of £8 in 
respect of herself and the only child of the marriage. It 
is submitted that it will be socially undesirable for such 
order to be confirmed by a court in Nigeria when the 
husband is now in Nigeria on a basic salary of £720 per 
annum, or_£l5 per week. Indeed, the English case of hood 
v. Mood Z.19527 P.25^ , would also suggest that it lies 
within the discretion of the Nigerian court to var;> or 
discharge such foreign maintenance order.
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Nigerian State “whereby any sum of money is made payable11, if 
registered according to the provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil 
Process Act, must be enforced in any other court in Nigeria as 
the judgment or order of the court where registration is effected.
(b) The Travers v. Holley Doctrine
In 19535 following the statutory extension of divorce 
jurisdiction in England, the unilateral rules that the English 
courts could exercise extraordinary jurisdiction on the wife’s 
petition, to the exclusion of the husband, was enlarged by the 
courts into a bilateral rule of recognition so that recognition 
was accorded to a decree granted to a wife on basis of a foreign 
rule giving the court of such country jurisdiction to dissolve 
a marriage on a basis substantially similar to those of English 
courts.
The leading authority on this point is the Court of 
real’s decision in Travers v. Holley . ^  In that case two 
ritisn nationals, immediately after their marriage in England 
where the husband had his domicile of origin, left that country 
• 1937 for New South Males, Australia. In 199-0, the husband 
obtained a commission in the Australian forces and later trans- 
Terred to the Eritish forces. Three years later, the wife filed 
: petition in the Supreme Court of New South Males alleging 
that she hac been deserted tsy the husband since 199-0. The hus­
band was served with notice of the petition but did not defend 
the action. Jurisdiction was assumed by the New South Males 
court under the State’s Matrimonial Causes Act, 1899? section
97. Z--95^7 P. 29-6, followed in Carr v. Carr /19557 2 E.R.61.
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16 (a) of which provided that a wife who, at the time of the 
suic, had been domiciled in New South Males for three years may 
present a petition for divorce. For the purpose of this Act, a 
deserted wife whose husband was domiciled in New South Males 
with the wife before his desertion, was deemed to have retained 
cr domicile in the State even if the husband had subsequently 
fter his desertion acquired a new domicile abroad. The New 
.out: M;les court, having found that the wife was domiciled in' 
the State as provided by the Act, accordingly granted, her a 
divorce decree. Both the husband and the wife later remarried, 
the husband in England and the wife in the State of Michigan, 
in the United States. The second marriage of the husband in 
ingland proved unsatisfactory and he brought proceedings for 
divorce against his first wife on the ground of her adultery 
with her second husband. In other words, he was alleging the 
invalidity of the Hew South Males divorce because he was not 
domiciled there at the commencement of the proceedings, so as to
that his second marriage was a nullity.
By a majority of two to one, the Court of Appeal held that 
:M.[mediately before the husband’s desertion he had acquired a 
‘o icile of choice in Mew South Males. It was however doubtful 
hiether the husband still retained his domicile in that State at 
tne commencement of tine proceedings. A decision on this point 
s considered unnecessary since the decree, even if not granted 
by the court of domicile of the husband, was based, on a juris­
diction substantially similar to that being exercised by English 
courts by virtue of section 13 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1937 (now section 9-C (l)(a) of the Act of the 19^5 Act). The 
ccurt therefore held that it would be inconsistent with comity ' 
£nc contrary to principle if English courts refused to recognise
a decree granted by a foreign court whose jurisdiction was cased, 
iuttis .uhw is, on one that the English courts claim for
themselves.
-he principle of recognition established in this case was
qo
water extended in hetiuson-bco11 v. abi, .son-Jcotty° to a case 
where the foreign court assumed jurisdiction on a basis sub­
stantially similar to the provision of section 1, Law Reform
99(miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 19^9? i.e. residence of trie 
wife for three years in England.
. any difficulties lay in the way of the principle estabo­
lished in fravers v. hoiley at its inception which developments 
by subsequent cases have clarified as will be presently shown, 
lire doctrine itself has been the ^ubject of considerable dis­
cussion not only in legal treatises1 but also in legal periodi- 
2
cels. he reed only to set out the salient points in our critical 
re-appraisal of the doctrine with a view to considering how far 
the bilateral rules of recognition developed in this and other 
cases should be allowed to operate in Nigeria.
98. /19587 p.71.
>>. Uov section 5-0 (l)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965.
1. Dicey and Morris, op.cit.. (8th ed.) pp.312-315; Cheshire,
op .cl t.. pp. 35-2- 15-6; t raveson, op .cit ■. (6th ed.) pp.315— 319.
2. Sinclair, 30 B.Y.B.I.L. (1953) 527; Kennedy, 31 Can.Bar.
lev.(1953) PP.799 end 1079; 32 Gen.Bar.Rev. (1955-) 359 at
p.362; Gov;, 3 I.C.L.Q. (1955-) 156; F.A. Mann, 17 M.L.R. 
(1955-) at p.79; Elaokburn, 17 M.L.R. (1955-) p.5-71;
Graveson, 17 M.L.R. (1955-) p.509; C-riswold, 67 Harv.L.Mev. 
(1955-) 823; Bus sell, 5 I.C.L.Q. (1956) 126; Cowen, 31 Aust. 
L.J. (1957) 8; ..ebt, 6 I.C.L.Q. (1957) 608; 7 I.C.L.Q.
(1958) 375-; Cohn, 7 I.C.L.Q. (1956) 637; Kahn-Mreund,
Growth of Internationalism in English Private International
Law (1960) pp.26-35-; Cuetel, 4-5 Can.Bar .Rev . (1967) 15-0;
..ebb, 16 I.C.L.Q. (1967) 997.
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In deciding whether a foreign court had proper jurisdic­
tion entitling its civorce decree to be recognised under this
3
principle it has been decided in subsequent cases that it is 
no io .ger necessary to demand substantial identity between the 
foreign jurisdictional rule and that of the English courts. 
Provided that the circumstances under which the foreign court 
ssuaied jurisdiction was factually similar to the basis of 
c ivorce jurisdiction in England, such foreign divorce decree 
..rust be recognised. Thus in ^obinson-Scott v. horn' nson-Scott 
she Swiss court's basis of jurisdiction in dissolving the marriage 
between the parties was the separate domicile of the wife in 
Switzerland. On finding that the wife had in fact resided in 
Switzerland for not less than three years immediately before 
- - ■ e commencement of the divorce proceedings there, Karminski, J., 
-eld that the facts before the foreign court were such that had 
hey occurred in England, an English court would have exercised 
jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage on a. petition presented 
by tue wife. He therefore recognised the Swiss divorce decree 
.not because it was granted by the court of the separate domicile 
of the wife (a concept which is not permitted by English lav/) 
but because of the equivalence in the facts giving the Swiss 
court jurisdiction and the basis of the English courts' juris- 
diction under section 18 (l)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1950. hence it is the factual circumstances of the foreign 
jurisdiction rule that is important for purpose of recognition 
under this principle.
3. -mold v. Arnold £19 5 Z7 P. 237 5 Hobinson-Scott v. ho bins on- 
>cott /1956/ P.71; Manning v. harming /195'b/ P. 112; Irown 
TTTroWi /1968? 2 .L .R.' y g q . -----  ----
5-. L95-7 p.71.
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It iiiay be recalled that the decision in Travers v. Holley 1^
proceeded on the ground that' comity demands that a divorce decree
granted by a foreign court exercising similar jurisdiction as
the one claimed by the English courts should be recognised in
ingland. Th$ decision has recently been disapproved of on this
ground by the House of Lords in Indyka v. Indyka.^  In showing
that this basis of the decision was faulty, the House was of the
view that the mere fact that English courts recognise foreign
decrees granted on a jurisdictional fact as the English courts
themselves exercise, does not imply that a decree granted by an
English court on a jurisdictional basis factually or substantially
similar to that of a foreign court would be recognised by such
foreign country.
According to Lord Reid, ’’comity11 in the sense of
11 if you will recognise that we have this jurisdiction 
we will recognise that you hage a similar jurisdic­
tion has never been the basis on which we recognise or
give effect to foreign judgments.” 7
concluded by saying that it would be quite unrealistic to 
suppose that when Parliament entrusts new jurisdiction to English 
courts, it has any intention to affect their rules for recog­
nising foreign judgments.
O
In Levett v. Lcvo tt,^  by an inductive approac*., the uni­
lateral rule that the English courts could exercise extra­
ordinary jurisdiction only on a petition by a wife, to the 
exclusion of any cross-petition by the husband, was engrafted by
5. Z~95i7 P.2^ 6.
6. Z~96Z7 3 '.J.L.R. 510.
7. Z19627 3 l.L.E. 510 at p.518.
8. £L95Z7 P.156.
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Lie Court of Appeal on the exceptional rule of recognition
9
enunciated in 1 ravers v. ...olley. In chat case, an English 
soldier domiciled in England. married in Germany, a German girl 
domiciled in Germany. They lived together for a time in England 
:fore the wife in 1952 left the husband to live in Germany.
Less than a month after her arrival in Germany, she presented a 
petition to the appropriate German court praying for a dis­
solution of the arriage on the ground of her husband’s cruelty, 
the husband cross-petitioned for divorce on the ground of the 
..ife’s adultery. The wife decided not to proceed with her 
petition and the German court, applying the English law as the 
personal law of the husband, found that the wife’s adultery was 
proved and accordingly granted a divorce decree to the husband.
1i England the husband asked for a declaration that the German 
decree Lad effectively dissolved the marriage.
In considering whether the German decree should be recog- 
iised in England under the doctrine of Travers v. Holley,, the 
~ourt of Appeal found it unnecessary to decide under what 
circumstances the foreign court assumed jurisdiction even though 
:i t was established by expert evidence that the German test was 
the ordinary residence of the wife in Germany with no period of 
time stipulated. The court held that in so far as the statutory 
exceptions to divorce jurisdiction of the English courts, on 
which the doctrine of Travers v. Holley is based, only affords 
a wife to petition for divorce in England to the exclusion of 
hie husband, so also must recognition of a foreign jurisdiction 
factually similar to that of the English courts be limited to a 
decree granted to the wife. Therefore the decree granted to the
9 . IV)537 P.216.
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irasband by the German court must be refused recognition irres­
pective of the fact tliat he was merely a respondent to the 
action brought by the wife in Germany, -She the r a decree granted 
to a husband in circumstances as occurred in this case will now 
be recognised in England in view of the new rules established by 
tiie house of Lores in Indyka v. I no yka will be considered below.
(e) hecent Trends in England
An important point on which there had been a cleavage of
academic opinion was whether the doctrine in Travers v. Holley
could have a retrospective effect so as to enable a foreign
decree that had been granted before the statutory extensions of
nglish courts' jurisdiction to be recognised in England."1" This
~  11point ;as the rail- issue in mdyka v. Indyka. In that case, 
.ife wno was a national of, and had always lived in, 
Czechoslovakia but whose Czech husband had acquired a domicile 
of cnoice in England, in 19^ -6, was granted a divorce by a court 
in Czechoslovakia in January, 19^9 on the ground of deep dis­
ruption of marital relations. The decree became final in
zruary, 19^ 9.• T^ e precise basis of jurisdiction of the Czech 
court was not known, though there was no dispute before the court
10. Tor example, Dr. J.H.C. h0rris in 15 I.C.L.Q, (i960) k22 at 
p. *+2 5 said: The foreign divorce which was recognised in
Travers v. Holley on the analogy of the English s tatute of 
1937 had. been granted in 19^3 • The question therefore 
arises, would the decision have been the same if the divorce 
had been obtained before 1937? Since the decision would 
have been inconceivable before the statutory change made in 
that year, it is submitted that on principle no divorce 
granted before 1937 or 19^9 as the case may be should be 
recognised in England under the doctrine of Travers v.
hoiley . kith this submission other writers in the Common­
wealth disagreed. See e.g. Grodecki, 35 B.Y.B.I.L. (1959)
58 at p. 62; Kennedy, 32 Can. Bar .Rev .359 at p.3675. Cowen 
and Da Costa, matrimonial Causes Jurisdiction (1961) p.86; 
..ebb, 7 I.C.L.Q. (1958) 3'83-381i-; C as tel k5 Can. .„ar. Rev. 
(1967) lko at pp. 1^3-15^. In Arnold v. Arnold 7cT9527" B.236, 
the retrospective effect of the rule was assumed without 
.is cuss ion by hr, Co:.m;issioner Latey.
11. /±9bjJ 3 u JCi.R. 510.
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Liu t the Czech court had jurisdiction. Lord he id thought that
cue jurisdiction of the Czech court was based on the spouses'
Czechoslovakian nationality or the life's residence in the 
12country. The other Lords took it that the Czech court assumed 
jurisdiction on basis of the parties being Czech citizens. In 
19? 9? the sosbanc went through a ceremony of carriage with a 
second wife in England and six years later, the second wife peti 
Lionet for dissolution of the marriage on the ground of her 
husband's alleges cruelty. In reply, the husband claimed that 
Che second marriage celebrated in England was void for bigamy 
in that the Czech decree of January, 19^9 which purported, to 
issolve his marriage was not valid in England.as he was 
Ireucy domiciled in England long before the Czech proceedings 
.ore commenced. In short, that from the view-point of English 
xaw xie was still married, to his first wife.
This contention was accepted by Latey, J., who accordingly 
pronounced the second iarriage null and. void. On appeal this 
ecision was reversed by a majority decision, Russell L.J., 
dissenting. It should be pointed out at this juncture that the 
court below found as a matter of fact that the nusband, contrary 
so the Czechoslovakian court's decision, did not desert his wife 
i .: Czechoslovakia but in fact requested her to join.him in 
higland, a request which sue declined. Co it was clear that 
the decree could not be recognised as being based on a jurisdic­
tional ground similar bo the statutory extension first given to 
the English courts by the matrimonial Causes Act, 1937. The 
question presentee to the house of Lords therefore, was whether 
the Czech decree should be recognised as having been based on a
12. Ibid ., at p.5l5*
jurisdictional requirement factually matching the other excep­
tional jurisdiction being exercised by the Jnglish courts under 
tbe Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 19^9 bearing in 
x the fact that that Act came into operation in December 19^9 
ereas the Czech decree was granted in January of that year.
In other words, the main issue in Ind.yka v. Ind.yka was whether 
recognition of a divorce decree by a foreign court on an analo­
gous basis as the 19*+9 Act should be retrospective or prospective.
This point was summarily dismissed by all their Lordships 
..nose unanimous decision was that the Czech decree should be 
recognised retrospectively. Lore Pearce stressed the point that 
the facts which compelled Parliament to give English courts 
nicer jurisdiction in the interest of the wife existed in 
January 19^9 when the Czech decree was granted though those facts 
..ere not statutorily acknowledged in England until December of 
that year, he pointed out further that the ground of recognition 
rests not on any exact measure of English courts' jurisdiction 
cut on a wider ground of the public policy of English lav:, of 
which the domestic basis of jurisdiction was a most important 
clement. He concluded by saying that
'•whether a foreign decree should be recognised should 
be answered by the court in the light of its present 
policy regardless ... (with reason) of when the decree 
was granted." 13
Lord Eilberforce was of the view that "the crude facts speak
ih
strongly in favour of recognition" of the Czech decree and 
observed that the rule in Er. vers v. Holley should not be taken 
s a "cast-iron rule" to be applied on a "quasi-mathematical"
15basis. ' The fact that the Czech decree ante-dated by a few
13. Z196Z7 3 ■< «L.R. 510 at p.5^6.
I11-* Ibid. at p. 5^6.
15. I bid. at p. 559.
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.onths the statutory extension in 19 *+9 of the Tnglish Courts’
jurisdiction was also dismissed by the other members of the
_ case as not fatal to its recognition.'1'1"
Besides the specific approval given by the majority of the
17^ouse to doctrine of .Invars v. halley, the decision in Ind.yka 
v . t ndyka is also significant in another respect. In the words 
of febt, it completely revolutionalised the whole basis of recog­
nition of divorce decrees and thus rendered the decision a 
muse celebre of the century. u In stressing the historical 
point that the British Parliament has rarely intervened in the 
judicial evolution of rules regarding recognition of foreign 
divorces, their Lordships took the opportunity presented by the 
case (a) to re-iaterpret precedents on recognition and (b) to 
lay down new rules for testing the validity of foreign divorce 
decrees granted to the spouses, especially the wife, by a court 
other than that of the domicile of the husband, which in 
glish law -always represents the domicile of the wife.
To start with, it was agreed by all their Lordships that 
the basic rule that recognition should be given to a decree
^Tinted to either spouse by the court of the country in which
19, ,ey had their domicile should be maintained. 7
Secondly, there was unanimity that the world is almost 
equally divided between systems of lav; operating the principle
16. Ibid. at p. 533 (per Lord horris of Borth-y-Ge.fi t) and at 
p.561 (per Lord Pearson).
17. Z~95j.7 P. 2^ 6.
16. ..ebb, 16 I.C.L.Q. 997 at p. 998.
19. Indyka v. Indyka 1^ 9 &£/ 3 *L.R. 510 at p. 525 (per Lord
he id); pp. y±k & 5^5 (per Lord Pearce); pp.556-557 (per
Lord ilberforee); p.563 (per Lord Pearson).
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of domicile and those operating the principle of nationality 
for the assumption of divorce jurisdiction. Greatly assisted 
by the Report of the English Royal Commission on Marriage and 
divorce, the i.ouse held that nationality of both parties^0 or
that of the wife alone,
"if trie law of the /foreign/ country concerned enables 
a wife living apart from her husband, to retain or 
acquire a separate qualification of nationality", 21
should be an additional basis of recognition of foreign
divorces. On this point, their Lordships "in a truly r.eo-
internationalistic way" lifted the heavy hand of Le hesurier v.
i-iO __esurier^fc~ that the English courts should discountenance
wtionality as a criterion for recognising foreign divorce
decrees. In abrogating the exclusiveness of domicile ^or this
purpose, Lord Pearce noted that "even at the time of Le hesurier,
nationality could not properly be ignored". Lord Pearson,
owever, warned that just as an alleged domicile might be
fictitious, so
"nationality might perhaps in some circumstances be 
regarded as insufficient to found jurisdiction, if 
there was no longer any real and substantial con­
nection between the petitioner and the country of 
his or her nationality". 23
In the third place, their Lordships also were in agreement
2bthat the principle in drmitage v. At borney-General should
20. Ibid. at p.527 (per Lord Reid); pp.537 and 5*+5 (per Lord 
Pearce); pp.551 and 557 (per Lord hilberforce); pp.563 
and 565 (per Lord Pearson).
21. Ibid. at p. 563.
22. gL8917 A.C. 517.
23. Indyka v. Indyka £L96£7 3 W.L.R. 510 at p.56W
2k. 7.T90P7 P. 135.
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continue to be upheld in supplementing the jurisdiction of the 
court of domicile for purposes of recognition of foreign decrees. 
' - view of some of their Lordships, this principle should also 
e extended to nationality with the result that a decree recog- 
.ised by the court of nationality of both parties should also
Cif"
e regardedXvelid in England even if granted by a non-national
2 *5„ouru. inaeed, Loro Pearce went further than this in advoca­
ting that the rule in Armitage's case should be adopted for 
validation of foreign divorces to the extent suggested by the 
.ogal Commission on marriage and Divorce. The view of the Com­
ics ion, which was quoted extensively by his Lordship, was that 
a foreign decree should be recognised, if it has been obtained 
judicially or otherwise by a spouse in a country of which either 
the husband or the wife, or both spouses, were nationals at the 
commencement of the proceedings, furthermore, that such decree 
should also be regarded, as valid in England, though not granted 
v the court of nationality, if it would be recognised by the
„aw of the country of nationality of both spouses or of one of
26cue.:. Although this recommendation was fully endorsed by
Lord Pearce, it must be pointed out that his judgment on this
point could not be more than an obiter dictum since it was wholly
irrelevant to the decision in Indyka!s case.
Fourthly, Lord Reid, influenced by the Scottish practice
on divorce jurisdiction, was in favour of accepting the concept
of “matrimonial home*1 or “matrimonial domicile1 as a proper basis
of divorce jurisdiction by foreign courts entitling divorce
27
ecrees of such courts to be recognised in England. The
25. Indyka v. Indyka fh-9627 3 f.L.R. 510 at pp .51+5-51+6.
26. Cud. 9678 of 1955 -at para. 857.
27. 71962/ 3 .l .R . 510 at pp. 526-527.
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concept of matrimonial home or matrimonial domicile as used by 
his Lordship in this connection would seem to be different from 
the country in which' both spouses had a common domicile at the 
commencement of the suit and is rather more extensive than the 
Scottish concept. In Scotland, the courts have long been 
exercising divorce jurisdiction in favour of the wife 011 the 
oasis that the last matrimonial domicile of the spouses was in 
Scotland. In other words, if both parties were domiciled in 
Scotland and the husband deserted or abandoned the wife in that 
01.itry to acquire a separate domicile abroad, the courts in 
Scotland will entertain any divorce proceedings instituted by 
the wife provided she remains resident in Scotland at the com­
mencement of the proceedings, on the ground that the matrimonial 
home or domicile in which the parties last lived together wras in 
Scotland. This is a Scottish common law concept which does 
lot derive its authority from legislative action as in England.
Undoubtedly, a divorce decree granted by the Scottish, 
or for that matter any other foreign, court under the concept of
latrimonial home as described above will be accorded recognition
29in England by virtue of the doctrine of Travers v. Holley 
wi.ich as indicated above was approved, by a majority decision of 
the House of Lords in Indyka v. Indyka. But this doctrine was 
severely criticised by Lord Reid as incapable of leading to a 
rational development of the lav/, especially with regard to
su. i.v-uk v. Jack (1862) 2^ Sess .C&s>V67; - .ason v. has on (1877)
l5-!, S.L.u. 592; 1 adst v . Pabst (IS96) 6 S.L.T. 117$ Luck
v. Lack (1926) .L .T. 656j Gf. Anton, op .cit.. pp.317-31^h
and. see also Report of the Royal Commission on Harriare and 
Divorce, 1955, Cnd. 9678, para.76 .^
29. ^19537 i’ • 2h6 .
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recognition of a foreign decree granted under a jurisdictional 
pug i nalogous to the three years’ residence basis of the English 
Courts’ jurisdiction.-^  Instead, he was of the view that a 
tetter test for recognising foreign divorces based on residence 
is to revive
“the old conception of the matrimonial home and hold 
that if the court where that r.ome is grants decree of 
divorce we should recognise that decree’1 .
illustrating what he meant by the conception of matrimonial 
.one, Lord Reid instanced the case of an English man who goes 
with uis wife to a foreign country intending “to remain there 
for his working life” but without an intention to reside there 
per :anently. He pointed out that according to the present law, 
such person would not be domiciled in that country. But in his 
view, it will be wrong not to recognise a decree granted to the 
spouses by the court of such country irrespective of the fact 
that they had not, at common law, acquired a domicile of choice 
there. Recognition, he said, should not depend on whether or 
..ot the husband intends to reside permanently there, but on the 
fact of his having his matrimonial home, or as appropriately
31termed by Professor Graveson, his “centre of domestic gravity”
there. Lord Reid envisages no difficulty in determining where
spouse have their matrimonial home, or the community with which
they have a substantial connection in this sense, except as
regards persons who are confirmed normads for whom domicile
should continue to be the test. He then went on to say that
“In this matter I can see no good reason for making 
any distinction between the husband and the wife. If 
we recognise a decree granted to the one we ought
30. L-WjJ 3 ■* .L.K. 510 at p. 527.
31. Griveso.., o 0. c 1 b. (6tfi eci.) p. 325-.
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equally to recognise a decree granted to the other, 
hut if the husband left the matrimonial home and the 
'..ife remains within the same jurisdiction, I think we 
should recognise a decree granted to her by the court 
of that jurisdiction." 32
Lord Reid's judgment that a decree granted to the husband by the 
court of matrimonial domicile of the parties should be recognised
dm England is self-evidently obi ter since the facts of Indyka1s
Ocse only concerned recognition of a divorce granted to the 
.ife. hut a similar guidance for future development was con­
tained in the obiter dictum of Lord /ilberforce. He said
"Recognition might be given to decrees given on a 
residence basis, either generally,33 or in the 
particular case of wives living apart from their 
husbands where to subject them uniquely to the law of 
their husband's domicile would cause injustice, and 
where jurisdiction of the court of residence is 
appropriate ... As regards /.residence basis/, although 
it may be possible without any general change in the
law by Parliament for judicial decision to allow
recognition generally to decrees based on the non- 
domiciliary residence of the spouses,^ to do so in 
the present context appears to me to go further than 
is justified by the considerations advanced before us 
... It is my clear opinion that the particular depar­
ture from the rule, or tyrrany, of the domicile which 
I have mentioned ... is justified and is long overdue." 3^+
Hierefore, according to the views of Lord Reid and Lord
..ilberforce, a matrimonial home of the wedded pair should be
sufficient as one of the tests for recognising foreign divorce
decrees. Indeed, as will be presently shown, this test nas
already been accepted by an English High Court Judge.
Finally, Lord Reid would permit the recognition of a
decree granted to a wife who, though not abandoned by her
husband, goes alone to reside in a foreign country only if
32. Indyka v. Indyka /196^ .7 3 ...L.R. JlO, at p. 527.
33. Emphasis supplied.
3*K I ic'yka V. Indyka Zl$6£7 3 M.L.R. 510 at pp. 557-558.
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"such a wife is habitually resident within that jurisdiction and
-v ve no present intention of leaving it." hhereas the other
ue.lers of the house e.g. Lord iearceJ  ^ and Lord Wilberforce'3'
considered mere residence as a test of recognition of a foreign
divorce in the interest of the wife in so far as such residence
is reinforced by the nationality of the petitioner so as to
provide a real and substantial connection between the petitioner
end the court of the country which granted the decree.
In view of these extensive range of circumstances under
u ich foreign decrees may'now be recognised in England, their
Lordships were quick to enumerate certain limitations which
should prevent recognition of foreign divorce decrees. These
are (i) when recognition of a foreign divorce will be contrary
 ^ft
to public policy of the English law or (ii) when the decree is
vitiated by fraud or contrary to natural justice^' or (iii) where
the petitioner has gone abroad to obtain a divorce in evasion 
Lj-0
of English law. How the last limitation contained in the 
obiter dicta of some of the members of the House should be worked 
out must await further interpretation of the lower courts in 
view of the wide range of permutations possible in the tests of 
recognition enunciated or suggested by individual members of the 
House.
35. Inciyka v. Indyka Z.I96rjJ 3 W.L.R. 510 at p. 527.
36• Ibid. at p. 55-6.
37 . Ibid. at p. 558.
38. Indyka v. Indyka /19627 3 h .L.R. 510 at p. 55-9- (per Lord
Pearce) ; pTr+9 (per Lord hilberforce).
39. Ibid. at p. 583 (per Lord Pearson); at p. 531 (per Lore
horris of Eorth-y-Gest), approving of the decision^in Lesre 
v. Leu re £L9 6^7 P. 52; >^ee also Gray v. Homos a Z1963/  P.259.
9-0. Ind yka v. Ind.yka /19 627 3 ...L.R. 510 at p. 55*5- (per Lord
Pesrce); p. 55-9 (per Lnrd hilberforce) 5 Peters v. Peters
^19627 3 All E.R. 31b.
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Although‘there is unanimity by all members of the. House in 
their decision that the Czech decree granted to the wife, should 
e recognised, unhappily all their L0rc.ships spoke with dif­
ferent voices as to the exact nature of the new recognition rules 
..in ch they all agreed are necessary to reduce limping marriages, 
hie different criteria adopted or suggested by each of them for 
determining the validity of foreign divorce make it rather diffi­
cult to formulate a general principle underlying the decision 
c-esides stating the individual tests of recognition as we have 
done above.
It is rather surprising therefore that judicial inter-
kl
pretation of trie ratio decidendi in Indyka v. Indyka has pro­
ceeded almost unanimously on the basis that the general principle 
established by the House of Lords in that case is that
A c5.ivorce granted by a foreign court will be recog­
nised in England if there is a real and substantial 
connection between the petitioner and the court of 
the country where the decree was granted. k2
hut this formulation of the general principle seems faulty, if
a general principle is ever needed in this sort of situation,
k3H:re it excludes the rule in Armitage v. Attorney-General 
hen their Lordships agreed should be maintained in supplemen­
ting the jurisdiction of the court of domicile or that of the 
cyurt of nationality as the case may be. Lord Pearce spoke of 
H is rule as a “sound and valuable one" . If it is recognised
hi. 3 W.L.R. 510.
Lr2. E.g. Angelo v. Angelo /19&27 3 All S.R. 3lk; Peters; v.
Peters /19677 3 All E.R. 313; frown v. ..rown /ifof/ 2 ...L.R. 
969. This view might have been influenced by comments on 
Ind.yka!s case made by Gilliam Latey, Q.C. in 16 I.C.L.Q. 
(1967) 982 at p. 995. Cf. Webb, ibid. 997 at p. 1015.
*+3. Z~9067 P. 135'.
kh. Except Lord Reid who was silent on this point.
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that the philosophy underlying the decision in Indyka*s case is 
tnet the House has now finally come to terms with the idea that 
just as a wife living apart, under English lav/, had ceased 
since 1937 from being amenable in matters of divorce to the lav/ 
of the husband's domicile; so also has the concept of unitary 
personal law failed in the field of recognition of foreign 
ivorce decrees. Hence the evolution of the conception of sub­
stantial connection should be interpreted as an acknowledgment 
of the fact that many countries both in the common law and civil 
law countries have conferred on a wife living separate and apart 
from her husband the right to choose a different legal district 
so the law of which place she is amenable for the dissolution 
of her marriage. In other words, shorn of all forms of spurious 
itellectualism, the admission of the right of the court of the 
country with which the wife has substantial connection, whether 
determined by her ordinary or habitual residence, or her 
nationality, in that country, to dissolve the marriage in certain 
circumstances by applying the leu fori and not the lex domicilii 
of the husband, does presuppose that the lav/ of such country, 
i u ependent of the lex domicilii, determines the validity of the 
ivorce in such circumstances. If the decision of the House in 
1 uyka's case is viewed not solely from strict jurisdictional 
;p roach but also from the view-point of the applicable lav/, then 
it will be realised that the general principle in that case 
. _ould perhaps be formulated in the following terms:
A foreign divorce decree granted to either spouse by a 
foreign court will be recognised in England if it is 
granted, or recognised as valid, by the law of the 
country with which he or she has a real and most sub­
stantial connection.
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.'his statement of the general rule will therefore comprehend such 
case as i.ountcat ben v. nountbatten and also provide a rational
explanation for the recent decision of Payne, J., in Lather v. 
if6
.n.i.oney which, according to the judge, cerives its authority 
from Indyka v. Indyka.
In Mountbatten1 s case, an American wife, wrho was resident 
in hew York for more than three years, obtained a divorce decree 
in the State of Chihuahua in Lexico on the ground of incompati­
bility of temperament. The wife was in fact present within the 
jurisdiction of the Mexican court for about 2k hours. The hus- 
:. nd who was domiciled in Ingland submitted through a Mexican 
Attorney to the jurisdiction of the Mexican court. The husband 
later petitioned in England for a declaration that the Mexican 
ocree had validly dissolved the marriage between him and his 
ife. For the husband it was submitted that since a divorce 
ecree which has been granted by the court of a country which 
w:s not the domicile of the parties will be recognised in 
^ngland if it would be regarded as valid by the court of domicile 
jf the parties at the time of the suit (the Armitane v. Attorney - 
i. . q v i rule); this two pronged rule should be applied to the 
present case so that in so far as the Mexican decree would be 
recognised in Mew York, where the wife was ordinarily resident 
.or more than three years and whose court would have had juris- 
iction under the Jr.vers v. Molley doctrine, such decree should 
also be recognised in England.
Davies, J., not only rejected this submission but also
l+5. O S  527P. h.
b6. Z h c p 7 3 Ail 3.R. 223.
d eclined the further argument on behalf of the husband that it 
would be contrary to public policy to regard spouses who were 
lready considered as divorced in New York as still married in 
Nagland and a re-marriage by either party in England as biga- 
ous. in the course of his judgment on this point, Davies, J., 
Observed that the principle underlying the decision in Eravers 
v. nuLley was that the English courts should recognise as valid 
c foreign divorce decree which has been granted to a wife by a 
court other than that of domicile only when the jurisdiction of
the foreign court is exercised under situations "strictly
a aiogous" to that being exercised by the courts in England.
Yet it was in fur t her cine e of this same public policy of preven­
ting limping carriages that prompted the majority of the House 
(no the Court of Appeal) in Indyka's case in holding that 
recognition rules should not be a "mirror image" of the domestic 
lav/ on divorce jurisdiction nor should "the pace of recognition 
,e geared to the haphazard movement" of the English legislative 
process on jurisdiction.
Of course, the main reason advanced for justifying the
decision in hountbatten*s case and which probably influenced
1+7
Lord Pearce in Incyka v. Incfyka ‘ in supporting the decision of
navies, J., in that case, is that England was the domicile of
the parties. It is however ironical that the same Lord Pearce, 
who was the more vocal out of the two members of the House in 
Indyka's case to support nationality to the extent recommended 
by the Royal Con lissi.on as the test of recognition of foreign 
divorces, should alone agree with the decision of Davies, J.,
b7. /19&Z7 3 .v.L.R. 510 ct p. 5C5.
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i .ountbat ten v. ..ountbatten. It will be recalled that the
Jo .ission recommended that a decree granted by the court of
i tionality of either party or which would be regarded as valid 
/of
.7 the court nationality of either party should be recognised
in England.
In the nountbatten1s case, while Lord Hilforc Haven, the 
ius band, was a British national, domiciled in England, Mrs.
- ountbatten was
l
“an American by birth ,/who7 had to ail intents and 
purposes always been resident in the Hew York State". ^8
therefore she was a citizen of the United States and of the
1+9
create of Hew York. As was found in the case, the State of New
fork, the country of nationality of the wife, where she was
ordinarily resident at the commencement of the suit, would
recognise the Mexican decree. Therefore the decree of the
i-exican court would be recognisable in England under the test
of nationality advocated by Lord Pearce in Indyka’s case. This
cost which was perhaps overlooked by Lord Pearce would seem to
justify discountenancing his Lordship's dictum in Indyka's case
in which he approved, of the decision in Mount bat ten v. Mountbatten.
The uncertainty in this area of the law did not, however,
50prevent Payne, J., in Mather v. Mahoney from linking the rule
5l 52
in Armitage v. ^11orney-General with that of Travers v. Holley
ko. As reported by Margaret Puxon, “--exican Mix-Up" in 103 S.J. 
(1959) p. 246.
49. According to the Fourteenth Auendment to the United .States 
Constitution which provides that “all persons born or 
naturalised in the United States, and subject to the juris­
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside."
50. /I96b7 3 All E.R. 223.
51. /I9067 P. 135.
52. £T9537 P. 246.
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so as to recognise a decree which was not granted by the court 
of the country where the wife was substantially connected but 
....ich was granted in analogous situation as in ..ountbatten v. 
..ountbat ten. The American wife of a husband domiciled in England, 
iut living in Italy, deserted him in Italy and returned to 
Pennsylvania where she had "spent ;iOst of her life". After less 
.nan a year's residence in Pennsylvania following her desertion, 
sue went to the State of Nevada (another American State) in the 
ores of Payne, J., "for purpose of obtaining her divorce". She 
based her petition on the ground of mental cruelty, a complaint 
v. ich was served on the husband in Italy. The husband entered 
an appearance by instructing a Nevada Attorney to act on his 
■3half in the proceedings. Under these circumstances, the wife 
obtained a Nevada decree dissolving her marriage. Later on the 
husband sought a declaration in England that the Nevada decree 
sho Id be recognised.
Payne, J., had no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion 
that at the commencement of the proceedings, the wife was an 
American national who was habitually resident in Pennsylvania.
-e, therefore, held that she had the same connection with 
Pennsylvania as that which was established between the petitioner 
and Czechoslovakia in the Indyka's case, and that since the 
-•evada decree would be recognised in Pennsylvania, it should also 
be recognised in England. In arriving at his decision, Payne, J., 
id not consider the effect of kountbatten v. I.outbat ten. But 
there is no doubt that he nust have been aware of that case 
since there was a reference to it in the Indyka's case which the 
judge relied on as authority for his decision. He seemed to have 
assu ied that the kountbatten's case had lost its effect in view 
of the two-pronged nationality rule enunciated by Lord Pearce in
379.
:he k'idyka‘s case. Mather v. , .a..oney therefore supports the 
suggestion made above that the general principle established in 
I: id yka v. In' yka is that a foreign decree granted or recognised 
by tine court of the country with which the petitioner has a real 
and substantial co.niection will be recognised in England. It 
also shows that if 1 .ountbat ten v. Kountbatten were to be decided 
today, the result would be in favour of recognising the Mexican 
decree.
Apart from the case of Kather v. Mahoney« the process of 
giving meaning to the conception of substantial connection estab­
lished in Incyka v. Inoyka has already commenced. In Angelo v.
50
Angelo,y the question was whether a German decree granted to 
the wife should be recognised. The marriage dissolved was 
celebrated in Germany in i960 between a British subject, domi­
ciled in England, and a girl of German nationality, domiciled, 
before the marriage, in Germany. The spouses lived together for 
a short time in England and then in France. In December, 1962 
the wife left the husband in France and returned to Germany.
There in April of 1963 she obtained a divorce from the court of 
:.w vensburg. In considering a petition by the husband praying 
for a declaretion that the German divorce decree had effectively 
terminated his marriage, Ormrod, J., observed that the law as to 
recognition of foreign decrees underwent an abrupt change in 
I .id yka v. Indyka. He held that the wife mad a real end substan­
tial connection with Germany by virtue of her having her 
nationality and residence there at the commencement of the 
divorce proceedings and that the German decree should be recog­
nised in England.
53. W9U.7 3 All E.R. 314.
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In re tors v. Pe ters „ the husbanc. and wife, both n. tionals
of Yugoslavia, \ ere domiciled in that country at the time of
11 eir marriage in 19^7. cy left Yugoslavia and came to
-A.gland where they acquired a domicile of cnoice and also
obtained Eritish nationality. They later separated and towards
the end of 1962, the husband who was anxious to marry another
,/oua i, requested his enstranged wife to go to Yugoslavia for a
divorce. A decree was granted to the wife after ten days
residence in that country 011 the jurisdictional base that the
arriage was celebrated in Yugoslavia. Immediately afterwards,
sue returned to Ingland with her decree. The husband, in
reliance on the Yugoslavian decree sought a declaration in
Jngland that ..is marriage had been validly dissolved, hrangham,
J., stated that the high water mark of the house of Lords
decision in Indyka v. Indyka and the interpretation of its ratio
eci< end! made in Angelo v. Angelo was that a foreign divorce
decree will be recognised in England
uwhenever there is a real and substantial connection 
between the petitioner and the court exercising 
jurisdiction11 .
Yxiis connection he found to be lacking in the present case since 
the mere celebration of a marriage in a particular country where 
the divorce was obtained does not fall within any of the tests 
established in Indyka’s case for determining the substantial 
connection of a petitioner with the legal system of a country 
competent to pronounce the dissolution of the marriage. He also 
further Held that the fact that the spouses were at the time of 
their marriage nationals and domiciliaries of Yugoslavia will 
not alter the position since they have long abandoned their
u. tionality and domicile in that country before the commencement
$k. /r9627 3 All 3.R. 318.
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ji the divorce proceedings there.
5 5
The case of Tj.janic v. Tjjanlc was also concerned with 
recognition in Ungland of a divorce decree granted by a Yugos­
lavian court. The husband and wife married in 193*+ in Yugoslavia 
ct a time when both parties were nationals of, and also domiciled 
, Yugoslavia. Later the husband acquired a domicile of choice 
in higland and obtained British nationality. Despite repeated 
requests by the husband, the wife refused to join him in England. 
Jonsequently he initiated in i960 divorce proceedings in 
Yugoslavia through a proxy who was assisted by the husband's 
solicitor. The Yugoslavian court assumed jurisdiction under the 
provision of a Yugoslavian law whereby a marriage could be dis­
solved if the spouses had been living apart for a long time and 
00th consent to divorce. The wife joined the husband in applying 
for a divorce under this provision and a decree was accordingly 
giunted to them in 1961. On the husband's petition in England 
.hat the Yugoslavian decree should be recognised, Sir Jocelyn 
Simon Y, referring to the house of Lords Decision in Indyka v.
~.adyka. pointed out that there might be other grounds upon which 
■me decree could have been recognised. He was, however, content 
with basing his decision on the ground that in so far as the 
wife joined the husband in obtaining the decree, the decree was 
granted to a wife who had been resident for the whole of her 
life in Yugoslavia; that English courts assume jurisdiction 011 
similar basis and that the rule in Travers v. Holley. which was 
approved in I nd yka v. Inc. yka compels recognition being given to 
the Yugoslavian decree.
Independent of the fact that the wife joined the husband
55. /196Z7 3 W.L .P.. 1J66.
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:i obtaining the divorce ecree, one of the grounds on which
-Ir Jocelyn s.'.mon P. could have recognised the decree is that it
was granted to the husband by the court of nationality of the
.ife, a test proposed by the Royal Co,mission on Marriage and
- 'vorce and which was endorsed by Lord Pearce in the Indyka's
. .jo. The judge left this point open and it remains to be seen
.nether a decree granted to the husband alone by the court of
the country of which the wife is a national is ipso facto
entitled to recognition in England.
56Also in mo..n v. brown the rule in *obinson-Scott v.
57-oi- :..ison-Scott was combined with that of substantial co...nection 
n  recognise a divorce decree granted by a Swedish Court to a 
.ife whose nationality was Swedish and who had resided in 
wweden for at least three years before the commencement of the
proceedings.
58Finally, in -lair v. -iiir, the suggestion made by 
Lords Reid and Eilberforce that the concept of matrimonial home 
i, lit in appropriate cases be accepted as constituting a proper 
jurisdiction for purposes of recognising a
decree granted by the court of such place was translated into a 
rule of law by Gumming-Bruce, J. In that case, a husband whose 
domicile of origin was English married a Rorwegian woman in 1957 
aid settled with the wife in I\0rway, thereby acquiring a domicile 
of choice in that country. Two and a half years later, the 
husband went to England on a training course. The wife subse-
56. /I9667 2 W.L.R. 969.
57. /195o7 P. 71.
56. r.y. J  3 All 2.R. 639.
3&3.
,ue:itiy joined him but soon became unhappy after a short stay in 
che country. He therefore sent her back to :,0rway intending to 
eet her there on completion of his training. Once back in 
orway, the wife committed adultery and became pregnant. She 
later confessed her adultery and asked the husband to divorce 
,.er. fhe letter communicating the wife's adultery to the 
.-usband was received by him in England in July, 1963 and on 
:eceipt of the letter, he abandoned his intention of going back 
to Horway thereby losing his domicile of choice in that country 
end reverting to his former domicile in Englan.d. nonetheless, 
ue acceded to the wife's request and instructed a Norwegian 
Lawyer to start divorce proceedings in N0rway. A suit was com- 
. need on August 315 19^3. the Norwegian court assumed juris­
diction on the basis that the wife was born and settled in Norway 
and that Norway was at all times intended to be the matrimonial 
one of the spouses. And a divorce decree was granted to the 
husband in September 1963 on the ground of the adultery by the 
wife.
In considering whether the Norwegian decree should be
recognised, in England, Gumming Bruce, J., found that the husband,
clbeit unawares, lost his domicile of choice in Horway in July
1963 before the divorce proceedings were commenced. He pointed
99out that on the authority of Le nesurier v. he Hesurier he 
lwould have been duty bound to consider the Norwegian decree 
(Invalid, but he was satisfied that the tests of recognition are no 
longer inflexible in view of the House of Lords decision in 
Incyka v. Indyka. He went on to say that the speeches of their
59. (1895) .c. 517.
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Lores', ips in the t case were immediately concerned with recog-
ndtion of a decree granted to a wife by the court of the
country with which she had a real and substantial connection.
o.etleless, he was of the view that the decision in the case
cent further than that and continued by sayings
,rLhile affirming that domicile, the main foundation 
of English Jurisdiction, must continue to be regarded 
as the primary foundation of recognition in Sngland of 
foreign decrees, their lordships have decided that, in 
so far as Le hesurlor v. La hesurler laid down that 
domicile was the sole test of recognition it should not 
be followed if other tests are applicable. Their lord­
ships indicated that they left to the courts the further 
elucidation and application of these tests, emphasising 
the importance of controlling or suppressing any attempt 
at abuse. In my view, it is now open to an Tnglish 
court of first instance to consider all the facts 
appertaining to the grant of a decree by a foreign 
court, whether to a husband or to a wife, and to deter­
mine whether in spite of the fact that there was no 
domicile of a petitioner husband at the date of the 
institution of proceedings, the decree should be recog­
nised.1* 60
One of the “other tests1 proposed in Indyka’s case, as we have 
indicated above, was the doctrine of “matrimonial home11 or 
1 ion-domiciliary residence” which both Lord Reid and Lord 
-ilberforce suggested could be used as additional cest of recog- 
iition of foreign decrees granted to either spouse. In uphold­
ing the validity of the horwegian decree, Cuiming Lruce, J., 
quoted in support the die turn of Lord - ilberforce on this point 
held that since the decree was granted to the husband by the 
court of the matrimonial home of the parties, it should be 
recognised. In his view, the fact that the husband had just 
abandoned his domicile of choice in Horway before the commence­
ment of txie suit should not be regarded as fatal, more so when 
it was clear that the very event which terminated his domicile
60. p O a /  3 All I.E. 639 at p. 6S3 .
. '$rvay, i»e* adultery by the wife, was the cause of the 
proceedings there.
An interesting problem raised by the decision of Gunning’ 
-ruce, J., in this case is whether a divorce decree granted to 
a husband in such circumstances as occurred, in Leve tt v. Leve11 
should now be recognised in England 011 the authority of 
- -i.yha v. Indy ha. This question is still not free from doubt in 
that lair v. Hair though having some similarities with Leve 11 
v. Lovett differs in one significant respect from that case. In 
Levett's case as in the Blair's case, the divorce decree was 
t r nted by the court of nationality of the wife. In both cases, 
0 wives had also resided for a time in the countries of their 
1: tiQualities before the dissolution of the marriage. These two 
f ctors i.e. nationality and residence, would presumably 
constitute a similar connection between Mrs. nevett and Germany 
(even though she was resident in Geraiany for about a month 
before the commencement of the proceedings) as that between Mrs 
Blair and horway. Also in both cases, the decrees were granted 
to the husbands both of whom were domiciled in England at the 
co ence ent of the proceedings. But in Blair’s case, the 
husband had in addition established a matrimonial home in 
horway, where until shortly before the time of the suit, he was 
also domiciled; whereas in Levett's case there was no such 
connection between the husband and Germany. But it is also sig­
nificant that in Elair’s case, it was the husband who Instituted 
divorce proceedings in N0rway, albeit at the request of the 
.ife, whereas the husband in Levett's case was merely concerned 
. ith defending the . ife 1 s petition and. only cross-petitioned the
61. ZJ-95Z7 P. 156.
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.man court for divorce on the ground of the wife's adultery 
..'hen she refused to proceed with her own action.
In our view, it would seem that the difference between 
1- ir v. Isir ..nd Leve tt v. Lovett is rather insignificant as 
to justify non-recognition of a divorce granted to the husband 
on his cross-petition in a country with which his wife has a 
real end. substantial connection. In any event, if the rule of 
. scognition recommended by the Loyal Commission that an English 
court should recognise a divorce obtained 1 by a spouse in accor- 
h.nee with the law of the country of which ... either the 
nusband or the wife was a national at the time of the proceedings" 
cnd which was fully supported by the dicta of some of their 
Lordships in Ind.yka v. Ind.yka is accepted, a decree granted to a 
-..,s L: nd under circumstances as occurred in Levett v. Leve tt will 
cw be recognised. It may be mentioned in this connection that
i
~ord Pearce specifically adverted to the nevett s case in advo- 
e: ting the adoption of this rule and stated that its acceptance 
“would have produced a different and more satisfactory result" 
in that case.
(c ) Summary of the English Pules of Recognition and 
Suggestions for their modification in Nigeria
To reiterate, the general principle of recognising foreign 
divorces in England as extended by recent decisions is that an 
English court should recognise a foreign divorce if it emanates 
from, or it would be recognised by, the court of the country 
ith which the petitioner had a real and substantial connection
62. Ind.yka v. rndyka L-W£7 3 V.L.R. 510 at p.55-6.
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ie co.A.encemenfc ?f the divorce proceedings. IT I-.acnor v.
/ O
- looney is £ good interpretation of the ratio decidendi in
6^- u v. i.n .yka, this v;ay of stating the general principle
tdes eare of the „eeb. for recognising a foreign divorce decree,
though not granted by the court of the country with which the
petitioner had a real and substantial connection, but which
wo Id be recognised by the court of the country with which the
part}- xiad such connection.
several criteria may be used to determine the country with
.. tch there had been substantial connection for this purpose.
’ i stating these tests, two situations are clearly discernible.
(a) ..'here the spouses are living together in the same country
abroad and (b) Hhere, for one reason or the other, they had
cessed from doing so.
In the first situation, the common domicile of the spouse
6*3is still a foundation of recognition. y However, of cumulative 
consideration with domicile for this purpose are now the common 
rationality^ or the joint matrimonial home^ of the spouses.
In the second situation, i.e. wThere the spouses are living 
part in different countries, the archaic dogma that the wife 
was always dependent on the court of domicile of the husband for 
ner matrimonial rights and remedies, dispensed with to a certain 
extent in the bilateral rules of recognition established in 
fravers v. Holley.0 is now considered totally unnecessary. As
63. /T9607 3 a h  B.a. 223.
65. tJSb'JJ 3 C.L.R. 510.
65. Le Mesurier v. Le Cesunler (1895) A.C.517; Indyka v. Inc yka 
Z1962/ 3 .R. 510.
6. Indyka v. Indyka /196^7 3 -CL.I.. 510.
67. 1116.t lair v. Hair /r968 3 All X.R. 639.
68. /pL95S7 P. 256.
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ye; arcs this situation, the court of the following countries 
coulc pronounce on the dissolution of the arriage between the 
spouses on a petition presented by the wife.
(i) The country of the last matrimonial domicile or
matrimonial home of the spouses in which the wife
continues to reside.L/
(ii) The country of nationality of the wife which is also 
the place of her residence at the time of the
7°proceedings.
(iii) The country in which the wife habitually resides
with no present intention of leaving even if the
71wife is not a national of such country/
(iv) The country whose basis of jurisdiction corresponds
with any of those being exercised by the English
courts under section -^0 (1) (a) snd (b) of the
72matrimonial Causes Act, 1965.
According to the judicial interpretation of the Indyka’s case
7 ^
e in Tj janic v. T1 ;i an j. c. J it is clear that no objection 
would be raised to recognising a foreign decree granted to the 
iusband by the courts of such countries as enumerated in (i) to 
(iv) above, provided the wife joins the husband in the divorce 
proceedings and the decree is granted to both spouses. It would 
logically follow that a decree granted to the husband as a result
09. Indyka v. Indyka /I967/ 3 W.L.H. 510.
70. Angelo v. -myelo /19627 3 All T.R. 31i+;  'Tjianic v. Tj.janic
/1962/ 3 Vl.L.R. I rown v. Irown &1968/ 2 i.h.R. %9.
71. Indyka v. Indyka /I962.7 3 h.L.R. 510.
72. Travers v. F.olley P. 25-6.
73. Z"96^7 3 v/.L.R. 1566.
oi his cross-petition in a proceeding instituted by the wife in 
any of such countries should also be recognised.
There could be no doubt that the House of Lords made a 
remarkable breakthrough in Indyka v. Indyka by establishing a 
wider bases of recognition of foreign decrees so as to limit 
the number of limping marriages and remove the disastrous effects 
of such pehnomenon in English private international law. It is 
_ot surprising then that their Lordships’ decision in the case 
x- s evoked sympathetic reception from all quarters. On the 
other hand, it must be admitted that a full crystalization of 
some of the rules established or proposed for recognition of 
foreign decrees by their Lordships still awaits such refinement 
s tne lower courts in England would give them, a process which, 
Co we nave seen, has already commenced. -Iso, few of the rules 
are overlapping and are uncertain in their scope of operation.
Tor xample, now that matrimonial home has been equated, with 
domicile or nationality as a concurrent test of recognition,
. ould a decree granted to either spouse in a country outside 
the matrimonial home, and with which the petitioner has no sub- 
sta -tial connection whatsoever, not be recognised in England if 
it would be recognised by the court of the matrimonial home on 
tne analogy with the rule in Armitage v. -t t.-Gen. and hatner 
hahoney? In our view, the complex nature of, and the un­
certainty in, some of these rules are cue to thee factors in 
the English domestic law on divorce jurisdiction.
first, the refusal of the British Parliament, despite 
protestations by almost all judicial and juristic experts on 
tnis subject, to give a wife who is living separate and apart 
from her husband tiie capacity to acquire a separate domicile for
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purposes of divorce and other matrimonial causes. Rather, the 
statutory mitigation of the principle of single domiciliary 
jurisdiction has proceeded on a piecemeal basis which, on the 
other hand, is being matched by hotchpotch rules of recognition.
Secondly, the serious disadvantages inherent in adopting
an unduly rigid and formalistic means of determining where a
75-
person nas his domicile. After all, the notion of real and 
substantial connection is not a novel idea in the common law 
rules of private international law. The concept of domicile has 
lways been basically associated with the country with which an 
individual has 1 the closest personal connection in matters of 
domestic law”.
dlosely linked with the second factor is the notion that 
domicile, for the diverse purposes for which the concept is 
being used, should have the same meaning. The adoption of a 
roader basis of definition of domicile which will make it 
capable of being manipulated to achieve slightly variable sig­
nifications for the diverse purposes for which it is being 
employed, would have obviated the necessity for creating an 
additional connecting factor i.e. that of the umatrimonial home1 
or “non-domiciliary residence" - implying some degree of perma­
nence which is a shade less than the degree of permanence 
required to establish a new domicile - for the purpose of recog­
nising foreign divorce decrees, -ith this point in view, 
domicile with a less-exacting definition would have been adequate
75-. In fact these two defects of English law were acknowledged 
by the majority decision in Indyka v. Indyka. Tor example, 
Lord -ilberforce pointed out that later developments in 
English law have meant that the conception of domicile 
frequently does not represent the community to which people 
belong and that the principle that a wife could not acquire 
a separate domicile, when living apart, could c.use great 
hardships to the wife in the field of matrimonial causes. 
This point has been fully considered in our chapter on 
Domicile.
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to perform its .istoric function of determining the individual1s
personal law, which in principle ought to govern all matters of
j ..ir stic status including dissolution of his .marriage. That
the core of domicile is the same but that its location depends
on the particular purpose for which the concept is being employed
is the conclusion drawn in the American law Institute’s Re-
75statement on Conflict of Laws and also a solution suggested by
1 -| . , 76 American legal wnters.
In view of these defects in the bases of English courts' 
jurisdiction, admirable though the effort of the House of Lores is 
in extending the common law rules of recognition of foreign divor­
ces .lay be, the recognition rules are at best an endeavour to 
patch up or fill gaps in the law by pouring new wines into old. 
bottles. Unless the domestic policy on divorce jurisdiction is 
radically modified, the new rules for recognition will still be 
fraught ith the difficulty of precise analysis. And since the 
Algerian nigh Courts are required to exercise their jurisdiction 
in conformity with the law and practice in England, the Nigerian 
law on divorce jurisdiction shares these defects of the English 
law.
Ce have already observed that in strict legal theory, only 
the pre-1900 common law rules are of authoritative effect in 
Algeria and that any common law rule established, in England after
75. Proposed Official Draft, Part I (1967) at pp.61-62. "Domicil 
serves a large number of purposes, and undoubtedly, somewhat 
different reasons and motivations underlie its use for cer­
tain of these purposes. It may therefore be expected that 
the courts will on occasion be either more or less inclined 
to find :. person domiciled in a Lcate for one purpose (as 
to give him a divorce) than for another purpose ... /l7he 
core of domicile is everywhere the sate. Aut in close 
cases, decision of question of domicile may sometimes depend 
upon the purpose for which the domicile concept is used in 
the particular case".
7a. Cook, op.cit., pp.195-203; Reese, "Does Domicil Lear a Single 
Leaning?" 55, Coin ...L.Rev. (1955) 589; Ehrenzweig, conflict 
of Laws, p.25-0.
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1900 are of persuasive effect in Nigeria. This sort of situa­
tion makes it possible for the Nigerian courts to nake notifica­
tions to some of the criteria of substantial connection which 
ere propounded by recent English decisions as bases of recogni­
tion of foreign divorce decrees. But it is submitted that this 
they will find almost impossible to do in so far as the Nigerian 
law 011 divorce jurisdiction is tied to tne apron strings of the 
English law.
Nith regards to the bases of the Nigerian courts' juris­
tic tion, it has been suggested in the first part of this chapter 
that the Nigerian law should be untied from the English law and 
that a wife, living apart from her husband, should be capable 
of acquiring a separate domicile for purposes of divorce juris­
diction at home or abroad. If this proposition is accepted, 
the problem of recognition of a foreign decree granted to either 
the husband or the wife in accordance with the common lex 
comicilii or one of the leges domicilii of the spouses will be 
susceptible of easier solution.
Moreover, the acceptance of our suggested definition of
domicile as the "country in which a person has the centre of his
77
domestic, social and civil life" will make it possible for the
country in which the spouses have their matrimonial home, as
78defined by Lord he id/ to be equated with the country of their 
domicile for purposes of recognition of divorce decrees, resides 
these suggestions, it will be appropriate to welcome in Nigeria, 
the spirit of internationalism which motivated the house of
77. Giiapter 2 “Conclusions" .
78. Supra.
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Lords In accepting nationality as one of the foundations for 
recognising foreign divorce decrees, inis additional test will 
enable a divorce decree based on the nationality of one or both 
spouses j especially in neighbouring Uric an civil lav/ countries, 
to be recognised, in Nigeria. And since it is generally accepted 
that a close relation exists between bases of divorce jurisdic­
tion of the courts of a particular country and its tests for 
recognising foreign divorce decrees, the acceptance in Nigeria 
of the conception of separate domiciles for a husband and a wife 
who are living apart will involve the formulation of the Algerian 
courts' rules of recognition as follows;
A foreign divorce obtained by a spouse shall be recognised
a
as valid by the court of/State in Nigeria lfs-
1. It has been obtained in the country in which both the 
parties were, or either of tiie.iv/as, domiciled at the 
commencement of the proceedings, or
2 . It would be recognised by the court of the country in 
which both the parties were, or either of them was, 
domiciled at the commencement of the proceedings, or
3. It was obtained in the country of nationality and 
residence of one of, or both, the parties at the com­
mencement of the proceedings, or
k. It would be recognised by the court of the country of
nationality and residence of one of, or both, the 
parties at the commencement of the proceedings.
5. Lastly, in view of the special circumstances of the 
Nigerian law, it will be necessary to provide for 
recognition of a divorce which has been obtained by a 
spouse in the country in '.which she was resident at the
39^.
commencement of the proceedings if there was substan­
tial identity between the divorce law of such country 
and that of the State in igeria in which the foreign 
c'ivorce is sought to be recognised
Inis last rule will no doubt strike anybody familiar with the 
co.. .on law as a novel approach, fine purpose of this rule becomes 
clear when it is realised, that the iligerian law on matrimonial
' t 'o
cl uses relating/ monogamous '.marriages is not merely am incorpora­
tion by reference of the English lav; on this topic but shares 
the same identity with the laws of some other former British 
colonial territories which, instead of enacting their own laws
on divorce and other matrimonial causes, still apply, like
79igeria, the lav; in England for the time being in force. For 
example, section 17 of the Ghanaian Courts Ordinance which is
G A
preserved by section (3) of the Co.rts Act of i960' provides
that the High Courts in Ghana should apply the matrimonial causes
lav; for the time being in force in England. Similarly, section
8lI> of the Gambian Laws of :gland (Application) Act provides 
that the Supreme Court of Gambia should apply the English 
.a triuonial Causes law in force in England before loth February, 
1965. The effect of these enactments is that in so far as these 
countries viz. Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and England, are concerned, 
issolution of a monogamous marriage is governed by the same lav;,
Op
i.e. the English law. This type of situation raises what is
79. For the present position of the law on the recognition of 
foreign divorce decrees, see the postscript.
80. (C.A.9) of i960.
31. Cap. 1C1)-, Laws of Gambia (i960 ed.).
82. The fact that the application of the English matrimonial 
causes lav; in Gambia is limited to the lav; in force in 
England before 18/2/65 does not detract from this statement 
since the English Patrimonial Causes Act, 1965 which came 
into force on 8/11/65 is mostly a consolidation of previous 
enac tments.
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k .own in private international law as “false conflicts" in that 
■ 1 t.nough there may be conflict of jurisdiction of the courts, 
there certainly is identity in the lav/s being applied. To 
demand, therefore, the domicile or nationality of the parties in 
any of these countries as a test of recognition of its divorce 
screes will be nothing but an illogical adherence to verbal 
formula. Even when the desirable break is made with the English 
lew on divorce and other patrimonial causes relating to mono­
gamous marriages, it will still be necessary to retain the last 
rule, abuncsns cautela, for a period of time so as to permit the 
recognition of any divorce decrees already granted in these 
countries to Nigerian nationals amid Nigerian State comiciliaries 
who might have been resident there before the change in the 
. igerian law is effected.
In conclusion, it must be added that since extra-judicial 
ivorces are permitted by most systems of law in Nigeria, there 
seems to be no reason why the above guidelines as to the atti­
tude which Nigerian courts might be disposed to take should be 
jonfined to decrees granted by courts of lav; in foreign countries. 
The recognition rules should also be employed to determine the 
validity of divorces granted by other agencies as well as extra­
judicial divorces.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CREATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGITIMACY
UNDER THE NIGERIAN DOMESTIC LAV.
1. INTRODUCTION
Legitimacy has been defined as "the legal kinship 
between a child and one or both of its parents*’.^  It is a do­
mestic status attributed by law to the natural kinship existing 
between a child and its parents. Though derivative from the 
acts of the natural parents, if the status is not conferred 
by law, the natural relationship existing between the child
and its parents is an illegitimate one.. As has been pointed 
2
out by Kuhn, legitimacy is a legal and not a natural concept, 
for nature known no legitimate children; it is only concerned 
with children.
The status of a person as the legitimate child of 
his parents may arise from one out of a number of factors. The 
mostJuniversd in all the legal systems of the world is birth 
in lawful wedlock. Indeed, this was the only method acceptable 
to the common law. But the harsh common law rule that all chil­
dren that were not begotten by parties to valid marriage were 
bastardised and remained indelible bastards for life was.A. not 
found in the Roman law. Under that system of law, there were 
certain prescribed conditions upon which a child otherwise 
illegitimate according to the lav/ful wedlock theory could sub­
sequently be admitted to the status of legitimacy, thereby 
placing it in a position which he would have occupied had it 
been born legitimate. These methods of "legitimation” strictly 
so-called, were (a) Subsequent marriage of the child’s natural 
parents; (b) Special dispensation by the Emperor; (c) Acknowledg-
1. Kuhn, Comparative Commentaries on Private Internatfcnal Law 
(1957) p.l9&; See also, The Restatement Second, Tentative 
Draft No.4 , Para.137* Comment a.
2. op.cit., p.198-
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ment or recognition of paternity "by the putative father (d) De­
signation by the last will of the putative father; and (e) 
Adoption. In the Roman law, all these five modes of conferring 
the status of legitimacy on an otherwise illegitimate child 
put the child upon the same footing as if he had been born in 
lawful wedlock.
All these prerequsites of attaining full legitimate 
status have been preserved by some civil law countries where
IL
institutions of the Roman law are more predominant• But with 
regard to the principle of paternal acknowledgment in the 
European civil law systems, the effect varies from country to 
country. Though accepted in Austria, Belgium Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugo­
slavia, ^ only in few of these countries, e.g. Norway, ^ Denmark,^
o
and Switzerland does paternal acknowledgment effect a complete 
transmutation of status from that of illegitimacy to one of 
legitimacy with full equalization with children born in lawful 
wedlock. In most others, acknowledgment of paternity by the
3# See H.F. Jolowicz, Roman Foundation of Modern Law (1957) 
pp.194-201. “ :
4. See I. Rabel, op.cit., p.629 et seq.; R.D. Killewijn, 4 I.L.Q.
307 at p.314 as regards paternal acknowledgment.
3* For a detailed and comparative study of the laws of the countries 
enumerated see Lasok, 10 I.C.L.Q. (1961) 123 at p.127 at seq., 
17, I.C.L.Q. (1968) 634; Stone, 15 I.C.L.Q. (1966) 505 at pp. 
517-525.
6. Para.l of Law No. 10 of Dec. 21, 1926.
7. Inheritance Act, No.215 of May 31> 1953 which came into
effect on 1.4.1964.
8. Art. 461 (2) of the Civil Code.
putative father only creates a priviledge category of ille­
gitimacy, i.e. a hybrid, status of partial legitimacy, in the 
sense that an acknowledged, child&as limited rights and cannot 
compete on equal terms with a child born in lawful wedlock.
In the common law countries, the concept of legitima- 
tio per subsequens matrimonium has been accepted almost univer­
sally ande has, in the quaint aphorism of a Californian judge,^ 
become "manna to the bastards of the world" while paternal 
cknowledgment is a mode of determining the legitimate status 
of a person in about twenty jurisdictions of the United States
of America. The last mode of attaining legitimate status
11 12 is also found in some legal systems in Asia and in Africa,
although it is uncertain whether legitimation by acknowledgment
in African and Asiatic jurisprudence has any connection with
the Roman law as in the European and American systems.
In the Nigerian law, there are three methods by which
the offspring of two persons may acquire legitimate status. As
has been aptly stated by Ademola C.J#!', in the Federal Supreme
13Court case of Lawal v. Younan: ^
9. in Blythe v. Ayres (1892) 96 Cal. 532, at p.565.
10. For a comparative survey of the common law system operating 
this concept, see White, 56 L.Q.R. (1920) 255* However, since 
1920 many more countries have adopted the conception of le- 
gitimatio per subsequens matrimonium. .
11. e.g. Turkey, See 9 International Social Science Bulletin (1957) 
p .51;Thailand, See D.C. Buxbaum, Family £aw and Customary Law 
in Asia: A Contemporary Legal Perspective Q1968) p. xxxil; 
India, See Hulla, Principles of Mohammedan Law, (1968)(16th ed. 
by M. Hidayatulla) 516 et seq.
12.e.g. Tanganyika, See Declaration of Local Customary Law, Govt, 
Notice No.279 of 1965, Rule 181B, and Formerly in Congo Kinsha­
sa before 1958; since when the father of an illegitimate child 
who is not married to the mother is no longer able to claim 
"droit de paternite". See J.M. Pauwels "Legitimation of Childrer 
In Customary Law in Kinshasa" in Gluekman, Ideas andProcedures 
African Customary Law (l969) at p.227 et seq.
15. (1961) 1 All N.L.R. 245 at p.250.
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"Unlike England, legitimate children in 
Nigeria are not confined to children born 
in wedlock or children legitimated by sub­
sequent marriage of the parents. In Nigeria 
a child is legitimate if born in [monogamous] 
wedlock  There are also legitimate chil­
dren born in marriage under Native Law and 
Custom [i.e. polygamous marriage]. Children not 
born in [monogamous] wedlock or who are not the
issue of a [polygamous] marriage ..... but are
issues born without - marriage can also be regarded 
as legitimate for dertain purposes if paternity 
has been acknowledged by the putative father.
.....On the face of this, it is clear that le­
gitimacy in England is a different concept to 
legitimacy in Nigeria"•
Two observations need be made about this concise statement of 
the Nigerian law on legitimacy. First, the three criteria for 
determining legitimacy in Nigeria are. shared with most con­
tinental, some American, Asiatic and other African legal 
systems. Secondly, it will be noticed that the Chief Justice 
makes no distinction between legitimacy strictly so-called 
i.e. birth in lawful wedlock, and legitimation, i.e. a process 
whereby legitimacy is later conferred on an illegitimate child 
by a subsequent act of the parents. This is because the English 
idea of "heirship", as an incidnnt of land or in relation to 
succession to heriditary peerage and title of honour, being 
dependent, at common law "not only that the man should be le­
gitimate, but born within the narrowest pale of English legi­
timacy" is an alien conception to the Nigerian law. Thus as
14has been stated by Callow J. in Phillips v. Phillips, there 
is no evidence under Nigeria law of "inheritance by the eldest 
son to the exclusion partially or wholly of younger children 
and I have no reason to believe that any such form of succession
15
exists." ^ Therefore, since the effect in Nigeria of the above
14. (1946) 18 N.L.R. 102 at pp.105-104.
15* But contra. Obi, The Ibo Law of Property, p.153 et seq. where 
he states that inheritance by the eldest son to the exclusion 
of all younger children exists in Ibo Customary law in si­
tuations where the children of the deceased were born of 
the same woman.
three criteria for attaining legitimate status is the same, 
no useful purpose will he served by considering legitimacy 
strictly so-called apart from legitimation except that the term 
legitimacy will henceforth be used to denote the status of a 
person as the lawful offspring of his parents while legitima­
tion will be employed with reference to the process of attain­
ing that status by all other means apart from birth in lawful
v
marriage•
It cannot be gainsaid that the law on legitimacy 
plays an important role in the legal system of any particular
country. In Nigeria the legitimacy of a person is relevant in
16determining his nationality, and domicile, the right to his 
father’s name and his entitlement to his parents' intestate 
estate or to take as beneficiary under the parents' insurance 
policy. His status as a legitimate child is also relevant in 
determining whether he could share in the family property or 
whether the word ’’child” or ’’issue” in wills or other dispo­
sitions inter vivos and in statutes includes him. Moreover, 
the interest of his parents, especially the father, may be de­
pendent on his legitimacy e.g. right of the father to inherit 
through him on his intestacy or whether his father owes him 
any obligation of support or whether he has a prior claim to 
his custody or guardianship.
There is no doubt that the law on legitimacy in Ni­
geria is still bedeviled by many of difficulties. To begin
16. See the Nigerian Citizenship Act, No.43 of 19£0, s.4(1); 
and also the Republican Constitution, 1963> ss.7* 11» 12 
and 17(2). By virtue of these provisions, a child born 
outside Nigeria can claim Nigerian Nationality through his 
father who is a citizen of Nigeria. Since an illegitimate 
child has no claim of rights on its father, legitimacy of 
a child becomes relevant in determining its nationality.
with, apart from being imprecise in places, it lacks legisla­
tive or judicial co-ordination of principles in relation to 
the above three modes of determining the legitimacy of a per­
son* Also, despite the historic parting of the ways between 
the domestic laws of England and Nigeria - a fact which was 
well emphasised by the Federal Supreme Court in Lawal v. Younan^  
- the full development of the Nigerian law on legitimacy, in , 
accordance with the degp-rooted tradition of the society, is 
still being hampered in practice by the harsh attitude of the 
common law of England towards illegitimacy. Curiously enough, 
it is admitted by judges and legislature alike that the social
stigma attaching to illegitimate children is less accute
18in Nigeria than in England. This admission would seem to 
make it illogical for the English common law to have a predo­
minating influence on the Nigerian law.
The ensuing discussion will elucidate further on the 
above reflections on the Nigerian law. Suffice it to say for 
the moment that at least three factors seem responsible for 
the unsatisfactory position of the law. First, the problem 
with most Nigerian judges is that, having been trained almost 
exclusively in the English legal system and consequently more 
conversant with that system of law than any other, they appear 
already psychologically conditioned to fixing Nigerian law 
into the scheme of English common law without having regard 
to the basic political and social differences between the two 
countries. For example, the proposition has been accepted 
that an illegitimate child born to a man during the subsistence
17. 0-961} All N.L.R.245.
18. See e.g. Phillips v. Phillips (1946) 18 N.L.R. 102 at p.103
(per Callow J.); also the Mgerian Legislative Council
Debates on the Legitimacy Bill, 19^9* 7ih Session, 1929 at
p.62.
of a polygamous marriage can be legitimated by an act of 
acknowledgment by its putative father even if the legitimati­
zing act was performed during the continuance of such marriage. 
On the other hand, it has been decided several times that a 
person who is married under monogamy has no capacity to le­
gitimate an illegitimate child born to him during the subsis­
tence of such marriage by paternal acknowledgment, whether 
during the continuance of the monogamous marriage or after 
its termination. In short, just as the common law of England 
elevates monogamous marriages over a polygamous one, so also 
are the judges of the MEnglish-type,f courts in Nigeria pre­
pared to accord pride of place to birth in monogamous marria­
ge over all other prerequisites for determining the legitima­
cy of a person in Nigeria on the viewpoint that the public 
policy of the common law against promiscuous relationships 
demands such a solution.1^ (We shall have cause to show later 
that even the English law has now adopted a solution which 
disregards the circumstances of a child's birth in determining 
what the attitude of the law should be towards it.)
19* Messrs. Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.c±t., p.227* sum up the 
attitude of the Nigerian judges to legitimation by pater­
nal acknowledgment as follows:
"Some Nigerian judges trained in the English 
law find it difficult if not impossible to 
appreciate the fact that a person can have a 
legitimate child without.going through a 
marriage. This has led to their reluctance 
to accept the concept of acknowledgment 
under customary law in toto".
In our view, the unsatisfactory position of the law on 
legitimacy in Nigeria is due, not to the judges' reluctance 
to accept the proposition that marriage is not an indis- .
. pensable prerequisite to legitimacy, but to their lack of 
appreciation of the fact that paternal acknowledgment 
should be an equal mode of determining the legitimacy of 
a person as birth in lawful marriage, whether such marriage 
is monogamous or polygamous.
Secondly, the law in the books is often inaccurately 
stated, perhaps as a result of inadequate research or legal
analysis, For instance, despite the statement of -the* law in •
20 21 Lawal v. Younan v and in statutory provisions, Dr. Lloyd
was still able to assert, rather inaccurately, that "The le­
gitimacy of the children depends on their recognition by the
father; the status of the mother - as wife by English or
22customary law, or as a lover - is a immaterial". In addition, 
the same author was able to write that before legitimation by 
paternal acknowledgment can be validly effected, a bilateral 
recognition by both the father and the illegitimate child is 
necessary. When it is remembered that Dr. Lloyd was writing 
exclusively on the Yoruba law of Western Nigeria, this assertion 
appears to us equally untrue. As would be discovered below, 
only a unilateral act of recognition by the putative father 
is required to legitimate his otherwise illegitimate child in 
this jurisdiction# Of cburse, Dr. Lloyd may be forgiven for 
failure to make what would seem to appear to a social anthropo­
logist as minor, if not unnecessary, refinements; this cannot
23however be said of legal writers  ^who are of the erroneous 
view that legitimation by acknowledgment or recognition is 
confined to few jurisdictions in Nigeria and that it is not a 
concept of Moslem law operating in most of the Northern Nigerian 
States.
Thirdly, absence of comparative study in legal litera­
ture has meant that the Nigerian judges have no opportunity to 
know what they do in other cpuntries besides England and thereby
20. (j.9613 All N.L.B.245.
21. e.g. s# 14-7 of the Evidence Act, Cap.62, Laws of the Federa­
tion of Nigeria, (1958) ed.).
22. P.O. Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, p.297*
23* e. g. Ehsunmu and Salacuse, op.cit. pp.207 and 227; E.I. 
Nwogugu, 8 J.A.L. (1964) p.95 and Obi, Modern Family Law 
in Southern Nigeria, p.311.
discover that there is nothing unusual about the apparent 
idiosyncracy of the Nigerian law in tracing legitimacy of a 
person through an act of acknowledgment by his putative father, 
in addition to other usual modes of determiningjlegLtimacyq.
The complex nature of the law on legitimacy, especially 
in view of the co-existence of monogamy and polygamy, coupled 
with the chaotic situation of the rules designed for deter­
mining legitimacy under some of the above three criteria, 
will necessitate an exhaustive analysis of the domestic law 
than is usually required in a study solely concerned with con- 
flicutal situations. For if the domestic law is not based 
on a sound foundation, the formulation of its conflicts 
rules would be a difficult exercise. Also, since it is our 
considered opinion that the Nigerian law on legitimacy is 
likely to need a great deal of information about foreign legal 
systems so that judges may appreciate the danger of consider­
ing this part of the law in isolation, our discussion even 
about the Nigerian municipal law will be heavily linked with 
a comparison of the conception of legitimacy in some other
dountries as a background to reform proposals. After all,
24-comparative law, says Vinogradoff is a useful exercise m  
that comparison of existing systems of law makes it possible 
to trace analogies and contrasts in the treatment of practical 
problems, and offers many expedients and possible solutions. 
Therefore, it is proposed to use comparative law in this 
Chapter to stimulate the imagination with regard to the do­
mestic law, while the next Chapter will be devoted to a con­
sideration of the. rules of private international law for 
determining the legitimacy of a person.
24-. Encyclopedia Britannic a (11th ed.); Jurisprudence, Compara­
tive .
2. THE LAWFUL WEDLOCK THEORY AND PRESUMPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY.
(a) Monogamous Marriages.
Until the passing of the Evidence Act, 194-3 which 
came into effect on 1st June, 194-5?. the common law rule that 
birth in lawful wedlock determines legitimacy was operative in
Nigeria. This rule has given rise to two presumptions:
(i) Birth in lawful wedlock is presumed if the child
was actually or possibly born of the mother*s 
husband during the continuance of the marriage.
(ii) Where a child was born within a reasonable
period after the dissolution of the marriage by 
death or divorce, the child so born is deemed to 
be the legitimate child of the mother*s late or 
former husband.
The first presumption derives its source from the
unanimous opinion of the judges of the Common Please in Banbury
Peerage Case. ^ There, it was stated, in reply to questions
addressed to the judges by the House of Lords, that ’’the
fact of the birth of a child from a woman united to a man by.
lawful wedlock is, generally, by the law of England, prima
facie evidence that the child is legitimate”. For the purpose
of this presumption, it is immaterial whether the child was
conceived before or after the celebration of a marriage between
its parents. The crucial time for its operation is that of
the birth of the child and not the time of conception. Thus,
as stated by Lord Cairns in Gardner v. Gardner, ”
’’the marriage to a woman avowedly pregnant, 
and near the time of delivery, by a man who has 
been courting her and keeping company with her 
would raise ... a presumption of fact so strong 
that the man was the father of the child, that 
it would be extremely difficult to rebut or contro­
vert it”.
25. (1811) 1 Sia & St. 155 at 155.
26. (1877; 2 App. Cas. 725 at 728.
There appears to he no judicial authority in England
for the second presumption -until the decision in Re Letaan's 
27Trusts { besides the statement of Sir Edward Coke in his
po
Commentaries on Littleton. It was, however, clearly esta­
blished long before the enactment of the Nigerian Evidence Act
of 194-3 that the normal period of gestation for purposes of
29the second presumption was 270 to 280 days. J
At common law, these two presumptions were rebuttable;
but the only way by which this could be done was by satisfactory
evidence that the husband was "beyond the four seas" during the
whole period of the wife's conception. In particular, it
was further established by the House of Lords in Russell v.
51Russell  ^ that neither the wife nor the husband was competant
to give evidence proving or tending to disprove the fact that
sexual intercourse did not take place between them, or that
there was no access between the spouses, at the time the child
could have been conceived.
These common law rules were incorporated into the
rather controversial section 14-7 of the Evidence Act, 194-3
which is now contained in an identical section of the Evidence
52Act, 1958* The section provides:
"The fact that any person was born during 
the continuance of a validCmonogamous] 33 
marriage between his mother and any man,
27. (194-6) 61 T.L.R.566; 113 L.J. Ch.89.
28. Co. Litt. 123b.
29* Bosville v. A.G. (1887) 12 P.D.177 at p.183; Burnaby v.
Faill'ie"(1889T"4-2 Ch. D. 282 at p.296.
30. Head v. Head (1823) lQiin. & St. 130 at 152; See also Morris v. 
Davies (1837) 5 Cl. & Pin. 163-
31. [1924-] A.C.687. The rule was in fact first propounded in
Goodright d. Stevens v. Moss (1777) 2- Cowp. 591•
32. Cap. 62, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1958 ed.).
33. This interpretation is implicit in the fact that a "husband"
as used in s.14-7 of the Evidence Act is defined by s.2 of the 
Act as meaning the husband of a monogamous marriage.
or within two hundred and eighty days 
after its dissolution, 34- the mother remaining 
unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he 
is the legitimate son of that man unless it 
can be shown -
(a) either that his mother and her husband 
had no access to each other at any time 
when he could have been begotten; 
regard being had both to the date of 
the birth and to the physical condition 
of the husband; or
(b) that the circumstances of their access, 
if any, were such as to render it highly 
improbable that sexual intercourse
took place between them when it occurred:
Provided that neither the mother nor the husband
is a competent witness as to the fact of their
having had sexual intercourse with each other 
where the legitimacy of the woman's child would 
be affected, even if the proceedings in the course 
of which the question arises are proceedings 
instituted in consequence of adultery nor are 
any declarations by them ujbon that subject 
deemed to be relevant, whether the mother or 
her husband can be called as a witness or not."
Despite the conclusive nature of these presumptions, 
it is clear that they are not juris et de jure since the so-
called "conclusive proof" raised by the facts enumerated in
the section could be controverted by evidence that the spouses 
had no access to each other at any time when the child could 
have been conceived, or that the circumstances of their access 
were such as to render sexual intercourse between them improbable 
And like the rule in Russell v. Russell, the proviso to the 
section makes neither the husband nor the wife a competent 
witness to give evidence that marital intercourse did not 
take place in order to bastardise a child born during lawful 
wedlock or within 280 days after its termination so long as 
the wife remained unmarried. Neither is a declaration made 
by either spouse admissible to disprove the legitimacy of such
34-. The word "dissolution" is not defined but it seems to cover
termination,of marriage by death of the husband as well as 
by the court1s divorce decree.
a child. Moreover, the incompetence of the spouses to give
evidence of marital intercourse is regardless of the fact
that the proceedings in which such evidence is sought to be
adduced arises in consequence of adultery. And with regard
to the period of gestation, it has been held obiter by Tayloi?
35C.J., in the Lagos case of Efhumeze v. Elumeze that the cal­
culation of the 280 days starts from the date of pronouncement 
of the decree nisi and not from the date when the decree 
absolute was granted.
But it seems clear that evidence of non-access or 
that the circumstances of access was such that sexual inter­
course was improbable, could be given by either spouse since 
the proviso to section 147 (a) and (b) of the Act only pre­
vented the spouses from adducing evidence of absence of mari-
36tal intercourse to bastardise the child. This inteipretation
was, however, rejected by the Lagos High Court in Elumeze v. .
37Elumeze, ^( on the ground that the mischief (i.e. undesira­
bility of bastardising a child born or conceived within a 
lawful marriage) which the Act seeks to avoid by making the 
spouses incompetent to testify as to absence of sexual inter­
course, would still exist if they were allowed to give evi­
dence of non-access during the period of the marriage when 
the child could have been conceived. In the words of Taylor, 
C.J., 1 It seems to me that if the Act forbade one it equally 
forbade the other”.
The undisputed facts of the case would seem to
suggest that the decision of Taylor, C.J., which was affirmed
38on appeal by the Federal Supreme Court  ^ on this point, should
35* Unreported, Suit No. H.D./41/64 of 10/4/67 of the Lagos High
Court.
36. Cf. Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.cit., p.213*
37• Unreported, Suit No. HD/41/64 of 10/4/67.
38. Unreported, Suit No. SC. 79/1968 decided on 18/7/69.
be limited, to the special circumstances of the case. The 
husband, had been resident in the United States of America since 
August, 1948 before the wife, who was living in Nigeria, joined 
him there in October, 1950. In February, 1951* approximately 
five months after her arrival in America, she gave birth to 
a daughter. In a divorce proceedings later instituted by the 
husband in Lagos on the ground of the wife's adultery, he 
sought permission to give evidence that there was no access 
between him and the wife at the time the child was conceived 
and also that he had no marital intercourse with the wife 
during the period between her arrival in the United States 
in October, 1950 and the birth of the child on 21st February,
1951 presumably because of the advanced stage of her pregnancy. 
Indeed, "in a series of sup^emental answers" by the wife to 
the husband's petition, she admitted that the marriage was 
never consumated because of the husband's refusal to have 
intercourse with her either in Nigeria or in the United States 
and that there was no children of the marriage. This later 
answer countermanded her previous statement that there was an 
issue of the marriage, i.e. the daughter whose paternity was 
in dispute.
Despite what appeared to be a virtual admisacn of 
adulteiy by the wife, the court chose, rightly in our view, 
to proceed on the logical basis that the issue was not merely 
concerned with the adultery of the wife.but inseparably linked 
with the legitimacy of the daughter since the mother's husband, 
i.e. the petitioner, had denied her paternity in his petition.
The Chief Justice had no hesitation in rejecting the husband's 
contention that he could adduce evidence of absence of sexual 
intercourse to bastardise, the child since he was clearly rendered 
incompetent by the proviso to section 147 of the Evidence Act.
As regards the contention that the husband should be allowed
to give evidence of non-access, the Chief Justice observed
that medical evidence was lacking as to when the child could
have been conceived. Was the child fully developed when it
was born, in which case it would be clear that the child was
conceived while the wife was in Nigeria, having regard to the
fact that the period of gestation according to the section is
about nine months? Or was it born prematurely in which case
there was a possibility that it could have been conceived in
America? According to.the observation of the Chief Justice,
"Common sense would dictate that a child born 
within five months of the first act of inter­
course between a man and his wife would have little 
chance of survival, but can I dn my belief 
alone without medical evidence say that the 
child in issue was not premature or in the words
of the Act that there was no access at the time
when the child could have been ••• conceived" ?
It was on the possibility that the child might have been born 
prematurely that constituted the turning point in the case, 
though the FederalrSupreme Court wrongly assumed that Taylor, 
C.J., dismissed the possibility of premature birth. The learned 
Chief Justice held that he could not allow evidence of non- 
access to be given by the husband to bastardise the child since 
there was no medical evidence to show that it was a fully de­
veloped child at the time of its birth, an evidence which could 
have conclusively shown that the child was conceived in Nigeria.
In other words, if the child was, in fact, conceived in the
United States and had been born after pregnancy of the mother 
for five months, to allow evidence of non-access to be given 
by the husband in order to show that there was no marital inter­
course between him and the wife at a time when they were, in 
fact, living together would amount to letting in through another 
channel what the Act has expressly prevented. Had medical
39evidence showed^' that the daughter was not horn prematurely, 
could Taylor, C.J., have "been right in rejecting the evidence 
of the husband that there was no access between him and his 
wife at the time the child was conceived, since it would have 
been clear that the spouses were living at different countries 
at the relevant time? It is submitted that tb^ disallow evidence 
of either spouse as to non-access under such circumstances 
would have been contrary to the provision of the Act.
After section 147 of the Evidence Act has declared
the common law rules on presumptions of legitimacy with the
slight modification noted above, the principle established in
40Russell v. Russell was abrogated in England by the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949• The provision of this Act 
was later replaced by section 52 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1950. Section 45 of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 
is the current enactment ofi the point. It provides that the 
evidence of a husband Or wife is admissible in any proceedings 
to prove that marital intercourse did or did not take place 
between them during any period, but that neither of the spouses 
is compellable. It will be recalled that all the various State 
High Courts in Nigeria are impelled by section 16 of the High 
Court of Lagos Act, and section 4 of the ISt^ Lfce.' Courts (Federal 
Jurisdiction) Act, to exercise their respective jurisdiction in
59* It is surprising how it did not occur to the husband*s 
counsel to obtain a certified true copy of the medical 
records of the child’s birth from the Hospital or whatever 
medical centre or Home in the U.S.A. where she was born. Such 
statement would have been admissible under section 90 of the 
(Fed.) Evidence Act, 1958 without the necessity of calling 
the maker as a witness since he was beyond the seas. The fact 
that the child.was already 16 years old at the time of the 
hearing might, however, explain the difficulty.
40. [1924] A.C. 687.
divorce and other matrimonial cuases relating to monogamous
41
marriages in conformity with the law and practice for the
42
time being in force in England. In Elume ze v. Elume ze 
the Federal Supreme Court held, rightly in our view, that 
section 32 of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, the 
predecessor of section 43 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965* 
could not abrogate the provisions of the Evidence Act.as regards 
the inability Qf spouses to give evidence of marital intercourse 
to bastardise a child born in lawful marriage, whatever the 
position might be in proceedings for divorce or other matri­
monial causes. The net result of this.situation is that for .
matrimonial causes, all the High courts in Nigeria do admit
43evidence of marital intercourse from the spouses ^ either to
establish whether there has been condonation of a matrimonial
44 "offence, or whether a marriage has not been consummated
45as a result of impotence of one of the spouses y or wilful
46refusal by either party. Whereas, in cases where the issue 
is the legitimacy of the child, the spouses are incompetent 
to give evidence that marital intercourse did or did not take 
place during the marriage! Hence a glaring absurdity has arisen 
between proceedings for matrimonial causes and those relating 
to the legitimacy of a person. .
41. Emphasis supplied.
42. Unreported, Suit No. SC. 79/1968 decided.on 18/7/69*
43* See e.g. Tinubu v. Tinubu {19592 W-*N.L.R.314 at p.316;
Udom v. Udom (1962) L.h.R.112.
44. Martin v. Martin (1931) 10 N.L.R. 92 at p.95*
45. Ogunmuyiwa, v. Ogunmuyiwa, Unreported decision of the Lagos 
High Court, No. WD/49/65 of 23/3/66; Akan v. Akan, Unreported 
decision of the Lagos. High Court, No. Wd/12/67*
46. Ofodile v. Ofodile, Unreported, Lagos High Court Suit No. 
W 5 7 T 9 6 5  decided on 7/3/1966.
413.
It will be recalled that to such "grotesque conflict 
in the result of the two proceedings", as it has been appropiate- 
ly termed by the House of Lords in Russell v. Russell, the 
House was not prepared to shut its eyes. In their lordshipS1 
view, to arrive at such conclusion would be ludicrous and in­
congruous. And it was in order to prevent such absurd result 
that would have arisen if the spouses were considered competent 
to give evidence of absence of marital intercourse in divorce 
and other matrimonial causes proceedings but incompetent in 
any proceedings in which the legitimacy of a child was in 
issue, that prompted the House to hold that the bar imposed 
on spouses as regards evidence of marital intercourse was not 
confined to legitimacy cases, but that it was "a general rule
to be applied, in the full generality of its scope, to,; all
47cases which it is wide to cover". { Of course, the basis of 
the rule as given by the House of Lords was that decency, 
morality and public policy rendered it unbecoming and inde­
corous that evidence should be received from such quarters.
In Nigeria, the basis of the rule has been found not maintain­
able as regards proceedings in matrimonial causes, but is still 
preserved for cases of legitimacy by section 147 of the Evidence 
Act. Also, as the following discussions will show, both the 
customary and the Moslem law which govern most people in Nige­
ria do allow evidence of marital intercourse to be given by 
spouses where such evidence is relevant to the determination 
of an issue. In view of this absurd result and lack of co­
ordination of principles of customary law and statutory enactment 
governing the determination of a single status of legitimacy,
Russell v. Russell [1924] A.C.687 at p.720.
nothing more needs he said than to suggest that the Evidence Act
should he amended so as to allow evidence or marital intercourse
to he given by spouses in cases where the issue of legitimacy
48of a person is raised.
Another unsatisfactory result of the statutory pre­
sumptions of legitimacy is the way the Act attempts to resolve 
the problem of turbatio:. sanguinis, ie.e where a woman remarried 
within a short time after dissolution of her previous marriage 
and gave birth to a child which could have possibly been con­
ceived during the continuance of her first marriage. As we 
have observed, the section provides that legitimacy of a child 
born after dissolution of the mother*s marriage should be pre­
sumed in relation to the mother's former husband only when the 
mother remained unmarried for 280 days after dissolution of 
her marriage. Thus when the mother remarried less than 280 . 
days, any child begotten by her during the second marriage 
would almost invariably be deemed to the legitimate issue of 
the second husband even though the possibility exists that it 
could have been conceived during the first marriage. Consider, 
for example, the case of a woman whose husband died as a re­
sult of an accident. Three months later, the widowed woman 
remarried a man who, among other reasons, was anxious to give 
her protection.
Approximately eight months after the death of her 
late husband, but five months after her memarriage, she gave 
birth to a fully developed child. The arbitrary solution 
provided by section 147 of the Act is that the child is ncon­
clusively" deemed the legitimate offspring of the second husband.
48. The law on this point has now been amended on similar 
lines as suggested; see the Postscript.
Even if both spouses are in agreement that there was no sexual 
intercourse between them until after the woman's remarriage 
three months after the death of her first husband, neither of 
them is competent to testify as to this fact, nor is a decla­
ration made e.g. by the wife immediately after the death of 
her first husband that she had marital intercourse with the 
deceased husband the day preceding his death, receivable to
disprove the legitimacy of the child in relation to the second 
49husband. ' And according to the unfortunate decision of Taylor, 
C.J., in Elumeze's case, the parties could not even give evi­
dence of non-access at the time the child could have been con­
ceived. Even under the common law which is purported to have
been declared by the provision of the Act, it was well re-
50cognised by the earliest cases ^ on presumptions of legiti­
macy that it is necessary by the laws of nature for the man 
in whose favour the presumptions operate "to be, in fact, the 
father of the child
No doubt, a conflict of the two presumptions and 
hence conflict of paternity ought to be prevented as it has 
been done by the Evidence Act. On the other hand, the legi­
timacy of a child b o m  in lawful wedlock ought to be safe­
guarded; not, however, by declaring a child the legitimate 
offspring of a person who is not, and who is fully convinced 
that he is not, the natural father of the child. It is sub­
mitted that the provision of the Act lacks a common sense 
approach in the sense that it fails to realise that in cases 
of turbatio sanguinis, the child whose legitimacy is in issue 
will invariably have a legitimate father. The real issue in
49* Both spouses are now competent witnesses as regards evidence 
of marital intercourse; see the Postscript.
50. e.g. Banbury Peerage Case (1811) 1 Sim. & St. 153*
51. Ibid at p.154, second answer.
such situation is to ascertain the person, Whether the former 
or the latter husband of its mother, from whom the child de­
rives its legitimate descent. To resolve the matter by insisting
on the application of the above statutory presumption will not 
an
be more than/anaahronistic adherence to an inadequate test to 
produce injustice in a changing society. Unless positive evi­
dence is allowed to establish whether or not sexual inter-
52course between the spouses did take place, coupled, if
necessary, by serological examination of the parties concerned,
the determination of the true paternity of a child will always
of
be hampered by disallowing the evidence/those best able to know ' 
of the true position.
(b) Polygamous Marriages.
As indicated above, the rule that birth in lawful
wedlock determines the legitimacy of a person applies also to
children born during the existence of polygamous marriage by 
55their parents."  It is clear that legitimacy is determined 
with the aid of the presumptions (i) that a child born within 
a polygamous marriage is deemed the legitimate child of the 
mother*s husband and (ii) that a child born within a reason­
able period after dissolution of the marriage is the legiti­
mate offspring of the former husband of the mother. These 
are rules of customary law (including Moslem law) and have 
no connection with the statutory presumptions discussed above, 
which in any event, apply i to monogamous marriages only.
Some observations may be made with regard tp these 
presumptions. First, in the case of a Moslem marriage, birth 
in lawful marriage must have occurred not less than six months
52. For the present position of the law on this point, see 
the Postscript.
53* See Bamgbose v. Daniel [19351 A.C.107(P*C.); Lawal v.
Younan ; ITT“7r7L.R. 245. .
from the date the marriage was consumated before a child of
such marriage could be presumed the legitimate issue of the
54mother's husband. On the other hand, in the case of custo­
mary marriage, no such limitation is imposed* Under custo­
mary law, it matters little when, during the subsistence of 
the marriage, the child was bom. Right from the celebra­
tion of the marriage to its termination, any child begotten 
by the wife is presumed to be the legitimate issue of the hus­
band. This rule was so strictly enforced that if a married 
woman abandoned her husband for another man for whom she had 
a child, such child would be deemed the legitimate issue of 
the husband in so far as the marriage between the mother and 
the husband.had not been formally dissolved.^
There is also a divergence of approach between the 
various customary laws in relation to the second presumption.
For example, under the Moslem (Maliki) law, the orthodox 
rule is that a child born of the wife within five years of 
dissolution of her' marriage is the legitimate issue of the 
former husband.^ But as pointed out by Professor Anderson, 
this period of gestation, though widely accepted in principle
in the Moslem States of Northern Nigeria, is "seldom, if ever,
57applied in practice". ' This is due to the fact that like some
58continental legal systems, the Maliki law attempts to prevent 
legitimacy in relation to two fathers by restricting the right 
of a divorced or widowed woman to remarry within a certain 
period after the dissolution of her previous marriage as would 
54. Ma'aji Shani, op.cit., p.18.
55* See Elias, The Nigerian i»egal System, pp.307-8; Kasunmu and 
Salacuse, op.cit.7 pp.216-217.
56. Anderson, op.cit., p.214; Ma’aji Shani, op.cit., p.18.
57- Anderson, op.cit., p.214.
58. e.g. Germany, Switzerland and Prance. See E. Guttman, 5 I.C.L.Q, 
(1956) 217 at pp.227-229.
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allow a child conceived before the dissolution to 'be born prior . 
to her subsequent marriage.
This period of restriction on remarriage, known in 
Islamic legal parlance as ’Idda, varies according to circumstances. 
If the termination of the marriage is due to the death of the 
husband, this period of waiting lasts for four lunar months and 
four days. In the case of termination by divorce, it is three 
menstral periods or three lunar months, whether or not the 
divorced woman is past child-bearing age; while in the case 
of a woman who is of child-bearing age but who appears to be 
pregnant by reason of her having missed her mentral circle, the 
period of restriction on remarriage is one year or until such time 
as she gives birth to a child. It is interesting to notice that 
the husband is legally responsible, as a general rule, for the 
maintenance and accommodation of his divorced wife during the 
period of her disability to remarry. And in determining the 
various periods of restriction, expert evidence based on medical 
examination by doctors or nknowledgeable women” is always admis­
sible to determine whether or not a widowed or divorced wife was 
pregnant or past child-bearing age immediately on dissolution of 
her marriage by death or divorce. Thus, it becomes obvious that 
only when a woman of a child-bearing age, having observed her 
period of waiting, refused to marry within five years after dis­
solution of her previous marriage, could the presumption arise 
that a child born within five years after the mother1s previous
marriage is considered the legitimate issue of the former 
59husband. y
59. Supra, note 57*
Furthermore, the two presumptions of legitimacy found 
in the Moslem law are, unlike those contained in the Evidence Act, 
easily rebuttable. This is done not merely by the spouses 
establishing non-access between them at the time the child was 
conceived, but by way of Lian - a proceedihgs instituted by 
the husband either to accuse the wife of adultery at the rele­
vant time or simply to disavow the paternity of a child pre­
sumed to be his legitimate offspring.^* Since the object of a 
Lian proceedings is to displace the presumptions of legitimacy, 
it naturally follows that the evidence of the spouses are freely 
given and carefully sifted by the courts in determining whether 
or not there was marital intercourse at the time of Conception 
and hence determine whether the child is, in fact, the legiti­
mate offspring of the mother’s husband.
Presumably influenced by the Moslem law, similar 
restrictions on remarriage are placed on divorced women by sta­
tutory provisions declaring customary law in certain jurisdic­
tions in NorthernNigeria so as to prevent a child being presumed 
the legitimate child of two fathers. For example, section 6(2)
of the Declaration of the Biu Customary law on Marriage and 
AT
Divorce, 1964- provides as follows:
"After divorce no woman shall contract a further 
marriage until one month has expired from the 
date on which divorce was awarded ^2 .... or,
if she is pregnant, until after she had delivered 
and weaned her child"•
Section 13 and 14- of the Declaration then go on to provide that
if, at the end of one month after divorce, the court is satisfied
that the woman is pregnant, then the court should make an ordel*
60. Ma’aji Shani, op.cit., p. 16. .
61. N.A.L.N.9 of 1964-.
62. Judicial divorce under customary law is made by a single 
decree which is final and irrevocable.
awarding the custody of the child to the former husband as
his legitimate child, the order taking effect when the child
is born. Of course, under the provisions, the court has the
power to order a child which has not5 been weaned to remain
with the mother until it is old enough even though its legal
custody has already been granted to its father. In the case 
63 64of Idoma  ^and Borgu Declarations, the period of restric*- 
tion on the wife's right to remarry is, in each case, three 
months. And to ensure that she complies strictly with the 
prohibition, breach of it is even made a statutory offence 
punishable as stipulated in the Declarations.
It by no means follows that all the Northern 
Nigerian legal districts are unanimous in imposing a restric­
tion on the right of a woman to remarry after dissolution of 
her marriage as a solution to the problem of turbatio sanguinis. 
One, if not the only, exception to this approach is the Igbira 
Customary law which merely provides that any child born within 
ten months after dissolution of the mother's marriage is the 
legitimate child of the mother's former husband. This rule 
came up recently for consideration before the Northern Nigeria 
Court as Appeal^for Civil Cases in Mariyama v. Sadiku Ejo. ^ 
Mariyama was the divorced wife of Ejo. After obtaining 
a divorce of her first marriage, she entered into a second 
marriage during which a daughter was born. The birth occurred 
about 300 days after she obtained a divorce of her first marria­
ge. Ejo, the former husband, claimed this child as his legitimate 
issue in accordance with the Igbira customary law which
63. N.A.L.N. 63 of 1959, ss. 7(2) and 17(1).
64. N.A.L.N. 52 of 1962, ss. 7(2), 17(1) and (b).
65. 19611 .N.N.L.R.81.
prescribed, that a child born within ten months after the 
divorce of the mother belongs to the mother’s former husband.
The Igbira Central Court upheld this rule even though it was 
found that the first husband could not be the natural father 
of the child. On appeal, the court not only sought new evi­
dence about the rule of customary law applicable but also ad­
mitted fresh evidence as to whether sexual intercourse took 
place between the parties at the time when the child could 
have been conceived. Consequently the court was able to 
uphold the finding of the lower court that the woman last had 
intercourse with the former husband fifteen months before the 
birth of the child. It however reversed the decision of the 
lower court by holding that the daughter was the legitimate 
child of the second husband.
As regards the customary law rule which said that 
a child born within ten months after divorce is the legitimate 
child of the former husband, Holden J., in giving the unanimous 
decision of the court, held that the welfare and interest of 
the child (which incidentally all courts in Nigeria are en­
joined to consider as of paramount importance in any proceedings) 
demands that such customary law rule for determining legitimacy 
of a person should not be regarded as more than a rebuttable 
presumption of law and concluded his judgment by the following 
important remarks:
“We must not be understbdd to condemn this native 
law and custom in its general application. Ve 
appreciate that it is basically sound and would 
in almost every case be fair and just in its re­
sults. There is a similar provision in Muslim 
law, and also in English law where there is a 
presumption in similar cases that the former 
husband is the father. That presumption we feel 
must be rebuttable if natural justice is to be 
done. In this case it has been'clearly and 
absolutely rebutted, and in very exceptional 
circumstances of this special case we feel that 
to enforce the rule would result in a serious 
injustice."
42,£.
In Southern Nigeria, customary law rarely insists 
on any restriction on the right of a divorced woman to remarry 
so as to allow the birth of a child conceived during the pre­
vious marriage. The position was however different under the 
traditional law with regard to a child begotten by a woman 
after the death of her husband. In tracing the development 
of the law from the traditional period to modern times, it 
will be necessary to make a distinction between determination 
of the legitimacy of a child born after the death of the 
mother's husband and a child b o m  after the dissolution of 
the mother's marriage*.
Under the traditional law, the rule with regard to 
the legitimacy of a child begotten by a woman after the hus­
band's death had always depended on whether or not the mother 
had refunded to the family of the deceased husband the dowry 
or bride-price paid to her family at the time of the marriage.
If such account remained unsettled, any child begotten by the 
widowed woman was considered the legitimate issue of the deceased 
husband, irrespective of whether or not he could have been the 
biological father. No doubt, this rule was an extension of 
the doctrine of widow-inheritance whereby a close relative of 
the deceased has the right to take the deceased widow and 
raise issues unto him through the woman. The relationship 
between the deceased relative and his widow is considered a 
continuation of the marriage previously existing between the 
dead husband and his widow. The only way this sort of rela­
tionship could be prevented or, having been brought into being, 
could be terminated is by the woman refunding to the substi­
tute "husband" the dowry which was paid to her family at the 
time of the original marriage. On close analogy, therefore,
to this sort of leviratic union is the rule that any child 
horn by the widowed woman even in concubinage is the legiti­
mate issue of the deceased husband*
In Amachree v. Goodhead, ^  Beckley J., applied this 
rule and held that the fact that the child whose legitimacy 
was in dispute was born in concubinage after the death of the 
mother's husband did not preclude the child from being regarded 
the legitimate issue of the deceased husband, so as to justify 
awarding its custody and upbringing to the head of the deceased's 
family. In so holding, the judge felt no constraint in rejecting 
the contention that the strict application of the rule would be 
contrary to natural justice, equity and good conscience. But in 
Edet v, E s s i e n , the rule was rightly held to be repugnant to 
natural justice, equity etc. The case itself was concerned 
with the child betrothal of a girl, Iyang, to a man called Nyon 
Essien on payment by him of dowry to the girl's parents1. Sub­
sequently, when Iyang became of age, she agreed to marry an­
other man, Ekpenyong Edet, who obtained the consent of her 
parents and paid another dowry to them. The dowry first paid
O
by Essien was not refunded. Nonetheless, a customary marriage 
took place between Iyang and Edet and out of this marriage the 
two children, whose legitimacy was in dispute, were born*
Though ostensibly not their natural father, Essien claimed
these children as his in accordance with the Calabar customary law*
66. (1923) 4 N.L.R. 101.
67. (1932) 11 N.L.R. 4-7.
6 8. Receipt by the parent of a girl of dowry from another man 
when the one previously paid by the existing suitor or hus­
band has not been refunded is now a criminal offence in most 
jurisdictions in Southern Nigeria. See e.g. The Marriage, 
Divorce and Custody of Children Adoptive Bye-Laws Order,
1938? s.6 . This order as we have observed applies in the 
Western and the Mid-Western States.
The native court found that the rule was clearly established 
and therefore ordered the children to be handed over to Essien. 
But on appeal, the Divisional Court concluded that the rule 
was not successfully proved before it and therefore reversed 
the decision of the lower court by awarding the custody of the 
children to the mother's husband who, of course, was their na­
tural father. Further, the court held that even assuming that 
such customary law rule had been successfully established, the 
court would have been duty bound to declare it contrary to m -  
tural justice, equity and good conscience under its statutory 
powers. From this decision, it becomes obvious that no court 
in Nigeria would now be prepared to enforce this archaic rule 
of customary law which gives the paternity of other person's 
children to another man simply because the dowry paid by the 
latter at the time of the mother's betrothal or marriage had 
not been refunded. It would also follow that the only way 
a court could determine, at customary law, whether a child 
born after the death of the mother's husband is the legitimate 
issue of the deceased husband is by satisfactory evidence that 
the child was conceived as a result of marital intercourse 
between the woman and the deceased during his life-time.
The question of the legitimacy of a child born by 
a woman during the existence of her subsequent marriage, but 
within some few months after dissolution of her previous mar­
riage, depends on careful analysis of the facts of the case 
as presented by the parties. In illustration, the provision 
of section 13 of the Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children 
Adoptive Bye-Laws Order 1938 may be observed in this connection. 
It provides simply that
"the husband of a woman shall be presumed, for the 
purpose of these Bye-laws, to be the natural father 
of any issue born or conceived by the woman during 
the period over which the marriage subsists."
As could be seen, nothing in the section prevents the courts
from receiving evidence of absence of marital intercourse
from either of the spouses to establish that the mother*s
husband is not the natural father of a child born during the
existence of her marriage, and hence bastardise the child.
Similarly, if a divorced woiian gives birth to a child during
the subsistence of a later marriage, evidence may be adduced
by the former feusband to show that:; the child was conceived
during the woman's first marriage and hence establish that the
child is his legitimate issue. These set of principles were
established by some customary courts in the Western State of
Nigeria as the logical interpretation of section 13 of the
State's Adoptive Bye-laws Order 19 58 .^9 It is gratifying
to observe that the view of the customary courts on this point
has been affirmed by the State's High Courts.^
71In Solomon Awolola v. Maria Adunola,f it was held 
by Fakayode J., that strict adherence to the customary law rule 
that the mother's husband is the legitimate father of a child 
begotten by his wife during the existence of their marriage may 
lead to injustice in some cases and that the correct approach 
to a case in which the paternity of such a child is in dispute 
should be as follows: The court should presume legitimacy of
the child in relation to the mother's husband. This presumption
69. See e.g. Karimu Akano v. Titilayo-Abeke and Mudashiru Lawal v. 
Risikatu i.£oIe, unreported decisions of the Grade B Customary 
Court (No.5), Ibadan, Western State, Nos. C5 277A/902 of 
5/7 /6 8 and C5 370/67 of 13/1/69 respectively.
70. In Isaac Bankole v. Israel Adeoye, unreported decision of 
Abeokuta High Court, No• AB/21A/67 of March 12, 1968; 
and Solomon Awolola v. Maria Adunola, unreported decision 
of the Oshogbo High. Court, No'*1 H0S/2A/68 of May 3j 1968.
71. Unreported decision of the Oshogbo High Court, No.H0S/2A/68 
of May 3> 1968.
is rebuttable and the onus of rebutting it rests on the person, 
even if not tbe mother's husband, who alleges the contrary*
In determining the issue, the court should have regard to all 
the circumstances of the case, including such factors as (a) 
opportunity of access for sexual intercourse between the 
husband and the wife at the time the child could have been 
conceived, (b) the physical condition of the husband at the ! 
material time, (c) opportunity of access for sexual inter­
course between the wife and the third person, (d) the time 
of birth and the times of sexual intercourse by each contestant 
and (e) if the issue is still unresolved, bloodiest of the
parties may be ordered. And as regards the last point, the
72case of Isaac Bankole v. Israel Adeoye f afforded an opportu­
nity for the High Court to lay down detailed procedural rules 
regarding the admission of evidence of blood test to determine 
the paternity of such a child.
The justice of these rules was illustrated by the
decision of a Grade B Customary Court in Western Nigeria.
7-5In Mudashiru Lawal v. Risikatu Atole, y the plaintiff was the 
former husband of the woman who was the respondent.. Shortly 
after the dissolution of her first marriage to the plaintiff, 
she remarried and during the second marriage, a child was bonn 
in circumstances which raised the possibility that the child 
might have been conceived during the first marriage of his 
mother. The court considered the evidence of the first husband, 
the wife and the man who later became the wiman's second husband, 
evidence which included testimonies as to whether or not there 
was sexual intercourse between the parties shortly before the
72. Unreported decision of the Abeokuta High Court, No.AB/21A/67 
of 12/3/6 8.
73. Unreported decision of the Grade B Customary Court (No.5) 
Ibadan, No. C5 370/67 of 13/1/69.
dissolution of the woman's first marriage. The issue was, 
however, still unresolved. The court therefore ordered a 
blood test which eliminated the possibility that the second 
husband could have been the natural father of the child whose 
paternity was in dispute. Custody of the child was therefore 
awarded to the first husband, the child being found by the 
court to be his legitimate issue. It is interesting to note 
that this was a case in which both the former and the present 
husband of the woman were anxious to know who the real father 
of the child was and in which the employment of the presumptions 
of legitimacy could have produced either a deadlock or an un­
satisfactory result. This could well be illustrated by slightly 
reversing the facts of the case. Suppose the two marriages 
of the woman had been monogamous ones, the following results 
could have followed: Section 147 of the Evibnce Act would have
applied. Since the woman's second marriage took place within 
280 days after dissolution of her previous marriage, and since 
the child whose paternity was in dispute was in fact born 
during the continuance of the second marriage, the statutory 
presumption would have operated to divest the child of having 
a legitimate relationship with its mother's first husband.
The child could have been conclusively considered the legiti­
mate issue of the mother's second husband who was in fact not 
the natural father of the childi
In summary, a comparison of the presumptive modes of 
determining the legitimacy of a child b o m  within or shortly 
after the dissolution of any of the three types of marriage 
existing in Nigeria reveals the following defects in the law 
and lack of co-ordination of principles. These may be remedied 
in the way summarised below.
(1) THE EVIDENCE ACT AND MONOGAMOUS MARRIAGES.
In operating the presumptions of legitimacy, the 
existence of the bar which makes spouses incompetent to give 
evidence of absence of marital intercourse, or presumably that 
of non-access, to bastardise a child presumed to be legitimate 
is not maintainable, since it is capable of making the pre­
sumptions operate in favour of a person who is not the natural 
father of the child. The rule is also absurd in the snnse 
that spouses could give evidence of marital intercourse in 
divorce proceedings which are not connected with the issue 
of legitimacy. If public policy is an indication of those 
matters which the legislature or the courts regard as inimical 
to the interest of the community as a whole, the reason adduced 
for the rule, i.e. that "morality, decency and public policy" 
demand the exclusion of evidence of marital intercourse by 
spouses, has no foundation in Nigeria since it is the practice 
of the customary courts to receive such evidence from spouses 
in all proceedings in which its admission will be relevant in 
resolving the issue in dispute: More so when these courts are
concerned with establishing the legitimacy and rights and 
duties of preponderant majority of people in the country. 
Furthermore, since the rule has been abrogated in England from 
whence it was imported into the Nigerian law, there seems to 
be no further justification for adhering to it in Nigeria.
Secondly, we have noticed that section 147 of the 
Evidence Act makes 280 days the period of gestation for a woman 
who married under monogamy in Nigeria. Thus, when a child is 
born on the 285th day after the dissolution of the mother's 
marriage, the fact that the mother remained unmarried and that 
she was too ill to have sexual intercourse during the whole of
4-29.
the period, would seem not to he relevant matters to he taken 
into consideration in determining whether such a child is legiti­
mate or not. According to the section it would seem that such child
should he considered illegitimate. Yet cases abound not only in 
74-Nigeria ( hut all over the world, showing that the maximum period
of gestation may at times he up to 300 days.
Further, to confound the situation, the section provides
that the widowed or divorced woman should remain unmarried before
a child horn within 280 days after dissolution of the mother's
marriage could he considered the legitimate issue of the former
husband. This condition appears to us as a negation of common
sense and justice. As the above case of Mudasfriru Lawal v. Risikatu 
75Atole/-^ has shown, circumstances will always arise under which a 
divorced or widowed wife will remarry shortly after the dissolution 
of a previous marriage and give birth to a child conceived as a re­
sult of marital intercourse with her former husband. Yet the solu­
tion provided by section 14-7 of the Evidence Act is that such 
children must conclusively he presumed the legitimate issues of 
their mother's second husbands.
In our submission, the best approach to subh problems 
of turbatio sanguinis is to regard the presumption of legitimacy 
as a non-starter. The only means by which the real father of 
a child born under such circumstances could be established is
by empowering the courts to receive evidence from those who are 
c*-bte-
best/to know of the true position. In addition, in difficult 
cases, serological examination of the parties may be called in 
aid as it is being done not only under some systems of customary 
law in Nigeria, but also in most countries.^ This will prevent
74-. See Mariyama v. Sadiku Ejo .1961; N.M.L.R. 81.
73- Unreported decision of Grade B Customary Court No.5> Ibadan, 
Western State, No.370/67 of 13/1/69*
76. E.g. in England; See the Family Law Reform Act, 1969* ss.20 
to 23 of which give the English courts power to order blood 
test to determine the paternity of a child.
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the injustice of making the husband of a wife maintain a child
who is probably not his own and the disrepute into which the
law is brought as a result of the rigidity and the inadequacy
of the statutory presumptions of legitimacy. In this respect,
a useful advice may be found in the Report of the English Law
Commission on Blood Tests and the Proof of Paternity in Civil 
77Proceedingsrf that
"it is in the child's interest to know, if possible, 
the true position as to its paternity. Where a 
husband has denied being the father of his wife's 
child, but has been unable because of the strength 
of the presumption of legitimacy to prove that he
is not, the emotional and financial effect on the
child is not likely to be beneficial if the husband 
is nevertheless still firmly convinced that he is 
not its father".
That the situation should be as suggested above in Nigeria is 
born out by the fact that illegitimacy is not indelible. An 
illegitimate child can always be legitimated by the subsequent 
marriage of its parents or by mere acknowledgment by its pu­
tative father. Only when the law provides clear rules for 
identifying the real father of a child could such a father, 
if not the husband of the mother, be in a position to legitimate 
it by some subsequent act.
(2) MOSLEM LAW.
The Maliki law rule that a child, before it can be 
regarded as the legitimate issue of the mother's husband, must 
be b o m  not less than six months after consummation by the parties 
of their marriage is ludicrous. How is the court to determine 
when a marriage is, in fact, consummated when there is a dispute 
between the spouses on the point? Or should the solution of the 
problem be the result of another presumption that a marriage is 
consummated on the wedding night? If so, what happens when the
77- Law Com., No.16 of 1968.
husband was himself responsible for the ante-nuptial pregnancy 
of the wife when he was courting her? Should a strict appli­
cation of this rule mean that even when it is glaring that 
both husband and wife are the natural parents of the child, 
it should still be considered illegitimate if born less than 
six months after the consummation of the parents1 marriage?
It is submitted that this condition is unjustifiable in view 
of the fact that a Lian proceedings is always available to the 
husband to disprove the paternity of the child presumed to be 
his according to Moslem Law.
Secondly, it is rather disconcerting that the right 
of a father under the Maliki law to bring a Lian proceeding 
should be limitless as to time. Obviously, a person once con­
sidered legitimate should not, in justice, have the question 
of his legitimacy hang in the balance throughout his life for 
the simple reason that his legal father may one day bring an 
action to disown him and render him a bastard. And finally, 
since the presumption that a child born within five years 
after the dissolution of the mother's marriage is the legiti­
mate issue of the mother's former husband, is seldom applied 
in practice, there is no justification for the retention of 
such dead wood in the law.
(3) CUSTOMARY LAW.
By far the most satisfactory presumptive method of 
determining the legitimacy of children born within, or shortly 
after the dissolution of, a marriage is that found under some 
systems of customary law. Having started with such primitive 
rules that legitimacy is determined by the right to a refund 
of the dowry paid on behalf of the child's mother, it is
gratifying to note that customary law has been developed by 
judges to take account of the social, economic and even scienti­
fic development of the modern era. Here, as in the Maliki law, 
there is no restriction on spouses preventing them from giving . 
evidence in any proceedings that marital intercourse did or did 
not take place during the marriage. Hence the presumptions 
are easy to rebut and are merely designed to assist the courts 
in straightforward cases. It will also be observed that it is 
under this system of law that the modern method of receiving 
evidence of blood test to determine paternity has been adopted. 
Unfortunately, however, the diversity and multiplicity of 
systems of customary law in Nigeria means that the law on this 
point cannot develop on the same scale throughout the country.
May we therefore suggest that the time is ripe for 
the respective Governments in Nigeria to adopt a uniform set 
of rules for determining the legitimacy of children born or 
conceived in lawful marriages, having regard to the criticism 
made of the existing rules and irrespective of whatever the 
nature of the marriage. For whatever the differences between 
the incidents of a monogamous, Moslem, and customary law mar­
riages, one thing is clear: each is a vehicle by which a child
can attain legitimate status. And whatever the difficulty of 
integrating the Moslem law with other systems of secular law, 
whether based on customary or English law, this cannot be said 
of presumptions of legitimacy which is known, in one. form or 
the other, in all the three systems. In adopting this approach, 
we shall be following the expedient of the Indian Parliament 
which has found it desirable for quite a long time to provide 
a single set of presumptions of legitimacy for births emanating
r p o
from a monogamous as well as a Moslem marriage.
78. See s. 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and D.F.Mulla, 
Principles of Mohamedan Law, 16th ed., p.$14 et seq.
3. LEGITIMATION BY SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE OE PARENTS
In Nigeria, a process by which a child born ille­
gitimate according to the lawful wedlock theory can subsequent­
ly attain legitimate status is by the subsequent marriage of 
its natural parents. As pointed out above, legitimatio per 
subsequens matrimonium was one of the more tolerant modes of 
determining the legitimacy of a person under the Homan law.
It later passed into the Canon law about the 12th Century 
and gradually became the law of continental Europe from whence 
it found its way into the common law countries. Today scarcely
is there any system of law both in the common law and the civil
79law worlds in which the conception has not been adopted.('
After abortive attempts, dating from the 13th Century,
to introduce the concept into the English law, mainly on the
basis that the Kingdom of England should be "wholly free from
80every kind of subjection to the Roman Empire", legitimation 
of a person by the subsequent marriage of his parents was ac­
cepted in England in 1926 by the passing of the Legitimacy Act 
of that year. In 1922, following a decision of a Nigerian court
which met with hostile reception by the public, it was sug-
81gested in the Nigerian Legislative Council that legitimation 
by subsequent marriage should be introduced into the country*s 
legal system. But by 1923> it had been discovered that a similar 
move was being made by the British Parliament. It was there­
fore decided to suspend the plan to introduce the concept into 
Nigeria until the English Legitimacy Bill was passed. This,' 
as we have observed, was done in 1926. Three years }.ater, a
o p
Legitimacy Act, modelled on the English statute, was passed
79. See White, "Legitimation by Subsequent Marriage" in 36 L.Q.R. 
235.
80. Lissertatio ad Fletan, ed. 1647, p.536, cited from White,
3'6"17.q.R7255:---------
81. Legislative Council Lebate.s. Session, 1929* p.62.
82. No.27 of 1929.
in Nigeria with a minor hut significant modification. This 
Act came into effect on 17th October, 1929*
Despite the co-existence of monogamy and;*) polygamy 
in Nigeria, the Nigerian Legitimacy Act, 1929 is solely con­
cerned, like the English Act, with legitimation of an other­
wise illegitimate child by a form of subsequent marriage which 
is described by the Act as "the voluntary union for life of 
one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.” ^ In 
other words, only a subsequent monogamous marriage, as dis­
tinguished from a polygamous marriage, of the child*s parents 
could confer the status of legitimacy on it. It is difficult 
to explain the exclusion of a polygamous marriage as a sub­
sequent act which may legitimate an illegitimate child under 
the Act since it was sufficiently recognised by the Nigerian 
Legislative Council even in 1929 that the qeustion of legitimacy 
in Nigeria "is obviously one of considerable complexity in­
volving as it does the consideration of questions of marriage
in connection with native law and custom and also inheritance
84according to native law and custom". We shall return later 
to the absurdity created by the failure of the Act to include 
customary or Moslem marriage as constituting a sufficient sub­
sequent act which would legitimate an illegitimate child.
As a result of regionalisation in 1954, the Legitimacy 
85Act, 1929 was re-enacted ^ by each of the three.regional legisla-
o/r
tures while the existing Act was retained with certain routine 
85 • s • 2 •
84. Legislative Council Debates, 7th Session, 1929* p.62.
85• As Cap.62, Laws of Western Nigeria (1959 ed.); Cap.65* Lav/s of 
Northern Nigeria (1965 ed.); Cap.75* Laws of Eastern Nigeria , 
(1965 ed.).
8 6. . V'. As Cap.105, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and
Lagos (1958 ed.)•
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amendments "by tlie Federal Parliament .for the then Federal 
Territory of L a g o s , n o w  the Lagccs State* With the creation 
of the new twelve states structure in 1967* all enactments 
existing in a Region out of which a state was created are
o o
deemed to he part of the statutes of the new state. The 
effect of this is that the Legitimacy Laws of the former Re­
gions of Nigeria now become.the Laws of all the new states 
created out of them* Since all the Legitimacy Laws are iden­
tical as to name, sections and substance, it will not be ne­
cessary to refer to more than one of them in considering the 
concept of legitimation by subsequent marriage in all the 
Nigerian states.
Section 3(1) of the Western State Legitimacy Law 
provides as follows:
’’Subject to the provisions of this section, where 
the parents ,of an illegitimate person marry or 
have married one another, whether before or after 
the commencement of this law, the marriage shall, 
if the father of the illegitimate person was or is 
at the date of the marriage domiciled in the State ^ 
render that person, if living, legitimate from the 
commencement of this law, or from the date of the 
marriage, whichever last happens.”
Thus, by this provision, it becomes obvious that only two con­
ditions are relevant before the subsequent marriage of an ille- , 
gitimate child’s parents could render him legitimate. First, the, 
putative father must have been domiciled within the state at the 
time of the marriage between him and the child’s mother and 
secondly, the’, illegitimate child must be living at the date of 
87* See footnote 8 6.
8 8. See States Creation (Transitional Provisions) Decree, No.14 
of 27/3/67, s.1(5).
89* The Word "Region” was used in the text. It should now be read
as "State” ...... by virtue of s.l (b) of the States Creation
(Transitional Provisions) (Amendment) Decree, 1967.
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its parents' marriage. It is not essential, for example, that 
the subsequent marriage be celebrated in good faith. Legiti­
mation will be effected even though the parents go through a 
formal ceremony of marriage solely for the purpose of securing 
the legitimacy of their illegitimate children and without any 
intention of future cohabitation.
If the marriage took place after the commencement of 
the Law, then the legitimacy of the child commences from the 
date of the parents' marriage. If the parents had married be­
fore the commencement of the Law, the legitimacy of the child 
began from the commencement of the Law, i.e. 17th October, 1929* 
And for this purpose, it would seem that the death of one or 
both of the child's parents after their marriage but before
October 17* 1929 does not affect the legitimacy of the child
qo
provided he was alive on October 17* 1929*
By section 5 of the Law, a legitimated person is 
placed on equal footing with a person who is born legitimate 
for the purpose of testate and intestate succession and also 
for participating under any disposition which comes into ef­
fect after the date of his legitimation. Similarly, the spouse 
of a legitimatedperson, his children and remoter issue are all 
entitled to succeed to property, whether real or personal, in 
like manner as if the legitimated person had been b o m  legiti­
mate. But where property or. succession rights depend on the 
relative seniority of children, and such children include a 
legitimated child, he ranks as if he had been born at the date 
of legitimation, whatever his actual age. And if more than 
one person became legitimated at the same date, they rank as 
between themselves in order of seniority. However since nothir© 
prevents a person from excluding a legitimate child born in law-
90. Cf. Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.cit., p.220.
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ful wedlock, as well as a legitimated child, from the provisions
of a will, or a disposition inter vivos, in which rights in
property are given to his children, such intention if.clearly
expressed in such instrument with regard to a legitimated child
is to be effective according to the section.
Where a person legitimated under the Law or any of his
children or remoter issue dies intestate, the same persons who
would have been entitled to succeed to his real and personal
91property had he been born legitimate are entitled to take.
Also, a legitimated person has the same rights and he is under 
the same duties for maintenance and support of himself or of 
any other person as if he had been born legitimate. Furthermore, 
he is similarly entitled to claim damages or compensation,allow­
ances or benefits made available to a person born in lawful
92wedlock under any enactment existing in the State.J
It has been shown that before the subsequent marriage 
of his parents can legitimate an illegitimate child, he must be 
alive at the date of the parents1 subsequent marriage or at the 
commencement of the Act. This limitation is somewhat neutra­
lised by section 7 of the law in respect of the illegitimate 
child who died after the commencement of the Law but before the 
subsequent marriage of his parents. Although such person re­
mained in law an illegitimate person, any surviving spouse, 
children or remoter issue living at the date of the marriage 
can take interests in any property, whether real or personal,
as if the illegitimate person had become legitimated by the subt
95sequent marriage of his parents. ^
In short, by giving a legitimated person capacity ta 
inherit from, or to take under a disposition by, any of his
91. s.6.
92. s.8.
93. s.7.
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parents and to pass property to them; by imposing a mutual
obligation of support and maintenance on both the legitimated
person and his parents, and by conferring on him the right to
claim compensations, damages, benefits and allowances accruing
to a legitimate person under any enactment, legitimation per
subsequens matrimonium, for all practical purposes, confers
on the person thus legitimated full status of legitimacy as
if he had been born in lawful wedlock. The only limitation
placed by the Law on the rights of a person legitimated Tinder
it are that when there is a competition between him and children
born in lawful wedlock as regards property or succession rights,
he is deemed as to his seniority within the group as if he was
bourn at the date of his legitimation and, consequently, can only
take interests under Mills and settlements which take effect
after he has become legitimated,
A notable departure from the English Legitimacy Act of
1926 on which the Nigerian Legitimacy Laws are based is that,
unlike section 1(2) of the English Act of 1926, the Nigerian
enactments do not prohibit a filius adulterinus, i.e. an
illegitimate child born at a time when both or either of his
natural parents was married to a third person, from being 
94legitimated,y The pragmatic explanation given by the Attorney-
General for Nigeria for the omission of section 1 (2) of the
English Act from the original Nigerian Act is that:
jIn England, illegitimate children "were outcasts 
of society and a stigma attached not only to them 
but to their offspring. It is almost impossible 
to magnify the injustice and harshness suffered by 
these unfortunate persons whose status was occasioned 
by no fault of their own. Their incapacity as 
members of society was also extended to inheritance 
and no illegitimate person could inherit property
94. By virtue of ss.l and 6(3) of the English Legitimacy Act, 1959* 
a filius adulterinus can now be legitimated by the subsequent 
marriage of his natural parents.
on an intestacy, •••It is obvious that the 
same conditions do not apply in a country 
. like. Nigeria as they do in England; in qj- 
view of the differences of native custom 
the stigma of illegitimacy is not what it is 
in England".^
Thus, suppose F. and M, are the natural parents of S. At the 
time of S's birth, F., the Father, was married to W., and M., 
the mother, was married to H. The marriage between F. and TJ. 
was dissolved by a court’s decree while H., the husband of M. 
died as a result of a motor accident. Later F. and M. contracted 
a monogamous marriage. From the date of this marriage, S. 
becomes legitimate.
But suppose the subsequent marriage between F. and M, 
is a polygamous one, i.e. a customary law marriage or a Moslem 
marriage; Is S. legitimated by the subsequent polygamous marriage? 
Characteristic of mosti Nigerian statutes having their matrix in 
the English law, none of the States' Legitimacy Laws countenances 
the possibility of a later customary or Moslem marriage of the 
illegitimate child's parents as a sufficient act which would 
legitimate such child, since they all define a "marriage" for 
the purpose of the Laws not only as "the voluntary union for 
life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others" 
but further emphasised that they were providing for elegitima- 
tion by subsequent monogamous marriage by stipulating that the 
words "marry" and "married" anywhere appearing in the Laws should 
be construed with reference to a monogamous or "Christian" marriage 
The inadequacy of the law in failing to assimilate polygamous 
marriages with monogamous ones for the purpose of legitimation 
by subsequent marriage has given rise to some absurdities as
95• Emphasis supplied.
96. Nigeria, legislative Council Debates, 7th Session, 1929* p.62.
aptly revealed by the obiter dictum of the Federal Supreme Court
97in the case of Cole v. Akinyele.y' The facts of the case are 
not strictly relevant here and will later be considered in 
another context. Suffice it to say that the Highest Court in 
Nigeria held that it ’would be contrary to public policy for 
[a person] to be able to legitimate an illegitimate child born 
during the continuance of his [monogamous] marriage.... by any 
other method than that provided for in the Legitimacy [Act]”.
In other words, since the various Legitimacy Laws provide for 
the legitimation of an illegitimate child only by means of a 
subsequent monogamous marriage of his parents, the court was 
of the view that neither a subsequent valid customary law or 
Moslem law marriage by the child's parents could legitimate 
him. Perhaps one should not quarrel with the view of the Supreme 
Court in so far as it only declared the clear intention of the Act 
without raising any objections against its provision.
But the vital question is, should the incongruous 
situation be allowed to continue, the respective legislatures 
having failed to address their mind to such absurdity at the 
time the Laws were being passed? Perhaps, one could excuse 
the unfortunate oversight on the part of the Colonial Parliament 
of Nigeria in failing to assimilate polygamous marriages with 
monogamous ones as sufficient subsequent acts whereby illegi­
timate children would be legitimated. The view of that era 
would seem to be that polygamy with its attitude to promiscuity, 
though tolerated, would soon died a gradual death with the spread 
of Western civilization. Could such absurdity in the law be
97. (I960) F.S.C.84 at p.88.
allowed to persist now that all the various legal districts
in Nigeria have acknowledged the fact that polygamy is as much
a part of the fabric of the society that there could be no ques-
98tion of its abrogation in the foreseable future?' If one should
take seriously such statements that the ultimate objective of
the respective governments in Nigeria is to unify the "body
of thw derived from our customary laws ....with our local sta- 
99tutes", ' one should have thought that a foreign concept of 
proven quality introduced into the Nigerian law should take 
account of all the legal institutions, whether customary or 
otherwise, which should logically act as conduit pipes for the 
operation of such concept. The result will then be a balanced 
adaptation of the conceptto." Nigerian requirements.
Since monogamy and polygamy are mere forms of the 
same institution of marriage in Nigeria, the discrimination 
against polygamous marriages in this respect appears to us as 
artificial and unreasonable. It is accordingly suggested that 
each of the Nigerian States, especially those having no concept 
legitimation by parental recognition (see below), should amend 
its Legitimacy Law so as to enable a subsequent customary law 
or Moslem marriage to legitimate all illegitimate children 
hitherto born to the parties. What will be required to effect 
such a desirable change would be simply for each State to amend 
section 2, the definition section, of its Legitimacy Law so 
that the word "marriage", in addition to its present definition 
in the section as "the voluntary union for life of one man and 
one woman to the exclusion of others", will include "a marriage 
celebrated under customary law or Moslem law".
98. See Record of African Conference on Local Courts and
Customary Law, Dar es Salaam, 1963? PP»57> 71-72 and 81.
99* Ibid., at p.71*
4. LEGITIMATION BY PARENTAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OR RECOGNITION.
This last mode of conferring the status of legitimacy 
on an otherwise illegitimate child is a concept of the customary 
law, using the term "customary law" to include the Moslem law.
It is the most controversial, the most mistated, presumably 
because of the unm?itten nature of customary law, and the least 
favoured by the English-law-oriented judges of the superior 
courts of Nigeria who,*.as has been pointed out above, are 
always prepared to employ the elusive conception 6f public 
poLicy - the unruly horse - to hamper its latent development.
(a) Under Moslem Law.
To begin with and contrary to general belief, legi­
timation by paternal acknowledgment is not confined to the 
Yoruba areas or the Yoruba sub-groups in Nigeria and some 
localities in the Mid-Western State. Thus, according to a 
recent work*1* published by the Centre of Islamic Legal Studies 
at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, paternal acknowledgment
is also a process of establishing legitimate descent under
2
Maliki law as in other schools of Islamic law. Add the Maliki 
school of Islamic jurisprudence obtains in most of the States 
of Northern Nigeria. Briefly to deal with the Maliki law, it 
is well recognised that an illegitimate child may, under the 
following circumstances, acquire legitimate status from the 
time of its birth if his putative father publicly acknowledges 
him andtreats him as if he were a ’ legitimate child. Eor the 
purpose of paternal acknowledgment, a reciprocal regognition
1. Ma'aji Isa Shani, Digest of Maliki Family Law; see pp*19 
et seq. where the concept is fully discussed.
2 See Re Ullee (Infants of Nawab Nazim of Bengal) (1885) 54 L.T. 
286; on appeal from (1884) 55 L.T.712; See also, Mulla, op.cit. 
16th ed., p.316 et seq.
by the child is not required unless he is an adult in which 
case an acceptance of the putative father as such is a nece­
ssary condition for his legitimacy. Secondly, the putative 
father must possess legal capacity. That is to say that he 
must be an adult, sane and capable of having sexual inter­
course with women, presumably at the time of the child's 
conception, before he could validly acknowledge the offspring 
of his fortuitous connection. Furthermore, he must be much 
older than the person he seeks to acknowledge as to admit the 
possibility of a father and child relationship between them.
Thirdly, a valid marriage between the father and 
the mother of the child must have been possible at the time 
of the child's birth, a condition which presupposes that a 
child born to a man by a woman to whom she is related by 
reason of affinity or consanguinity could not be acknowledged 
by the putative father. Similarly, it would seem to follow 
that a filius adulterinus, in the sense of a child born to a 
man at a time when the mother was the wife or someone else, 
could not be legitimated by paternal recognition. Indeed, this 
seems obvious since under the Maliki law, a man may not marry 
a woman who is already married to another man or who is in the 
period of restriction imposed upon her following the dissolu- 
tion of her marriage.^ Otherwise, he would be committing the 
serious offence of Zina, i.e. illicit sexual relations, which 
is the subject of heavy penalties.
Fourthly, nothing prevents an acknowledgment of pa­
ternity from being made in favour of a dead child.
Under the Maliki law, no formal act, written statement 
or registration, is necessary for paternal recognition of an
3. See above.
illegitimate child. All that is required for the subsequent 
legitimation of the child is that the putative father should, 
by some positive act, admit that he is the father of the child.
The effect of a valid acknowledgment made under the law is 
that an acknowledged child acquires all the rights accruing 
to a child born in lawful wedlock. And once acknowledgment 
is made, it becomes irrevocable.
(b) Under Customary Law.
At customary law, legitimation by paternal acknow­
ledgment is also found in the Lagos State, the Western State, 
the Mid-Western State and parts of the Kwara State. The only 
jurisdictions, therefore, in Southern Nigeria in which the con­
cept of legitimation by paternal acknowledgment is unknown 
are the Eastern Nigeria States. As regards these jurisdictions,
it was stated by Ainley, C.J., in the Eastern Nigeria High
5
Court case of Onwudinjoh v. Onwudinjo^ and by William, J., in
the Northern Nigeria High Court decision in Elizabeth Diri v.
Bashinya Nyikwa that evidence is lacking on the existence of
7
legitimation by paternal acknowledgment in Eastern Nigeria.(
On the other hand, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary,
o
Alexander, J., assumed in Re Edu Lien that, it was a universal 
concept of the Nigerian customary law and hence applicable to
A. See J. Salacuse, A Selective Survey of Nigerian Family Law,
pp.87-88, cited from Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.cit., pp,228-229*
5- (1957) U  E.R.L.R.l.
6. Unreported, No. E/M.91/1965 decided on 25/10/65 at the Kano 
High Court.
7. See also, Obi, Ibo Law of Property, p.190; Modern Family Law 
in Southern Nigeria, p.299; 0. Achike "Statutory and Customary 
Marriage: A Comparison" in 2 Nig. L.J. (1967) 49 at p.55 where 
he qualified the statement that the principle of legitima­
tion by acknowledgment is not known in Eastern Nigeria by the 
assertion that it "is generally practised by the Ibos in 
Eastern Nigeria”.
8. Unreported decision of the Lagos High Court No. N/5/64.
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determine the legitimacy of a person who was subject to Calabar 
customary law in the South Eastern State.
Be that as it may* acknowledgment of paternity at
Q
customary law needs not necessarily be in writing' but could be 
established, as in Moslem law, by some positive act of the putative 
father, indicating that he recognises such child as his legitimate 
offspring during his lifetime. Thus, the following have been held 
as sufficient acts of paternal acknowledgment or recognition as a 
result of which an illegitimate child becomes the legitimate off­
spring of his natural father: - Performance.by the putative father 
of the naming ceremony of the illegitimate child, the fact that 
the putative father performed it at a place, not his house, with 
the intention of concealing the fact of his paternal relationship
with the child from other members of his family being considered 
11irrelevant; Putative father providing medical attention for the
12 1-5illegitimate child after his birth . or after a serious accident; ^
Voluntary assumption by the putative father of support obligation
towards the child coupled by his admission of the child into his
1 lL
household as a member of it; Or causing the Birth Certificate
of the illegitimate child to be issued with the surname of the
15putative father put on it. ^ Eor the last act to constitute one 
of legitimation by acknowledgment of paternity, it does
9. As in Young v. Young (1953) W.A.C.A. cyclostyle! Reports 19> 
where the putative father wrote a letter to his relative ad­
mitting paternity of a child. The letter was not discovered 
until after his death. Nonetheless, the child was held le­
gitimated by paternal acknowledgment.
10.Phillips v. Phillips (1946) 18 N.L.R.102.
11.Akgrele v. Balogun (1964) L.L.R.99.
12.Savage v. Macfoy (1909) I Ren. G.C. Rep.504.
15.Phillips v. Phillips (1946) 18 N.L.R.102. ,
14. JirigTx) v. Chief Anamali -.1958) ' AA/.N.L.R. 195*
15- Akerele v. Balogun (1964) L.L.R.99*
not matter that the registration of the child's birth was done
b# another person provided it has been done on the clear autho-
16rity of the putative father. And contrary to the statemeir 
of the law by Ademola, C.P.J., in Lawal v. Younan,1^ that an 
acknowledged child is legitimate Mfor certain purposes", there 
is no evidence under customary law to show that a child legi­
timated by paternal acknowledgment by any of the methods enu­
merated above is treated differently from a child born in law­
ful wedlock. Indeed, in the majority of cases in which the 
concept has come up for consideration btfore the courts, the 
vital issue in such cases has been whether an acknowledged 
child could inherit from M s  father, an issue which has al­
ways been resolved favourably to the acknowledged child. If 
it is recalled that succession rights constitute the major 
incident arising out of the status of legitimacy, the state­
ment of the Chief Justice tending tb limit the effect of legi­
timation by paternal acknowledgment appears to have been made 
per incuriam.
In considering the concept of legitimation by paternal 
acknowledgment in Nigeria, it will be necessary for purposes 
of clhrity to discuss the topic under the following three cate­
gories: (i) Legitimation by Paternal Acknowledgment when there 
is no form of marriage or when the marriage is void; (ii) legi­
timation by Paternal Acknowledgment when there are legitimate 
children of a valid Polygamous Marriage, and (iii) Legitimation 
by Paternal Acknowledgment when there are legitimate children of 
a valid Monogamous Marriage. Under these heads, it is proposed 
to show how the dualism of marriage law in Nigeria has introduced
some complexities into the problem and how far the courts have 
responded to the difficulties thus created,
16. Akerele v. Balogun (1964) L.L.R.99*
17. [l96ll . All N.L.K.24-5.
i. Legitimation by Paternal Acknowledgment when there
is no form of marriage or when the marriage is void.
In Nigeria, a marriage which is void ab initio: ' 
produces the same effect on the issue of such marriage as if 
the parents were never married. In both cases, the children 
of such association are illegitimate. This is not only true 
of issues of void monogamous marriages but also with regard 
to the issues emanating from void polygamous marriages. The 
former situation is governed by the common law rule which pres­
cribes that children of void marriages are illegitimate and 
can claim no rights through the husbands of such void marriages. 
The second situation is brought about by rules of customary law 
of the respective Jurisdictions in Nigeria, though, as the 
only system recognising the doctrine of putative marriage, 
the Moslem law clothes an invalid marriage with certain effects, 
one of which is that the children of such marriage are legiti­
mate, provided that the marriage was contracted by the parties
18in ignorance of the impediments which invalidated it.
Legitimation by paternal acknowledgment operates a 
process by which children of void monogamous and polygamous 
marriages, and children which are not the issues of any marriage 
could acquire legitimate status in most Jurisdictions in the 
country. Furthermore, this aaacept brings about the same re­
sult with regard to children of voidable monogamous marriages 
which have been annulled by court decrees. Often than not, 
the husband of such voidable monogamous marriage would have 
performed, before the annulment, acts from which it may be 
inferred that he had accepted the" paternity of. the children 
of such marriage•
18. See Ma'aji Shani, op.cit., pp.12-13*
The earliest case in which the Concept has been ap-
. . iq
plied, is that of Savage v. Macfoy. J There, as we have seen
in our earlier consideration of the case in connection with
the law governing the validity of marriage, two persons do-
1
miciled in Nigeria, at a time when the country had not become 
a federation, contracted a polygamous marriage which was de­
clared invalid on the ground that the law of the husband’s 
domicile of origin, i.e. Sierra Leone law, did not permit 
polygamous marriages. But with regard to the rights of the 
children of the void marriage to take on the intestacy of their
father, Osborne C.J., held that since their ipaternity had been
acknowledged by their father before his death, they were legi­
timate and entitled to take on the intestacy of the deceased 
father. Furthermore, he held that there could be no difference 
between the status of such children and those b o m  in lawful
wedlock. This point was amplified by the same Judge two years
20later in the case of Re Sapara where he stated that under
the Lagos customary law, "a child's right of succession to his
father’s property can be legalised by mere acknowledgment
without the necessity of any form of marriage between his parent
In the earlier case, the learned Chief Justice had
given the basic consideration underlying the concept when he
remarked that
"There has been divergence of testimony as 
to the details of this native law, but from 
all the evidence adduced, one fact stands out 
predominant, it is, the principal interests to p-. 
be considered, are those of the ..... children"•
In other words, unlike the common law, the customary law dis­
associates the circumstances surrounding the birth of a child 
from the question of its social welfare. Therefore, the fact
19. (1909) I Ren. G.C. Rep.304.
20. (1911) 1 Ren. G*6.Rep.604 at p.606.
21* Savage v. Macfoy (1909) 1 Ren. G.C. 504- at p.508.
that the parents had breached some stringent prescriptions of 
the matrimonial law will not affect the status conferred by 
the law as a result of its recognition by the putative father*
In short, customary law does not believe in visiting the in­
discretions of the parents on their innocent offsprings. Of 
paramount importance to the law are the welfare and interests
of the child. Thus analysed, the seeming irreconcilable view
PP p^of Osborne, C.J., in Savage v. Macfoy, i.e. that a person ^
who is not normally subject to customary law as will allow 
him to contract a valid marriage under it, many nonetheless 
take advantage of the customary law concept of legitimation 
by acknowledgment to legitimate the children of his void 
marriage - becomes intellifele. The net result of this judgment 
is that legitimation by paternal acknowledgment has been ele­
vated from a principle of customary law and has become a con­
cept of the general (i.e. territorial J- law of the Lagos State 
applicable to all persons domiciled in that State, irrespective 
of racial identity.
24-In Phillip v. Phillip, there was even no form of 
marriage between the intestate and the three women who each 
bore him a child. All these children were acknowledged by the 
deceased father during his lifetime and it was held that all 
the children were legitimate issues of the intestate, the 
effect of which was that they were entitled to succeed to 
his property.
The principle established in the above case has been
25applied in subsequent cases in the Western State ^ and the Mid- 
Western State where similar rules exist in the customary laws.
22. $avage v. Macfoy (1909) 1 Ren. G.C.Rep. at p.508.-
23. e.g. a European.
24-. (194-6) 18 N.L.R.102.
25* Lawal v. Younan [19613 * All R.L.R.24-5.
26. Jirigho v. Chief Anamali -[1958] ■ W-W.L.R.193*
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We have also seen that the position is the same under the
Moslem law which operates in most of the Northern Nigerian
States, subject to the, proviso that the putative father must
have been capable of intermarriage with the child's mother
before he can validly legitimate the child of their fortuitous
connection by acknowledgment. To adapt, therefore, the words
27of Lord Phillimore in Khoo Hooi Leong v. Khoo Hean Ewee, ' 
it is beyond dispute that it is a jural conception in these • 
Nigerian States that a child may be legitimate though its parents 
were not legitimately married.
There is, however, still a lacuna in the law in some 
States with regard to the children of void marriages. These 
are, most of the Northern Nigerian States and the three Eastern 
Nigerian States. In the former, legitimation by paternal 
acknowledgment is a concept of Moslem law of the ^aliki School 
which operates in the States. It is therefore not a secular 
law which applies territorially but a religious personal law 
applicable to those professing the Moslem faith. The question 
is, should mere acquisition of domicile in any of these States, 
without an admission of the Moslem faith as well, operate to 
endow a putative father with capacity to acknowledge the ille­
gitimate child of his void marriage, whatever the nature of
usch marriage? It is submitted that, as the state of the law
28is, it will not.
As previously stated, the principle of legitimation 
by paternal acknowledgment is not permitted by the domestic 
laws of the three Eastern Nigerian States. With regard to these 
jurisdictions, it has been stated that a void customary marriage
27. [1926] A.C.529 at p.543; cited with approval in Bamgbose v. 
Daniel [1955] A.C.107.
28. Some suggestions to deal with such situation will be con- ■ 
sidered below.
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29has no legal effects. J Consequently, the wife of such marriage
is considered as a feme sole and any child begotten by her is
30rightless as regards the husband th& void marriage. The 
position is the same at common law in relation to the children 
of void monogamous marriages or the issues of voidable mono­
gamous marriages which had been annulled. Since legitimation 
by paternal acknowledgment is not permitted in these places 
and since there is no statutory enactment preserving the legi­
timacy of the children of such marriages, there is no doubt 
that their illegitimacy is indelible, unless their natural
fathers (or both parents) are prepared to go by the rather
31tortuous and expensive process of legal adoption ' to remove
the stain of bastardy attaching to them.
Presumably in mitigation of the deficiency of the law
relating to the legitimacy of children of void and annulled
marriages in the Northern and the Eastern Nigerian States,
32a tiiikid but rather ingenious suggestion has been made  ^ that 
the current English enactments on this point should be con­
sidered as part of the Nigerian law. In our view, there is
to
no authority for this expedient but first,/deal with the English 
law; Section 11 of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965* 
re-enacting similar provisions contained in the Acts of 1937 
and 1950, alters the common law rule that a child of a voidable 
marriage is automatically bastardised by the court's decree 
annulling the marriage. In its place, the section provides 
that where a nullity decree is granted in respect of a voidable 
marriage, any child of such marriage is the legitimate offspring
29. Obi, Modern Eamily Law in Southern Nigeria, p.181.
30. (lbid. Ibo Law of Property, p.190.
31. See the Adoption Law, 1965* No.12 of 1955*
52. by Messrs Kasunmu andSAlacuse, op.cit., pp2L0-212,
4£2.
of the parties. In other words, the annulment of a voidable 
marriage no longer has a bastardising affect on a child begotten 
before the court's decree of nullity. In this respect the 
section impliedly recognises that there is no intrinsic dif­
ference between annulment of a voidable marriage (which the law 
regards as valid until terminated'at the instance of one. of 
the parties^ and divorce. Both proceedings have identity of 
purpose, i.e. the legal termination of the conjugal union. 
Secondly, it is provided by section 2 of the English Legitimacy 
Act, 1959> that the child of a void marriage should be treated 
as the legitimate issue of its parents, if at the time the 
child was conceived, or at the date of the marriage, if later, 
either of both parents reasonably believed that the marriage 
was valid.
It will be remembered that by virtue of section 16 
of the High Court of Lagos Act and section 4 of the State 
Courts (Eederal Jurisdiction) Act, all the various High Courts 
in Nigeria exercise their jurisdiction in relation to the annul­
ment, dissolution and other matrimonial causes concerning
monogamous marriages in conformity with "the law and practice
34for the time being in force in England. Messrs Kasunmu
and £*SLacuse, having asserted that section 11 of the English
"Matrimonial Causes Act 1965” applies in Nigeria by virtue of
the above provisions goes on to argue that section 2 of the
English Legitimacy Act 1959 might also be regarded as applicable
in Nigeria if legitimacy of children of void and voidable
marriages " is regarded as incidental to ......  annulment of
35marriages"• ^ The sole reason given by these learned authors for
33- See Jackson, The Formation and Annulment of Marriage (1951) 
pp.75-76. : :
34. See the Postscript for the present position of the law on 
this ]poihtl.
35. Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.cit.. p.210 et seq.
the suggestion that the provisions of these two English Acts 
apply in Nigeria is that the interest of children horn in void­
able marriages in Nigeria demands such a course of action!
It is submitted that the view that section 11 of the 
English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 and section 2 of the 
English Legitimacy Act 1959 apply in Nigeria is devoid of reason­
able foundation in logic and in principle. The identical pro­
visions of section 16 of the High Court of Lagos Act and 
section 4 of the State Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act 
mean no more than they say. They only authorised the courts to 
exercise their jurisdiction in divorce and other matrimonial 
causes according to the English law on such matters. On a
restrictive interpretation, it may even be stated, as it has
36been done by these learned authors, ^ that the provisions 
do not impose on the Nigerian courts any obligation to apply 
the substantive law on divorce and matrimonial causes obtaining 
in England, though as a pragmatic expedient, the provisions 
had been interpreted by the High Courts in Nigeria as justi­
fying the application of the English substantive law in the 
absence of a Nigerian law on such matters. Nonetheless this 
broad interpretation cannot be taken as justifying the total 
application of the English Matrimonial Causes Act 1955* Sec­
tion 11 of the Act is a provision on legitimacy and the mere . 
fact that it was contained, presumably for convenience, in an 
Act entitled "Matrimonial Causes" does not make the section
37operative in Nigeria. As aptly pointed out by Professor Allott, (
"Where there has been a specific adoption of 
English law on a particular topic, only so much 
of the English law as is specifically adopted 
will apply".
36. Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.cit., p.106 in connection with 
"Termination of Statutory Marriage".
37* Essays in African Law, p.6.
Vfey should the positive test laid down in section 2 of
the English Legitimacy Act 1959 for determining the legitimacy
of /'issues of void marriages he operative in Nigeria? As
38admitted by Messrs. Kasunmu and Salacuse,^ the invariable
condition under which an English Act of general application
39
may operate m  certain States in Nigeria^.is that it should 
have been passed in England before 1st January, 1900. This 
eliminates the- applicability of the English Legitimacy Act,
1959- And to the best of our knowledge the Act has not been 
specifically adopted in any of the States. If we, therefore, 
accept the sole argument marshalled by these learned writers 
in favour of the applicability of this Act in. Nigeria, i.e. 
that the legitimacy of children of a void marriages is an 
incidental matter to the annulment jurisdiction of the High 
Courts, then the following anomalous situation will arise in 
relation to the determination of the legitimacy of such chil­
dren in Nigeria. At common law, a court decree is not neces­
sary to annul a void marriage as opposed to a voidable marriage. 
Whether or not a nullity decree has been obtained, a void 
marriage is of no legal significance. If the applicability of 
section 2 of the English Legitimacy Act 1959 depends on the 
annulment jurisdiction of the States' High Courts, which is 
made exercisable in conformity with the current English law 
on such matter, then the result will be that section 2 of the 
Legitimacy Act 1959 will confer the status of legitimacy on 
issues of void marriages which had been annulled in Nigeria, 
but the section will be ineffedtive in respect of such children 
whose parents wisely refused to initiate some cumbrous and ex­
pensive proceedings of annulment to determine the obvious 
effect of their.void marriages. Therefore, apart from the 
38. op.cit., pp.208-209•
39* Ho English Statute of general application applies in the 
Western and the Mid-Western States of Nigeria by virtue ^ of 
section 4 of Vesbern Nigeria, Laws of England (Application)Law, 
Cap.60, (1959 ed.). . . ,
condition imposed by the English Act that there should be good
faith on the part of either party to the^marriage, the legitimacy
of issues of void monogamous marriages will further be conditional
on whether a nullity decree has been obtained by one of the
child’s parents in respect <bf their void marriage* If only
for the confusion that such construction will introduce into
the law, this view should be rejected*
Finally, all the points mustered by Messrs* Kasunmu
and Salacuse in support of their view that the provisions of
the English Acts are operative in Nigeria are b.hsed on the
fundamental assumption that legitimacy is a matter incidental
to marriage, or the annulment of marriage, and therefore should
be classified as a matter within the legislative competence
40of the Federal Government under the Constitution* Conse­
quently, the two Federal Acts which impelled the High Courts 
in Nigeria to exercise their jurisdiction ”in relation to 
marriage and the annulment and dissolution of marriage .* *. in 
conformity with the law and practice for the time being in 
force in England”, also impelled them to apply the current 
English law on legitimacy since legitimacy is incidental to 
marriage or the annulment of it! This point will be fully 
dealt with in connection with the problem of choice of laws, 
but in the meantime it must be submitted that this view appears 
the result of muddled thinking* Legitimacy has never been 
considered a federal subject under the Nigerian Constitution* 
Therefore, any argument that the Federal Acts which authorised 
the courts to exercise jurisdiction on marriages and nullity 
of marriages in conformity with the current English law imports 
into Nigeria the current English law on the legitimacy of
40* Item 23 of the Exclusive Legislative List of the 1963
Republican Constitution gives the Federal Parliament power to 
enact laws on ’’Marriages other than marriages under Moslem law
or other customary law; annulment and dissolution of, .iand 
other matrimonial causes relating to, marriages other than
/cont••••
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children of void and voidable marriage^ goes into the melting 
point since the Federal Parliament has no power to enact laws 
on legitimacy.
The view that whenever there is a gap in the law in 
Nigeria, we should look to the English law for a ready-made 
solution provides no foundation for constructive or imagina­
tive reform. The best approach should be to recognise the 
existence of such laeuna in the law and then devise a solution 
which will accord with the popular consciousness of the. common 
weal, rather than to strain the language of the existing sta-. 
tutory provisions to achieve some imperfect remedy. To the 
problem of reform, we shall return at the end of this part.
ii. Legitimation by Paternal Acknowledgment when the
illegitimate child’s father is polygamously married 
and has legitimate children.
There are two situations which may arise under this 
category. An illegitimate child may be born to a man in con­
cubinage either before or after his valid polygamous marriage 
of which there are legitimate children. On the other hand, 
during the existence of a valid polygamous marriage, he may 
form an illicit association with another woman who begat him 
an illegitimate child in addition to other children of his 
polygamous marriages. Could the putative father by acknowledging 
the paternity of such illegitimate children during his life 
make them legitimate from the time of their birth as other 
children born in lawful wedlock?
The law has been clarified as regards these two situa­
tions after some initial uncertainty created by the decision in
F/note 40 cont. from previous page.
marriages...under Moslem law or other customary law".
Item 43 further provides that the Federal Parliament has exclusive 
power to enact laws on "Any matter that ismincidental or supplemen 
tary ... to any matter mentioned elsewhere in this list".
ZL1
Re Estate of Macaulay. In that case, the facts were that the 
deceased, Herbert Macaulay, was the issue of a monogamous 
marriage who himself first, contracted a monogamous marriage 
in December, 1898. This marriage lasted approximately for 
six months as a result of the death of his wife in May 1889. 
There was no issue of the marriage. But prior to this mar­
riage, Macaulay had had some illegitimate children born to 
him in concubinage. The paternity of these children was acknow­
ledged by him. After the termination of his monogamous marri­
age by death of the wife, he contracted a set of four poly­
gamous marriages as a result of which some children were born. 
And during the continuance of these polygamous marriages, other 
illegitimate children were born to him by different women none 
of whom was his wife. The paternity of these children was 
also acknowledged. The net result was that at the time of 
his death there were thirteen children claiming the right to 
succeed to his intestate estate. Since Herbert Macaulay was 
subject to the jurisdiction of the then Lagos Oolong where 
all his properties were to be found, the distribution of his 
intestate estate fell to be made according to the provisions 
of section 36 of the Marriage Act which is as follows: On
the death intestate of a person subject to customary law but 
who contracted a monogamous marriage under the Act, or on the 
death intestate of the issue of such person,
"the personal property of such intestate and 
also any real property of which the said inte­
state might have disposed by will, shall be 
distributed in accordance with the provisions 
of the law of England relating to the distribu­
tion of the personal estate of intestates” any 
customary law to the contrary notwithstanding.
Thus in the instant case, since Macaulay was not only the issue
of a monogamous marriage but since he himself had contracted a
hi. Unreported decision of the Lagos Supreme Court, No.AG.68 of 
15/9/52.
monogamous marriage under the Act, even though at the time of 
his death he was polygamously married, the distribution of 
his intestate estate fell to be determined by English law. 
Therefore, it was necessary to know which of tlhe thirteen 
children were legitimate so as to determine which of them were 
entitled to succeed.
It was on this point that the trial judge showed a 
fantastically naive idea about the process of classification 
as to what law, the Nigerian or the English law, should deter­
mine the legitimacy of the children and as regards which the
LlO
West African Court of Appeal was similarly confused. Thus, 
as could be seen, the section is only concerned with distribu­
tion according to English law but does not purport to authorise 
the Nigerian courts to determine who are to succeed to the 
property by reference to English law. But both Reece, J., the 
trial Judge, and the West African Court of Appeal, decided that 
the persons entitled to succeed should be ascertained by re­
ference to English law. Reece, J., decided that reference 
should be made to English domestic law on legitimacy and found 
that only children who were born in lawful monogamous wedlock 
were legitimate in England. Therefore, since none of the 
thirteen children of Herbert Macaulay was born within mono­
gamous conjugal union, all were illegitimate and accordingly 
could not take on the intestacy of their father.
On appeal, the West African Court of Appeal (per 
Verity C.J., who gave the unanimous decision of the court) 
was of the view that it was *hn complete agreement that it is 
the law of England that the local [Act] directs that reference 
should be made, though I consider that it is to distrubution and 
not to [the ascertainment of the persons having the rights of?]
4-2. Sub-norm, Re Sarah Adadevoh (1951) 13 W. A.C. A. 304-.
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43succession that accuracy demands the application of that law".
It is only hy making an adjustment to the statement by the in­
sertion of the words in the second brackets that the state­
ment becomes intelligible. Otherwise it is difficult to see 
the distinction which the Chief Justice was trying to make 
between "distribution” and "succession”. But if our supposed 
mistatement of the Chief Justice's words could be attributed 
to the reporter's error, the passage from the same page in 
his judgment precludes such a conclusion being reached. The
court, having made copious references to English decisions, on
44private international law said:
"In regard to the appellants, [i.e. the thirteen 
children] therefore, the question to be determined 
is whether in accordance with the provisions.of 
the law of England relating to distribution they 
are the children of the deceased, that is to say 
his legitimate children, their status as such- 
being determined, according to the law of England,
Isy reference to the law of the domicile of their 
parents at the time of their birth".
Thus, while Reece, J., made reference to the internal law of
England as the law applicable to determine the legitimacy
of the children, the Vest African Court of Appeal proceeded
a little further by holding that it was to the whole of
English law, including its rules on private international law,
that reference should be made. Fortunately, since the English
conflict rule determines the legitimacy of a person by reference
to the law of domicile of his parents at the time of his birth,
the court was able to remit the case to the lower court with
the direction that the issue of the legitimacy of the children
should be determined in accordance with the Nigerian lex domicilii
43. Sub-norm, Re Sarah Adadevoh (1951) 15 W.A.C.A. at p.309#
44. viz., Re Goodman1s Trusts (1811) 17 Ch.D.266; Sinha Peerage 
Case [ 1946J 1 All i2.R.348; Baindail v. Baindail L1946J 
T T T l E.R. 342.
of the parents at the time of their birth.
That this interpretation is capable of producing an 
unreasonable result can be illustrated by the assumption that 
had the English Conflicts rule on this matter being that no 
effect should be given to status of legitimacy emanating from 
the polygamous marriage of the child's parents, then the Ni­
gerian courts, operating in a polygamous society, would have 
been prepared to accept this supposed conflict rule of a mono­
gamous society on the basis that section 36 of the Marriage 
Act compelled them to do so! It is, however, now unnecessary 
to belabour this point since the Privy Council has rightly 
held in Bamgbose v. Daniel ^  that the effect of section 36 of 
the Marriage Act is to fix the table of distribution in accord­
ance with the English law, leaving the Nigerian law to deter­
mine the particular individuals who are entitled to participate 
in the distribution table, without any prior reference to the 
English law.
Reverting then to the question of the legitimacy of 
the children under the Lagos customary law to which all were 
subject, Jibowu J., on the retrial of the issue as ordered 
by the Court of Appeal, held that the children of the poly­
gamous marriages were legitimate having been born in lawful 
wedlock. He also held that under customary law the other 
children were legitimate since their paternity had been acknow­
ledged by their father during his lifetime• Nonetheless he 
refused to give them any interests in the intestate estate 
of their deceased father on ground of public policy. He said
45* [1955] A.C.107; followed in Taylor v. Taylor (I960) L.L.R.286 
and Cole v. Akinyele (I960) 5 P.8.0.84 at p.86.
"The position is then that we have two 
conflicting systems.of law: one which
does not recognise a child as legitimate 
unless the parents are lawfully married, and 
the other, a crude rule obviously intended 
to meet the requirement of primitive society, 
which says that marriage is not necessary and 
the issue of concubinage or adulterous connec­
tion is legitimate as long as he is acknow­
ledged by his father. Such a customary law 
....offends against common sense, decency 
and public policy.’1
46Regardless of the decision in Savage v. Macfoy that there 
should be no difference between children whose paternity had 
been acknowledged by the putative father and those born in 
lawful conjugal union, Jibowu J., concluded that children le­
gitimated by paternal acknowledgment would not be held legi­
timate so as to entitle them to succeed on the intestacy of 
their father when there are in existence children of a marriage 
recognised by law.
A second decision by the same judge involving the
application of public policy to disinherit children legitimated
47by paternal acknowledgment is that of Alake v. Pratt. Al­
though in the case, the acknowledged children were claiming 
in competition with children born in monogamous marriagq, it 
will be convenient in view of the public policy consideration 
involved to consider it at this juncture. Contrary to the
brief and misleading statement of the facts of the case in the
48law report, the true position was that One Dudley Coker, 
the deceased, contracted a monogamous marriage under the Marriage 
Act in 1906. The wife of this marriage died ten years later 
with two issues surviving her. They were the defendants in the
46. (1909) 1 Ren. G.C.Rep.504.
47. (1955) 15 W.A.C.A.20.
48. As revealed by the decisions of thefLagos Supreme Court 
in Suits Nos. 400/1951 and 4289 of 6/4/1954. Cf. Nwogugu, 
J.A.L. (1964) at p.104.
present case. After the wife's death, Dudley Coker entered 
infcd an illicit union with a woman, Yeside, whose Moslem 
marriage with another man, Folawiyo, appeared to "be still 
subsisting, although at the time of her illicit association 
with Dudley Coker, she was living apart from her husband.
Out of this illicit association, two children (the appellants) 
were born and their paternity was duly acknowledged by Dudley 
Coker before his death. In a claim by the acknowledged chil­
dren that they were entitled to share equally in the intestate 
estate of the deceased with the children of the monogamous 
marriage, Jibowu J,, held that according to the Lagos customary 
law the illegitimate children of the deceased had been legi­
timated since their father acknowledged their" paternity before 
his death. He further held, however, that it would be incompa­
tible with public policy to accord them any succession rights 
in competition with children born in lawful wedlock and there­
fore excluded them. In the words of the learned judge,
"Where there are children born in lawful wd&lock, 
children born out of wedlock should be excluded 
from participating in the distribution of the 
estate of their father [but] if the children 
of the deceased are all of the same status, that 
is, born without marriage, they could inherit 
their father's property".
On appeal, the West African Court of Appeal held
that the trial judge was wrong in excluding the acknowledged
children from participating in the distribution of the deceased
estate on the ground of public policy. The unanimous decision
of the court was given by Foster Sutton P. and in his judgment,
he observed:
"I do not think for one moment that the court 
[below] intended to suggest that if such 
native law and custom were proved, and a child 
born out of wedlock was held to be legitimate 
under the law in Nigeria, there could, in effect, 
be different grades of legitimacy so as to affect 
their rights of succession. The evidence in this
case is that under Yoruba Law and Custom all 
legitimate children are entitled to share in 
their father's estate, and the appellants 
having hadn held to be legitimate, I do not thinfe 
the question of their parents' marriage is then 
a relevant subject for investigation. Nor do I 
think that public policy demands that the courts 
of this country should hold otherwise." ^
The effect of this judgment is that it not only reversed the
decision of Jibowu J., in the court below but also nullified
50the authority of his earlier decision in Re Adadevoh/ that 
legitimation by paternal acknowledgment is a crude rule designed 
for a primitive society and that if offends against common 
sense, decency and public policy. Therefore, to restate the 
law on the authority of the above decision, it may be taken 
as now well established that an illegitimate child born either 
before, during or after the existence of a polygamous marriage 
of his putative father is legitimate if the paternity of such 
child is acknowledged by the putative father. After acknow­
ledgment, such child has the same rights and is subject to the 
same duties as a child born in lawful wedlock since there are 
no different grades of legitimacy.
All the above cases, no doubt, originated in Lagos.
But since the principle of acknowledgment is not confined to 
this state, the reinterpretation of customary law made in these
cases has been accepted in other States in Nigeria. Thus, in
51the Mid-Western State case of Jirigho v. Chief Anamali, the 
question was the rights of acknowledged children to claim for 
wrongful death of their father under the English Fatal Accidents
4-9. (1955) 15 W.A.C.A.20 at p.21.
50. (1951) 15 W.A.C.A.504-.
51. 0-958] VW..N.L.E.195.
Acts of 184-6 and 1864.^ The deceased had died as a result 
of the negligent driving of a motor vehicle Lfcy the defendant. 
The plaintiff who was the deceased's mother claimed compensation 
on behalf of herself, the widow and the six children of the 
deceased under the Fatal Accidents Acts for the wrongful death 
of her son. Under section 2 of the Act of 18^6, action for 
compensation may be brought, inter alia, for the benefit of 
the child of the person whose death shall have been accidentally 
caused. But by section 5* a child is defined as a son or 
daughter, grandson or grand-daughter, stepson or step-daughter, 
but excluding an illegitimate child.^ It was therefore
imperative for the court to determine whether the six children 
came within the terms of the Acts. Duffus J., found as a 
fact that only one of the six children was born in lawful poly­
gamous wedlock while the rest were issues of adulterous connec­
tions the deceased had with different women during his lifetime. 
He also found that the deceased acknowledged the paternity of 
the five illegitimate children during his lifetime and that
9
according to the Kwale customary law, they become legitimate 
and rank with the child of the valid marriage in all respects.
He therefore concluded that the five children legitimated by 
paternal acknowledgment were, together with the one born in 
lav/ful wedlock, within the meaning of the Fatal Accidents Act 
1846 and as such were entitled to be considered for awards of 
damages. If illegitimate children born during the continuance 
of a valid polygamous marriage could be legitimated by paternal 
acknowledgment, it follows, a fortiori, that such children born
52. The Acts are entitled "An Act for Compensating the Families 
of Persons Killed By Accidents 9 & 10 Viet. Cap. of 1846 
and "Accidents Compensation Act", 27 & 28 Viet, of 1864.
The latter Act provides that the two Acts should be read 
as one.
55* Dickinson v. North Eastern Railway Company (1065) 9 L.T*
before or after the marriage could also be legitimated by 
paternal recognition*
It appears that the position is the same in the Western
54State,^ not only because it is a Yoruba tribal area as Lagos, 
but more importantly by virtue of the State's Marriage, Divorce 
and Custody of Children.Adoptive Bye-laws Order which provides, 
that "paternal rights shall normally be awarded to the natural 
father whether or not such natural father is married to the 
mother" and then goes on by way of proviso that the husband 
of the mother shall be presumed the natural ,father of a child 
born or conceived during the subsistence of their marriage*
This provision, it is submitted, makes nonsense of any rule 
of public policy which categorises the concept of legitima­
tion by paternal acknowledgment existing under the State's 
customary law as a crude rule designed for a primitive society.
It seems certain that the courts of the Western State will 
uphold the legitimacy of a child legitimated by the acknow­
ledgment of his paternity by his natural father, whether such 
child was bom before, during or after a valid polygamous mar­
riage of his putative father, and whether the acknowledged child 
was born to the putative father by a married or unmarried woman.
A point of great difficulty against this contention
55is the case of Oladele v* Akinsola, ^  a decision of the High 
Court of Western Nigeria given at the Abeokuta Judicial Division* 
But that decision loses its authority as a binding precedent 
since it was given per incuriam* The facts of the case are
54. See P.O. Lloyd, op.cit., pp.78 and 297; subject to the cri­
ticism of his statement of the Yoruba law as made above. 
Indeed, a Yoruba person's mind will recoil at the statement 
that a child born to a deceased man by a concubine establishes 
his rights as a legitimate child by contributing towards
the funeral expenses. See p. 287.
55. Unreported, Suit No* AB/7/65.
rather involved hut the relevant parts may he summarised as 
follows: W. was the wife of H., their marriage, validly con­
tracted under customary law, not, having been dissolved. During 
the existence of this marriage, W. formed an association with X. 
who was himself polygamously married. As a consequence of 
this association S., the plaintiff, was born. The paternity 
of S. was acknowledged by X. by his performance of the naming 
ceremony of the child. Two months after the birth of the child,
X died as a result of a motor accident caused by the negligent
driving of the defendant. Together with other children of the
56deceased, S. claimed under the Western Nigeria Torts Law x 
for compensation for the wrongful death of X. With regard to 
the claim by S., Beckfey Ag.J., held that although S. was 
acknowledged by the deceased father as his son during his life­
time, nonetheless, it would be contrary to public policy to let 
him in as a legitimate child of the deceased fotf the purpose 
of claiming compensation under the Law, since S. was the issue 
of an adulterous relationship.
It is submitted that this decision is palpably wrong 
within the context of the Western Nigeria Torts Law. Section 4 
of the LA'W provides that compensation for negligent death may 
be claimed for the benefit, inter alia, of a child of the de­
ceased. Section 5 goes on to say that for the purpose of the 
Act, "a person shall be deemed to be the ..... child of the 
deceased person notwithstanding that he was only related to 
him illegitimately”. From these ifcwo sections of the Law, it 
therefore becomes clear that a decision on the legitimacy of 
the child was not. called for. A child neeck not be legitimate 
to claim under the Act. Therefore, the pronouncement of Beckley,
Ag. J*, that the child of an adulterous relationship could not be
56. Cap.122, Laws of Western Nigeria (1959 ed.).
legitimated by paternal acknowledgment must be discountenanced 
since it was vitiated by his unfortunate oversight of the sta­
tutory provision on the point at issue. This decision also 
illustrates that "public policy", in relation to the concept 
of legitimation by paternal acknowledgment in Nigeria, has 
become a term of art for expressing the idiosyncratic pre­
ferences of individual judges for what is considered best for 
the public good. Whether or not such expendiency is completely 
out of tune with the good of the community in which they 
operate, or is contrary to clear provisions of the law, seems 
irrelevant.
iii. Legitimation by Paternal Acknowledgment when
the illegitimate child's father is monogamous- 
ly married and has legitimate children.
Most of the problems arising here are similar to those 
endountered when considering the claim of an acknowledged child 
in competition with legitimate issues of a polygamous marriage. 
They also admit of the same solution. Thus, for instance, if 
a man had an illegitimate child before his monogamous marriage 
to a woman not the mother of the child, such child attains the 
same status of legitimacy as that of a child begotten during 
the subsequent monogamous marriage of his putative father,
57provided his paternity has been acknowledged by the father.
If the illegitimate child was born after the dissolution of
57» Taylor v. Taylor (I960) L.L.R.286.
the monogamous marriage of his father, he is also legitimate
58frm birth if the putative father acknowledges his paternity.^
The position is, however, different when a father
seeks to acknowledge an illegitimate child born to him during
the continuance of his monogamous marriage. This is where the
Nigerian law differs from those of other countries whose legal
systems permit of legitimation by parental acknowledgment and
where comparison of the Nigerian law with those systems of law
will be a rewarding exercise in relation to reform proposals.
The first decision in which the principle of acknowledgment in
respect of an illegitimate child born during the existence of
a monogamous marriage between the putative father and a woman
not the mother of the child, was refused on the ground of
public policy is that of the Federal Supreme Court in Cole v.
59Akinyele.  ^ Albert Abimbola Cole, the deceased, twice entered 
into a valid monogamous marriage under the Nigerian Marriage 
Act, his first marriage having been terminated by the death 
of his wife. The respondent was the issue of the first marriage. . 
The second marriage was childless. But in addition to these 
two marriages, the deceased maintained an irregular union with 
a woman for many years during the duration of these two marriages. 
Out of this association, two children, the appellants, were born. 
The elder child was born during the continuance of the first 
marriage while the younger was begotten six weeks after the 
death of the first wife but before the deceased's re-marriage 
to the second wife. In the words of Brett, F.J., "it is not 
disputed that during his lifetime the deceased openly acknowledged
58.mAlake v. Pratt (1955) 15 W.A.C.20.
59. (I960) 5 F.S.C.84.
the appellants as his children and treated them,, as such".
On the death intestate of their father, therefore, the acknow­
ledged children, not unnaturally, sued in reliance on the 
Lagos customary law for a declaration that they were the le­
gitimate children of the deceased and that they were entitled 
to equal shares with the child of the monogamous marriage in 
their father's property.
In the lower court, Kaine, J., held both acknowledged 
children illegitimate on the ground that they were the off­
springs of a promiscuous relationship, a relationship which 
he found incompatible with monogamy. In so holding, he con­
sidered it unnecessary to differentiate between the elder child 
who was born during the subsistence of the first monogamous 
marriage and the younger one who was born when the father was 
a widower, on the footing that the latter "was already in being" 
before the death of the deceased's first wife. In other words, 
since the deceased could not have married .the mother of the 
acknowledged children at the time when the first was born or 
when the second was conceived, acknowledgment of paternity by 
their natural father did not legitimate them.
On appeal, the Federal Supreme Court adopted a pre­
eminently illogical attitude towards the issue by considering 
the legitimacy of the two children separately. With regard 
to the child born during the existence of the monogamous 
marriage it held, affirming the decision of the lower court, 
that it would be contrary to public policy for the natural 
father to be able to legitimate his illegitimate child, who, 
was born during the existence of the father's monogamous mar­
riage, by any other method than that provided for in the Le­
gitimacy Act. To put it more lucidly, since the Legitimacy Act 
permits only legitimation by subsequent monogamous marriage of
the illegitimate child's parents, neither acknowledgment of 
paternity by the putative father nor a subsequent polygamous 
marriage by the parents, could legitimate such child. This 
is regardless of the facts (i) that legitimation by subsequent 
monogamous marriage is not intended to displace all other pro­
cesses of attaining legitimate status in Nigeria but to sup­
plement them and (ii) as pointed out by the Federal Supreme 
Court itself, that a man who was previously married under 
monogamy can go back to polygamy after a valid termination of 
his monogamous marriage. In any event, the view of the court 
was that "to hold otherwise would almost be to reduce the dis­
tinction between the effects of the two forms of marriage to 
a matter of w o r d s " - a view which would seem to suggest 
that the Federal Supreme Court was going back on the opinion 
of the Privy Council in Bamgbose v. Daniel ^  that the Nigerian 
legal system, like some others, had moved away from the posi­
tion that legitimacy and a valid marriage between the natural 
parents of a child are correlative factors.
With regard to the second illegitimate child who was 
born after the death of the first wife, even -though conceived 
during the existence of the monogamous marriage, the court re­
versed the decision of Kaine J., by holding that there was no 
rule of public policy which excluded his legitimation by paternal
acknowledgment since he was "born at a time when his father was
6?free to marry whom he chose".
60. (I960) 5 F.S.C.84 at p.88.
61. [1955] A.C.107.
62. (I960) 5 F.S.C.84- at p.88.
will be recalled that what the court was minded 
to prevent, by its application of public policy to strike down 
legitimation of the first child by paternal acknowledgment, 
is the "encouragement of promiscuous intercourse" between parties 
to a monogamous marriage, and, hence, prevent the reduction of 
the distinction between the effects of monogamous marriage and
i
polygamous marriage to a matter of words* But since both
children were the offsprings of a promiscuous relationship
(regardless of the fact that only one was actually born during
the continuance of the father's monogamous marriage, the other
being born six weeks after its termination), the court, no
doubt, recognised the disparity in its findings regarding the
legitimacy of these two children and felt constrained to
rationalize it by the following observation:
"When a man indulges in irregular unions, no 
rule regarding the legitimacy or legitimation 
of his children, however liberal, can altogether 
avoid anomalies. It goes without saying that 
the two appellants are equally free from blame for 
the circumstances of their birth, and in the present 
case the conduct of their father and mother was 
morally and legally neither more nor less culpable 
when the first appellant was conceived than when 
the second appellant was. Nevertheless, it so 
happen that before the birth of the second 
appellant the lawful wife of their father....
.... had died, and I feel bound to hold 
him legitimate since his paternity has been 
acknowledged by the father."
With respect, it ;f-is submitted that this rationalization of the 
rule of public policy which bastardises an adulterine child 
if born during the existence of a monogamous marriage but legi­
timates it if it happens to be horn after the end of such marriage, 
even when conceived at a period when the marriage subsists, is 
total unconvincing.
65. (I960) 5 F.S.C.84 at p.88
64The rule in Cole v. Akinyele has evoked a lot of
65criticism "by academic writers ^ who are of the unanimous view
that the limitation placed on the concept of legitimation by
paternal acknowledgment in this case is an attempt, hitherto
successful, to fix the Nigerian law on legitimacy into the
scheme of the common law of England without having regard to
66the "basic social and economic differences which exist m  the 
two countries. Nonetheless, the rule has been confirmed by 
the Federal Supreme Court in Abisogun v. Abisogun ^  and
followed by the Lagos High Court in such cases as Jose Williams
68 69v. Babatunde Williams, Akerele v. Balogun J and Graig v.
Graig.^
Cole v. Akinyele and other cases following it are 
concerned with the Lagos law. But in view of the fact that it 
is a decision on public policy by the Federal Supreme Court, 
there is no doubt that it will be generally followed in the 
Astern State and the Mid-Western State where the principle of 
legitimation by paternal acknowledgment operates. The Maliki 
law has a similar, if not stricter, rule. With the state of 
existing law, therefore, it is our considered opinion that only 
legislation could reverse the unsatisfactory position of the 
law in this respect. What we propose to do in the rest of this
part is to stimulate the imagination by showing that the ap­
proach of several countries, particularly in the Western 
64. (I960) 5 F.S.C.84 at p.88.
69. See e.g. Nwogugu, 8 J.A.L.(1964) 91* at p.100 et seq.; Kasunmu
and Salacuse, op.cit., p.236 et seq.
66. Unlike in England, there are no social institutions in Nigeria 
where hard-pressed mothers could jettison their illegitimate 
children. This factor alone would seem to justify the encourage 
ment of a principle which allows natural fathers to assume vo­
luntary responsibility for the welfare of their children.
67. [1963] : All N.L.R.237.
68. No. M/112/63 decided on 11/11/63.
69. (1964) L.L.R.99 70. (1964)L.L.R.96.
civilization, to the problem of illegitimacy in modern times
✓
reflects an active and extensive movement towards the reform 
of their laws on a line favoured by the principle of acknow­
ledgment which, unfortunately, the Nigerian courts are now re­
jecting. For despite the assertion by Ademola C.F.J., in
71Lawal v. Younan ' that "legitimacy in England is a different 
concept to legitimacy in Nigeria", there is no doubt that the 
limitation placed on the principle of legitimation by paternal 
acknowledgment is still being dictated by a supposed universal 
principle of "Christian morality" with its Biblical concept 
of sin as a contagious matter which may be transitted from 
parent to child. But before we consider the present position 
in the European laws, we would like to point out that the 
Ghanaian courts have not accepted the rule of public policy 
which forbids an adulterine child from being legitimated by 
paternal acknowledgment.
72In Wilson v. Wilson' Edward B. Thomson, a native of 
Lagos, contracted a monogamous marriage under the Marriage Act 
in Nigeria. Later, both he and his wife left Nigeria for Ghana 
where, after several years' residence, they died; the wife 
in October 1902 and the husband in October, 1912. There was 
no issue of the marriage. But during the continuance of the 
marriage, E.B. Thomson purported to contract in Ghana a custo­
mary law marriage with a Ghanaian woman of the Ga tribe. The 
court found no hesitation in holding the customary law marriage 
void since the effect of the then identical Marriage Acts of 
Nigeria and Ghana was that a customary lav; marriage contracted 
during the existing monogamous marriage was void. The plaintiff, 
born about nine months before the death of Thomson's lawful wife,
71.0-961] All N.L.K.24-5.
72.(1925) Div. Ct. (1921-25) Rep.155
was the issue of the second (void) marriage. On the death 
intestate of E.B. Thomson, the plaintiff claimed that he was 
the legitimate child of the deceased and therefore entitled to 
succeed on his iiitestacy.
In the Divisional Court, Michelin C.J., resolved the 
issue of legitimacy of the plaintiff by holding as follows:
(1) That despite his several years' residence in Ghana,
E.B. Thomson still retained his Nigerian domicile 
of origin since he had no intention at any time 
during his life-time to reside permanently in 
Ghana.
(2) That his Nigerian law of domicile governed succession
to his property and also decided whether the child
of his void customary law marriage was legitimate.
(3) That it was clearly established before him, and in
particular, having regard to such Nigerian cases as 
Savage v. Macf o y ^  and Re Sapara, ^  that an illegi­
timate child could be legitimated by acknowledgment 
by his putative father.
(4) That E.B. Thomson acknowledged.the paternity of the
plaintiff according to Lagos customary law by a 
series of acts during his lifetime viz., by naming 
him immediately after his birth, by arranging for 
his baptism and giving the child his surname, and 
by accepting full responsibility for the child's 
education in Lagos, Nigeria, until his death.
He therefore concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to inherit 
both the real and personal property of the deceased as his
73. (1909) 1 Ren. G.C.Rep.504.
74. (1911) 1 Hen. G.C. Rep.604.
legitimate child* Even though it was "abundantly clear11 to the 
Chief Justice that the plaintiff was horn illegitimate during 
the existence of a monogamous marriage between his father and 
a woman not his mother, and indeed, that his paternity was 
first acknowledged during the continuance of the marriage, he 
dould see no rule of public policy which justified the non­
enforcement of a clearly ascertained rule of a foreign law 
which is almost identical with the Ga customary law of Ghana*
5. MODERN TRENDS IN THE LAW OF LEGITIMACY IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
As indicated in our introduction to this Chapter, 
many countries in the monogamous world have discarded the doc­
trine of making birth in lawful wedlock a sine qua non of 
legitimacy and permit legitimation of adulterine children not 
only by subsequent matrimony but also by other methods. In 
these countries it has long been recognised that no amount of 
legal restrictions could prevent the obvious fact that sexual 
relations and living together can and do take place outside 
the legally sanctioned marriage relationship: That the bye-
product of a strict legal regulation of marriage, i.e. monogamy, 
is birth of children outside wedlock; and that instead of 
tfisitSng the sins of the parents on the offspring of their in­
discretion, the law, even if it penalizes pre-marital or extra­
marital relationships by criminal and quasi-criminal sanction^ 
should consider the interest and welfare of the innocent child 
as of paramount importance to his acquisition of legitimate 
status, rights, privileges, etc. in society. In other words, 
there is a growing universal rejection of the philosophy of 
law which discourages bastardy by denying the right of inheritance 
or of support to illegitimate children and an acceptance of the
view that the time is ripe for disassociating the wrongful 
conduct of parents from.the general well-being of the child.
Three methods are found in the modern laws for catering 
for the problem of illegitimacy. One is to preserve the ille­
gitimacy of children who are not born in lawful wedlock or who 
are not issues whose parents' subsequent marriages had legi­
timated, but to enact laws by which both legitimate and 
illegitimate children may inherit from..their parents on equal 
basis. This method is now found in England. The second, which 
is more favoured by the American and continental systems of law 
is to provide by statutes, either in substitution for or in 
addition to legitimation by subsequent marriage, that an ille­
gitimate. child may attain full status of legitimacy upon 
express or public acknowledgment of his paternity by the father. 
The third is to make a complete abrogation of the status of 
illegitimacy and to make, through statutory provisions, all 
children, whether born in or out of wedlock, legitimate and 
entitled to equal rights under the law. We shall deal, firstly, 
with legitimation by paternal acknowledgment or recognition, 
and in this respect our attention will be concentrated on the 
American jurisprudence mostly because of its common law con­
nection and the easy availability of materials. This done, 
we shall consider,very briefly, the existence.of the second 
and the third expedients in the legal system of individual countries 
. 1  I , A notable feature of the American concept of legi­
timation by parental acknowledgment is that it is all a matter 
of statutory regulation. The effect of this is that legitimation 
by acknowledgment is available to every person, who, according 
to conflicts rules, is subject to the law of the State having
such concept. As could he expected, there are some divergencies 
in the laws of the twenty odd States operating this concept.
For the purpose of this short survey, a discussion of the Ame­
rican concept could conveniently he divided into three groups:
(a) those States permitting acknowledgment without writing,
(b) those States providing for a written acknowledgment, and
(c) those States permitting acknowledgment by other methods.
(a) Acknowledgment of paternity without any necessity
of writing as a means of conferring the status of legitimacy
on an otherwise illegitimate child is found in seven States of
America, viz., California,^ Idaho,^ Montana, ^  North Dakota,^
Oklahoma, ^  South Dakota,^ and Utah.^ These States each
have almost identical provision saying:
"The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly 
acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such, 
with the consent of the wife, if he is married, 
into his family, and otherwise treating it as if 
it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as 
such, such child is thereupon deemed for all pur­
poses legitimate from the time of its birth. The 
foregoing provisions of this Chapter [i.e. on 
Statutory Adoption of Children] do not apply to 
such an adoption"•
The last sentence in the provision is obviously inserted, 
abuntela cautela, so that the words "thereby adopts" in ,:,k 
the provision will not be confused with Statutory Adoption 
since both legitimation by acknowledgment and statutory adop­
tion are contained in the same Chapter of each of the Code.
75. Cal• Civ. Code s. 250.
76. Idaho Code Ann. s. 16-1510 (194-7).
77* Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. s.61-156 (194-7).
78. N. Dakota Century Code s. 14-11-15 (I960).
79. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 s.55 (1951).
80. S. Dakota Code Ann. s. 14.0408 (1959).
81. Utah Code Ann. s. 78-50-12 (1955).
It is beyond dispute that there are many similarities 
between the concept of legitimation by acknowledgment as found 
in these American States and the concept as found in some States 
in Nigeria. Thus like acknowledgment in the Lagos, the Western, 
the Mid-Western States and the Maliki law, the effect of 
acknowledgment is that it produces a complete transmutation 
from the status of illegitimacy to that of legitimacy from the 
time of birth of the person thus legitimated. Also like the 
concept in all the States in Nigeria where it is known, an 
act of recognition need not be in writing* The American concept 
is, however, mere elastic than the Nigerian concept in some 
respects. First, as could be observed, nothing in the above 
provision prevents an illegitimate child who was born during
o p
the continuance of his father*s monogamous marriage from 
being legitimated by the father acknowledging.its paternity 
after the dissolution of his marriage. Thus if the case of 
Cole v. Akinyele v were to be decided in any of the seven 
States listed above, the American State concerned would arrive 
at a different conclusion as regards the legitimacy of the 
adulterine child actually born during the continuance of the 
father's monogamous marriage, since it was foundl as a matter 
of fact that "the deceased openly acknowledged the appellants 
as his children and treated them as such". Whether or not the 
lawful wife of the deceased objected to legitimation by acknow­
ledgment would seem to be irrelevant in this sort of situation.
84In the California case of In Re Lund's Estate, which is 
considered a leading case on the topic in the United States
82. It is beyond dispute that polygamy is not now a feature 
of the American Family Law.
83. (I960) 5 F.S.C.84.
84• (194-5) 26 Cal. 2d 47 2, 159 P.2d 645.
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of America, it was held, that acts of acknowledgment "once 
proclaimed and established they exist as facts for all time 
and in all places". Thus, since it was found that the de­
ceased acknowledged the paternity of the <£hild after its birth, 
i.e. during, his wife's lifetime, no fresh acts of acknowledg­
ment is required after the death of the wife, assuming that 
the wife refused her consent during her lifetime. Of course, 
since the second child's paternity was acknowledged when the 
deceased was a widower, it automatically follows that an American 
court will arrive at the same conclusion as that reached by 
the Federal Supreme Coprt.
Secondly, a father may, under the provision, legi­
timate his adulterine child by acknowledging its paternity at 
any time during which his monogamous marriage subsists, pro­
vided his wife consents. Although there is no direct American 
authority on this point as far as we are aware, it seems that 
the requirement for the wife's consent is not even as strict 
as it sounds. Before a wife could consent or refuse her con­
sent to her husband's legitimation of his adulterine child by 
acknowledgment, she must be aware of the existence of the child.
No doubt, admission of paternity of such child by the husband 
will constitute an admission of adultery, which is a ground of 
for divorce in all the American States. Under such circumstances, 
the wife would be faced with the dilemma of whether to petition 
for divorce on the ground of the husband's adultery or to keep 
the marriage going with the constant reminder of the husband's 
past, and presumably continuing, infidelity having been brought 
to her notice. It is most probable that rather than choosing 
the latter course, she would, in order to preserve the peace 
of the family unit, give her consent to legitimation of the 
adulterine by allowing her husband to recognise its paternity.
And almost certainly, the grant of her consent will be ac­
companied by a firm threat that the marriage would be dissolved 
at her instance if the husband persists in his promiscuous 
relationships.
In this sense, the provision, at one breath balances 
two competing interests: the interest of the illegitimate child
to be legitimated by its putative father and the interest of 
the father's lawful wife in seeing that her family unit is not 
disrupted by the husband's injection of an extraneous person 
into it without her consent. The provision thereby preserves 
the traditional role of the wife of a monogamous marriage as 
the only effective check on her husband's promiscuous tendencies 
but, in the final analysis, does so in a way that will not 
jeopardise the chances of the child becoming legitimate. Thus, 
if the wife is generous enough as to give her consent to le­
gitimation of the child by paternal acknowledgment, the husband 
would be wary as from then onwards to incur t&.e wife's future 
displeasure by curbing his extra-marital relations or, at least, 
by ensuring that they do not result in the birth of another 
illegitimate child. If she refuses her consent and sues for 
divorce, the child can still be legitimated since his putative 
father can acknowledge its paternity after the end of his mar­
riage irrespective of the fact that it was an adulterine child. 
Only in the exceptional cases where the wife withholds her 
consent and at the same time condones the adultery by the 
husband could the chances of paternal acknowledgment as a 
process of legitimation be remote. And it is submitted that 
having regard to human conduct, such situation is not bound 
to continue for long.
Or Of*
(b) In some, of the American States e.g. Alabama, ^ Iowa,
q rp OQ  D q  Q O  Q1
Kansas, ' Nebraska, Nevada, - Maine, y and Michigan, ^ 
the putative father's written acknowledgment is necessary to 
enable him to legitimate his natural child. In Iowa, Kansas 
and Nebraska, any written document will suffice. In Nevada, 
the writing must be before witnesses. In Alabama, the written 
acknowledgment must be executed before the court or filed with 
the court. In Maine, such written acknowledgment must be executed 
before a notary public or justice of the peace while in Michigan 
it must be executed with the formalities of a deed and in 
addition be filed with the court. Finally, the effects of le­
gitimation by written acknowledgment in these States are the 
same as in those where acknowledgment need not be in writing*
(c) In several other States, ^  all that is required to confer 
legitimacy on an otherwise illegitimate child is a court decree 
granted upon a petition presented by the father. Of these judi­
cial proceedings, the establishment of legitimacy is not dependent 
on the consent of the wife if the father is married, and once
85. Alabama Code tit. 271 s. 11 (194-0).
8£. Iowa Code Ann. s*656.46 (1950).
87* Kansas Gen. Stat. Ann. s.59-501 (1949).
88. Nebraska Rev. Stat. s. 15-109 (1954).
89. Nevada Rev. Stat. s. 154.170(1) (1959).
90. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Ch. 170, s.5 (1954-).
91. Mich. Stat. Ann. s. 27.3178 (153) (Supp.1957).
92. Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. s. 21-5-2; Indiana Ann. Stat. ss.6-207 
(t>) $1) (Burns 1953)> 44-109 (Burns 1952); Iowa Code Ann**
s.656.46 (1950); Kansas Gen. Stat. Ann. s.59-501 (1949); 
Mississippi Code Ann. s. 1269-01 (1956); North Carolina Gen. 
Stat. s.49-10 (1950); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. s.2105.18; South 
Carolina Code s. 15-1584 (1952) Tennessee Code Ann, ss.36-501, 
-305> -506 (1955); amL Wisconsin Stat. Ann. s. 257*06 
(£>upp.l960) •
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pronounced legitimate, such child becomes legitimate for all 
purposes as if horn in lawful wedlock. ' .
Finally, at one end of the spectrtum, Arizona and Oregon 
have virtually legislated illegitimacy out of existence. If 
only for the sweeping nature of the statutory provisions re­
garding legitimacy in these two States it will he necessary
to quote them in extenso. ■
93The Arizona Revised Statute of 1956 provides:
"Every child is the legitimate child of its 
natural parents and is entitled to support and 
education as if horn in lawful wedlock, except 
that he is not entitled to the right to dwell 
or reside with the family of his father, if the 
father is married.
Every child shall inherit from its natural parents 
and from their kindred heir, lineal and collateral, 
in the same manner as children horn in lawful 
wedlock.
This section shall apply although the natural 
father of such child is married to a woman other 
than the mother of the child as well as when he 
is single’1.
As can he seen, the only limitation placed on the rights of a 
child who is not horn in lawful wedlock is that he is not en­
titled to reside with his natural father if the father is 
married to a woman who is not the child1s mother.
The Oregon , Revised Statute of 1963 employs brevity 
94of provision^ to achieve a complete, equality not only of status 
hut also of rights for all children irrespective of the cir­
cumstances of their birth. It says;
"The legal status and legal relationships and the 
rights and obligations between a person and his 
descendants, and between a person and his parents, 
their descendants and kindred, are the same for all 
persons, whether or not the parents have been married".
93* Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. s. 14-206.
94. s.109.060.
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Even if we disregard the Arizona and the Oregon statutes as 
falling within a special category next to he touched upon, 
we shall still disaover that the most restrictice provisions 
of the American law on legitimation by acknowledgment dis­
agree with the philosophy of the Nigerian Federal Supreme Court 
that an illegitimate child born during the existenceof his
father*s monogamous marriage cannot be legitimated by paternal 
95acknowledgment•
On a wider basis, some Western European and the
Latin-American legal systems have accepted like the Arizona
and the Oregon laws, the illegitimate child's claim for equality
of treatment before the law as a basic human right. Ash has
96been pointed out by Professor Krause, ' the Scandinavian 
countries are the first to open the floodgate to new thinking 
about the problem of illegitimacy in the present Century. Thus, 
as far back as 1915* a Norwegian Law has placed the illegiti­
mate child on equ&l footing with a child born in lawful wedlock 
solely in relation to his mother and father. This statute was, 
however, repealed by the Law of December 21, 1956 which abolished 
all the remaining distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate 
children. Similarly, the Danish Law of May 18, I960 in regula­
ting the rights of children makes no distinctions between those
97born in lawful wedlock and those begotten out of it.
95. For a detailed discussion on the American conception of le­
gitimation by acknowledgment, see C.G. Vernier, American 
Family Laws, (1931-1958) and. Supplement, Vol.IV pp.l?S-l86; 
and also for a recent work on the topic, J.W. Ester, 
"Illegitimate Children and Conflict of Laws" in 36 Ind. L.J. 
(T%1 J 163.
96. H.D. Krause, "Bastards Broad - Foreign Approaches to 
Illegitimacy" in 15 Am. J. Comp. Lt. (l967) 726 at p£2?.
97* cited from Krause, Ibid.
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The Latin-American countries have recently decided to 
make the matter of legitimacy a constitutional law matter. They 
each have in their respective Constitutions, a provision which 
abolishes the legal inequalities between illegitimate and le­
gitimate children. For example, article 183 of the Bolivian 
98Constitution y provides that "inequalities among children 
are not recognised; they all have the same rights and duties".
In similar vein is article 86(2) of the Constitution of Guate­
mala which provides that "all children are equal before the
law and have identical rights" and that the "law shall esta-
99blish the means of proof of investigating paternity"• Both
1 2 the Panama's Constitution and the Constitution of Uruguay
have an almost identical provision stating that parents have 
the same duties towards children b o m  in lawful wedlock and 
those born out of it, with an addition by the Panama's Consti­
tution that "all children are equal before the law and have 
the same hereditary rights in intestate succession".
This trend towards conferment of legitimate status 
on all children regardless of whether they were b o m  in or out 
of lawful wedlock is not limited to the Western European countries. 
Many Eastern European countries, viz., Albania, Bulgaria,
98. Ean-American Union, Constitution of the Republic of Bolivia, 
1961.
99* Pan-American Union, Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, 
1963.
1. Pan-American Union, Constitution of the Republic of Panama, 
1946, Art.38.
2. Pan-American Union, Constitution of the Republic of Uruguay, 
1967, Art.42.
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and
Yugoslavia, have Constitutional or statutory provisions which
"grant equal or near equal rights to the child horn out of
3
lawful wedlock” as one horn in it.
Lastly, hut most importantly for the Nigerian law* 
the English law, assuming that Nigerian judges have no alterna­
tive hut to follow its lead, has comet a long way since the 
ancient days of filius nullius. We have seen that.legitimation 
hy subsequent marriage was accepted in England in 1926 subject 
to the express provision that an illegitimate child horn during 
the period of a monogamous marriage hy one or hoth of its 
parents could not he legitimated. Despite the recommendation
IL
of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce that the status 
quo should he maintained, the stigma imposed on adulterine 
child whose parents subsequently inter-married was removed hy 
the Legitimacy Act, 1959*^ Exactly ten years after the 1959 
Act, a remarkable development has taken place in the English 
law, either in response to or despite repeated suggestions hy 
academic writers ^ that the principle of acknowledgment might 
he accepted in England as a partial remedy to the problem of 
illegitimate children whose number is on the increase from year 
to year.
Krause, op.cit., p.728 and the authorities cited hy him at fn.2L
ty. Cmd.9678 (1955)? para.11 where it was stated:
”So long as marriage is held to he the voluntary union for 
life of one man with one woman, that conception is wholly 
incompatible with the provision that one or other of the 
parties can during the subsistence of the marriage, beget 
hy some other person children who may later he legitimated”.
5* as from October 29, 1959* See s. 1 (2).
See e.g. Lasok, 10 I.C.L.Q. (1961) 123, 17 I.C.L.Q. (1968) 634-; 
Stone, 13 I.C.L.Q. (1966) 305.
To begin with, the United Kingdom Government, recognising
that the law of succession seemed to be tbe main, if not the
only, field in which illegitimate children are still discriminated
against in England and, moreover that such discrimination is
no longer compatible with the changed attitude of the English
society towards illegitimacy, appointed in 1964' a Committee,
the Russell Committee on the Law of Succession in Relation to
Illegitimate Persons, to consider what changes are desirable
7in the law. The Committee reported on May 12, 1966.1 Permeating 
the whole recommendations of the Committee is the idea that 
morals are, at best a poor ground for deciding what the rights 
of children born out of wedlock should be. In the words of the 
Report
Mno child is created of its own volition.
Whatever may be said of the parents, the 
bastard is innocnnt of any wrongdoing.
To allot to him an inferior, or indeed unrecognised, 
status in succession is to punish him for a wrong 
of which he was not guilty.” g
Proceedings from this basis, the Committee considered a number
9of civil law solutions, including the concept of acknowledgment, 
but rejected such expedients in favour of a wider view that 
(a{> &n illegitimate child, or his issue, should have
the right to share on his mother's or father's 
intestacy on the basis of oqiality with a child 
born in wedlock. (Paras. 31> 32, 33 and 46)
(b) the parents of an illegitimate child should be
able to share on his intestacy as if he were a 
legitimate child. (Paras. 46 and 47)
7. Cmnd. 3051 of 1966.
8. Ibid., Para.19*
9* Ibid. Paras. 39 and 42.
(c) an illegitimate child should have the same right 
as a legitimate child to apply for a share in the 
estate of either parent under the English Inheri­
tance (Family Provisions) Act, 1938* (Paras. 26 
and 46)
(d) for the above purposes, there should be no distin­
ction between adulterine, incestous and other 
illegitimate children. (Para.56)
(e) but that the rule of construction of phrases such 
as "children” or "issue" occuring in wills or in 
other instruments should, prima facie, be limited 
to legitimate relationships as in the existing law.
All the above proposals, except the last, were
adopted by the British Parliament and passed as Part II of the
Family Law Reform Act 1969*^ Consequently all enactments
11affected by these proposals were amended accordingly. As 
regards the construction of such words as "child" or "issue" 
in wills, codicils, dispositions inter vivos and statutory 
enactments, it is provided that where such words occur, they 
should be construed with reference to legitimate and illegiti­
mate children, unless in the case if wills, codicils and dis­
positions inter vivos, a contrary intention is clearly expressed. 
The only limitation placed by the Act on the rights of inheri­
tance of an illegitimate child on an equal footing with a le­
gitimate child is that he cannot take as an heir in a property
or interest which devolves with a dignity or title of honour or
12with an entailed interest. Also, since the Act is not
10. ss.14-19.
11. viz., The A.E.A., 1925; The Legitimacy Act, 1959; The Wills 
Act, 1837 and The Trustee Act, 1925*
12. Family Law Reform Act 1969> ss.. 14 (5)> 15 (2) and (5)*
retroactive, the provisions of the Act giving an illegitimate 
child equal rights of inheritance as a child born in lawful 
wedlock are all limited to wills, codicils and dispositions 
inter vivos coming into effect after the commencement of the 
Act.15
Shortly after the Report of the English Committee 
on the Law of Succession in Relation to Illegitimate Children, 
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Projection 
of Minorities - a Sub-Commission of the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights - presented on January 13, 1967» the text of its 
proposal concerning Discrimircfcion Against Persons Born Out of 
Wedlock. The Sub-Commission observes that a great proportion
of the human race is composed of persons b o m  out of wedlock 
and that many of them, because of the promiscuous nature of the 
relationships leading to their birth, are victims of legal or 
social discriminations in most systems of law in the world. It 
considers such legal disabilities as violations of the prin­
ciples of equality and non-discrimination set out in the Charter 
of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the United Nations Convention on the elimination of all forms 
of Discrimination and the International Convention on Human 
Rights. It therefore adopted some MG|neral Principles of 
Equality and Non-Discrimination in Respect of Persons B o m  out 
of Wedlock” to be followed by all its members. The gist of the
15. 1st January, 1970.
14. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights, United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, Study of Discrimination Against 
Persons Born out of Wedlock: General Principles on Equality
and Non-Discrimination in Respect of Person Born out of 
Wedlock, UN. Doc. E/CN.4 Sub.2/L.453 of January 13, 1967-
whole "General Principles" is contained in section 7 which
provides that "every person, once his filiation has "been
established, shall have the same legal status as a person
born in wedlock"* The other sections which can be seen in 
15the appendix ^ to this work contains detailed rules for 
ascertaining the paternity of a person.
The glances already taken at other legal systems of 
the world show that there is no novelty in the General Prin­
ciples adopted by the United Nations SubtCommittee that equal 
treatment should be given to persons born in or out of wedlock. 
Rather, they appear nothing more than approbation of the social 
utility of most municipal laws on legitimacy, be it customary 
or otherwise, which have successfully disassociated the moral 
abhorence to parental sin from the social protection to which 
all children are entitled.
It will be noticed that all the various legal systems 
so far considered in our comparative survey, or the majority 
of which the United Nations Sub-Commission had in contempla­
tion in formulating its General Principles, are countries in 
which the only fbrm of marriage permitted is the monogamous 
one. If these countries see nothing wrong in conferring le­
gitimacy on an adulterine child 'begotten during the existence 
of the monogamous marriage by one or both the parents to a 
third party, or in giving such child rights of inheritance as 
if he were born in lawful wedlock, there would seem to be no 
sociological or moral justification in a polygamous country 
like Nigeria for placing any bar on legitimation of such child 
by acknowledgment. Therefore, for the Federal Supreme Court
15. See App.4-.
or any other court in Nigeria to persist in the view that 
public policy demands such a limitation becomes an insular 
approach out of tune with the world's modern thought and 
certainly contrary to the declaration of the United Nations 
Sub-Commission of which Nigeria is a member. Moreover, the 
suggestion that the stigma of bastardy, coupled with its le­
gal disabilities, would curb promiscuous relations in Nigeria 
appears to us not convincing. As the above cases show, it 
has not worked in the country. Besides, apart from the greater 
immorality in penalising an innocent child for a guilt to
which he was not a party, we must accept the logicality of
16the statement of an American judge in extolling the virtties
of legitimation by acknowledgment that
"The complete freedom from legal responsibility 
for illegitimate children which the law afforded 
the father, may have been a doctrine which to the 
male in licentious moments was more encouraging 
than deterrent, and were better abandoned".
In other words, the more the law allows the father of an 
illegitimate child to assume voluntary responsibilities towards 
the child, the less will be the inclination of such father to 
have more illegitimate children. Finally, the adoption of 
this approach in Nigeria will mean that hard-pressed unmarried 
mothers would be greatly relieved of sole responsibilities ibr 
their illegitimate children since there are no social institu­
tions in Nigeria providing (as in other more economically 
developed countries) for the welfare of illegitimate children 
to which such women could jettison their children.
16. In Re Lund's Estate (1945), 26 Cal. 2d 472; 159 Pac.(2d) 643
4®-.
6. SUMMARY OF REFORM PROPOSALS*
There is no doubt that the Nigerian law regarding 
legitimacy, fragmentary as it is, is quite inadequate and calls 
for reform* It is considered that any reform proposals, if it 
is to he of any fundamental value, must embrace the whole of 
the problem in the field of the general law and customary law, 
since there are no ’’different grades of legitimacy” in Nigeria*
In short, the urgent need is for an integration of the rules 
for determining legitimacy as presently existing in a two-fold 
form in each of the States* And in doing this, advantage 
dould be taken of the present chaotic situation to produce, 
through the efforts of a much needed National Commission 
for the Unification of Legislations in Nigeria, a uniform law 
on legitimacy throughout the federation on the following lines.
To begin with, if we accept the postulate that legi­
timacy should be predicated upon the innocence of the children 
and upon the pointlessness of penalising them for the fault of 
their parents, then the ideal solution would be- for a short 
E&ict to be promulgated by each of the States' legislators 
providing that all children, whether born within or outside 
monogamous nr polygamous marriages, are legitimate. Under 
such Edict, the only act that would be necessary to make a child 
legitimate in relation to his natural parents and their colla­
terals would be the fact of birth itself. And to establish
/
this fact, the Edict will contain comprehensive rules and
presumptions for establishing paternal filiation. Such rules
should contain no restrictions on spouses as to the nature of
evidence that may be given to disprove paternity of a child
17presumed to be their legitimate issue. ( And in difficult cases,
17* Eor the present position of the law on this point, see the 
Postscript.
the courts should have power to order blood tests to determine 
paternity. The adoption of this approach wouHfiave brought 
Nigerian law on legitimacy into line with the progressive 
systems of law in the world, in addition to making ill conform 
to the recommendations of the United Nations Sub-Gommission.
Alternatively, the two methods of legitimation may 
be widened in scope as follows:
1* Statutory Legitimacy, i.e.. legitimation by sub­
sequent marriage, should be extended in scope to allow a 
subsequent polygamous marriage of a man and a woman to legitimate 
their illegitimate child or children. Whther or not such child 
was begotten in adulterous relationship which took place during 
the continuance of a monogamous marriage between the man or 
woman to a third person should be immaterial. The existing law 
which allows legitimation only by subsequent monogamous mar­
riage is deficient in failing to take into account the fact 
that there is a dualistic system of law on marriage in Nigeria 
and consequently, that a person who was previously married 
under monogamy may, after dissolution of such marriage, enter 
into a valid polygamous marriage.
Secondly, owing to the existence of the principle 
of legitimation by paternal acknowledgment in certain States 
of Nigeria, it may be wondered why legitimation by subsequent 
marriage in these States should not have retrospective effect 
from the date of birth of the child rather than taking effect, 
from the date of the, parents' inter-marriage or the commence­
ment of the Law, whichever is the case. Otherwise, the co­
existence of legitimation by paternal acknowledgment with le­
gitimation by subsequent marriage wil-l mean that the former 
method, with its retroactive effect, will render superfluous 
the latter mode, since it will be more advantageous for a person
493.
subject to the law of any of these States to establish his legiti­
macy by proof of his paternal acknowledgment rather than by proof 
of the subsequent marriage of his parents. For instance, it has 
been accepted as a matter of course in all the American States 
where legitimation by paternal acknowledgment is permitted that 
these two methods for legitimation are complementary and not mu­
tually exclusive. Hence legitimation by acknowledgment as well as 
legitimation by subsequent marriage dates from birth. Illustrative 
of this point is the Wisconsin statute. (The part dealing with le­
gitimation by acknowledgment has been noted above.) A complemen­
tary provision on legitimation by subsequent marriage provides that
uIn any and every case where the father and 
mother of an illegitimate child or children 
shall lawfully intermarry •.• such child or 
children shall thereby become legitimated and 
enjoy all the rights and priviledges of le­
gitimacy as if they had been born during the 
wedlock of their parents".-^
Similar trends have been projected even in countries
where there are no legitimation by paternal acknowledgment• For
example, following the recommendations of the Commissioners on
Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, the Canadian Provinces have
each enacted new statute providing that the legitimacy of a person
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents should date
from the time of his birth. Representative of the Canadian statutes
on this point is the Legitimacy Act of Saskatchewan,"^ section 2(1)
of which provides:
"Where before or after the coming into force 
of this section and after the birth of a person 
his parents have intermarried or intermarry, 
he is legitimated from birth for all purposes 
of the law of Saskatchewan”.
The position is the same in Australia as a result of the Austra-
20lian Marriage Act of 1961. And finally, almost the same
18. Wis. Stat. Ann. s. 249.36 (1957)•
19. Cap.343, Revised Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1965.
20. s. 89 •
result has been achieved in England by virtue of the Family 
Law Reform Act 1969# Section 15 (4) (b) of the Act amends section 
3 (2) of the English Legitimacy Act, 1926 to the effect that 
where the right to any property depends on the relative seniori­
ty of the children of a person, a child legitimated under tte 
Legitimacy Act 1926 should rank, in relation to any right 
conferred by a disposition made after 1st January, 1970> sis 
if he had been born legitimate, unless a contrary intention 
is shown by the terms of such disposition.
2. The principle of acknowledgment under the Maliki 
law is unduly restrictive in refusing the principle to be used 
as a means of conferring legitimate status on a person whose 
parents were incapable of inter-marriage at the time of his 
birth. If this is a rule of public policy of the Maliki 
law, it is submitted that it has become outmoded since it is 
based on the now discredited theory of penalising the innocent 
child for a wrong committed by his parents. In any event, 
the effect of this rule has been somewhat neutralised by the 
Northern Nigeria Legitimacy Law, a statute which operates in 
all the six Northern Nigerian States. Thus, a father who 
cannot legitimate his adulterine child by acknowledgment accord­
ing to the Maliki law because he could not marry the child's 
mother at the time of its birth, may nonetheless legitimate 
such child by marrying the mother in a monogamous form.
In the Lagos, the Western, and the Mid-Western States, 
it is considered that the principle of acknowledgment should . 
be allowed to operate with full regard to popular consciousness. 
The employment by the Federal:\Supreme Court and the respective 
High Courts of the concept of public policy to bastardise 
adulterine children who had been validly acknowledged under 
customary law is certainly artificial and uncalled for.
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21As has been pointed out by Savage v. Macfoy, at the' root of 
the principle of paternal acknowledgment is the "predominant" 
fact that it is the interests of the illegitimate children 
and not the circumstances of their birth that should be regarded. 
Therefore, of gratifying interest to the Nigerian Judges and 
legislatures should be the fact that this same factor, i,e. 
the welfare and interests of the children, is instrumental 
to the change tor the better of the hitherto unfavourable at- . 
titude towards illegitimate children in most legal systems 
in the Western civilization. Under such circumstances, it 
has become unnecessary for the Nigerian law on legitimacy • 
to conform to a supposed universal concept which discourages
J
promiscuity by bastardising the offsprings of such relationship. 
Rather, the philosophy of the indigenous kw which all systems 
of law are now trying to adopt, should be fully projected.
Like the rest of the federation, there is no statute 
preserving the legitimacy of children who are b o m  in void mono­
gamous or polygamous marriages of their parents in the Eastern 
Nigerian States. Neither is there any enactment which legiti­
matizes the issues of voidable monogamous marriages which were
22
subsequently annulled. But unlike the rest of the federation, 
none of the three Eastern Nigerian States upholds the principle 
of paternal acknowledgment as a mode of conferring the status 
of legitimacy on an otherwise illegitimate child. The result is 
that the incidents of illegitimacy must be great in these 
Jurisdictions especially in view of the last civil war. This 
is, however, partially remedied by the Eastern Nigerian Adoption 
Law of 1965 under which full degree of legitimacy may be reached
21. (1909) 1 Ren. G.C.Rep.504.
22. See now the Postscript for the position of the law on this 
point.
if the natural parent of an illegitimate child adopts him.
But like all cases of statutory adoption, the,'judicial process 
for achieving this is not only cumbrous but expensive. May 
we therefore suggest that the concept of legitimation by 
paternal acknowledgment offers a better and inexpensive process 
of conferring rights and priviledges on illegitimate children 
in these States, as in other States of the federation. It 
will preserve the legitimacy of children of void and voidable 
marriages, and in addition, allow legitimation where there is 
no form of marriage between the parents of an illegitimate child.
CHAPTER SIX
LEGITIMACY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS.
A. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.
1. In almost all systems of law the rights of a mother
towards her natural child, or that of such child towards its 
mother, depend on the physical fact of birth. Though this type 
of mother and child relationship is generally considered ille­
gitimate, in so far as their mutual duties and rights are con­
cerned, problems of private international law are invariably 
avoided. ■ But as regards the legal rights and duties of the 
father towards his natural child, or vice versa, different con­
siderations are involved. To determine legal fatherhood and 
hence legitimacy is not susceptible to a universal solution in 
all legal systems as the above comparative treatment of the Ni­
gerian law on legitimacy has revealed. In most systems of law, 
birth of a person in an antecedent marriage, whether lawful or 
invalid, between his parents is demanded as the prerequisite 
for his legitimacy. In most others, the subsequent marriage 
of the parents of an illegitimate child is an additional cri­
terion. While in few others, mere acknowledgment or recognition 
of paternity by the putative father is sufficient. Finally, in 
some countries, as the modern tendency has revealed, the fact 
that a person is the natural father of the child is adequate to 
determine the legitimacy of such a child. Since the situation 
in which legitimate relations arise between a child and its 
parents are not the same all the world over, problems of what 
municipal law determines the legitimacy of a person are bound
to arise when such person has had contact with more than one 
system of law before the question of his legitimacy arises.
The role of private international law in this sort of situation 
is to indicate which particular municipal system should determine 
the legitimacy of such a person. .
With the existence of several legal districts under 
the federal umbrella in Nigeria, conflicts between divergent 
laws on legitimacy not only looms in theory but exists in 
practice. Except for birth in monogamous marriage and legiti­
mation arising from the performance of such marriage subsequently 
after the birth of a child, no other modes of determining legi­
timacy has an identity of rules within the Federation. In so far 
as the position remains the same, any discussion on Nigerian 
private international law of legitimacy must proceed on the 
basis that the choice of law determinants provided for ascertain­
ing the legitimacy of a person at the international plane cannot 
be radically different at the inter-state level. The suggestion 
made above that the law on legitimacy should be unified within 
the federation is with a view to eliminating conflicts in this 
sphere.
2. A point which has been assumed throughout the pro­
ceeding Chapter and which touches on the choice of law problem 
is that in Nigeria, legitimacy is a subject within the exclusive 
legislative competence of the State, and not the Federal, Govern­
ment. Under all systems of private international law, the 
approach to legitimacy is to treat it as a matter concerning the 
status of the de cutjus, and therefore to be governed by the re­
levant personal law as in all other matters of status. We have 
noticed that this personal law is ascertained in the common law 
systems by reference to the law of the country or the legal 
district where a person has his domicile. And that with regard
to a federation or a political affiliation, the orthodox view 
is that domicile should he fixed within a territorial unit 
under a single system of law, e.g. a State of the federation, 
and not within the federation or the political affiliation as 
a whfcle. We have also seen in previous Chapters that this view 
has been modified in certain countries to the extent that where, 
in a Federation, a certain matter, e.g. divorce or legitimacy, 
is within the exclusive legislative list of the Federal Government 
a federal law may stipulate that a national domicile, as opposed 
to a State domicile, should be found for purpose of jurisdiction 
or for choice of law, as the case may be. In Nigeria, just 
as it has been suggested that a national domicile should be found 
as basis of jurisdiction for divorce of monogamous marriages, 
so also has it been claimed that domicile for purpose of choice 
of law in relation to legitimacy should be located in the Fede­
ration as a whole. The problem here contemplated is whether 
legitimacy arising from birth in lawful monogamous marriage or 
the result of a subsequent marriage is a matter within the exclu­
sive legislative competence of the Federal Government so as to 
justify the Nigerian courts* finding that a national domicile 
has been created for the purpose of the choice of which law 
determines the status of legitimacy*
Legitimacy is not specifically mentioned in this list 
of topics allocated to the Federal or the State Government in 
the Constitution. The nearest approach made by the Federal Con­
stitution to this problem is that it includes, in the list of 
matters within the legislative competence of the Federal Parlia­
ment ,
"Marriages other than marriages under Moslem 
law or other customary law; annulment and 
dissolution of, and other matrimonial causes 
relating to, marriages other than marriages
under Moslem law or other customary 
law”. ^
In short, what the provision attempts to express in so many 
words is that only the Federal Parliament can enact laws on 
monogamous marriages and matrimonial causes in relation thereto* 
In addition, the Constitution further provides that the legisla­
tive competence of the Federal Parliament on the above matters
includes uany matter that is incidental or supplementary" to 
2them. The question arising for consideration,,therefore, is 
whether legitimacy is inseparably linked with marriage in Nigeria 
that the former should be considered an incidental matter to 
marriage, thereby justifying legitimacy being considered as 
falling within the legislative competence of the Federal Parlia­
ment ,
The solution offered on this point by judicial pro­
nouncements are divergent. The first case to consider the issue 
is that of the Northern Nigeria High Court. In Okonkwo v. Eze, 
Hurley, C.J., stated, obiter, as follows:
Legitimacy is not a subject within the exclusive 
legislative competence of the Federal legislature.
In regard to it, the States may legislate independent­
ly of the Federation and of one another, and may 
legislate variously. Each State, in relation to 
legitimacy, is a territory subject to a separate 
system of law. Each State is a unit, to the exclu­
sion of the other States and the Federation, for the 
purpose of domicile where domicile comes in question 
in relation to legitimacy. The person whose domicile 
is material in any dispute concerning legitimacy will 
necessarily have a domicile in one of the States, 
not in Nigeria as a whole.
Almost simultar|)UBly:' with the expression of the above view was
4the adoption by the Federal Supreme Court in Cole v. Akinyele
1. Federal Republican Constitution of Nigeria, 1963* Schedule. 
Part I, Item 23*
2. Ibid., Item 45.
3* ;1960j j. .M.N.L,R.80, at pp.81-82.
4. (I960) 5 F.S.C.84.
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of the opinion of the Privy Council*^ that "it is a possible 
jural conception that a child may be legitimate though its 
parents were not and could not be legitimately married". With 
the above strong dicta, one could have been justified in stating 
that it is now beyond doubt in the domestic law that marriage 
and legitimacy are not correlative matters and that power to 
enact laws on one does not imply power to bring forth legisla­
tion on the other#
But contrary to this view is that expressed by Ade-
6farasin, J., in the Lagos case of Odunjo v. Odunjo that legi­
timacy is by the Constitution of the Federal Republic within 
the exclusive legislative competence of the Federal legislature 
and that with respect to it there should be one Nigerian domi­
cile. The two legal writers who have so far commented on the 
point appear confused. Thus, in the earlier part of their work,^ 
Messrs. Kasunmu and Salacuse were quite emphatic that legitimacy, 
even when it arises out of monogamous marriage, is a subject 
"upon which only the [States*] legislatures may act". Yet at 
the same breath, they later maintained that the two Federal 
acts which impelled the High Courts to exercise their juris­
diction in divorce and other matrimonial causes in accordance 
with English law also impelled them to apply English law on 
legitimacy because "legitimacy in respect of void and voidable 
marriages is incidental to the question of annulment of a sta-
o
tutory marriage"i
It must be pointed out, however, that the view of 
Adefarasin, J., that legitimacy is a federal matter because it 
is incidental to marriage and that domicile in respect of
5. in Khoo Hopi Leong v. Khoo Kean Kwee [1926] A.C.529 at p.54-3* 
cited with approval in Bamgbose v."Daniel [1953] A.C.107.
6. (1964) L.L.R. 43 at p.47#
7# Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.cit., p.5*
8. Ibid., at p.211.
legitimacy emanating from monogamous marriages should be fixed 
in the federation as a whole, has some measure of support in 
Australia. The Australian Constitution, like the Nigerian Con­
stitution, allocates certain matters within the exclusive legis­
lative competence of the Federal Parliament, while the rest are 
reserved for the state’s legislature. |>The Federal list includes 
"marriage" and "matrimonial causes".'! Also, like the Nigerian 
Constitution, section 51 (xxxix) of the AiSbralian Constitution 
provides that tbas Commonwealth Parliament has power to enact 
laws on any matters which are incidental or supplementary to 
the topics enumerated in the federal legislative list. In 
1961, the Commonwealth Parliament enacted a Marriage Act, 
sections 89 to 93 of which deal with legitimacy of children of 
valid and invalid marriages. The State of Victoria brought an 
action challenging the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament to 
include provisions on legitimacy in the Marriage Act. The
question that arose for determination in Attorney-General for
q
the State of Victoria v. The Commonwealth of Australia, J there­
fore, was whether legitimacy is a matter incidental to marriage 
and therefore within the exclusive legislative competence of the 
Australian Federal Parliament under section 51 (xxxix) of the 
Constitution. As regards this, the High Court for Australia 
decided that it was, and that the Commonwealth Parliament had 
validly exercised its Constitutional powers by enacting laws on 
legitimacy.
Despite the apparent similarity between the Nigerian 
and the Australian Constitutional provisions on this point, it 
is submitted that the Nigerian Constitution must be interpreted 
differently in view of the differences between the criteria for 
determining legitimacy in the two countries. In the Australian
9. C1961] 107 C.L.R. 529.
domestic law, a monogamous marriage, which, is within the le­
gislative competence of the Commonwealth Parliament, is the only 
vehicle through which legitimacy may he established. In other 
words, before a person can be considered legitimate his birth 
must have occured in a valid or invalid monogamous marriage, 
or if born out of lawful or ostensible wedlock, he must have 
been legitimated by a subsequent monogamous marriage of his 
parents. In Nigeria, apart from birth in an antecedent mono­
gamous marriage and legitimation by a subsequent monogamous 
marriage, there are other modes of determining legitimacy.
These, as we have seen, are (i) birth in lawful polygamous 
marriage and (ii) acknowledgment of paternity by the putative 
father even when there isDno form of marriage between the na­
tural parents of the child concerned. These last two modes of 
establishing legitimacy are concepts of customary law and 
customary law, in all its ramifications, is a subject within 
the exclusive legislative competence of the state Government. 
Therefore, even if we disregard the fact, as Adefarasin J., has 
done, that legitimation by paternal acknowledgment is incompa­
tible with the view that legitimacy is incidental to marriage, 
we shall still be led to the following anomalous situation: 
that is to say, the Federal Government would be the competent 
body to enact law on legitimacy when it arises out of an ante­
cedent or a subsequent monogamous marriage, while the states 
will retain their constitutional powers to regulate the law on 
legitimacy which emanates from a polygamous marriage or from 
paternal acknowledgment. Therefore, being a federal subject, 
a national domicile should be found when the issue is the legiti 
macy of a person whose parents had contracted an antecedent or 
subsequent monogamous marriage, whereas a state domicile should
be demanded when the.criterion for acquiring legitimate status 
is a polygamous marriage or paternal acknowledgment. In our 
view, the complexity in the domestic law on legitimacy is a 
sufficient problem intellectual groping. Further confusion 
dnuld not be created by the introduction of the concept of. 
"divisible legitimacy" and hence a two-dimensional concept of 
domicile to regulate it.. If only on this ground, it is submitted 
that domicile for the purpose of determining the law of which 
legal unit within the federation determines the legitimacy of 
a person must be located in a state.
Secondly, the view that legitimacy, whether arising 
from a monogamous or polygamous marriage, or when not dependent 
on any form of marriage at all, is a state subject, necessitating 
the finding of a state domicile for purposes of choice of the 
applicable law, has been the basis of the various Legitimacy 
Laws of the States."^ Having been considered as validly en­
acted by competent authorities for about fifteen years, the 
validity of the statutes should not be disturbed on the footing 
that the States have no powers under the Constitution to enact 
them, since such a vew will not be conferring advantages but 
creating confusion and difficulties.
10. See e.g. s. 3 of the Western Nigeria Legitimacy Law, Cap.62, 
which provides that "where the parents of an illegitimate 
person marry or have married one another [monogamously], 
  the marriage shall, if the father of the illegiti­
mate person was or is at the date of the marriage domiciled 
in the State render that person, if living, legitimate"•
A similar section of the Lagos Legitimacy Act employs the 
words "domiciled in Nigeria". However, it has been clearly 
shown that "domiciled in Nigeria" was left in the statute 
as a result of the draftsman's error and that "domiciled 
in Lagos" is intended. See Machi v. Machi (I960) L.L.R.
103 at p.108. *
Finally, the view that legitimacy is incidental or 
supplementary to marriage is incompatible with legitimation by 
acknowledgment of paternity by the putative father* For one of 
the indisputable rules of this mode of acquiring legitimate 
status is that it is irrelevant if the parents of the legitimated 
child did not undergo any form of marriage ceremony.
3. The last observation preliminary to a discussion on
the choice of law concerns the difference of approach in the 
treatment of the incidents arising from the status of legitima­
cy in the Nigerian law and at English common law. Since the 
formative period of the English common law rules of private 
international law, it has been accepted that the rules for deter­
mining legitimate birth is different in character from that which 
determines legitimacy arising as a result of a subsequent mar­
riage or through acknowledgment of paternity by the putative 
father. The reason for this is not far fetched. As we have 
pointed out above, only children born in lawful wedlock _ are 
treated in England as legitimate for all purposes. In so far 
as the enforcement of the incidents of the status of legitimacy 
is concerned, the status arising from legitimation by- subse­
quent marriage or legitimation by paternal acknowledgment is 
inferior to that arising from legitimate birth. For example, 
a child legitimated by the subsequent marriage of its parents 
or by acknowledgment by the putative father under a foreign law ^  
cannot succeed as heir to any property or interest which devolves 
with a dignity or title of honour. In Nigeria, howevei;, legiti­
mation by subsequent marriage or legitimation by paternal 
acknowledgment confers the same rights on a child thus legitimated
11. Legitimation by acknowledgment is unknown to English 
domestic law.
as if lie had been born in lawful wedlock. In this respect, 
it is noteworthy to observe that the limitation placed on the 
succession rights of a' person legitimated by subsequent marriage 
by section 3(3) of the English Legitimacy Act, 1926 was con­
sidered meaningless in the Nigerian context and hence ommitted 
from the provisions of the Nigerian Legitimacy Act of 1929 which, 
as we have stated, was almost a carbon copy of the English Act 
of 1926.
Finally, in view of the equal treatment of the inci­
dents pertaining to legitimacy, whether' by birth in wedlock 
or through legitimation by some subsequent act of the parents, 
in the Nigerian law, the only justification for considering the 
law governing legitimacy which arises from birth in wedlock 
separately from that which is the result of subsequent marriage 
or paternal acknowledgment is b©ause of the time element involved 
in the choice of the applicable domiciliary law.
B. BIRTH IN LAWFUL OR OSTENSIBLE WEDLOCK.
It has been pointed out that legitimacy is a status 
to be governed by the law relevant for determining such matters 
of domestic status viz. the law of domicile. However, the status 
of legitimacy being derivative from the acts of the child's 
parents, the applicable law may only be predicated on the domi­
cile of the parents. Hence a lot of problems bedevil the private 
international law rules governing legitimacy which arises through 
birth in wedlock. At what time should reference be made to the 
lex domicilii of the parents since this may change from timat 
to time? If the parents are, or were, domiciled at the relevant 
time in different countries, which lex domicilii is to prevail 
or are the two leges domicilii to be applied cumulatively?
Is the validity of the parents' marriage a necessary condition
to the child's legitimacy? These are the questions which we
shall attempt to answer for the Nigerian law in this section,
starting first, for convenience, with the last question.
Before the rather unorthodox decision of Romer J.,
12in the English case of Re Bischoffsheim: Cassel v. Grant,
the attitude of the common law judges was that the issue of the
legitimacy of a person should he predicated on the validity
15of the marriage between his parents.  ^ Therefore, when both 
or one of the parents lacks capacity to marry each other accord­
ing to the rules of English private international law, the marriage 
between the parties is not only void but any child born of such 
marriage is illegitimate. This attitude seems hardly surprising 
in that in the formative period of the English private inter­
national law, the only mode of attaining legitimacy known to 
the English domestic law was birth in lawful wedlock. Legitima- 
tio per subsequens matrimonium was a latter addition and legi­
timation by paternal acknowledgment has never been known.
Therefore, the rule of the English private international law 
that the legitimacy of a person depends on the validity of his
parents' marriage is merely a reflection of the domestic notion 
14of legitimacy. But as contact with other legal systems in­
creased, the question becomes pressing as to what is the status 
of children born in foreign countries where their parents were 
domiciled and where the marriage between them was regarded as 
lawful, even though such marriage was invalid according to English 
conflicts rules.
12. [1948] Ch.79.
15. Shaw v. Gould (1868) L.R. 5 H.L. 55; Re Bethe11 (1887) 58 
Cfci. D. 220; Brook v. Brook (1861) 9 H.L.C.I95; DQ Wilton v. 
Nontefiore [1900T 2 Ch.481.
14. Compare Kurt Lipstein, in Festschrift Vol.l (ed. by Ernst 
Rabel) (1954) 611 at pp. 612 and &£l~t. seq.
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a 15Such./situation re-occurred in Re Bischoffsheim
where Romer, J., made a clean break with prior authority by
holding that a person’s legitimacy and a valid marriage between
his parents are not correlative factors and that the legitimacy 
»
of a person may be established without makihg the validity of 
his parents' marriage its concomitant prerequisite; The facts 
of the case were that in 1917» an Englishwoman, Nesta, married 
a domiciled English man, Lord Richard Wellesley. Two children 
were born of this marriage before Lord Richard was killed in 
action in 1917* Three years later, his widow re-married in 
New York, one George Wellesley, the brother of her deceased 
first husband. At that time, the marriage of a widow to her 
deceased husband's brother was invalid by English law although 
the New York law saw nothing wrong in such a legal relationship.
In 1920, a son Richard was born of this second marriage. Mean­
while, an English testator had given a share of residue to his 
granddaughter, Nesta, for her life with remainder to her children. 
The question to be answered by the court was whether Richard 
could take under the will as one of the children of Nesta.
After reviewing all prior English authorities on the
subject of legitimacy, Romer, J., found it unncessary to decide
were
whether Nesta and George/domiciled in England in 19175 the date 
of the second marriage and hence whether their marriage was void 
according to English law. He was satisfied that by the time 
Richard was born in 1920, both his parents had established a 
domicile of choice in New York and that according to the New 
York law Richard was legitimate. He therefore held that since 
the status of legitimacy was conferred on Richard by the law of 
his domicile of origin, "i.e.'the domicile of his parents at his 
birth", such status shouid be recognised in England. Even
15. [1948] Ch.79.
assuming that the parents were domiciled in England at the time
of the mother’s second marriage, with the result that the
marriage was void, he wasc of the opinion that the invalidity
of the marriage should not affect fcfye status of legitimacy
conferred on Richard by the law of his domicile of origin*
The decision has been the subject of comments by
16private international lawyers in the commont law world.
Some of these comments are favourable ^  while those that are 
"LBcritical are based on the ground that Romer, J., refused 
to follow prior common law authorities and not that his deci­
sion is a bad law. However, Romer J.’s decision in Re Bischoff-
sheim ^  is instrumental to the decision of the Privy Council in
20Bamgbose v. Daniel, v the most important single Nigerian case 
dealing with legitimacy in the conflict of laws. The facts in 
the case were as follows: H. and W., domiciled in Nigeria,
contracted in 1884- a monogamous marriage under the Marriage 
Ordinance. Section 41 of the Ordinance (now section 36 of the 
Marriage Act) provides that when any person, subject to customary 
law, had married in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 
i.e. monogamously, then on the death intestate of such a person, 
or on the intestacy of his issue, the intestate estate should be 
distributed according to the law in England relating to the 
distribution of personal estates of intestates, any rule of 
Nigerian customary law to the contrary notwithstanding. X. and Y.
16. See notes 17 and 18 below.
17. Cheshire, op.cit. 7th ed. pp.363-366; Graveson, op.cit., 6th ed 
p.386; Wolff, op.cit., p.38 8; Kurt Lipstein in Festschrift, 
Vol.l (ed. Ernst RabQl, 1954-) P*611 et seq.; B.D. Inglis,
6 I.C.L.Q. (1937) 202 at p.219.
18. J.H.C. Morris, in 12 Conveyancer (N.S.) 223; Dicey and Morris, 
op.cit., 8th ed. pp.4-22-425; E.A.Mann, 64 L.Q.R. 199; Palcon- 
bridge, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed.) pp.747-751 and 761-769.
19. [1948] Ch.79-
20. [19553 A.C.107.
were the legitimate children of H. and W. X., the elder brother, 
became legitimate by the subsequent marriage of his parents 
while Y. was the issue of the marriage. X., following the 
footsteps of his parents, married monogamously and had one son, 
namely, Bamgbose, the appellant. Y. on the other hand, contracted 
nine polygamous marriages of which twelve children, the respon­
dents, were born. On the intestacy of Y., Bamgbose claimed to 
be entitled to succeed to the intestate estate of his uncle in 
default of any legitimate children surviving him. The twelve 
children of Y ’s polygamous mrriages, he contended, were illegi­
timate by the law of England which governed the distribution of 
the estate. To put it in another way, the appellant argued 
that the only course open to the court was to classify the 
question, who were entitled to succeed on the intestacy of Y., 
as one of construction and therefore to be governed by English 
domestic law, the lex successionis, with the result that since 
polygamy is unlawful according to that law, the children of 
such marriages are illegitimates. Therefore, of prior consi­
deration to the question whether the children should be accorded, 
as against the appellant, right of succession in their deceased 
father’s estate, is the issue of their legitimacy and by which 
law it should be determined.
As regards these points, the Privy Council gave the 
following answers. First, as a matter of statutory construction, 
the court was of the opinion that there was nothing in section
CSrc^^cvYvoe'
41 of the Nigerian Marriage  which compelled the courts to
determine the question of the legitimate or illegitimate status 
of the twelve children by reference to English law. What the 
section demanded was that the distribution of the deceased 
estate should be made according to the law relating to intestate 
succession in England, leaving it to the appropriate law governing
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matters of domestic status to determine whether rights of
succession are attributes of such status.
Secondly, their lordships found that the universal
principle governing the legitimacy of a person in a conflictual
situation is that such matter of status is to be determined by
the law of the person's domicile of origin. In support, they
quoted, among others, the decision of Kindersley, V.C., in Re
Don's Estate^  to the effect that:
"®he legitimacy or illegitimacy of any, 
individual is to be determined by the law 
of that country which is the country of his 
origin. If he is legitimate in his own 
country, then all other civilized countries 22 
...... recognise him as legitimate everywhere".
They found that all the circumstances concurred to fix Nigeria
as the domicile of the parents of the children at the time of
their births. And that since they were considered legitimate
by their common lex domicilii at the relevant times, their
status and the attributes should be recognised for purposes of
inheritance under English law. In this respect, the fact that
they were issues of polygamous marriages was considered of no
moment by the Privy Council who was of the view that the private
international law rule enunciated in the cases cited before it,
though strictly in relation to birth in monogamous marriages,
was of equal applicability to a status alleged to have arisen
as a result of birth in a polygamous marriage.
Thirdly, with regard to the contention of the counsel
for the appellant that the validity of the children's parents'
marriages was inseparably linked with their legitimacy, the
court held that the initial validity or invalidity of the
marriages of the children's parents should not be considered,
21. (I857) 4 Drew 194.
22. (1857) 4 Drew 194 at 197» See also the similar judgment of 
Cotton L.J. in Re Goodman's Trusts (1881) 17 Ch. D. 266 at 
p.292 which was quoted in support by the Privy Council.
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since such consideration would be confusing the issue of validity
of the marriages with the legitimacy of the children. The one *
is not a correlative of the other. It was in the relation to
this point that they quoted, with approval, the judgment of
23Romer J., in Re Bischoffsheim ^ to substantiate the practice of
the Privy Council in separating the legitimacy of a person from
24the means by which such relationship was acquired. In
Bischoffsheim1s case, Romer J., had stated that
’’where succession to personal property depends 
on the legitimacycf the claimant, the status 
of legitimacy conferred on him by his domicile 
of origin (i.e. the domicile of his parents at 
birth) will be recognised by our courts; and 
if that legitimacy be established, the validity 
of his parents’ marriage should not be enter- «r 
tained as a relevant subject for consideration". ^
It becomes clear that though it may be incorrect to 
say that there is no link between marriage and the concept of 
legitimacy, in that if the parents of a child are lawfully 
married, such child will be considered legitimate in almost 
all systems of law: But in so far as it goes that a valid
marriage of one’s parents is an indisputable pre-requisite to 
the person’s legitimacy, the case of Bamgbose v. Daniel 
has established the principle for the Nigerian private inter­
national law that such condition precedent cannot be maintained. 
¥hat matters for the universal validity of the legitimacy of a 
person is that such status must have been conferred by the law 
of domicile of his parents at the time the'person was born.
The fact that the parents* marriage would have been void if 
tested by the Nigerian municipal law, including its conflicts 
rules, is immaterial.
No doubt, the formulation by the Privy Council of the
23.C1948] Ch.79.
24. e.g. Khoo Hooi Leong v. Khoo Hean Kwee [1926] A.C.529.
25. [1948] Ch. 79 at p.92.
26. [1955] A.C.107.
choice of law rule for determining the legitimacy of a person as 
the lex domicilii of the parents at the date of the person’s birth, 
was adequate for the situation which arose in Bamgbose's case.
It, however, does not cover the situation where the countries 
of domicile of the parents at the date of the child's birth 
were different. Thus in Bamgbose's case, the parents of the 
twelve children were not only nationals of, but also domiciled 
in, Nigeria where they lived throughout their lives. Consequently 
it was not necessary for the court to determine which law or 
laws of domicile, whether that of the father or that of the 
mother or both, should govern the legitimacy of a person whose 
parents were domiciled in different countries at the time of 
his birth. Example of this situation is the case where the 
parents of a child had contracted a void marriage and the 
mother retained her ante-nuptial domicile which is different 
from that of the husband at the time of the child's birth; Qr 
a child may be born shortly after the dissolution of a valid 
marriage of his parents and at a time when the mother had 
acquired a separate domicile of her own. In such cases, which 
lex domicilii or leges domicilii will suffice?
At least two suggestions could be made as regards such 
choice of law determinant. These are, that the law of the domi­
cile of the mother's husband or that of the person who claims to 
be the father of the child, at the time of the child's birth, 
should govern; or that the law of the domicile of the child's 
mother, at the time of the child's birth, should determine the 
question. To these may be added, in the case of a foundling, 
the law of the place where it was found. The last solution is 
so obvious for the special circumstances of such situation that 
no further comment will be necessary.
The law of the country of domicile of mother becomes
indefensible on the ground that legitimacy in Nigeria, as in
most countries, connotes a legal relationship between a father
27
and his natural child. As aptly put by Obi, "the Nigerians
proverbial desire for children has led to the principle that 
every child is affiliated to (i.e. is a member of ) some family 
at birth"• In other words, even though considered illegitimate, 
a child still acquires membership of his mother's extended 
family and has certain rights and priviledges almost commensu­
rate with those of other members. Therefore, the incidents of 
illegitimacy in Nigeria is no more than that a child so born 
has no enforceable rights as against his natural father. That 
legitimacy is a process of establishing a relationship primarily 
between the father and the child is, perhaps, borne out by such 
judicial pronouncements by Nigerian judges that a child, if
p o  p Q
legitimate, "belongs" or "becomes the property of" y the 
father.
That the lex domicilii of the father governs, is the
30suggestion offered by the decision and dicta in all the cases^
31cited with approval by the Privy Council in Bamgbose v. Daniel.
32For example, Kindersley V.C., in Re Don's Estate,  ^ purporting 
to offer a prospective solution to the question as to which law 
determines the legitimacy of a child if the law of domicile of 
the parents at the time of his birth are different, said:
"If it were necessary for me to determine these questions, I
27. Modern Family Law in Southern Nigeria, pp.285-286.
28. Amachree v. Goodhead (1923) 4 N.L.R.101.
29. Mariyama v. Sadiku Ejo 119611 f,.$.N.L.R.81 at p.82.
30. Re Don's Estate (1857)* 4 Drew 194; Re Andros (1883) 24 Ch. 
D.637; Re Grove (1887) 40 Ch.D.216.
31. C1955] A.C.107.
32. (1857) 4 Drew. 194 at p.197.
should hold that the law of the father’s domicile governs”.
The Vice Chancellor's view was succintly laid down as a general
rule several years later.in Re Andros ^  where Kay J., in giving
the view of the majority of the Court of Appeal, said:
”A bequest •••• to the children of A. means 
to his legitimate children, but the rule of 
construction goes no further. The question remains, 
who are his legitimate children? That certainly is 
not a question of the construction of the will. It 
is a question of status. By what law is status ot
to be determined? .....  The law, as I understand
it, is that a bequest of personality ••••• to the 
children of a foreigner means to his legitimate 
children, and that by international law, .... those 
children are legitimate whose legitimacy is 
established by the law of the father's domicile”
Besides the point that these cases were specifically referred 
to in Bamgbose's case, the principle enunciated in them consti­
tutes common law rule established before the 1st of January,
7.h.
1900, and therefore applies, as we have shown, as part of
the Nigerian law.
That the lex domicilii of the father is decisive is
35the preponderant view of academic writers and the rule accepted
36by most continental systems. In our view, it is the most lo­
gical and the most practical. We may accordingly attempt a 
reformulation of the test for determining the.legitimacy of a 
person born during a lawful or an ostensible marriage of his 
parents as follows:
The legitimacy of a’ child claimed to have been 
born during the existence of a lawful or an 
ostensible marriage between his parents is to be 
determined by the law of the country or state in 
which the mother's husband, or the man alleged to
35. (1883) 24 Oh. D. 637 at p.642.
34. Supra Chapter One.
35* See e.g. apart from the standard text books, K. Lipstein,
op.cit., p.611; Egon Guttman, 14 Rutgers L. Rev.764 at p.783.
36. See Rabel, op.cit., Vol.I, p.603.
be the father of the child, was domiciled 
at the time of the childfs birth#
The adoption of this rule will mean that the choice of law rule 
for determining the status arising from birth in,lawful or puta­
tive marriage will not differ radically in character from the
one being operated in respect of other modes of acquiring le-
37gitimate status in Nigeria. (
C. LEGITIMATION BY SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE♦
3.# POSITION AT COMMON LAW#
At common law, the choice of law rule for determining
whether a legitimate status is conferred on an illegitimate
child by the subsequent marriage of his parents was finally
established in 1887 by the Court of Appeal in England, after
the initial uncertainty created by the ■vacillation of the lower
courts. The first distinct authority on this point is the case
38of Re Wright*s Trusts. By his will, Joseph Wright bequeathed 
the sum of £4,500 to his son, William, for life and stipulated 
that the remainder should be shared by all the children of 
William. The testator died in 1814. William, who was domiciled 
in England, had seven children by his marriage to Mary. Mary 
died later. After her death, William went to Prance and there 
cohabited with a woman, Florence, to whom he was not married.
Out of this association a daughter was bom. Subsequently, 
William acquired a Stench domicile and entered into a marriage 
with Florence. The effect of this marriage, according to the 
French law, was that since the parents of the illegitimate
57* See below.
58. (1856) 2 K & J. 595•
daughter acknowledged her as their own at the time of their
subsequent marriage, the daughter became legitimated by virtue
. ;
of the marriage. the time of death of William, only two
of the children of his first marriage were living. These 
claimed the whole of the legacy left by their grand-father1s 
will as the only surviving children of William. On the other 
hand, William's legitimated daughter claimed to be entitled to 
one third share of the legacy. The crux of the case, therefore, 
was whether the daughter, legitimated by the subsequent marriage 
of her parents in France, should be regarded as a legitimate 
child from the view point of English law for the purpose of 
sharing in the legacy.
Sir Page Wood V.C., gave two reasons for his decision 
that the daughter could not take. First, he held that the legi­
timacy of a child born outside marriage at a time when the 
father of the child was domiciled in England, must be deter­
mined by the English law regardless of where the subsequent 
marriage of the parents was contracted. And that once English 
law fastened indelibility of bastardy on the child, no other 
personal law subsequently acquired by the father changing his 
domicile could alter the illegitimate status of the child.
u
Secondly, a gift to "children" in an English will 
must be construed according to the English notion of legitimacy. 
Since legitimation by subsequent marriage was then not a con­
ception of the English law, a testator in England should not 
be credited with the knowledge that such a mode of determining 
the legitimacy of a person existed under some foreign law.
Hence in Boyes v. Bedale, ^9 where legitimation by subsequent
59. (1865) 1 Hem. & M. 798.
marriage complied with the French law of domicile of the
child's father at the date of the child's hirth and at the date
of the parents1 subsequent marriage, Sir Page Wood was still
able to exclude the legitimated child from taking under an
English will on the second ground for his decision in Re
Wright's Trusts. According to him, the question, who is a
child in a will made by an English testator, is a matter of
construction to be decided by the English lex successionis and
not one of status.
The reasoning in Boyes v. Bedale was rejected by a
majority of two to one in the Court of Appeal decision in Re
40Goodman's Trusts. In the latter case, the issue was also 
whether a child was validly legitimated by the subsequent mar­
riage of his parents outside England. Both at the time of the 
child's birth and at the date of the subsequent marriage of 
the parents, the father was domiciled in Holland where such 
child was considered legitimate for all purposes. Cotton L.J., 
and James L.J., held (Lush L.J., dissenting) that since the 
child was legitimate according to the law of the country where 
the parents were domiciled at the two relevant dates, the status 
should be recognised in England for all purposes except for the 
purpose of succession as an heir to real property. Consequently, 
the child was held entitled to claim as next of kin on the 
intestacy of his uncle under the statutes of distribution.
Thus, the second ground for the decision in Re Wright's Trusts ^
4?having been rejected by a majority in ReQ6odman's Trusts, the 
first arm of the decision in the earlier case was preserved.
That is to say that, the common law rule regarding the legitimacy
40. (1881) 17 Ch. D. 266.
41. (1856) 2 K & J 595.
42. (1881) 17 Ch. D. 266.
of an ante-natus whose parents subsequently intermarried, is 
that such matter of status is to be decided by reference to 
the law of domicile of the father at the time of the child*s 
birth and at the time of the parents1 subsequent marriage.
This law, at the two relevant dates, determines whether only 
the celebration of the marriage legitimates the child, as in 
most countries, or whether there should be something super­
added, as in France, or in some States of America, where a 
formal acknowledgment of the child must accompany the parents* 
marriage. This two-fold rule was followed in Re Andros ^  
and finally confirmed by a unanimous decision of the Court of
i\i\
Appeal in Re Grove. And this was the position at common law 
before the identical Legitimacy Laws of the Nigerian states 
provide for a different solution of their own to the problem.
2. POSITION UNDER THE LEGITIMACY ACT, 1929.
In relation to the law of which country or state
should determine the legitimacy of a person who alleged that the
subsequent marriage of his parents had legitimated him, two
sections are relevant in the identical Laws of the Nigerian
Legitimacy
states. Section 3 (1) of the Western State/Law provides:
nwhere the parents of an illegitimate person 
marry or have married one another, whether 
before or after the commencement of this Law, 
the marriage shall, if the father of the 
illegitimate person was or is, at the date of 
the marriage, domiciled in the ate, render 
that person, if living, legitimate from the 
commencement of this Law, or frm the date of 
the marriage, whichever last happens."
And as regards the recognition of the status of legitimacy alleged 
to have been created by a foreign law as a result of such sub­
sequent marriage, section 9(1) of the Law further provides:
43. (1882) 24 Ch. D 637.
44. (1887) 40 Ch. D. 216,
Where the parents of an illegitimate person 
marry or have married one another, whether 
before or after 17th October, 1929* and the 
father of the illegitimate person was, or is, 
at the time of the marriage, domiciled in a 
place other than within the Western State, by 
the law of which the illegitimate person became 
legitimated by virtue of such subsequent marri­
age, that person, if living, shall in the State 
be recognised as having been so legitimated 
from the above date or from the date of the 
marriage, whichever last hhppens; notwithstand­
ing that his father was not at the time of 
birth of such person domiciled in a place in 
which legitimation by subsequent marriage was 
permitted by law.
In short, the law of the domicile of the father of an illegi­
timate person at the date of his parents' subsequent marriage 
determines whether the marriage makes him legitimate or not.
This is regardless of whether or not the ceremony of marriage 
was celebrated in a place the law of which does not permit le­
gitimation. If the effect of the marriage according to the law 
of domicile of the father at the relevant time is that the 
marriage legitimated his illegitimate child, the child becomes 
legitimated.
It will therefore be seen that section 9 of the Law 
dispenses, for purposes of recognition under the statute, 
with the common law requirement that legitimation by subsequent 
marriage must have been authorised by the law of the country 
in which the father of the illegitimate child had his domicile 
at the date of the child's birth. Under the Law, it is,., i 
sufficient to show that the law of domicile of the father at 
the time of the marriage allowed the establishment of a person's 
legitimacy by such process. This approach is gratifying; but 
the main disadvantage of establishing legitimacy through the 
statute is that the status of a person legitimated under the 
statute dates from the time of the marriage of his parents or 
17th October, 1929* whichever last happens; whereas at common 
law, legitimation by subsequent marriage, if established, dates
from the time of birth of the person concerned* In view of the 
fact that legitimation by paternal acknowledgment in most States 
in Nigeria confers legitimacy from birth on an illegitimate 
child irrespective of when Eis father acknowledges his paterni­
ty, it has been suggested in the preceeding Chapter that it is 
undesirable, in modern times, to date the legitimacy of a person 
legitimated under the provisions of the Law from the time of 
the subsequent marriage of the parents or the commencement of 
the Law. And, furthermore, that Nigeria should bring its law 
into line with those of other civilized countries by accepting 
the recommendation of the United Nations Sub-Commission which 
provides that "any child born of parents who intermarry
after the birth of that child shall be considered to be born
46of that marriage”. ^
If the above suggestion is accepted, there will be no
necessity for the Nigerian private international law to follow
46the approach adopted by the English court in Re Hurll where 
it was held that the English Legitimacy Act of 1926 (of which 
the Nigerian statutes are almost carbon copies) does not affect 
the capacity of an illegitimate child to be legitimated at 
common law and that the choice of law rule which demands compli­
ance with the law of the country of the father's domicile at 
the date of the child's birth and at the time of the subsequent 
marriage, has not been abrogated. No doubt, such a decision was 
influenced by the fact that legitimation by subsequent marriage
45. See s. 5 of Part I of the General Principles on Equality 
and Non-Discrimination in respect of Person Born out of 
Wedlock, U.N. Doc. S/CN.4 £ub.2/L.453 of January l3>
1967 • (Appendix 4 of this work).
46. [1952] Ch.722.
at common law has more beneficial effects than such legitima­
tion under the English Act, in the sense that the former con­
fers full legitimacy from birth while the other, as in Nigeria, 
reckons legitimacy from the commencement of tha Act or from the 
time of the subsequent marriage,, whichever is later.
Furthermore, the requirement of the common law that
the illegitimate child must be endowed with capacity for legi­
timation by the law of domicile of his father at the time of
his birth, has been the subject of adverse comments and cri­
ticisms. For instance, the reasoning underlying the rule, i.e. 
that the law of domicile of the father at the time of the child's 
birth irrevocably fixes the child's status, was disapproved of
47
by the dissenting judgment of Scott L .J., in Re Luck's Settlement.
According to the Lord Justice, "the very idea of attributing to
a newly born child, to a filius nullius, a sort of latent capacity
for legitimation at the hands of the natural father to whom he
is denied any legal relation, seems to me an .... absurd legal
48fiction". In Blythe v. Ayres, Garoutte J., in giving the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of California on the same point, 
finds the English common law rule unusually "antagonistic" and, 
therefore, a bad law. Practically, all text writers stand on
common ground in condemning this rule. It was rejected by Sa-
49 60 ^vigny y and Bar. Rabel finds it too artificial to be rational*
Cheshire considers the extension of this archaic theory in the
field of private international law a "negation of commonsense
and principle", ^  while Graveson is of the view that the
47. C1940] Ch.864.
48. (1892) 96 Cal.532, 31 Pac.915.
49. op.cit., p.302.
50. op.cit., p.434.
51. Rabel, op.cit., Vol.I, pp*614-615*
52. Cheshire, op.cit., 7th ed., p.374.
53principle is "pre-eminently illogical"• In Nigeria, the
various statutes have dispensed with the concurrence of the law 
of the father's domicile at the time of the child's birth.
With this welter of adverse criticisms and rejection 
by statutory provisions, it is submitted that the Nigerian 
judges will do well to proclaim the formal demise of the 
common law principle of recognition of legitimation by sub­
sequent marriage. That the Nigerian municipal laws do not'in 
principle subscribe to the theory of indelibility of bastardy 
is borne out by the conception of legitimation by paternal 
recognition, the effect of which (under the various state laws) 
is that the legitimacy of a child so legitimated relates back 
to the time of his birth. The common law of England to which, 
originally, legitimation by subsequent act was an alien concep­
tion should not debar the Nigerian private international law 
rules from reflecting such conceptions of its domestic law.
With the confident hope that our suggestion will be accepted, 
the private international law rule of this topic, bcQiat common 
law and under statute, is stated as:
Whether the subsequent marriage of the natural 
parents of an illegitimate child makes such a 
child legitimate depends on the law of the 
country or state in which the child's father 
is domiciled at the time of the marriage.
Graveson, op.cit., 6th ed. p.389«
D. LEGITIMATION BY SUBSEQUENT ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY.
We have discovered from our consideration of the do­
mestic law that legitimation by paternal acknowledgment or re­
cognition is a process for ascertaining the legitimacy of a 
person in the majority of the states of Nigeria, just as is 
the position in some civil law countries and certain states 
of America. Authority is, however, lacking in the Nigerian 
law with regard to how a choice of applicable law should be 
made in conXlictual situations. For example, a child may be 
born illegitimate in country or state A, at a time when his 
parents were domiciled there, or at a time when they were 
domiciled in country or state B. Later the parents might 
migrate to country or state C where they do an act the effect 
of which was to confer legitimacy on the child. By reference 
to the law of which place is the status of the child to be 
determined.
In principle, the conflict rule governing this sort 
of situation ought not to be different from the one regulating 
legitimation by subsequent marriage. In each case legitimacy 
depends on subsequent pafeental act. This much is accepted by 
the common law world. But for the interest the divergent solu­
tion to this problem has created in the two common law countries 
whose courts had tackled it, we shall compare, briefly, the 
different methods of approach adopted by the English common 
Law and the American version of it in order to enable the Ni­
gerian courts to choose the better of the two.
The first and the only case so far which has arisen 
in England as regards which law determines the validity of a 
purported legitimation by paternal acknowledgment, made in
54-accordance with a foreign law, in Re Luck's Settlement* The 
facts were that one George Luck, domiciled in England, settled 
certain properties on his children and grandchildren at the 
time of his marriage and gave other interests to them by his 
will. One of the children of George Luck was Charles Luck, 
Charles had two children by his wife, Clare Henrietta. In 
addition, Charles Luck had, on July 29* 1906, an adulterine 
child, namely, David Luck, begotten by a spinster, Martha Anne 
Croft. On July 19* 1922 the marriage of Charles to Clare 
Henrietta was dissolved and eight days later, he married a 
third woman, one Alma Hyam. By a document dated October 23* 
1923* Charles, with the consent of Alma Hyam, formally acknow­
ledged David as his legitimate son. At the time of Davidfs 
legitimation byopaternal acknowledgment, his father, Charles, 
was domiciled in California and according to the Californian 
Code, the effect of such acknowledgment was that David ceased 
to be illegitimate and became "for all purposes legitimate from 
the time of his birth”, i.e. July 29* 1906. At the time of 
David's birth, however, it was found that his father was still 
domiciled in England where, of course, legitimation by paternal 
recognition is not permitted. The question posed was whether 
David could take under the settlement and the will as the le­
gitimate son of Charles Luck.
As regards this question, the Court of Appeal held, 
rightly in our view, that the principle laid down for deter­
mining which law governs legitimation by subsequent marriage 
covers the case of legitimation by parental recognition. But 
in our view, the majority erred (Scott L.J., dissenting) in 
finding nothing intrinsically wrong in supporting the so-called
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theory of potentiality of legitimation according to which the 
lex domicilii of the child's father at the time of the child's 
birth must concur with the father's lex domicilii at the time of 
acknowledgment, in permitting legitimation by such process.
The court, therefore, held that since the English law of domi­
cile of David's father at the time of his birth made David's 
status of illegitimacy immutable, no subsequent acquisition of 
domicile by his father in a country where paternal acknowledgment 
is a lawful mode of legitimation could change David's initial 
status of bastardy attaching to hinr under English law. Accord­
ingly, he was.not entitled to shares under the settlement and 
the will.
The common law requirement that legitimation by pa­
ternal recognition must be possible according to the law of 
domicile of the child's father at the time of the child's 
birth has been criticised in our consideration of the rule in 
connection with legitimation by subsequent marriage. But in so 
far as the English law is concerned, it must be pointed out 
that it seems certain that the hard decision in the above and 
other similar cases will be impossible to reach in future by 
English courts. As we have indicated, the sole matter in dis­
pute in Re Luck's case was whether David, the illegitimate 
child who was legitimated by, his father according to Californian 
law, was the "child" of his father for the purpose of taking 
under a marriage settlement and a will* Now, according to 
section 15(1)* (2) and (8) of the Family Law Reform Act, 1969 
which came into effect in England on 1st January, 1970, in any 
disposition made after the commencement of the Act in which a 
settlor or testator gives property or interests in property 
to his children, the children of any person, or to any person 
who would have been a relative of the settlor or testator were
it not for the fact that such person was horn illegitimate, 
then such expression "children" or "relative" includes, unless 
a contrary intention appears, an illegitimate child or any 
person who would have been a relative of the settlor or testator 
in some way had he, or some other person through whom he deduces 
his relationship, been born legitimate. But in the absence of 
similar provisions as above in Nigeria, some conflicts prin­
ciples must be found to achieve a result belatedly reached by 
the English statute.
The theory that the law of domicile of the father 
must endow his illegitimate child with the potentiality of 
legitimation at the time of the child's birth before a sub­
sequent act of the parents could make this child legitimate has 
never been accepted in America. There, it has long been 
established that if a father had attempted to legitimate his 
illegitimate child by acknowledgment of paternity, such legi­
timation will be effective in an American state if the result 
of the acknowledgment, according to the law of the domicile of
the father at the time of acknowledgment, is to confer legiti-
55macy on the child,^ This is so even though the state where
the legitimacy of the child is to be recognised has no statute
providing for legitimation by paternal acknowledgment.^^
The leading authority for this principle is Blythe v.
Ayres In this Supreme Court of California case, Thomas Blythe
was the natural father of an illegitimate daughter, Florence, who
was born to him in England by Julia Perry. Thomas Blythe .A
35* Blythe v. Ayres (1892) 96 Cal. 332, 31 Pac.915; Pfeifer v. 
Wright (1935) F. 2nd 464; Irving v. Ford (1903) 183 Mass.448, 
6? N.E.366; Holloway v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co. (1926)
151 Md. 321; In Re Slater's Estare (1949) 193 Misc. 713*
90 N.Y.S. 2d 546” :
56. In Re Slater' s Estate (1949) 195 Misc. 713* 90 N.Y.S. 2d 54-6.
57. (1892) 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915.
and Ju]2£. Perry were never married. The daughter was merely 
conceived during Blythe's temporary sojourn in England and 
was born after Blythe's departure to California., At the time 
of the daughter's birth, Blythe was domiciled in California 
where he had always lived, whilst Julia was domiciled in 
England. Blythe's natural daughter never went to California 
until after her father's death. Nonetheless, she claimed a 
right to succeed to Blythe's rather large intestate estate by 
reason of certain acts alleged to have been performed by Blythe 
during his lifetime, the effect of which was that the daughter 
became legitimate under section 230 of the California Code.
The section provides that the father of an illegitimate child 
may legitimate it from the time of its birth by publicly acknow­
ledging it as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent 
of his wife, if he is married, into his family, and otherwise 
treating it as if it were legitimate.
The Supreme Court had one difficult hurdle of construc­
tion to jump before it dealt with the problem of conflict of 
laws involved. This was the provision of the section which re­
quires the putative father "to receive" his illegitimate child 
"into his family". How could Blythe, who died a bachelor and 
without parents, have received into his family a daughter who 
was born in England after his departure from that country. 
Moreover, the daughter did not visit California until after 
Blythe's dath. On this point, the court held that Blythe had 
a constructive family into which he constructively received the 
daughter. The second problem, that of conflict of laws, was 
whether the Code applied to an illegitimate child who was born 
and resident out of California. The court was unable to find 
an American or English authority to guide it on the specific 
issue of choice of the applicable law relating to legitimation
by parental recognition, but clearly recognised that there
was no essential difference between legitimation by subsequent
marriage and legitimation by acknowledgment and that the. choice
of law rule applicable to one should apply to the other. It,
however, found that the assertedly general rule of the English
common law which referred the legitimacy of an illegitimate
child whose parents subsequently intermarried, to the law of
domicile of the child's father both at the time of the child's
birth and at the time of the father's marriage, was unacceptable
to the Californian courts. With regard to the doctrine of
"indelibility of bastardy" which underlies the English rule,
Garoutte J., who gave the judgment of the court-said:
"Legitimation is the creature of legislation.
Its existence is solely dependent upon the law 
and policy of each particular sovereignty.
The law and policy of this state authorise 
and encourage it, and there is no principle 
upon which California law and policy, when 
invoked in Californian courts, shall be made 
to surrender to the antagonistic law and policy 
of Great Britain"•
Instead, the court promulgated a new rule of its own to the 
effect that legitimation by subsequent act of the child's pa­
rents depends on the law of the father's domicile at the time 
of the alleged acts of legitimation, a principle which now con­
stitutes the black-letter rule of the American Restatement on 
the Conflict of Laws,^ As regards the facts of the case, it 
was held that since Blythe had performed acts which legitimated 
his natural daughter according to the Californian law of his 
domicile, the daughter suceeded to his estate even though she 
had no direct contact with California, jf In the view of the
court, "oceans furnish! ed] no obstruction to the effect of
60[California's] wise and beneficial provisions".
58. Blythe v. Ayres (1892) 96 Cal. 532 at 573» 31 Pac.913 at P»921
59* Tentative Draft Ro.4 of 1957? s* 140,
60. Blythe v. Ayres (1892) 96 Cal. 532 at 563, 31 Pac.913 at
P.917.
It is submitted that similar considerations which 
moved Garoutte J., in making amelioration to the apparent harsh­
ness of the English common law exist in Nigeria. Legitimation 
by paternal acknowledgment is a progressive policy of most 
systems of law in the country whereas in English domestic law, 
that concept is not permitted. Therefore, the rule of Nigerian 
private international law should be more concerned, like the 
American jurisprudence, with the removal of obstacles to the 
legitimation of children at the inter-state as well as the 
international level. In our view, a person should be considered 
legitimate from his birth in any state in Nigeria if his father 
had acknowledged his paternity in accordance with the law of 
the state or country in which the father was domiciled at the 
time of the acknowledgment.
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CHAPTER SBVBK
ADOPTION
-• f .^lil.I'taPlY observations a:td problhks 0? CONFLICT o? l: .;s
Kinship in the full sense of the term is created by con­
ception and birth. All the criteria for determining legitimacy 
dealt with in the last chapter are concerned, with the establish­
ment of the legal ties of paternity and maternity in respect of 
children who are so related by nature. Adoption, however, is a 
process whereby the relationship of parent and child is created 
between two people who are not necessarily related by nature. 
Therefore,■it is an artificial relationship the effect of which 
is the substitution of the adoptive parents for the natural 
parents in so far as a child's rights and duties are concerned. 
To other words, an adoption puts an end to parental obligations 
and creates a full set of obligations on the part of the adop­
tive parents even though it could not change blood ties between 
the child and its natural parents.
Adoption is of great antiquity in some countries. It was 
mentioned in the Bible. It was known to the ancient Greeks and 
the Homans. It is not an alien institution to some systems of 
traditional and modern customary laws in Africa and Asia. " 
Several factors motivate the establishment of the institution. 
Tor example, the motive of some ancient laws e.g. the Homan law,
1. For ~Tigeria. Bee Aminatu Alayo. Administrator - Gen. V.
Tunwase (1946). lSlT.L.R. 88; For Kenya. See A.J.F. Simance 
"The Adoption of Children among the Kikuyu of Kiambu Dis- 
trict" in 3 J.l.L. (19597 33; and for Botswana, see
Adoption of Children Proclamation, Cap.43, 1939 ed., s.15*
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was the perpetuation of the family sacra; whilst the function
of adoption in Hindu law is to maintain ancestor worship. In
2
.frican anc modern systems of law, the purpose of adoption in 
the ancient laws has either never been accepted or has given way 
to the more humanitarian motive of protecting the orphan and 
furthering the welfare of the waif, though not unnaturally, 
adoption has also been used by legal systems with strict laws 
on legitimacy as a means of reducing the incidents of illegiti­
macy. This factor seems to explain why the range of persons who 
could be adopted in the Eastern Nigerian States is much more 
extensive than in the Lagos State. Therefore, to cater for 
both this narrow and wide scope of adoption in the various legal 
systems, not only in Nigeria, but at the international level, 
the definition of Sir Alfred Hopkin can hardly be improved upon 
for purposes of the Nigerian private international law. It 
reads: Adoption is
’'the act of a person taking upon himself the position 
of a parent to another who is not in fact, or is not 
treated by law, as his child, and the person so acting 
is recognised by law as having the rights and duties 
of a parent by nature" . *+
The two statutes so far on Adoption in ’rigeria have some
2. See e.g. A.J.F. *^imance, ibid.
3. In Lagos, as we have shown in our Chapters on Legitimacy, a 
person’s legitimacy may be established by proof of (a) his 
birth in an antecedent marriage of his parents, (b) their 
subsequent intermarriage in a monogamous form, or (c) acknow­
ledgment of his paternity by his putative father. Hence, 
adoption as a means of conferring legitimacy on an otherwise 
illegitimate child becomes superfluous in the Lagos State, 
especially in view of method (c). In the Eastern Nigerian 
States, on the other hand, only methods (a) and (b) above
are permitted by law. Adoption, therefore, constitutes an 
additional mode of establishing legitimacy of a person who 
was born illegitimate.
k. Encyclopaedia Britannica (19^7 ed.) p. 177.
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interesting historical antecedent. Though they constitute an 
exception to the usual process of adaptation of an English Act 
by re-enactment, nonetheless, they both reflect the English law 
ideas since they originate, albeit indirectly, from English lav; 
sources. The first area in the common law countries of Africa
to which statutory adoption was introduced is Uganda. This was
5 6in 19^3.' Then followed similar legislation in Malawi,'
7 8 9 10 11Zanzibar,' Botswana, Tanganyika, Zambia and Kenya. All
17ese statutes were enacted during the colonial era and were
therefore modelled on the existing English Adoption Act or Acts,
at the time of their enactments, though some of them have
incorporated, the provisions of later English statutes into their
own enactments. There is sufficient similarity between the
Adoption laws of the above countries and the Ghana Adoption Act
of 1962^~to warrant the assertion that the Ghana Act derives its
inspiration from the laws of the above countries south of the
Sahara. The 1965 Adoption Lav; of the Eastern States of Nigeria
13is almost a verbatim copy of the Ghana Act, while the Lagos
5. See Adoption of Children Ord., Cap.19, Laws of Uganda (1951 
ed.).
6 . 195-9, See Adoption of Children Act, Cap.26.01, Laws of 
Maiawi (1963 ed .).
7. 1951? See Adoption of Children Decree, Cap.555 Revised Laws 
of Zanzibar 1959.
1952, See Adoption of Children Proclamation, Cep.*+3, Laws of 
Botswana (195c ed.).
9. 1953? See Adoption Ord.Cap. 335, Tanganyika Rev.Lews, 1950- 
1955-.
10. 1956, See Adoption Ord.Cap.136, Laws of the Republic of 
Zambia, (1965 ed.).
11. 1958, See Adoption Ord. Cap. 15-3, Laws of Fenya (1962 ed .).
12. Act 105- of 1962.
13. In this respect, we must disagree with Messrs Kasummu and
Salacuse, 00 .cit. pp.25-2-25-3, and Dr. S.E. Imoke, (Eastern
Region House of Assembly Debates, Vol.5 TTo.l, 1965) p.5*6,
who are of the view that the Eastern Nigeria Adoption Law, 
1965 is a copious copy of the English statutes. A section 
by section comparison of the English, the Ghanaian and the 
Eastern Nigeria statutes reveal that the latter two have
-uc more in common by way of presentation, substance, 
terminology anc even punctuation.
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Adoption. Edict of I968, though designed, for a special purpose,
vis. to cater for the Nigerian civil war orphans, reflects the
general feature of such enactments in the rest of the continent.
• 'he position, therefore, is that out of the twelve States of the
'■'deration of I igeria, statutory adoption operates in four viz.
the Rivers state, the South Eastern state, the East Central
state and the Lagos state. And as in England, an adoption order
1 igeria or in any of the above-named African countries will
My be made if it will be for the welfare of the child.
Of course, one is only too happy to admit that there are
closer ties binding these African countries together and which
allows a liberal acceptance of each other's laws. But in so
far as conflict rules are concerned, the lamentable aspect of
t is African co-operation in legislative experiment is that the
insufficient development of the theory and practice of private
international law revealed in almost all the other African
countries' enactments on adoption has been accepted in the four
igerian states, furthermore, the Lagos Edict introduces some
complexity into the problem by initiating some recognition rules
which are so general in content to be of any practical advantage.
The courts will have no alternative but to devise their own
solutions. And the purpose of this work is to help them to
formulate such rules. But more of this later*
As in most common law countries, adoption in the Nigerian
states emanates from a court's order. In the Eastern Nigerian
states, an adoption may only be granted by either the High Court
ll+
or the Magistrate's court at the option of the applicant.
Whereas, in the Lagos state, only the juvenile court may grant
lb. Eastern "igeria Adoption Law, 1965 s.11(1).
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suck order ilthough an appeal lies from it to the High Court. '''
An adoption order is granted by the court upon the favourable 
report by administrative officers. Has there been residence of 
the child with the prospective adopter for a trial period of 
three months? Has the relationship between the prospective 
adopter and the child during this period given rise to reason­
able probability that the prospective adopter will be able to 
provide a good home for the infant? Are the child's natural 
parents (in the case of the Has tern Nigeria Adoption Law only) 
or any person having legal rights over it, still desirous, after 
the expiration of the trial period, to relinquish their rights 
and control over the child? Or was their prior consent the 
result of a hurried and abrupt-decision to give up the child? 
Finally, is the application for adoption dictated by altruistic 
considerations and not motivated by a desire to derive some 
material benefits from the adoption of the child? All these 
are the questions to be answered affirmatively in the social 
welfare officer's report before the court could be satisfied 
that the adoption order, if granted, will be for the welfare of 
the infant. . In other words, the court is asked not merely to 
decide on the legality of the proposed adoption but also on its
advisability. This procedure is in contrast to that in some
l6civil law countries' where adoption is the result of inter-party 
agreement, or contract, which is merely to be approved by the 
court; and markedly different from the position under some
15. Lagos Adoption Edict, 1968, s.8.
16. See Rabel, on.cit., Vol.I, p.679 and also 0. Kahn-Freund,
The Growth of Internationalism in English Private Inter­
national Law, p.53.
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systems of customary lav; in "Tigeris and elsewhere where adoption
is the exclusive concern of the prospective adopter, on the one
hand, and the child to be adopted and his family, on the other
:and. Indeed, the intention of the Eastern Nigeria Adoption Law
is to put an end to the "spurious methods and laws" by which
17customary adoptions were being effected.
A child adopted under any of the Nigerian statutes is
fully integrated into the family unit of the adoptive parent or
parents since the order extinguishes all rights and duties,
obligations and liabilities, of the natural parents of the
child, whether arising under the general lav; or the customary
law, and vests them in the adoptive parents. Hence, as from the
date of the order, the adoptive parents become responsible for
the education, maintenance and custody of the adopted child as
10if he had been born in lawful marriage. In the case where the 
adoption order was granted to a man and his wife, the adopted 
child stands to the other children of the spouses, whether by a 
previous adoption, birth in lawful wedlock, or legitimation by 
subsequent marriage or by acknowledgment, as.a full brother or 
sister. If the order was granted to a single adopter, the 
adopted child stands to the adopter in full legitimate relation­
ship.1  ^ If he or she later marries and has natural children, 
the adopted child becomes a brother or sister of the "half- 
blood" to such natural children. This follows inferentially 
from the term of both provisions which stipulate that an adopted 
child shall have rights as if he was born to the adopter in
17. See Eastern Nigerian House of Assembly Debates (1965) Vol.5 
Ho. I , Column *+9 •
If. Eastern Nigeria Adoption Lav;, 1965? s.13; Lagos Adoption 
Edict, 196.', s. 12.
19. Ibid.
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lawful marriage. Also, both the adopter and the adopted child
have rights of mutual inheritance on the death intestate of 
21either of them. And furthermore, an adopted child takes on
equal terms with other children of the adopter on his intestacy,
or under any disposition inter vivos any person might make in
consequence of which he gives property to the adopter’s 
22''children11. In short, an adoption order, under any of these 
statutes, operates to divest the adopted child of its natural 
parentage as if it had never existed and gives it to the adopter. 
rone of the enactments, however, resolves the important question 
as to whether the adopted child continues to be the issue of 
his natural parents for the purpose of the lav/s relating to 
incest and the prohibited degree of marriage by reason of con­
sanguinity. It is submitted that for these purposes, the blood 
relationship still continues. Consequently, a father could not 
ot-rry his daughter whom he had given away in adoption to a 
stranger in blood, neither could he plead the adoption as a 
defence if he commits the offence of incest against her.
If all the municipal systems of the world, including those 
of the Nigerian states, could enact identical laws on adoption, 
the question of choice of law or which court has exclusive 
jurisdiction will become irrelevant. But a short survey of some 
legal systems will show that adoption is differently fashioned 
in different countries and states or provinces of the same
20. Eastern Nigeria Adoption Law, 1965, s. 13*, Lagos Adoption 
Edict, i960, s.12.
21. s.lLKl) of the Eastern Nigeria Adoption Law, 1965, and
s.13 of the Lagos Adoption Edict, 1968.
22. s.lLK2) of the Eastern :igeria Adoption Law, 1965; and
s.l^ of the Lagos Adoption Edict, I968.
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political entity. The term itself characterises, at least, two 
different kinds of relationships, not to mention the diversity 
of its effects even in countries where it means the same thing. 
Adoption to majority of countries connotes the complete 
severance of the ties between the adopted, and. his natural parents 
end his full integration into the family unit of the adoptive 
rent. The result is that the adopted child enjoys not only 
the rights to custody, maintenance and education but full 
rights of succession in the adopted parents' family on equal 
basis with their legitimate children. But in some other 
countries, e.g. Alabama, Botswana, California, Denmark, Greece, 
South Africa and Switzerland, adoption only permits the 
slackening of the legal ties between the adopted child and his 
natural parents but does not sever them. Consequently, a child 
adopted in any of these countries has a dual right of inheri­
tance, ab intestato, both from his natural parents as well as 
■ro i his adoptive parents. At the other end of the picture, in 
some other countries, particularly in the civil law countries, 
t e incidents of adoption in so far as the adopter is concerned 
is to care for and educate the adopted child. Ho right of in­
heritance, whether mutual or unilateral, is involved. As a 
result of its civil law connection, this was the position in 
Scotland until 196^ when the. law was altered by the Succession 
(Scotland) Act, an act which for the first time gives an adopted 
child rights of succession to his adoptive parents' property.
Sven in England, it was not until 1950 before adoption gave the 
c did so adopted the right of inheritance from his adopter, 
earer home, an adopted child is still unable to claim any right 
of succession or proprietary right from his adoptive parents in
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Uganda and alawi. In these two countries, an adoption order
does not deprive the child of any right to, or interest in,
rooerty devolving from his natural parents.
In lost common law countries, an adoption order, once made,
irrevocable but in Botswana, California, Denmark, France,
Japan, South Africa and Quebec, rescission of an adoption is
or lit ted. either absolutely or upon certsin conditions - e.g.
in Botswana, California and South Africa, if the child is
v 0nt: 11y disordered or defective. In Israel, an adoption is
also revocable if
uthere was a breach of the duties owed by the adopting 
parent to the child or by the child towards the adop­
tive parent as would justify revocation of the order". 23
2bIn Quebec, any "very grave ground" will suffice.^' In Ghana, 
the Lagos and the lestern Uigerian states, only an infant below 
the age of seventeen years can be adopted, whereas in majority 
of the other African common law countries, any person below the 
age of twenty-one can be adopted. In the Canadian Province of 
Quebec and some continental countries, persons of full age can 
be adopted as well. In most countries, only adults can apply 
for adoption orders, but in about eleven of the American states, 
statutes on adoption merely provide that "any person" or "any 
resident" may adopt a child. Presumably as a result of early 
economic independence of most infants in these highly indus­
trialised states, such provision has been construed by the courts 
in these states as giving capacity to minors to adopt their less
-3. Draft Family Code for the State.of Israel. (1956) s.105
(a)(2).
2*+. See Quebec, Adoption Act, Cap.218, Revised Statutes of 
Quebec, IQb^ f, s.19.
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29fortunate ones. "
Some laws e.g. that of Peru and Switzerland, stipulate that 
the adopter be childless but most others do not. In France, the 
law of November 1, 1966 abrogates the old restriction which made 
adoption impossible for any person who had already legitimate 
children. Now, such a person can adopt a child if the President
A /
of the Republic grants him a licence.^
In Israel, since adoption
"does not put an end to the blood relationship between 
the adopted child and his natural parents (and his 
other relative) nor does it establish blood relations 
between the adopted child and the adopting parent ... 
adoption does not affect legal relations based on 
consanguinity as such e.g. prohibitions on larriage." 27
I 1 other words, while an adopted child cannot still marry her 
natural father or brother after her adoption by a stranger in 
blood, nothing prevents her from entering into a lawful marriage 
with the adopter. In South Africa and Botswana, adoption is no 
obstacle to a marriage, for example, between an adopted daughter 
and the son of the adoptive parent even though such parent may 
not himself marry his adopted child; whereas adoption in the 
four Nigerian states creates a bar of consanguinity on the 
adopter and his natural children, on the one hand, and the 
adopted child, on the other. Finally, some countries have adop­
tion statutes while some have never introduced the institution 
into their legal systems. This is precisely the position with 
the ■ igerian states. And in the absence of a full faith and 
credit provision in the Nigerian Constitution, this state of
25. see M. L. Leavy, The Lav/ of Adoption. 2nd ed. 195^ > p.l8.
26. See 16 I.C.L.Q. (1967), pp.551-2.
27. Draft Family Code for the State of Israel, p.12b.
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affairs brings into the forefront the problem of recognition of 
sister-states adoptions.
Rather surprisingly, the two statutes on adoption at the 
? terstate level in Nigeria have tended towards the same varied 
icture showed at the international scene. One or two examples 
\"11 elucidate. Lncer the las tern Nigeria Adoption Law, 1965,
\ ich, as we have seen, applies in all the three Eastern Nigeria 
states, a father or mother can adopt his or her illegitimate 
child either alone or jointly with his or her spouse. ° But 
according to the Lagos Edict of 1968, only an infant who is an 
orphan or a waif may be adopted. If the child's natural parents
29are known, adoption must be refused the or any other applicant. 
Secondly, under the Eastern Nigeria Law, a sole applicant who is 
a male cannot adopt a child, whether male or female, other than 
his natural son unless there are special circumstances which
*5 O
justify such an "exceptional measure".' On the other hand, the
Lagos Edict only prevents a male person from adopting a female
infant unless, in the opinion of the court, there are exceptional
91circumstances making such order desirable.~
The above illustrations will have shown that diversity is 
the rule rather than the exception in municipal legislations on
2’ . Eefore leaving this point, a seeming gordian knot may be
posited. F. and I . are the natural parents of C. their
illegitimate child. Both are married to different persons. 
Both parents, with the approval of their respective spouses, 
want to adopt C. Under section 5 (1) of the Law, "an 
adoption order shall not be made except with the consent of 
every person who is a parent of the juvenile." Since each 
parent is desirous of adopting C., F. and K . naturally 
resent the idea that the other should have C. exclusively. 
Therefore, both refuse their consent. It may be assumed 
that both are able and willing to provide a good home for 
the child and have not at any time neglected him. With 
whose consent should the court dispense?
V  , Compare s.3(3) of the Eastern Nigeria Adoption Law, 1965
with s .1 of the Lagos Adoption Edict, i960.
3C. Eastern Nigeria It option Law, 1965, s.1!- (2).
91. Lagos Adoption Edict, 1968, s.3 (2) .
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adoption. They also emphasise the point that the various 
'lu-'leipal laws are based on policy considerations of the res­
pective countries, states or provinces, as the case may be.
■itb such plethora of laws, conflictual aspects of adoption must 
sDoner acquire added significance in Nigeria at the international 
■■y at the interstate levels: at both spheres because of the
j creasing mobility of our time which brings divers peoples, 
subject to civers laws, into continuing contact with the various 
systems of law in the federation of Nigeria. An additional 
factor at the interstate level has now been introduced by the 
1: st civil war which has made orphans of thousands of children 
in the country. The need to provide for the welfare of such 
c’ilcren led. to the promulgation of the Lagos Adoption Edict and 
is responsible for why similar measures are being contemplated
as a matter of urgent governmental policy in the other states of 
92the federation. Examples of the problems which the Nigerian 
private international law will be called upon to solve are 
(1) should a child adopted according to Eotswana law be allowed 
to succeed on the intestacy of his natural father who died 
domiciled in the Rivers state? Which law, the Eotswana or the 
Livers', decides the question? (2) What are the rights in the 
Lr'os state of an illegitimate child who was adopted by his 
•if tural parents in the South Eastern state a time when both 
p:rents and the child were domiciled in the Lagos state? The 
first example is an international conflict-acoption problem. The 
letter one concerns inter-state conflict. The role of the private 
international lawyer in this respect is to consider what ctoi.ce
3: . See the statement made, in this respect, by the Federal
Commissioner for Rehabilitation in "West Africa" of April 
26, 1969, P.1+86, Column 2.
5^3.
of law rules are better designed to advance the universal 
validity of adoptions granted in Nigeria or abroad in view of, 
or despite, the diversity of municipal laws as instanced above; 
bearing in mind that there is little virtue in advocating for 
stringent jurisdictional or choice of law rules which will make 
tl e beneficial status of adoption impossible.
Two topics will engage our attention in the chapter. The 
:’irst concerns the court's jurisdiction to create the status of 
doption which will have extra-territorial effect and the second 
deals with the problem of recognition of inter-state and foreign 
adoptions.
B • SASES OF JURISDICTION IN ADOPTION
Adoption is a statutory innovation unknown to the common 
law but for which the common law conception of jurisdiction has 
teem ascribed on the prior analysis that adoption changes the 
status of both the adopter and the adopted child and that such 
status should be created by the court of domicile which regulates 
other matters of status. In other words, the conflict methodo­
logy of the common law countries is to give exclusive jurisdic­
tion to the court of domicile. The same result is reached, 
albeit by a different approach, in some continental countries 
where Codes generally provide for the liberal assumption of 
jurisdiction coupled with a direction that the courts in exer­
cising their jurisdiction should apply the personal law of one 
or both the parties.''-'
The problem of jurisdiction and choice of law is simplest
33. For a detailed discussion on these two approaches on a com­
parative basis, See Rabel, op.cj t. , Vol.I, pp.6cl-691;
Hod ol f o De Ho vs., “ Adoption in Comparative Private Inter­
national haw1 in lC*f Heeuell des Cours (1961) pp.75-112; 
aid also, K. Lipsteii, 12 T.C.L.Q, (1963) 83 .^
when. all the parties to the adoption are domiciled in the same 
country or legal district. An adoption created by the law of 
such place will enjoy universal validity under most systems of 
law. If, in addition, the parties are national of such country, 
it is certain that the problem of universality of such status 
will be beyond dispute. Difficulties start to arise where the 
adopter is domiciled in one jurisdiction and the child is domi- 
clled in another jurisdiction at the time of the adoption, which 
i at have been created in one, or out, of these two jurisdictions. 
-he problem may further be complicated by one or both the parties 
Leing nationals of countries other than those in which they are 
domiciled. In such situations, where is the court having exclu­
sive jurisdiction to create the status of adoption to be located? 
hr expressed in another form, which law or laws should be 
applied, assuming that it is conceded that more than one legal 
district could lawfully create the status, to test the validity 
of the adoption? 'i'he two approaches detectable in the legal 
systems of the world for the creation of the status of adoption 
before it could be expected to have extra-territorial effect are
(a) the Choice of Law Approach and (b) the Jurisdictional Method.
1. CIXI.C3 OF LAX APPROACH
The legislator may, on ground of convenience, make adoption 
open to persons who are present or resident within his country 
or state, irrespective of their domiciles or nationalities, but 
ask the courts to establish the capacity of the prospective 
adopter and the child to enter into an adoptive relationship by 
reference to each party's personal law where such laws are dif­
ferent. This personal law, as we have seen, may be determined
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on the connecting factor employed by the particular legal system. 
The two personal laws may be applied either "cumulatively” or 
"distributively".
To explain these terms further, the doctrine of cumulation 
presupposes that the validity of an adoption depends on the 
c ncurrent fulfilment of the conditions and requirements pre­
scribed by each personal law of the adopter and the child. A 
distributive application of the two personal laws, on the other 
and, entails that the requirements of adoption are split into 
two, the first category consisting of those requirements which 
pertain to the prospective adopter and his family, and the 
second, relating to the adoptive child and possibly his family. 
Tome examples of the contents of the first category are such 
uestions as, should the adopter be more than a certain age or 
should he be so many years older than the adoptee? Should he 
.arried, and if so, should the consent of his spouse be an 
i dispensable condition to his adopting a stranger in blood?
SIould he or should he not have legitimate children of his own?
ong the second category are questions like, must the adoptee 
be an infant? Whose consent is necessary to his adoption? 
hoaid such consent be dispensed with and under what circumstances? 
Should his ties with his natural parents be completely severred? 
ri; 9 doctrine of distribution presupposes that the matters 
enumerated in the first category should be determined by the 
personal law of the prospective adopter while matters falling 
within the second category should be decided by reference to the 
personal law of the person to be adopted.
Examples of the joint application of the personal laws of 
the parties to decide the validity of the adoptive relationship
5*+6.
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existing between them is so numerous in the civil law systems.
It will be sufficient for our purpose if we give few illustra­
tions from international conventions. The doctrine of cumulation 
finds support in Article 73 of the Codigo Bustamante of 
?ebruary 20, 1920, ratified by most of the Latin-American 
countries. It provides that:
"The capacity to adopt and to be adopted and the
conditions and limitations of adoption are subject
to the personal law of each of the interested
persons."
Similarly, Articles 23 and 2b of the Montevideo Convention of 
1\ '-:-0 has this to say about which law should govern the validity 
of an adoption which has a foreign element:
■rt.23 "Adoption is governed, in so far as relates 
to the capacity of the persons concerned, and 
with respect to the conditions, limitations 
and effects involved, by the laws of the domi­
ciles of the parties, to extent of their 
mutual conformity, provided that the act of 
adoption is evidenced by public indenture."
Art.2*f "Other juridical questions in which the
parties may be involved, are governed by the 
laws to which the said parties are respectively 
subject
lie resume of this approach is that whenever the factual elements 
of an adoption are referrable to different legal systems, its 
creation raises a question of choice of law involving the appli­
cation of the personal laws of both the prospective adopter and 
the person to be adopted.
Before we leave the choice of law approach, it will be 
pertinent to point out that it has been much criticized by
3*+. See e.g. the list of countries cited by Rabel, op.clt. ,
Vol.I, pa.687-6915 ^odolfo De Fova, op.cit., p.9*+ et sea .;
F. Eipstein, 12 I.C.L.Q. (1963) 835, at pp. 836-8 .
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academic opinion-''- not because it is contrary to principle 
but mainly because it is inconvenient and completely disregards 
die sociological problems involved in adoptions. For while it 
is conceded that the cumulative application of the leges domicilii 
of the adopter and the adoptee for the creation of the adoption 
leans, in theory, that the two relevant laws are being used to 
effect a change in the status of the parties, nonetheless, what 
this amounts to is that the adoption must satisfy only the 
stricter law for its validity. Thus the initial premise that 
two laws are being cumulatively applied yields ground to the 
postulate that one law is, in fact, to be considered. For 
example, if the lex domicilii of the child prohibits adoption 
w list that of the prospective adopter allows it, the court 
seized of the application for adoption must refuse the adoption 
order, whether or not the grant of such order would have been 
for the benefit of the infant. Or suppose that the two leges 
co’ Icilii are not in accord as regards the revocability or non-
revocability of the adoption order once made, the severe law
•57
must prevail. In the words of Rabel,
35. See D.P. O'Connell, Recognition and Effects of Foreign Adop­
tion Order" in 33 Can.Bar .Rev. C195*5*) ^33 at pp.639-ob-l;
G.D. Kennedy, uAdoption in the Conflict of Laws" in 3*+ Can.
Bar.Rev. (1956) "5 07 at p. 516; Rabel. op. cit., Vol.I,
p.689*, 0 . Kahn-Freund., The Growth of Internationalism in
English Private International Law (i960) p.66; A. Ehrenzweig, 
Am.J,Comp.Law (i960) 5b-8; R. De Nova, op .clt., pp.96-100;
Z. Cowen, 12 I.C.L.O. C1963) 168, 170. But in favour of the 
doctrine of cumulation are such writers like Beale, op.cit., 
Vol.II, s.lb-2.2; Cheshire, op .cit., 7th ed . p.381; Graveson, 
op .cit., 6th ed . p.b-02; Mann, "Legitimation and Adoption 
in Private International Law" 57 L.O.R. (19b-!) 112 at p.122; 
and Gareth Jones, C.L.Q. 207 at p. 210. It is of 
interest to note that most of these authors fail to indicate 
t.meir preference for whether the two personal laws should 
be applied cumulatively or distributively.
36. See5 e.g. the practical explanation of the justifiability
of such doctrinal approach made by Prof. Kahn-Freund, op.cit.,
pp.83-85.
37. Op.cit., Vol.I, p.689.
"such mechanical addition results in not applying 
any one of the statutes and in impeding a transac­
tion that all students of juvenile welfare wish 
greatly to foster."
A second criticism of the cumulative approach proceeds
■so on the ground of inconvenience. In the words of Dr.
ft
“ orris,- to apply the lex domicilii of the infant in addition
to that of the adopter will
"render adoptions unduly difficult and expensive if 
proof of domicile were required in the case of 
infants who are waifs or strays or whose natural 
parents could not be traced".
: is argument must carry weight with the Nigerian private 
:i ternational law since the Lagos Adoption Edict, as the pre­
cursor of similar legislations in the rest of the country, only
c ontenplates the
"adoption of a person under the age of seventeen 
years who is abandoned, or whose parents and other 
relatives are unknown or cannot be traced after due 
inquiry by a ... court". 39
1 i trying to understand the philosophy of this provision, we
way cast a side look at the thousands of children whose parents
rve perished during the last three years in the igerian civil
war. Such children are being kept in refugee camps in several
centres in Nigeria and abroad, kith this factual situation may
be linked the proverbial saying that
"_the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of 
/ 'igerian/ parents over their children are inalien­
able" .
because of the love they have for their children. In other 
words, while some I igerian people will be prepared to adopt other 
persons’ children either because they are childless or because
38. Dicey and Morris, on.cit., 8th ed. p. b-58.
39. 3.1♦
M. A. K. Uche, Eastern Nigeria House of Assembly Debates (1965) 
Vol.5* No.l, Column b-6.
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they consider such transaction as a means of demonstrating the
higher ideals of human nature, yet, few parents, if any, will
be prepared to give their children av/ay in adoption. Therefore
t • only range of persons who are being, or would in fact be,
d oted in the country are parentless children or war orphans.
''' o Lagos Edict clearly recognises this fact in its provision.
3o 'Iso did this point dawn on the proponents of the Eastern
hi
” eria Adoption Law which was enacted even;before the com-
ice '.ait of the civil war. Therefore, since the persons
eligible for adoption in these Nigerian states, as would be in
ers, are mostly orphans and waifs whose dependent domiciles
could only be ascertained by looking at the intentions of their
:ceased parents, or by arbitrarily fixing such domiciles at
the states where the children are to be found, and presumably
where the adoptions are to be made, it becomes unnecessary to
wrsue further the point whether the theory of cumulative or
istributive application of the personal laws of both the
adopter and the child could be advocated, for the igerian private
h-25 iternational law.
L l . Eastern Nigeria House of Assembly Debates (1965) Vol.5 No.I, 
Column 991. In introducing the Bill leading to the Eastern 
Nigeria Adoption Law, the then Attorney-General and I inister 
of Justice said: ’’The need for this law arose from the
increasing number of delinquent children in the urban areas 
and large number of orphans in some rural communities. 
Applications and enquiries continue to be made by indivi­
duals and organisations wishing to adopt motherless babies 
but they cannot do so as there is no adoption law for this 
Region.”
b-2. We may add for the sake of completeness that the distributive 
application of the leges domicilii of the adopter and the 
adoptee has also been condemned. An obvious criticism is 
that the conditions or the requirements for adoption cannot 
just be neatly segregated into those touching the adopter 
end those pertaining to the adoptive child as instanced 
above. Some requirements will ” touch upon or even transcend” 
both laws and aim at the public morals of the States con­
cerned. ?or example, one lav/ may permit adoption while the 
other does not. As a measure of public concern, one legal 
syste may allovnadoption by a male applicant, the other 
may, on t o  same ground, disallow such adoption. Into which
-continued -
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Jn our submission, it is just too impractical. And on t is
mint, we shall let Fennycuick, J., in the English case of 
hi
he Valentine have the last say:
"The relation of parent and child is one of personal 
status, and it seems to me that on principle ^the7 
court must regard the law of the adopter's domicile as 
decisive on the question whether or not this status 
had been created. This view corresponds, I think, to 
the realities of the matter. Once an adoption order 
has been made in any country, the infant is brought up’ 
in the adopter's home as part of the adopter's family. 
In the vast majority of cases, the adopter's home is 
in the country of his domicile. The whole purpose of 
the relation created by the order would be defeated if 
the adoption were not recognised in that country."
’HE JURISDICTIONAL METHOD — — - — —   -
A second approach which is more prevalent with the common 
law countries, is for provision to be made for a strict and 
exclusive jurisdiction on adoption. This map be exercised on 
tl a basis cf the domicile of the adopter or the child, as in 
se e common law systems, or on the basis of the nationality of 
tie adopter or the adoptee as in some civil law countries. In 
addition, the court may be enjoined, to, or by its own tacit 
i: iderstanding, apply the local law i.e. the lex fori, which, for 
choice of law purposes will invariably coincide writh the personal 
] aw of one of the parties to the adoption. In short, the gist 
of this approach is that choice of the competent court implies
(continued) category should such conditions be classified 
since they do not refer directly to any of the parties to 
the adoption but are me.tters of state interest. It is 
such difficulties in the distributive application of the 
personal laws that prompted erle, Le Droit International 
Prive de la Famille en France et en A'lemagne., Tubingen - 
Paris (1955) p.329 to write that the "distributive system 
is only practical in so far as the substantive conditions 
of adoption can be clearly related to the person of the 
adopter or adoptee. Eut when a condition is common to them 
both, the c nice of a single law is absolutely necessary."
Zl96p7 Ch.226 at pp.2J3-23
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the c'etermination of the applicable law. Perhaps because of the 
s:‘ plicity of the approach - in the sense that it is unburdened 
uif the application of any foreign law - it is not only widely 
accepted but it is still on the ascendant in most systems of 
Taw. The two varieties of this method are best illustrated by 
section 1 of the English Adoption Act, 1958 and the practice of 
A American courts, the result of which is the formulation of 
e black-letter rule of the Second Restatement of the Conflict 
of Laws.
In England, the court has jurisdiction to grant an adop­
tion order if
(a) the prospective adopter is domiciled in England or 
Scotland; and
(b) the prospective adopter and the child are both
kkresident in England.
£ • - relaxation is made by section 12 of the Act in favour of 
rsons, e.g. British civil servants, businessmen, military 
rsonuel, etc. who are domiciled in England or Scotland but 
who, as a result of the nature of their callings, are resident 
"bro.wc. For such people, their domicile in England or Scotland 
alone is sufficient to enable the English courts to assume 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, if an application for adoption is 
wde by spouses, residence of either of them.in England with the 
c iId for the trial period of three months, is deemed sufficient 
for the requirements of section 3 (1) of the English Act.
No specific mention is made of which 1aw should be applied,
Ah. Adoption Act, 1958, s.l (1) anc (5). The basis of juris­
diction of the English Courts will be greatly extended when 
the Adoption Act, 1968 is brought into force. For a 
detailed discussion on the jurisdictional bases of the i960 
Act, see J. D. KcClean and K. If. Patchett, in 11 English 
Jurisdiction in Adoption1 in 19 I.C.L.Q. (l9?0) 1.
but the mass rules of procedure which the courts must observe in
renting an adoption order leaves little room for the applica-
bnion of any other law than. English. In Re B (S) (An Infant), "
t was held that since the provision as to domicile in the
nlish Adoption Act is directed solely to the prospective 
- ' ; ,:er, the English courts had Jurisdiction to grant an adoption 
' oder in respect of a child who was- domiciled in Spain but 
r si bent in England. It was further held that in exercising 
jurisdiction-, an English court needs only to consider the impact 
of the child's lex domicilii in arriving at the conclusion as to 
ether or not the adoption will operate for the welfare of the 
«• ild. In other words, respect may be paid to the foreign 
arsenal law of the child, if known, so as to prevent limping
:■ coptions. Eut such law has no predominating effect on whether 
r not the order should be granted. If the order will be for 
the welfare of the child, the fact that the child’s lex domicilii 
orbids adoption, or that it would not recognise foreign adop­
tions will certainly be disregarded.
in interesting development in the American jurisprudence 
lt first be noted, host of the States’ statutes on adoption 
: oeeh on the basis of "residence” as the jurisdictional 
j : o  irament which entitles the court of a state to grant an 
abortion order. Nonetheless, as in the case of divorce juris­
diction, the various States’ courts have interpreted the resi­
dential qualification to mean that at least one of the parties 
to the adoption must be domiciled at the forum in addition to 
: e residence or the physical presence of both parties in such
W .  A  9637 Ch. D. 20k.
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state. 'en.ce section lh2 of t e American Law Institute's
h6 'second Restatement of Conflict of L^ iws provides, following 
case law, that;
"1 State has judicial jurisdiction to grant an adop­
tion if
(a) it is the State of domicile of either the 
adopted child or the adoptive parent, and
(b) it has personal jurisdiction over the adoptive 
parent and over either the adopted child or the
person having legal custody of the child."
us Y7: ile the statutes speak of residence, the courts exercise 
their jurisdiction in terms of domicile on the ground that domi­
cile in the American law has a reasonably constant meaning,
\ ereas residence "is one of the most variable words in the 
legal c ictionary". ' And the reason for giving jurisdiction to 
tie court of the domicile of either the adopter or the adopted 
child is explained by the commentator on the Restatement on the 
footing that if exclusive jurisdiction were confined to the 
court of the state in which both parties have a common domicile,
few adoption orders would be granted and this will be contrary
to the overall interest of the American legal systems which aim 
at the encouragement of legal adoptions, at least interstate.
This slight modification of the traditional power of the 
d : icile to control the creation of adoption by placing desirable 
emphasis on the sociological advantages of adoption is also the 
method employed by the Scandinavian countries in dealing with the 
instituti n in their private international law. Article 11 of
:-:-6. mertative Draft "o.h of 1957. See now, S.78 of the Proposed
Official Draft, Part 1, 1967.
hy. . L. Reese and R. S. Green "That Pluslve ore 1 Residence11
5n The Symposium on Conflict of LawsT 6 Vanderbilt Law Rev. 
(19^)561.
the Convention signed between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, I: orway
- Sweden on February 6, 1931', provides in the following terms;
"If a person who is a national of one of the Contract­
ing States and is domiciled in such State wishes to 
adopt a national of one of the States, the application 
shall be made In the State where the adoptive parent 
is domiciled".
' en Article 12 continues by providing that the
"application shall be dealt with in each State accord­
ing to the legislation of that State".
finally, perhaps the most recent example of legal systems 
v del concentrate on the jurisdictional approach, i.e. assume 
jurisdiction if the adopter has his domicile or his nationality 
1 the country where the application is made and apply the law 
In rorce in such country, either as the lex fori or as the
rsonal law of the adopter, is afforded by the Hague Convention 
on Jurisdiction, Applicable I id Recognition of Decrees 
K- Anting to Adoptions. There are twenty-three contracting
LlR
countries y to V  is Convention, section 3 of which- deals with 
jurisdiction to grant adoption orders. It provides;
"Jurisdiction to grant an adoption is vested in
(a) the authorities of the State where the adopter 
habitually resides or, in the case of an adoption 
by spouses, the authorities of the State in which 
both habitually reside;
(b) the authorities of the State of which the adopter 
is a national or in the case of an adoption by 
spouses, the authorities of the State of which 
both are nationals."
Thus, by giving jurisdiction to the country of nationality as
well as the country where the adopter habitually resides, the
li-3. Austria-, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic 
of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxem­
bourg, The Netherlands, Hqrway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, The United Arab Republic, The United 
Kingdom of Great Fritain and 'orthem Ireland, United States 
of America, and Yugoslavia.
Convention strides a neat balance between those cqllutries which 
ore operating on the principle of nationality and those opera­
ting on the principle of domicile as basis of personal law.
at tie Convention means by "habitual residence" is not defined 
tut it has been suggested by a co-outhor that this is left to 
h ■ law of the country mailing the adoption order to interpret. ^
" t robably would, be taken by the countries operating the prin­
ciple of domicile to mean "domicile" shorn- of that notorious 
c stituent element - the permanent intention of never leaving, 
if ve are correct on this point, then such meaning will coincide 
with the definition of domicile suggested for the Nigerian law 
in Cup ter two of this work. And to complete the picture, it 
will be necessary to point out that Article b requires the 
. t .ority which is exercising jurisdiction on basis of nationality 
or habitual residence of the adopter to apply its domestic law,
thereby following the common law approach of applying the lex
hrvh 50 hri once jurisdiction is assumed.
- . Jl'lJShJCTIOr f.:T> CHOICE OF LAN TJ NIGERIA.
The next point to consider is how far has due .weight been 
iven by recent statutes in Nigeria to the solutions provided by 
other countries' legal systems and international conventions in
b-9. See Graveson, Ik I.C.L.Q. (1965) 528 at p. 53*+.
50. The Convention, however, makes some concession to the prin­
ciple of nationality and the doctrine of distribution. Art. 
b (b) directs the authority having jurisdiction by virtue 
of habitual residence to respect any prohibitions on adop­
tion contained in the lex patriae of the adopter, while
art. 5 enjoins the application of the lex patriae of the
child in relation to consents and consultations necessary 
on his part.
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dealing with the common problem of international validity of 
adoptions. To start with, it is gratifying to observe that both 
enactments on adoption in Nigeria even contain provisions which 
determine the limits of jurisdiction of the courts.
(a) The Eastern Nigeria Adoption Law. 1965
Section b (*+) of this Law, the whole of which is deemed to 
apply in the South Eastern, the East Central and the Rivers 
states as the specific enactment of each of the states, vests 
jurisdiction to grant an adoption order in the court solely on 
the basis of the applicants and the child*s residence in the 
state where the application is made. With this must be read 
section 9 of the Law which directs the courts to refuse an adop­
tion order in respect of an applicant who is not a national of 
Nigeria or, in the case of a joint application, when both appli­
cants are not nationals of Nigeria. In short, only a citizen of 
Nigeria who is resident, together with the child to be adopted, 
in the particular state can adopt. For example, a citizen of 
Nigeria who is married to a non-Nigerian national is bound to 
have his or her application for adoption rejected if he or she 
applies jointly with his or her non-Nigerian spouse. This is
regardless of the fact that the spouse who is not a national of
51Nigeria has made Nigeria his or her everlasting home. On the 
other hand, if the spouse who is a citizen of Nigeria applies 
singly, the adoption will be granted even though it subsequently
51. A classic example is that of an Englishman who is married 
to a Nigerian woman and who because of colour prejudice 
against his two half-caste children in Great Britain settles 
in Nigeria with the rest of his family. (The Times, 23rd 
July, 1968.) If, having decided to make Nigeria his ever­
lasting home, he now applies to adopt one of the war orphans 
in the Rivers state, for example, his application must be
rejected so long as he retains his British nationality.
transpires that the non- ri gerian spouse is the person who exer- 
c:\ses effective control and other parental rights over the 
adopted child!
Of course the problem of choice of law is conveniently 
swe; t under the carpet. If a South Eastern state court cannot 
entertain jurisdiction over a prospective adopter who is resi- 
dent in the South Eastern state because of his foreign nation­
ality, that determination forecloses the issue as to what the 
.revision of his foreign lex domicilii or lex patriae might have 
been with regards his capacity to adopt. 'either does it make 
any difference that the applicant is in fact domiciled in the 
South ha stern state. At the inter-state level, would a Rivers 
st; te court apply the provision of the Lagos state Adoption 
Cdict in determining whether the application for adoption of a 
kayos state domiciliary, who is resident with his illegitimate 
c 5Id in the Rivers state, should, be granted? To put it in 
'■ other way, will the Rivers state court say that since the 
I . os law, the lex domicilii, of the adopter and the child, prohi- 
its adoption of an illegitimate child by his natural parent, 
such adoption should be refused even though it is permitted by 
the Rivers state law? It is doubtful if any of the three Eastern 
'eria states, being common law jurisdictions, would burden 
v. ? .selves with what are the provisions of a sister-state or a 
foreign enactment before deciding the matter. Rather, since the 
court has jurisdiction by virtue of the Nigerian nationality of 
t e applicant and the residence of the applicant and the child 
In the state, it seems that the adoption order would be granted 
by applying the lex fori, regardless of the provisions of the 
lex domic .Hi i of the parties. The courts' experience in the 
field of divorce and matrimonial causes conveniently takes care 
of any suggestion to h e  contrary. In any event, the provisions
?? 8.
of the Adoption Law are such that no adoption made under it can 
b  vitiated in any of the Lastern Nigeria states where it has 
been jade for failure to apply %; sister-state or a foreign 
rsonal law of t e parties. That any Adoption order granted 
v. id e r c :r cut .stances described above might not be recognised 
r d will be the subject of the last part of this chapter.
(b) m e Lagos :\d option Edict 1968
The position under the Lagos Adoption 'Edict is only
slightly better. The Edict also makes residence of both the
respective adopter and the child the condition precedent to
dp
j exercise of jurisdiction by a Lagos court. And like the 
Eastern ' igeria Adoption Law, there is np provision that the 
court should link this liberal basis of jurisdiction with, 
c: oi.ce of law as the legal systems mentioned above have done, 
b'a Lagos Edict however makes a slight departure from the total 
bjcrimination against foreigners employed by the Eastern Nigeria 
boption Law. Instead of prohibiting adoptions by foreigners, 
tin. Edict authorises the courts to grant an interim order, which 
is toe nically not an adoption order, ~ in favour of an appli-
9*cr t or applicants who are not citizens of Nigeria. This 
i terim order may be made for upwards of six months, after the 
ex iration of which period, the court, in its absolute dis­
cretion, may decide whether to make a full adoption order or to 
continue the interim order for a period not- exceeding two years
52. S.3 (1)(b).
03. s.6 (?).
5k. S.7.
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■ 1 together. For this period which, in the language of section 
1 of the Edict, is a "probationary per:' od", the court will have 
decide what are the incidents of such interim order, i.e.
\.' et or it includes the obligations on the part of the applicant 
to oirite in, educate or to have the custody of the child . In 
addition, sucih order must contain a stipulation that the child 
s oulc be under the supervision of the welfare officers through­
out the period, and a condition that the child must not be taken
55out of the Lagos state without the prior consent of the court.
In all these, the provisions of the Lagos Adoption Edict closely 
follow similar provisions in the Ghana Adoption Act of 1962b 0 
bus, the discrimination between applicants for adoption who 
are citizens of Nigeria and applicants who are nationals of 
foreign countries, even though not as apparent as in the Eastern 
'igeria Adoption Law, is still real. A Nigerian national who 
satisfies the procedural requirements of the Edict can have a
h 11 adoption order made in his favour. On the other hand, a
foreign national who has no other home besides Lagos and who 
equally satisfies all the conditions of the statute will only 
e j . c  up with a provisional order which is so hemmed in with 
stringent restrictions such as his constant surveillance by 
welfare officers for a considerable time, and his inability to 
take the child out of the Lagos state, not even to another state 
in igeria where the foreign national may have subsequently 
settled, without the prior, and of course expensive, authorisation 
by the Lagos court.
As could be seen, none of the '’igerian statutes adopts
55. s s .6  and 7 .
56. ss.6 and 7.
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y of the solutions discussed above for exercising international
• .rise lotion on adoption. Rather, they ignore problems of
rive te international lav; entirely, as most such statutes in
57■.‘rice, have done, by asking the courts to assume jurisdiction 
n basis of residence .ithout telling them to test the validity 
of e proposed adoption by reference to the personal lav; of any 
-? the arties t ereto. The Nigerian statutes, like the Ghana 
id option Act, are even worse in this respect than those in the 
rest of the African continent. The courts of the Nigerian 
states, in exercising their jurisdiction on basis of residence 
.st refuse any application mace by non-Nigerian nationals (as 
ri the Eastern Nigeria Adoption Law) or consider the applica­
tions of such foreign nationals but make conditions for adoption 
s difficult that such foreign nationals would consider it 
worthless pursuing their applications to logical conclusions. 
Needless to say that this peculiar discrimination against 
foreign nationals in the field of adoption is repugnant to the 
generous spirit which under-lies all the other aspects of the 
Igerian private international law. Moreover, it is a complete 
negation of the rules of such body of law.
To pragmatic explanation is given for restricting adoption 
j; the Eastern Nigeria states to nationals of Nigeria or for 
rhy the Lagos Adoption Edict makes available to non-nationals of 
igeria mere interim orders, apart from the statement of the
57. Among those statutes in the rest of common lav; African 
countries which base jurisdiction of the court to grant 
adoption order on residence are, the Adoption Acts of 
Zambia, Cep.136, s.Lf(5); Tr ngs-nyika, Cap. 335? s.1+(5)?
Kenya, Cap. 1^2, 5.^(5); Uganda, Cap.19, s.li-(5) - Applicant 
should be a Iritish subject who is resident in Uganda, while 
the child must be a British subject resident in East 
Africa, i.e. Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika; Malawi, Cap. 
26.01, s. 3(5). An exception to the general rule is the 
icnzibar, Adoption of Children Decree, Cap.55 which provides 
that the applicant s oulc be domiciled in Zanzibar or in 
the Ini ted Kingdom (whatever that may mean ) - s.V(5).
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Attorney-General for the former Eastern Region of Nigeria.
1 It will be observed1 he said, "that adoption by a non­
native of Nigeria is ruled out. This does not mean 
that the Eastern Nigeria Government is opposed to such 
an adoption or that an adoption of that nature will not 
take place. It only means that it cannot be done under 
our own Regional Adoption Law. The reason for this is 
that such an adoption raises the question of citizen­
ship which is outside the competence of the Regional 
Government and is a concern of the Federal Government.1* 58
This reasoning is not convincing. Much more, it is clearly
wrong. The statement confuses a matter of status of adoption,
on which the Regional (now state) Government has exclusive power
to legislate, with the incident of such status. It is true that
nationality or citizenship is a matter within the legislative
competence of the Federal Government. It is also true that the
nationality or citizenship of a person may be affected by such
person*s adoption by a stranger in blood. But in our view,
nothing in the Federal Constitution of Nigeria prevents any
State Government from making adoptions available to nationals of
foreign countries who may have sufficient connection with such
state while reserving the incidental question as to whether a
child adopted by a foreigner in that state takes the nationality
of his adopter to the Federal Government. A near analogy is
the matter of marriage. Nothing prevents a State Government in
Nigeria from providing, as they have impliedly done, that a
foreign national may enter into a customary marriage with a
Nigerian citizen. The circumstances under which the non-
Nigerian spouse acquires Nigerian nationality then becomes the
concern of the Federal Government. Furthermore, the division of
legislative powers between the Federal and state Governments in
58. 1965, Eastern Nigeria House of Assembly Debates. Vol.5
No.I Column ^5*
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Nigeria is almost identical with such division in the federa­
tions like Australia, Canada and the United States of America.
Yet considerations of a common nationality have never prevented 
the individual states or provinces in these countries from 
making their courts available to nationals of other countries who 
may wish to adopt native children of these places. Indeed, in 
the final analysis, whether adoption in Nigeria of a Nigerian 
baby by a foreign national results in the conferment of a
foreign nationality on the Nigerian baby depends on the law of
the country of nationality of the foreign adopter and not for a 
Federal or„state law in Nigeria to decide. For example, what­
ever the provision of a Nigerian statute, if a Ghanaian or an 
English act denies a child adopted outside such country the
nationality of Ghana or the United Kingdom, that is the end of
the matter. The same considerations govern the acquisition of 
Nigerian nationality by a foreign child adopted abroad by a 
citizen of Nigeria. Nigerian law, and not the law of the 
country where the adoption was worked, decides the issue.
The main reason for refusing the adoption of Nigerian 
babies to foreign nationals would seem to be the fear that 
Nigeria might become a baby market for foreign adopters or that 
such babies might not find good treatment abroad where their 
adopters may subsequently settle. The fear that Nigeria might 
constitute baby markets for foreigners, if it actually exists, 
does not seem to have been based on secure grounds. We have 
seen that almost all adoption statutes in Commonwealth countries 
in Africa reject this notion of exclusiveness by making their 
courts open to foreign nationals who may wish to adopt African 
babies. The earliest of these statutes was enacted well over a 
quarter of a century ago while the majority have almost about
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twenty years existence. There has not been evidence that these 
African countries have become baby markets for prospective 
adopters from foreign countries. There should be no reason to 
believe that the situation will suddenly change with Nigeria 
having adoption statutes like other countries in Africa.
Secondly, whilst it must be admitted that it might not be desir­
able to give Nigerian babies in adoption to nationals or domi- 
ciliaries of those countries where there is a grosser form, or 
an official policy, of discrimination against persons on account 
of race, happily such countries are in the minority and their 
number is on the wane. But this state of affairs is no justi­
fication for making adoptions in Nigeria impossible or more 
difficult for nationals of all foreign countries. The suggestion 
later to be made that domicile of the adopter in a state of 
Nigeria should be the basis of the courts' jurisdiction, 
coupled with the requirement in the Adoption Statutes themselves 
that a court, before granting an adoption order, must be satis­
fied that such order will be for $he welfare of the child^ are, 
in our view, sufficient safeguards which will enable the courts 
to refuse adoption orders to foreign nationals or domlcillaries 
of foreign countries who come to Nigerian states apparently to 
adopt Nigerian babies away to uncongenial atmosphere abroad. 
Finally, the point mu3t be stressed that with the immense res­
ponsibilities devolving on indigenous Nigerian people as a 
result of the concept of the extended family, the future of many 
of the thousands of children orphaned by the last civil war may 
depend equally, if not more, on the benevolence of foreign
59. See s. 7(1) of the Eastern Nigeria Adoption Law, 1965 a&d 
s. 5(1)Cb) of the Lagos Adoption Edict, 1968.
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nationals, who are either domiciled or habitually resident in 
Nigerian states and who are prepared to use the institution of 
adoption as a means of showing their concern for the plight of 
such children.
(c) Meaning of "Residence11 under both Statutes
We have seen that both statutes employ "residence1 as 
basis of jurisdiction to grant an adoption order. Equally, both 
fail to define what is meant by residence. Is it synonymous 
with domicile as in the American law or does it mean something 
more? Is a visit as a visitor or a mere sojjourn enough? What 
of presence under compulsion or presence under sufferance e.g. 
when a foreign national stays in Nigeria as a result of temporary 
permit by the federal Government? On the other hand, should 
there be, at least, a well settled connection with the state 
where the application for adoption is being made before the 
court could assume jurisdiction? If so, how long should the 
connection be? Should .it be merely for the statutory period of 
three months during which the child is required to live on trial 
with the applicant? Or should there be a probability that such 
residence would continue until some considerable time after the 
adoption order has been granted? Whatever the quantum of the 
period of residence decided upon, how fatal to such residential 
qualification should be temporary absences out of the state for 
business or for convenience? And in the case of a joint appli­
cation by spouses, how far is it permissible for the uninterrup­
ted residence of one spouse within the state to found jurisdic­
tion when the other spouse is resident out of, or had just ceased 
his residence in, the state where the application was made?
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The above questions, most of which the courts will soon be 
called upon to answer, show that “residence” is an extremely un­
certain word, Indeed, as aptly pointed out in another connection
60by Alexander, J., in the Lagos case of Onwuka v. T ay man!.
“the word ‘resident* and cognate expressions admit of 
a variety of meanings depending on the intent and 
scope of the particular enactment in which the word 
occurs”.
For the purpose of the case, the Judge defined “residence” as 
"ordinary residence” - a term which has caused the courts some 
anxious moments as illustrated by the cases which are inter­
pretative of an identical terminology employed by section **0 of 
the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965. Therefore, as used in these 
two statutes, the term "residence” places upon the courts a 
difficult task of interpretation. Besides, this seeming diffi­
culty of construction placed upon the courts would seem to 
suggest that the legislators are unaware of the ambiguities and 
complexities which the use of the term involves before they make 
an uncritical adoption of the Jurisdictional requirement of 
other such statutes in Africa without defining it.
Without finding it necessary to repeat what we have already 
said about the conflicting views expressed in connection with 
the meaning of residence or ordinary residence as a Jurisdic­
tional factor for purposes of matrimonial causes on behalf of a 
wife, the meaning of residence in connection with Judicial Juris­
diction to grant an adoption order has already been given in 
England. It has already been mentioned that in addition to the 
domicile of the adopter in England or in Scotland, an adoption 
should not be made, as a general rule, in England unless the
60. (1965) L.L.R. 62 at p. 75.
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applicant and the infant reside in the country. In Re Adoption 
Application 5 2 / 1 9 5 1 a joint application for adoption of a 
child, resident in England, was made by spouses both of whom 
were domiciled in England but who were living in Nigeria where 
the husband was a District Officer in the Colonial Civil Service. 
Every 1? months, the husband had a period of leave, lasting for 
about three months which he spent with his wife in England.
During the period of such leave in 1951* the spouses bought a 
house in England intending to reside permanently there after the 
end of the husband*s service in Nigeria. Also during the 1951 
leave, they both applied for the adoption of the infant who had 
lived with them for the trial period of three months as provided 
by the English Adoption statute. But before the application 
could be heard, the period of leave expired and the husband had 
to return to his post in Nigeria, the understanding being that 
the wife should continue with the application and that she and 
the child should follow the husband to Nigeria after the grant 
of the order. As regards the contention of the wife that she 
was resident in England and that the court therefore had juris­
diction, Harman, J., first observed that it was dangerous to 
try to define what is meant by residence. However, he came to 
the conclusion that nResidence denotes some degree of permanence’1 
and that it does not mean that the applicant must have a home in
the country where the application is made but that he must have
62a ”settled headquarters” there. Support for this interpreta­
tion he found in the definition of residence or ”to reside” in
61. Zl9?£7 Ch. D. 16.
62. ^"9527 Ch.D. 16 at p. 25.
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the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary where the word is defined 
as "to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, to have 
onefs settled or usual abode, to live in or at a particular 
place”. These words were quoted with approval by the learned 
judge. Consequehtly, he held that the wife-applicant and her 
husband were not resident in England because the parties had 
always lived in Nigeria and Nigeria was where the wife intended 
to take the child as soon as an adoption order was granted.
Now, two significant points for the Nigerian law emerge 
from the above decision of the English court. The first con­
cerns the meaning ascribed to residence as a jurisdictional 
factor for purposes of adoption in England and the second relates 
to the means the court employed to ascertain the meaning of the 
word. In Aderawos Timber Trading Company Ltd. v. Federal Board 
of Inland Revenue.^ the Lagos High Court held that when terms 
used in Nigerian statutes are similar to those used in English 
statutes and are used in the same context and with the same 
connotation, the decisions of the English courts interpreting 
them may be used to construe similar terms in the Nigerian 
statutes where such Nigerian statutes do not themselves supply 
some definition. Secondly, in Ashekoya v. Olawunmi, the 
Federal Supreme Court, the highest court in Nigeria, establishes 
the rule that the courts may assist themselves in the discharge 
of their duty of construction of statutes by any literal help 
they can find, in particular, the consultation of authoritative 
dictionaries such as, in the words of the court, "the Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary". From these two cases, it appears
63. 11966V (2) A 1 R VComm. ! ¥+9 at pp. *+57-8• 
6k. C1962] All N.L.R. 125 at p. 128.
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certain that the definition of residence as used in the Eastern 
Nigeria Adoption Law and the Lagos Adoption Edict will be 
synonymous with the meaning ascribed to that word by Harman, J., 
in the above English case. In other words, before the residence 
of an applicant for an adoption order can be accepted as the 
basi^ of jurisdiction by the courts of the Nigerian states 
having adoption statutes, such residence must involve some degree 
of permanence. Presumably, the requirement contained in the 
Lagos Edict that only interim orders which are reviewable after 
6 months can be made in respect of prospective adopters who are 
not nationals of Nigeria, is intended to ensure some reasonable 
connection between such people and the Lagos state before full 
orders can be made.
If we are correct on this point, the meaning of residence 
in these two statutes will approximate the definition of domi­
cile as postulated in chapter two of this work. Since there is 
no indication that the various law districts in Nigeria are in 
favour of jettisoning the conception of domicile as being the 
result of dusty learning, ahd since adoption is a matter of 
status which, on principle, ought to be regulated by the law of 
domicile as in other matters of status such as marriage, legiti­
macy, succession, etc., it is our considered view that the dis­
placement of domicile as the jurisdictional factor, and for 
choice of law, in adoption is a gross legislative error on the 
part of the four Nigerian states. Will it not be better if we 
adopt domicile with a less exacting definition as the necessary 
basis of jurisdiction for adoption as well? It is submitted 
that this should be so. Therefore, with the aim of not allowing 
conceptual elegance to hinder the creation of the beneficial 
status of adoption in any of the Nigerian legal units, and at
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the same time to ensure that any adoption decreed in such state 
would be entitled to expect universal recognition outside 
Nigeria, the jurisdictional rule for creating the status should 
be formulated for the Nigerian private international law as 
follows: -
The court of the state where application for an adop­
tion is made has jurisdiction to grant the order if
(a) the applicant is domiciled In such state or 
in any other state of Nigeria, and
(b) both the applicant and the child to be
adopted are subject to the personal juris-
65diction of the court. J 
In exercising its jurisdiction, the court should apply 
the provision of the adoption statute in force at the 
state where the application is made.
It has earlier been suggested that a full faith and credit
clause should be incorporated into the Nigerian Federal Consti-
66tution or any Federal enactment. We shall also suggest that 
there should be uniform legislation^) on adoption by all the 
various states in the country. Such uniform legislations, even
if it involves the enactment of identical laws by each of the
states as in the case of the Legitimacy Laws, should include the 
rule proposed above with respect to judicial jurisdiction. The 
result will be the uniformity not only of substantive laws but 
also of jurisdictional rules. Since uniformity of law on a
65. Compare s. 1(1)(a) of the Adoption Act (Northern Ireland) 
1967, which provides that a Northern Ireland court has 
jurisdiction to make an adopt?on order in favour of an 
applicant who is "domiciled anywhere in the United Kingdom, 
or in the Isle of Man or any of the Channel Islands, and 
resident in Northern Ireland".
66. See Chapter one.
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particular matter within a federation presupposes the interstate 
recognition of any institution emanating from such law in a 
particular state, a decree of adoption created by any state in 
Nigeria will most probably be recognised outside Nigeria since 
it would be recognised at the state of the applicant*s domicile 
even if it does not constitute the forum adoptlonls.
In addition, a jurisdictional factor of domicile, as
suggested, will ensure that adoption will be available to a
foreign national who had established some reasonable connection
with Nigeria by being domiciled in a state of it, even though for
political or sentimental reasons, he retains his foreign
nationality. Finally, the acceptance of such a jurisdictional
base will make it possible for a citizen of Nigeria who is
resident abroad, but domiciled in a Nigerian state, to come to
Nigeria, live the statutory period of three month's trial period
with the child in any Nigerian state, and have an adoption order
made in his favour. In other words, if the facts in the English
67case of Re Adoption Application 52/1951 were reversed, with 
the result that the spouses were citizens of Nigeria who were 
domiciled in a Nigerian state but working in a Nigerian Embassy 
or a foreign office, an adoption order would be granted to them 
on their fulfilment of the statutory period of residence in a 
state of their choice with the child to be adopted. Thefhct 
that they intended to go back immediately after the adoption 
to the country where they normally resided, or that only one of 
the spouses eventually saw the application through, would become 
supremely irrelevant. There is no doubt that such order would 
be recognised in most countries outside Nigeria. And if, as it
67. Ch. D. 16.
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is being here strongly recommended, Nigeria adheres to the 
Hague Convention on Adoption, the chances of Nigerian adoption 
orders, based on nationality, being recognised in the countries 
who adhere to the Convention, will become greatly enhanced.
Only then may the jurisdictional base of domicile in adoption be
fl&-n - y
extended in favour of/nationals of those countries who adhere to 
the Hague Convention, since reciprocity will then become the 
basis of recognition between the member-nations.
C. RECOGNITION OF SISTER-STATE AND FOREIGN ADOPTIONS
Several incidents emanate from the status of adoption the 
recognition of the efficacy of which may present some acute 
problems where the factual situation of the adoption are refer­
able to two or more systems of law. A child adopted in a 
foreign country or a state of Nigeria may assert in any of the 
other sister-states that he is entitled to succeed to the estate 
of his adoptive parent or that of his natural parent. He may 
claim damages for the wrongful death of the adopter under the 
statefs Torts or Fatal Accidents Law as the adopterfs child.
Hq may demand that he is entitled to inclusion among those en­
titled to compensation for injury to the adopter under the 
Federal Workmen*s Compensation Act, or simply, that he is en­
titled to bear the surname of the adopter. On the other hand, 
the adopter may assert that he is entitled to the custody of 
the adopted not only at the foreign country or a sister-state 
where the child was adopted but also in the particular state in 
which both are now living. The adopter*s claim may be that he
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is entitled to the adopted child's services or to succession to 
his intestate estate as if he were his natural father. The 
problem to be resolved may be the knotty one as to whether an 
adopted daughter has capacity to marry the adopter's son in a 
Nigerian state where both parties are living temporarily, on 
the ground that their foreign personal law, both at the time of 
the adoption and at the time of the action, enables them to do 
so.
In discussing the recognition of sister-state and foreign
adoptions in the various states of Nigeria, a distinction should
be made between the recognition of such incidents as the child's
right to custody, maintenance and education (i.e. those rights
which, for convenience, may be described as the child's social
welfare rights) and such incidents as the parties' rights of
succession or capacity to marry. As observed in the early part
of this chapter, scarcely is there any country permitting the
institution of adoption in which an adoption, whether effected
by a court's order or by private acts of the parties, does not
give the minimum rights of care, maintenance and education to
the adopted child. This is due to the fact that almost all
systems of law in the world now accept the social value of any
legal institution whose purpose is to fit any deprived child,
whether an orphaned, abandoned or illegitimate child, into a
proper family structure. Adoption is one of the means of doing
this. Even most countries or legal units having no adoption
statutes still maintain that the welfare of such child is of
68paramount consideration. As already pointed out, provisions 
that the interest and welfare of the child should be of paramount
68. See chapter b.
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consideration in all legal proceedings involving his custody 
and maintenance are to be found in state enactments in Nigeria, 
even in those states where there are no adoption statutes.
Hence it seems certain that the situation will be rare indeed 
when the social welfare rights of the child conferred by a 
foreign lex adoptionis will not be recognised in the Nigerian 
states since, in most cases, such claims are likely to be con­
sidered as necessary for the welfare of the adopted child.
This should even be so in those states whose laws do not, at 
present, contain adoption statutes.
Some support for this contention is afforded by such 
provisions as section 2 (1) of the Lagos Fatal Accidents Act, 
1961^9 and section 5 (b) and (c) of the Western and the Mid- 
Western states1 Torts Law, 1959.^° Both provide in almost 
identical terms that for the purpose of claiming compensation 
for the wrongful death of a person under the statutes, an 
adopted child, whether adopted before or after the commencement 
of the statutes, in pursuance of a foreign adoption, should be 
treated as the legitimate child of the deceased adopter and 
hence entitled to claim as his natural child. The claim of the 
adopted child seems to have been based in the two Acts on the 
hypothesis that since the deceased was lawfully responsible for 
the care and maintenance of his natural children as well as his 
foreign adopted children whilst alive, compensation for his 
wrongful death should be available to all his lawful dependants 
without exception. It is significant that at the time of the
69. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and of Lagos, No.B^ f of 
1961.
70. Cap. 122, Laws of Western Nigeria, 1959 ecL
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enactment of the statutes, none of the three states which provide
for the recognition of the social welfare rights of a foreign
adopted child has an adoption statute of its own. Thus, the
supposed English law doctrine propounded by Dicey before his
death that 11 a status of a kind not recognised by English law
71will not be recognised as such in England1* has not been accep­
ted as a valid private international law theory in the Western, 
the Mid-Western and the Lagos states, and is not likely to be 
accepted in the other Nigerian states.
The main problem of recognition of interestate and foreign 
adoptions concerns whether an adopted child and the adoptive 
parents should have mutual rights of inheritance when the law 
which created the adoptive relationship does not confer such 
right or vice versa. Or in its more complicated form, should 
an adopted child be able to inherit from his adoptive parents 
as well as from his natural parents in pursuance of the lex 
adoptionis even though the lex successionls only contemplates 
inheritance through his adopter and the adopter's collaterals 
alone? Or should, or should not, an adoption be an impediment 
to the marriage of an adopted daughter and her adopter in 
Nigeria, when the lex adoptionis does not prohibit such relation­
ship? These inquiries lead, in turn, to another, mainly of 
classification, as to what law governs the effects or incidents 
of a foreign-created adoption. For instance, is the relevant 
law the law governing the succession or the law which created 
the status of adoption? Secondly, should the concept of adop­
tion as it exists at the lex successionls be identical with the 
conception of adoption as existing under the lex adoptionis
71. Dicey, Conflict of Laws. 3rd ed. pp. 502-3.
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before it could be recognised? What happens when adoption is 
unknown to the domestic law of the place where the adopted child 
claims to succeed to the estate of his adopter? These are some 
of the questions which create immense difficulties in private 
international law and as regards which nothing is said in the 
Eastern Nigeria Adoption Law, 196?. This is not surprising* 
Indeed, seldom do municipal statutes on adoption contain provi­
sions for recognition of sister-state or foreign adoptions as 
the case may be, except such rules are contained in international 
conventions or treaties. Hence this is an area in which case 
law predominates.
The Lagos state, on the other hand, following few countries 
like Canada, New Zealand and Kenya, in the common law world, 
attempts to make the position clear from the outset by the inser­
tion of a rule for the recognition of sister-states and foreign 
adoptions in its Adoption Edict. But as will presently be 
shown, this attempt is not completely successful. Section 20 of 
the Edict provides as follows*-
"Where any person has been adopted under the law of 
any part of Nigeria other than Lagos State, or under 
the law of any country other than Nigeria, the adop­
tion shall have the like validity and effect as if it 
had been effected by an adoption order under this 
Edict.”
Several points arise for comment about this smooth-looking 
provision which gives a false impression of simplicity with 
regard to the question whether the Lagos courts are now obliged 
to recognise all foreign and sister-state adoptions of whatever 
nature and of whatever circumstances.
1. MEANING OF SECTION 20 OF THE LAGOS EDICT
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The first question of interpretation is, what is meant by 
the statement that a foreign or a sister-state adoption ”shall 
have the like validity and effect as if it hatit been effected” 
under the Lagos Adoption Edict. It seems clear that the only 
common sense conclusion that could be drawn from the provision 
is that the words underlined are superfluous and that the courts 
are merely directed to attribute the same effects as they attri­
bute to an adoption granted under the Lagos Edict to a foreign 
or a sister-state adoption. The section does not require them 
to insist that such foreign or sister-state adoption should have 
been created under identical conditions as a Lagos adoption 
before it could be recognised. Otherwise, few, if any, adop­
tions granted out of the state will be found to coincide in all 
respects with regard to their intrinsic validity with a Lagos 
adoption.
Of more restrictive effect on the recognition of foreign
and sister-state adoptions appears to be section 1 of the Edict
which stipulates that the
f,Edict applies only to the adoption of a person under 
the age of seventeen years who is abandoned, or whose 
parents and other relatives are unknown or cannot be 
traced after due enquiry”.
Since the adoption of a person whose age is seventeen or more,
or who is not abandoned, or whose parents are known has no valid
effect in the state, could it, consistently with the section, be
argued that such foreign or inter-state adoption should not have
any valid effect in the state even though it is valid according
to the law of the country where it is created? There seems to
be no escape from the conclusion that such adoption will not be
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given any valid effect in the Lagos state. But we shall assume 
that both the positive and the negative answers to the enquiry 
are correct and therefore consider the implications of the 
provision in such light.
If we construe the provision to mean that a foreign or a 
sister-state adoption must be recognised in the Lagos state 
unless it differs essentially from a local adoption, the result 
will be that an adoption order granted, for example, to a 
Rivers state domiciliary by the court of such state under which 
he adopts his illegitimate child, or the child of one of his 
relatives, will be denied recognition in the Lagos state.
Neither will such order which emanates from outside Nigeria have 
any effect in the state. In this sense, there is no doubt that 
the Lagos provision fails to appreciate that dissimilar laws on 
adoption, though not desirable at the inter-state level, are to 
be expected within legal systems of the world and that any 
particular country or state should be wary about concluding that 
its laws and its public policy are superior to those of other 
legal systems. Furthermore, if we are correct as regards this 
view, such provision makes nonsense, at the inter-state level, 
of the consultations reported^ to have taken place between the 
Federal and the State Governments about the need to ensure that 
the adoption law of one state is in harmony with those of the 
others and hence lead to easy recognition of adoption orders 
inter-state.
If, on the other hand, the provision is construed as limited 
to adoption orders created locally at the State, and therefore 
inapplicable to adoptions made outside the state, then the
72. See e.g. Eastern Nigeria House of Assembly Debates. March 
1965, Vol.5, No.I, Column k$.
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following problems of evasion of law will have to be faced. We 
have indicated that adoption is differently fashioned indif­
ferent countries and that the incidents attaching to the 
relationship differs considerably from one legal system to the
other. Section 20 of the Lagos Edict fails to provide a con- 
7^necting factor J which will link the parties to the adoption
with the sister-state or the country outside Nigeria where the
adoption was created. Therefore, to evade the provision of the
edict which forbids the adoption of certain persons, becomes a
simple matter provided such evasion takes place outside the
Lagos state. For example, a childless married couple, domiciled
in the Lagos state, who wants to adopt the child of a living
relative, only need to go abroad or to any of the Eastern Nigerian
states, adopt the child there after a brief stay and then return
to the Lagos state with a ready-made family. Such adoption will
almost certainly be recognised under the provision of section 20
if we adopt the second interpretation. The same effect would
follow the adoption out of the state of an adulterine child
begotten during the monogamous marriage of his father, if the
natural father is determined to legitimate the child by adoption
7kin breach of the principle enunciated in Cole v. Akinyele.
Thus, by its conflicts rule on recognition of foreign adoptions, 
the Lagos state makes it possible for its subjects, whether 
domiciliaries or residents, to commit breaches of the restric­
tions on adoption imposed by the domestic law, provided that such 
breaches take place outside the state. That this is not the 
intention of the legislator is clear enough.
73* This point is fully discussed below.
7^. (I960) 5 F.S.C. 8 .^
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From this analysis of the provision, it becomes clear that 
whichever of the two interpretations is adopted by the Lagos 
courts will still lead into difficulties. The first cohstruc- 
tion denies recognition to foreign or sister-state adoptions if 
they are not created under identical conditions as a Lagos 
adoption, and the second, because of the failure of the Edict to 
provide a connecting factor for recognition, makes evasion of 
the local law possible. In view of these defects, among others 
which shall be considered presently, it is submitted that the 
provision of the Lagos Edict should not be made a standardised 
private international law rule of recognition in Nigeria.
2. THE CONNECTION FACTOR FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ADOPTIONS
The second question to be considered is, what connection 
should parties to a foreign or a sister-state adoption have with 
such legal district before the adoption could be recognised in 
a state in Nigeria. Should it be the nationality of the adopter 
or that of the adoptee or both? Is it the domicile of both or 
one of the parties, and if the latter, which? Or should the 
Nigerian private international law cast overboard the concept 
of connecting factor, or point of contact, and attribute the 
necessary effects to any foreign or sister-state adoption which 
had been validly created by the law of the place where it was 
granted, regardless of the personal law of the parties? We have 
indicated that the Eastern Nigeria Adoption Law and the rule 
contained in section 20 of the Lagos Adoption Edict fail to 
indicate the amount of connection which parties to an adoptive 
relationship should have with the country or state which decreed 
the adoption before its order could be recognised. This omission
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on the part of the Lagos Edict is undesirable as the above dis­
cussion on ”evasion of law1 has shown. But we may at once 
dispose of the inter-state problem of recognition by stating that 
if the suggestion made above is accepted that a full faith and 
credit provision be enacted by the Federal Government or that a 
uniform law or Identical legislations be enacted on adoption, 
the problem of inter-state recognition of adoption orders would 
have been solved. The next question is what connection will 
suffice at the international sphere, nationality or domicile.
Just as nationality is an inadequate test for determining 
matters of domestic status in a federation of several legal 
districts, all of which constitute the same political entity, so 
also is nationality insufficient, at the international level, 
for fouhding the jurisdiction of a foreign court, or for indica­
ting the law of which country should create an adoption with 
extra-territorial effect* more so when such foreign country is 
also a federation of many territorial areas like the Canadian, 
the Australian, the American or the Cameroons federation. For 
example, if we say that only an adoption granted to a Canadian 
national according to the law of his nationality should be 
recognised in a Nigeria state, it will be readily seen that such 
proposition is meaningless in as much as there are as many 
adoption statutes, differing in provisions, in Canada as there 
are many Canadian provinces and territories. Furthermore, as 
we have indicated in our chapter on ’'Domicile”, nationality, 
without more, does not always represent the community with which 
a person has the closest connection for purposes of choice of 
the relevant law that should govern matters of his domestic 
status, since he can retain his nationality in a particular 
country despite the fact that he had left it several years ago.
In addition, such a person may have more than one nationality.
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In the field of family law, the notion is accepted by the 
Nigerian courts,'7'* supported by statutory provisions,^ that the 
most intimate contact a person may have with a legal system 
before such system can be regarded as his personal law is domi­
cile. And in this respect, the Nigerian private international 
law follows the practice of other common law countries and even 
some civil law countries which employ the principle of domicile 
as basis of personal law. Hence the principle is well recognised 
that any change in a person’s domestic status must be accom­
plished by the law of his domicile at the time of the transaction 
in question. In the field of adoption, we see no rational 
justification for why the four Nigerian states having adoption 
statutes should make an amelioration to this logical basis of 
personal law in favour of nationality or residence. It is 
accordingly suggested that just as it has been postulated that 
domicile should be the test for determining the validity of the 
adoptive relationship, so also should the principle of domicile 
be the condition for recognising foreign adoptions. In this 
respect, it must be pointed out that the same forum-selecting 
rule suggested for the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of 
the Nigerian states should suffice to determine the requirement 
for recognition of foreign adoptions, i.e. an adoption which has
75. See e.g. Okonkwo v. Eze 119601 ‘ .M.N.L.R. 80.
76. See, The State's Legitimacy Laws, ss.3 and 9 where domicile 
is employed as the choice of law requirement for determining 
the legitimacy of a person; S.101 of the Sheriffs and Civil 
Process Act, Cap.189, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
(19?8 ed.) where domicile is used as the basis of jurisdic­
tion in divorce and matrimonial causes; S.*+l of the Adminis­
trator-General Act, Cap.*+, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
(1958 ed.) which indicates the law of the ’’country of the 
domicile of the deceased” as the relevant law to govern the 
distribution of the residue of his estate; Order-hj Rule 1 
(c), High Court Rules of the Western and the Mid-Western 
states, Cap.M+, Laws of Western Nigeria, (1959 ©£•) which 
enables the court of any of these states to assume jurisdic­
tion in respect of an action concerning its domiciliary who 
is resident outside the state; and also, s.3 of the
-continued-
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been granted by the court of domicile of the adopter or recog­
nised by the law of the adopter's domicile at the time of the 
adoption, should be recognised in Nigeria. In other words, 
international jurisdiction should depend on the domestic juris­
diction of the courts.
On the other hand, an extension to the domiciliary basis 
of recognition in favour of nationality between member-eountries 
will be necessary if, as suggested above, Nigeria adheres to the 
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition 
of Decrees Relating to Adoptions. By becoming a member country, 
any decree of adoption granted in Nigeria to Nigerian nationals 
would be recognised, under the convention, by those countries 
who adhere to it. Similarly, the respective jurisdiction in 
Nigeria would be bound, under the Convention, to give full recog­
nition to the effects of foreign adoption orders made to 
nationals of member-countries on basis of nationality.
This suggested rule has some measure of support in section 
1^3 of the American Restatement^ which provides that an 
American state should recognise an adoption granted by a sister- 
state, the court of which assumed jurisdiction on basis of 
domicile of either the adopter or the adopted child in the state 
plus the presence of the two parties at the state.
76. (continued) Probates (Re-Sealing) Decree, No.13 of 1966, 
which gives power to the state of "domicile of the deceased 
person" to realise the estate of the deceased in all the 
sister-states.
77. Of Conflict of Laws. Tentative Draft No.*+ of 1957: See
also Restatement. Proposed Official Draft. Part III, of 
1969. s.290.
In England, the principle of private international law
relating to the recognition of foreign adoptions is still in its
78infancy. The legislature, having provided1 that adoption
orders granted in any of the British Islands, viz., Scotland,
Ireland, the Isles of Man and the Channel Islands, should be
recognised in England, left the rules for the recognition in
the country of foreign adoptions to the general principles of
English private international law. Proper rules are yet to be
worked out by the courts but all indications point to the
acceptance of the lex domicilii of the adopter at the time of
the adoption as the basis of recognition of foreign adoptions.
79Re Wilson. 7 husband and wife, who were domiciled in England
at the relevant time, adopted in Quebec, Canada, a child who,
presumably, was domiciled there. Vaisey, J., held that the
adopted child could not succeed to the intestate estate of the
male adopter in England and remarked that if the male adopter
“had been domiciled in Quebec at the time when the 
infant defendant was adopted, the case of the latter 
would have been different and very much stronger11.
go
In Re Wjiby. the joint adopters, husband and wife, were domi­
ciled with the adopted child in Burma at the time of the adoption 
The adopters subsequently acquired a new domicile in England 
where the adopted child died intestate. The male adopter having 
pre-deceased the child, the female adopter applied for letters 
of administration as the mother of the adopted child. Barnard, J 
ruled against her on the ground that the mutual rights of
78. See Dicey and Morris, op.cit.. 8th ed, p. *+71 •
79. ZT95!j7 c&. 733 at p. 7^.
80. ^9567 P. 17^.
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succession conferred on parties to an adoptive relationship by 
the English Act of 1950 only applied to a child adopted in 
England. This case can be conveniently ignored since it was
81
condemned by Harman, J., in He Marshall and formally over-
82ruled by the Court of Appeal in Re Valentine.
In Re Marshall, the question was whether the adopted child
of the cousin of a testator who died domiciled in England could
succeed as the "issue1 of the cousin under the testator’s will.
Harman, J., said that he would have allowed the claim of the
adopted child "because he and his adoptive parent were both
83
domiciled in British Columbia when he was adopted". He, 
however, refused the claim on the ground that the law of domicile, 
i.e. the British Columbia law, of the parties at the time of 
adoption did not confer rights of inheritance on the adopted 
child as if he had been born in lawful marriage.
The position was carried a stage further by the Court of 
Appeal*s decision in Re Valentine, the most recent of the English 
decisions on this point. V, a British subject, was resident and 
domiciled in Southern Rhodesia. From there he went to South 
Africa to adopt two children, C. and T. who were domiciled and 
resident in South Africa at the time of the adoption. Under a 
settlement governed by English law, interests were given to the 
children of V. The crux of the case was whether C. and T. were 
the children of V within the terms of the settlement. The Court 
of Appeal by a majority answered the question in the negative on 
two grounds. One was that the adopting parents were not
81. ^95Z7 Ch. ?07.
82. ^9657 Ch. 831.
83. Z195Z7 Ch. 263 at p.273.
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domiciled in South Africa at the time of the order and the second 
was that the adoption was not recognised by the law of domicile 
of the adopters at the relevant time, i.e. the Southern 
Rhodesian Law. The principle was stated by Lord Denning, M.P.
He said:
“the courts of this country will only recognise an 
adoption in another country if the adopting parents 
are domiciled there and the child is ordinarily 
resident there11 84*
85Presumably in deference to the proponents ' of the doctrine of
cumulation for the English law not only for the creation of the
status of adoption but for its recognition, Lord Denning added:
“You do not look to the domicile of the child: for
that has no separate domicile of its own. It takes 
its parents1 domicile. You look to the /adoptive/ 
parents1 domicile only. If you find that a legiti­
mate relationship of parent and child has been 
validly created by the law of the /adoptive/ parents1 
domicile at the time the relationship is created, 
then the status so created should be universally 
recognised throughout the civilised world”. 86
Why the ordinary residence of the child at the foreign country 
where the adoption was effected was made a condition of recog­
nition by Lord Denning, or the usefulness of such qualification, 
is not clear. But as regards this, Danckwerts, L.J., who agreed 
with Lord Denning on domicile, was “not sure11. Therefore, what 
is sure about the English rule of recognition of foreign adop­
tions is that an adoptive relationship created by the lex 
domicilii of the adopter, or recognised by that law, will be 
recognised in England, provided that both the adopter and the
81*. £96.57 Ch* 831, at p. 81*3.
85. Cheshire, op.clt.. ?th ed. p. 3865 Graveson. op.cit.. 6th 
ed., p. 1*03.
86. ^19657 Ch. 831 at p. 81*2.
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child were resident at the place where the adoption was granted. 
Whether the absence of residence of the adopted child in such 
place will be fatal to recognition is yet to be seen.
But notwithstanding the uncertain position of the English 
law on this point, it is submitted that “residence" or “ordinary 
residence", with its difficulty of interpretation is an in­
elegant concept in the rule of recognition and that the Nigerian 
courts should have nothing to do with it.
D. WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ADOPTIONS?
One of the highly debatable aspects of this subject is the
question what law determines the effects or incidents of adoption
created out of the country or state where its recognition is
sought. The problem touches both aspects of the Nigerian private
international law at the inter-state as well as the international
levels. For although the effects of adoption are uniformly
regulated in the four states where adoption statutes exist, we
have seen that statutory adoption is not universal in Nigeria.
^ight out of the twelve states of the Federation are yet to have
such statutes.%
The following are few instances of how the choice of law 
rule to be applied in shaping the rights emanating from the 
status of adoption created by a sister-state or a foreign country 
may pose problems for the Nigerian law.
1. A. adopted C in the Rivers State three years ago.
C. is now domiciled in the Kano State where A. died 
domiciled and intestate. C. clears the initial 
hurdle as suggested above by establishing that his
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adoptive parent was domiciled in the Rivers State 
where the relationship was created, or in another 
Nigerian state , at the time of the adoption and , 
hence asserts that the status should be recognised 
at the Kano State. The Kano court approves of this 
reasoning but points out that the Kano law does not 
have an adoption statute and consequently does not 
provide for any right of inheritance from the adopter 
in respect of an adopted child. Whereas, the Rivers 
State’s law gives an adopted child inheritance 
rights. Which law, the Kano law or the Rivers law, 
decides whether C. succeeds to the intestate estate 
of A. his adoptive parent?
2. C., the adopted child, was adopted by A. the Adopter,
in Botswana at a time when Both C. and A. were domi­
ciled there. According to our proposed rule, since 
Botswana was the country in which A had his domicile 
at the time of the adoption, C. should be recognised 
in the Lagos State as the adopted child of A. But 
can C. go further and say that because the law of 
Botswana gives him the right to succeed to the intes­
tate estate of his natural father who died domiciled 
in the Lagos State, the Lagos court should enforce the 
right? Which law governs the matter?
3. X. waa adopted in Malawi in 1962. The Malawi law only 
attributes to the adopted child, rights of custody, 
maintenance and education, but no succession rights.
Is X entitled to succeed to the intestate estate of 
his adoptive parent who died domiciled in the Lagos
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State? Which law, the Lagos law which governs the 
succession, or the Malawi law which created the 
status, governs the incident of the adoption in the 
particular instance.
b. Suppose the facts are as in case 3 above, but the 
adoptive parent died domiciled in the Western State 
where there is no adoption statute and where the law 
of succession is silent on whether an adopted child 
can succeed on the intestacy of his adopter.
5. 0. gave certain property to the “issue" or "children" 
of P in his will which came into effect in July 1967. 
The testator died domiciled in the Lagos State. In 
January, 1966, P. adopted a child, C., in the former 
Eastern Region of Nigeria. According to both the 
Eastern Nigeria Adoption Law, 196?®^ and the Lagos 
Adoption Edict, 1968,®® the word "issue" or "children" 
of P. should, unless the contrary intention appears, 
be construed as, or as including, a reference to the 
adopted child of P. It may be assumed that there is 
no such contrary intention in the will. C. claims the 
right to succeed as the child of P. before a Lagos 
court. Should the claim be enforced. If so, which 
law decides the issue; the Eastern Nigeria Adoption 
Law, 1965, or the Lagos Adoption Edict, 1968, which 
was not in existence at the effective date, i.e. July, 
1967.
87. s.lb (2)
88. s.l^ (a)
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The answers to the above hypothetical cases depend on the 
choice of law rule accepted in Nigeria for determining the 
effects of foreign or sister-state adoptions. This is a topic 
which is much canvassed but as regards which statutes and case- 
law in almost all common law countries speak with different 
voices while juristic view is far from unanimous. It is pro­
posed to consider three possible solutions to the question, 
indicating at the appropriate place, the particular solution 
adopted by the Lagos law. This done, we shall indicate our 
preference for whichever out of these solutions we consider the 
best for the Nigerian private international law.
1. The Lex Fori Approach. There are many statements of law to 
the effect that the court of a particular country or state 
should attribute the same effects to a foreign or a sister-state 
adoption as it does to an adoption granted within the forum. In 
other words, regardless of the rights and duties emanating from 
the status of adoption according to the law of the place which 
created it, only such rights as are conferred by the law of the 
place where the incidents are sought to be enjoyed should take 
effect.
There is no doubt that this is the approach taken by 
section 20 of the Lagos Adoption Edict which, as we have seen, 
directs that a foreign or a sister-state adoption "shall have the 
like validity and effect as if it had been effected by an 
adoption under" the Edict. We may illustrate the practical 
effect of this approach by trying to solve the third hypothetical 
case above, i.e. the case of a child adopted in Malawi who is 
claiming rights of succession in Lagos. Despite the fact that
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the lex adoptionis confers no inheritance rights, section 20 of
the Edict gives the right. Whether or not the adopted child is
domiciled in the Lagos state at the time of the death of the
deceased is irrelevant. What is of significance is that since
the Lagos Edict confers all parental rights on the adopted child,
recognition in the state of foreign or sister-state adoptions
would rarely cut down, but would often enlarge, the effects of
such out of state adoptions.
The Lagos Edict is not alone in going by this approach.
89This is also the view of the Restatement Second 7 the relevant
section of which appears to have been formulated "in reliance
on the overwhelming majority of c a s e s " i n  the American states,
though the Restatement is not slow to point out that some courts
in the country
"take the position that the inheritance rights of the 
adopted child pertain to status itself and hence are 
governed by the law of the state where adoption was 
created", 91
Also, some Canadian Provinces have accepted this approach through 
92case law7 while some others have the principle enacted in their 
statutes. For instance, the Adoption Act of Nova Scotia^ pro­
vides that an adopted child and his adoptive parents
"shall have for all purposes in Nova Scotia the same 
status, rights and duties as if the adoption had been
in accordance with the /Eova Scotian7 Act."
89. Tentative Draft, No.1* of 1957V s. 1**35 See also, Proposed 
Official Draft, Part III of 1969, s.290.
90. Taintor, 1? Univ.of Pitt.L.Rev.222 at p. 2?6.
91. Tentative Draft, No.** of 1957? s. 1**3> Comment a. p.l*tl.
92. See Dicey and Morris, op.cit.. 8th ed. p. V73 and the
authorities cited in note 18.
93. of 1951*, as Revised by the Act of 1967, Cap.2, s.17.
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Among the modern writers on Conflict of laws in the common law
world, this approach has the support of Kennedy,^ Taintor^
96and Morris, the latter of whom finds it nthe preferable viewt 
for the English law.
Leaving aside the debatable point whether it is proper to 
accord more rights to a foreign or a sister-state adoption than 
are given to such status by the law of its creation, the chief 
defect of the lex fori approach in determining the incidents of 
adoption is that it presupposes that the state in which the 
incident of the foreign adoption is sought to be enjoyed must 
have an adoption statute of its own. Only then can the effects 
or incidents of a local adoption be attributed to the foreign 
status. This condition, in the operation of the doctrine, led
to the rather unsatisfactory conclusion reached in some Canadian
97 ■cases" of which the Court of Appeal s decision in Burnfiel v.
98Burnfeil is the leading authority. In that case, Mr. Burnfeil 
adopted the plaintiff in Iowa, U.S.A., when he was a child. At 
the time of the adoption, both Mr. Burnfeil and the plaintiff 
were domiciled in Iowa. Later the adopter acquired a new 
domicile in Saskatchewan where he died domiciled. The action 
was brought by the plaintiff adoptee who claimed, as the child
9^. 3^ Can.Bar.Rev. 507 at pp. 531* and 537.
95.l5Univ.of Pitt.L.Rev. 222 at pp. 263-^.
96. in Dicey and Morris, op.cit.. 8th ed., p. V73.
97. Burnfeil v. Burnfeil ^19267 2 D.L.R. 129; Re Donald. Baldwin 
v. Moonev /1922/ 2 D.L.R. 2Mf; Re Skinner /1922/ * D.L.R.
*f27.
98. ^19267 2 D.L.R. 129.
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of the deceased adopter, to he entitled to the grant of letters 
of administration. At the time of the death of the adopter, 
which was the relevant time to determine the child's inheritance
rights, there was no adoption statute in the Province of
Saskatchewan. But according to the Iowa law, the lex domicilii 
adoptionis. an adopted child acquired all the rights of a legi­
timate child including the right of inheritance from the 
adopter and his collaterals. Faced with the question as to which 
law should govern the incidents of the adoption, Haultain C.J.S. 
made the following preliminary observation:
MAn adopted child is an artificial creation unknown to 
our law. He is not a child in any sense of that term 
as used in our law. In his case, we have to look to
the law of the domicile of adoption to ascertain the
rights of succession attached to that relationship, a 
relationship which our law does not acknowledge, and 
to which under our law no rights are attached.” 99
In short, since the Iowa law gave the rights of inheritance to 
the adopted child as if he had been born in lawful marriage, the
leqrned judge was prepared to allow him to succeed to the
adopter's property in Saskatchewan even though that Province had 
no adoption statute at the relevant time. But unfortunately, 
since Dicey,'1' in the last edition of his work before his death, 
had stated that a foreign adoption ought not to be given effect 
in a country to whose law adoption is unknown, Haultain C.J.S. 
bowed to Dicey1 s opinion and concluded nmulto dubitante1 that 
the adopted child's claim failed. He finally expressed satis­
faction in the knowledge that such hard decision would not be 
reached in the future because of the existence of a local enact­
ment on adoption which gave rights of inheritance to locally as
99. Ibid. at p. 13*f.
1. Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed. pp. 502-3.
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well as foreign adopted children as if they had been born in 
lawful wedlock. The difficulty, he said, was that the Saskatchew­
an statute was not retrospective in operation.
I'he difficulty, if not the impossibility, of operating the 
1 lex fori approach*1 by a legal system which has no statute on
adoption is recognised, but not solved, by the American Restate-
2ment on the Conflict of Laws which merely states that
"It is uncertain what effect, if any.3 would be given 
to a foreign adoption in ^an American/ state which 
has no statute providing for the creation of such a 
status**.
kKennedy adverted to the above case but still had the courage to 
submit that the lex fori approach does no violence to the prin­
ciple of recognition. Of course, he was aware that if there is 
no local statute on adoption in the country or state where the 
foreign status is to be recognised there would be no local inci­
dents which are attributable to the foreign status. But this 
vital point he dismissed by saying that he was
"considering the position today when legal adoption 
exists in almost every part of the world". k
In other words, the few remaining places in the world, e.g. the
majority of the Nigerian states, which have no adoption statutes
should refuse to recognise foreign and sister-state adoptions
until they have adoption statutes of their own.'
2. Second Restatement. Tentative Draft No.1* of 1957. s.1*4-3* 
Comment a.
3. Emphasis supplied.
*4-. 3*4- Can. Bar Rev. at p. 5*4-8.
5. ^et surprisingly, this view has the support of no less an
authority than_Lord Denning in the recent English case of 
Re Valentine ^19657 Ch. 831. In his obiter dictum on the 
point, he considered that when the English law recognises 
the status of adoption conferred on a child by a foreign
law, 11 It only gives the child the self-same rights and
benefits as a child adopted in England by an English 
Adoption Order", at p. SH1*-.
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It follows from the above observation that if the lex fori
approach, i.e. the solution provided by section 20 of the Lagos
Adoption Edict, is accepted by all the other Nigerian states, all
adoptions orders granted in the three Eastern Nigerian states
before 21st September, 1968 - the date of commencement of the
Lagos Adoption Edict, should not be recognised in the Lagos
since it will be impossible for the Lagos courts to attribute
the self-same rights they give to a Lagos adoption to such foreign
adoptions. Furthermore, all the eight states where there are
no statutes on adoption should deny recognition to adoptions
obtained in other parts of Nigeria. If only for the harm such
approach will cause to several war orphans already adopted in
or outside Nigeria, it should be condemned. The Nigerian
private international law must be prepared to accept the famous
judgment of Cardoso, J., in the New York case of Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co. of New York  ^to the effect that:
"If a foreign statute gives the right, the mere fact 
that we do not give a like right Is no reason for 
refusing to help the plaintiff ... We are not so 
provincial as to say that every solution of a problem 
is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.
Similarity of legislation has indeed this importance: 
its presence shows beyond doubt that the foreign 
statute does not offend the local policy. But its 
absence does not prove the contrary. It is not to be 
exalted into an indispensable condition."
2. The Doctrine of Equivalence. A second possible approach in 
the recognition of foreign adoptions is the doctrine of equival­
ence which is found in the statutes of some common law countries. 
Representative of such enactments are the New Zealand Adoption 
Act of 1955^ and the Kenya Adoption Ordinance of 1958.^
6. (1918) 22*4- N.Y.99 (New York Court of Appeal).
7. s.17.
8. Cap.1*4-3, Laws of Kenya (1962 ed.), s.21.
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Ignoring the minor differences between the two statutes, they
both stipulate that any adoption valid according to the law of
any Commonwealth country^ where it was granted should have
1 the same effect as an adoption order validly made 
under /the local statute/ and shall have no other 
effect”.
Then both statutes went on to list certain conditions which such 
foreign adoptions must satisfy before they can be recognised.
The first is that the order of adoption must have been granted 
by a "court of law”. In short, an adoption created by deed or 
other inter-party agreement, even though valid according to the 
law of its creation, which is also the personal law of the 
parties at the time of the adoption, will not be recognised in 
any of these two countries. Whatever the situation might be in 
New Zealand, this is a surprising requirement to find in the law 
of Kenya in view of the fact that inter-party adoption is per­
mitted under customary law in certain parts of the country.^
A second condition common also to both statutes is that the 
foreign adoption must have conferred on the adoptive parents a 
right superior to that of the natural parents as regards the 
child*s custody, and a right equal or superior to that of the 
childfs natural parents as regards succession under wills and 
dispositions inter vivos. The net result of the last condition 
is that any adoptive relationship created in England before 1950 
or in Scotland before 196M- and a host of such relationships 
coming into force in Uganda, Malawi and some countries in the 
civil law world, will not be recognised, for example, in Kenya
9. The New Zealand Act includes the United States of America and 
other foreign countries.
10. see A.J.F. Simance, ”Adoption of Children among the Kikuyu of 
Kiambu District1 in J.A.L. (1959) 33. ' '
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in so far as they all fail to confer on the child adopted in­
heritance rights superior or equal to that of the natural 
parents] In addition to the above unsatisfactory result, this 
solution is open to the objection levelled against the lex fori 
approach in that it, too, proceeds from the premise that both 
the countries in which the status was created and the one in 
which its incidents are claimed to be enjoyed, should have 
adoption laws.
3. The Status Approach. By far the most universal of the
solutions adopted by legal systems for recognising foreign
adoptions is that which prescribes that the effect of the
relationship should, on grounds of logic and convenience, be
determined by the law of the country or state which created it.
Since we have suggested that the Nigerian law should accept the
proposition that the lex domicilii of the adopter at the time of
the adoption is the most appropriate law to govern the validity
of the status, it automatically follows that this same law
should govern the incidents of adoption. There is some measure
of support for this approach in English law although it must be
admitted that the question is still in doubt. Most civil law
countries even where the doctrine of cumulation is being operated
for determining the validity of adoption nonetheless determine
the incidents of adoption by reference to the personal law of
11
the adopter at the time of the adoption.
The first case to adopt this approach, in the absence of
12any lead by statute in England, is Re Marshall the facts of
11. See De Nova, op.cit.. pp. II1* et sea.
12. £&527 Ch. 263.
597.
which have already been given above. But briefly put for the 
purpose of the present discussion, the question was whether a 
child adopted in British Columbia, at a time when all the parties 
to the adoption were domiciled in that country, could claim as 
the adopter*s child under an English will. Harman, J., having 
decided in favour of domicile as the basis of recognition of 
foreign adoptions, proceeded to the second question as to which 
law determines the inheritance rights of the child through his 
adopter, the British Columbia law which created the status, or 
the English law of the testamentary disposition. The judge 
decided that whether the child had such right should be looked 
for in the British Columbia law which created the adoption. If 
it conferred succession rights, the child must be allowed to 
succeed under an English will. If it did not, then the claim of 
the child failed. And in the particular case, since the lex 
domicilii at the time of adoption did not make the adopted child 
a full legitimate child for the purpose of inheritance, the 
adopted child had no succession rights as a legitimate child in 
England. This was not because such rights were denied by the 
English Adoption statutes, but because the child had no inheri­
tance rights according to the law which conferred the status on 
him. The case went on to the Court of Appeal where, unfortu­
nately, the court missed the opportunity presented to state the 
relevant principle. Instead, it merely refrained from con­
firming or repudiating the view of Harman, J., in the lower court‘d  
This point was also touched upon by the English Court of
lif
Appeal in Re Valentine where the question was whether, and to
13. See Be Marshall Ch. 507.
^19657 Ch. 831.
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what effect, two children adopted in South Africa by a person 
domiciled, at the time of the adoption, in Southern Rhodesia, 
should be recognised in England for the terms of a settlement in 
which property was given to the "children" of the adoptive 
parent. The court, by a majority decision, held that since the 
adopter was not domiciled in South Africa at the time of the 
adoption and since his Rhodesian lex domicilii at the relevant 
time did not recognise the status, English law should deny 
recognition to the two children adopted in South Africa. In 
short, the status was not valid by the lex domicilii of the 
adopter, and hence ought not to be given universal acclaim.
Having answered the first question against the adopted children, 
it was not necessary for the court to answer the second one as 
to which law determines the incidents attributable to the status. 
But in separate dicta, all the members of the court made known 
their views on the point. Both Lord Denning and Danckwertz,
L.J., were in favour of the lex fori approach while Salmon, L.J., 
was all for the view that the law that created the status must 
also regulate its incidents. In this respect, he expressly
15approves of the solution adopted by Harman, J., in Re Marshall
and concluded by saying that the
"nature of the status conferred by adoption must 
depend upon the laws of the country where the adop­
tion took place"• 16
The same conclusion as that of Salmon, L.J., had earlier
17been reached in the Victorian case of Re Pearson and in the
l8New Zealand decision in Re Brophy Yaldwyn y. Martin. In the
15. & 9 5 1 7  Ch. 263.
16. Re Valentine /19657 Ch. 831 at pp.
17. Z£9**67 V.L.R. 356.
18. N.Z.L.R. 1006.
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latter case, the proper approach to the problem was given as 
follows:
"The first step is to ascertain status - namely,whether 
the relationship of parent and child was validly crea­
ted. This is a matter governed by the law of domicile.
The next step must be to ascertain the attributes of 
that status - what legal rights and liabilities are 
incidental thereto. This, too, must depend on the law 
of the domicile under which the adoption took place.11 19
If judicial opinion on the matter in the common law world
is divergent, so also are the views of academic writers. Dr.
Morris opposes this solution for the English law on the basis
that it may produce the
"surprising result that foreign adopted children would 
have greater rights than English-adopted children under 
English settlements, wills and intestacies". 20
Dr. Morris has in mind adoption orders created in England before 
1950 under which no rights of mutual inheritance were conferred 
on the parties to such adoptions. The position has now changed. 
And for our purpose, we have seen that an adoptive relationship 
which has been created in any of the states in Nigeria permit­
ting of such institution, puts an end to parental rights and 
duties and creates a full set of obligations on the part of the 
adoptive parents. So if this solution is accepted by the 
Nigerian private international law, there will be no question of 
any foreign adopted children being able to claim more rights 
than Nigerian adopted children. But assuming that the position 
in Nigeria is as argued by Dr. Morris, it must be pointed out 
that this is a surprising argument for a writer who sees nothing
19. Ibid. at p. 1017.
20. Dicey and Morris, QP.cit.y 8th ed., p. ^73.
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wrong in allowing the incidents of a foreign polygamous marriage
to be fully exercised and abrogated in a monogamous country, viz. 
21England. Surely, such laudable suggestion, if fully accepted
in England, would amount to the conferment by the English law of
greater rights on husbands of foreign polygamous marriages than
the English domestic law accords husbands of English marriages.
22In any event, the recent case of Alha.li Mohamed v. Knott has
once again shown the growing internationalism of the English
private international law and emphasised the point that English
law will not deny the incidents of a foreign status merely on
the ground that the attributes of such status are more than an
English equivalent.
On the other hand, other writers are almost unanimous in
support of the view that the most appropriate law to govern the
incidents of adoption is the lex domicilii which created the
status itself. For example, Graveson states that
“incidents of status which are or may be exercised to 
effect a transaction, such as marriage or adoption, 
on which a change of status itself may be predicated, 
are governed by the same law as that governing the 
status of which the particular incident forms part, 
that is, in domestic status, generally the law of 
the domicile” • 23
2**According to Schmitthoff,
“where the foreign adoption is recognised ..., it 
has, on principle, the same effect as is accorded to 
it by the law of domicile of the adopter at the date 
of the adoption order because it is that law which 
defines the new status of the infant11.
21. See the Law Commission^ Working Paper Wo 21 of 26/7/68 en­
titled “Polygamous Marriage1* compiled by Dr. J.H.C. Morris, 
at pp.19 et sea.
22. ^9687 2 W.L.R. lM+6.
23. Graveson, op.cit.. 6th ed. p.2^2.
2*+. The English Conflict of Laws. 3rd ed. (195*0 p. 299*
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And with regard to rights of inheritance, he concludes that the
lex successionis should treat the parties to a foreign adoption
1 as if the adopted person was the legitimate child of 
the adopter unless it is proved that the law of domi­
cile of the adopter at the date of the adoption order 
limited the effect of the adoption11.
25 2Similar view has also been expressed by Gareth Jones, 0!Connell,
on pQ
Rabel ' and Mr. Justice Scarman. The latter writer correctly
identifies, in our view, the process of recognising foreign
adoptions when he stated:
1 the court, in any given case must first determine 
the domicile of the ^adopter/2? at the time of adop­
tion. If the adoption be according to that law, the
effect of the act of adoption under that law must
then be investigated. If it be to confer upon the 
person adopted substantially the status of a child 
born in lawful wedlock, the ^Taw of the country where 
the incident is demanded/, I suggest, may recognise 
such a person as such a child ... But, if the 
foreign adoption does not have that effect according 
to its own law. there is no reason why it should be 
given any greater effect11 at the place where the 
status is to be recognised. 30
Finally, the view that an adoption made in accordance with, 
or recognised by, the law of the domicile of the adopter must be 
recognised with its own effects has a significant advantage over 
the other two solutions. Under this approach, the domestic law 
of the country or state where the foreign adoption is to be 
recognised needs not contain a statute on adoption, the incidents
25. 5 I.C.L.Q. 207 at p.215.
26. 33 Can Bar Rev. (1955) 635 at p. 6**5
27. opfcit. Vol.I on. 70*f et seq.
.00CV) 11 I.C.L.Q. (1962) 635.
29. 11 I.C.L.Q. (1962) 635 at p. 6*f0.
30. Ibid., at p. 638.
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under which can be ascribed to the foreign status. Such country 
or state merely ascertains whether the incident claimed is con­
ferred by the law which created the adoption. If so, it allows 
such incident to have full effect at the forum. If not, it 
denies the enjoyment of the incident to the claimant. There­
fore, the fact that the majority of the Nigerian states have no 
law on adoption is no bar to the recognition of sister-state and 
foreign adoptions. Moreover, the “status approach*1 leaves free 
the courts to determine the rare cases in which the incident of 
a foreign adoption e.g. the right of the adopter to marry his 
adopted daughter, will be repugnant to the public policy of the 
state concerned, without necessarily closing the doors to the 
incidents of foreign orders which do not approximate the effects 
of local adoptions.
It is accordingly suggested that this is the solution which 
the Nigerian private international law should adopt. And in 
operating this principle, it should be of no significance whether 
the foreign adoption was granted by a court order or effected by 
private act by the parties.
E. CONCLUSIONS
Adoption, whether created by a court decree or by an inter­
party agreement which is lawful according to the law of its 
creation, is an act whereby the relationship of parent and child 
is created between two persons who are not necessarily related 
by nature.
In principle, the laws of domicile of the parties to such
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relationship have the right to destroy the status between the 
child and his natural parents and substitute the adoptive 
parents for the child*s natural family, i.e. to confer a new 
status on the parties to the adoption. But to insist on the law 
of domicile of the child in the creation of the adoptive relation­
ship in Nigeria is certainly artificial in view of the fact that 
the preponderant majority of persons who can be adopted in the 
country are war orphans and waifs whose dependent domiciles can­
not be traced except by finding out what the intentions of their 
parents, who have either disappeared or are dead, are. There­
fore, to cater for this sociological phenomenon in the country 
as elsewhere, the appropriate Nigerian private international rule 
on the subject should be that only the state or country in which 
the prospective adopter was, or is, domiciled at the time of the 
adoption should have the right to create the adoptive relation­
ship or pronounce on whether such relationship which has been 
created in another jurisdiction is valid.
In order to facilitate the ease of recognition of adoption 
orders at the interstate level, a uniform adoption law or identi­
cal adoption legislations, and a full faith and credit provision, 
are needed in Nigeria. These will ensure that any domiciliary of 
a state in Nigeria can obtain an adoption order in another state 
with the assurance that such an order will be recognised not only 
in all the sister-states but in most countries outside Nigeria.
Finally, for the interstate and international conflicts, 
the existence or the nature of the incidents of adoption should 
be determined by the law of the country or state which created 
the status. No incident of a foreign adoption should be denied 
to an adoptive parent or the adopted child unless such incident
6o*f.
is contrary to the stringent public policy of the state in 
Nigeria where the incident is sought to be enjoyed. The fact 
that the state where the incident is demanded has no statute 
on adoption should not be a relevant question for determination.
CHAPTER EIGHT
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES.
1. INTRODUCTION AND TERMINOLOGY.
It is necessary to distinguish clearly between the 
questions of administration and those of succession since both 
are not necessarily governed by the same choice of law rules 
in private international law. Administration is the process of 
realizing and conserving the assets which make up the estate of 
the deceased, paying out of them the debts and other claims 
against the estate, and distributing the residue to those 
entitled. Succession, on the other hand, involves the sharing 
by the family of the decedent and his other beneficiaries, if 
any, of the net balance of the estate after its administration 
had been completed. In both cases, the person entitled to 
administer and distribute the estate is the personal representa­
tive of the deceased.
Under the general law, the personal representative 
may either be an executor or an administ rat orA n executor is 
a person nominated by the deceased in his will. Nonetheless, 
the designation of the executor as such must be confirmed by 
the grant of probate of the will. The grant of probate by the 
court thus constitutes the authentication of the title which the 
executor derives from the testator’s will. An administrator 
is normally appointed because of the intestacy of the deceased 
and he, the administrator, derives his authority from the court's
1. See e.g. the Western Nigeria, Property and Conveyancing Law, 
Cap.100 (1959, ed.), s.2.
order which appointed him. If the testator made a will hut 
made no provision therein for the appointment of an executor, 
the court may appoint an administrator with the will annexed 
(administrator cum testamnto annexo). If an executor or adminis­
trator, after obtaining a grant, dies, or is allowed to with­
draw, the court will appoint an administrator of the estate 
not yet administered (administrator de bonis non administratis).
Most of these terms may usefully be employed to
describe a person appointed under customary law to administer
the estate of the deceased person: provided that the following
distinctions about administration under customary law is borne
in mind. Under this system of law, a testator may also nominate
in his nuncupative will, or in his dying declaration, the person
who is to manage his property after his death, but his failure
to do so, or the inability of the person nominated to act,
does not mean that the customary court, or the deceased family
members under the traditional law, cannot appoint a representative.
The power of the family members to appoint a person who will
manage the properties of the deceased before they are distributed,
marks the first point of difference between the general law and ■
the customary law on this topic; the second being that whatever
the mode of appointment of a personal representative under
customary law, there is no distinction nomenclature between
the deceased person's nominee and the person appointed by the
2customary court or his family members.
A third point which distinguishes the personal re­
presentative appointed under customary law from his counterpart 
appointed under the general law is that the former does not
2# See Okoro, The Customary Laws of Succession in Eastern Nigeria  ^
p.29; and also Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, p.25?.
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become, as the latter, y the legal owner of all the properties 
of the deceased. The range of properties withtwhich a customary
law representative, cannot inter-meddle includes the deceased
4 4interest in;, a "family property” or his "self-acquired property"
which devolves on his children as family property. Such pro­
perties cannot be sold by the deceased personal representatives 
to pay the debts owed by the estate, since they are transmitted 
automatically on death to the beneficiaries. If any debts
5
remain unpaid, the beneficiaries are personally liable. This 
is the logical consequence of the customary law rule that 
whatever the nature of family property, whether a piece of land 
or a dwelling house, "it is with the consent of all those en­
titled ... that it can be mortgaged or sold".^
In respect of these properties, the position of a 
personal representative under customary law bears a striking 
resemblance to that of a civil law personal representative, of
7
which the-French system is a good illustration.' Both are 
regarded simply as a person to look after the properties of the
3. See e.g. ss. 36 (1) and 38 (3) of the Western Nigeria, Adminis­
tration of 1,Estates Law, under which all the deceased person*s 
real and personal properties are assets disposable by his 
personal representative for the payment of his debts and 
administration expenses.
4. For a detailed discussion about the meaning of these terms, 
see Coker, Family Property Among the Yorubas, 2nd ed., p.75 
et seq.
3. Cf. Lloyd, op.cit., p.287*
6. Coker v. Coker (1958) 14 N.L.R. 83 at p.86.
7. See, Pierre and Jean Pellerin, The French Law of Wills,
Probate, Administration and Death Luties, (4th ed. 1959) 
p. 56.
deceased, the title to which is already transmitted on death#
They may collect rents and profits and assume general manager­
ship of the properties until their beneficial successors take 
them over. If it is necessary for the properties to be sold 
before they can be shared, it is the beneficiaries who may. 
convey the legal ownership in them. The role of the personal 
representative is merely to supervise the beneficial distribu­
tion of the proceeds of sale.
The only exception to the refusal of customary law 
to allow an obligatory interposition of a legal owner between 
the deceased and those who will ultimately inherit certain types 
of his properties would seem to be in respect of his self­
acquired property which devolves as family property on his minor 
children. Although there is no authority on this point, such 
property would seem, in principle, to vest in the personal re­
presentative during the minority of the beneficiaries and con­
sequently, the representative has a power of disposition or 
otherwise dealing with it on behalf of the infant beneficiaries.
We have seen that there are several technical terms by 
which a person administering the estate of a deceased person may 
be described. In a conflictual situation, these minor differences 
in terminology and the mode of appointment of such person, either 
under one system of law or the other, are not important. In the 
ensuing discussion, therefore, the term "personal representative" 
will be used interchangeably to describe an administrator or an 
executor, who was appointed by the High Court, and a person ap­
pointed by the customary court, a family council, or other such 
body, to administer the estate of a deceased person. The only 
exception is that the use of the term "personal representative" 
will be qualified as follows: If a deceased person had his
domicile in the country or state where an executor or adminis­
trator was appointed to administer his estate, such administra-^ 
tor or executor will be called "principal or domiciliary per­
sonal representative".
An understanding of the conflicts problems relating 
to administration of estates requires some general knowledge 
of the functions of a personal representative in a purely do­
mestic administration. But before we deal with the topic, it 
will be necessary, first, to consider the basis of the Nigerian 
state court's jurisdiction to make a grant of administration.
2. JURISDICTION.
A feature of the High Court Laws of the respective 
states is that they all contain provisions, whether express or 
implied, authorising the High Courts to exercise their jurisdic­
tion in probate causes and proceedings in conformity, either 
with the law and practice in force in England at a certain date
Q
or from time to time or, with the jurisdiction being exercised
Q
by the High Court of Justice in England. Therefore, a state
8. Express provisions are s. 16 of the High Court of Lagos Act, 
Cap.80, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1958 ed.); s.35 
of the Northern Nigeria High Court Law, Cap.49 (1965 e&O; 
and s.17 of the Eastern Nigeria High Court Law, Cap.61 (1965 
ed.). The Eastern Nigeria Law authorises the High Courts of 
the three Eastern states to follow English law and practice 
in force on 50th Sept. I960, in the exercise of their probate 
Jurisdiction; whereas the Lagos Act and the Northern Nigeria 
Law provide for the application of the English law and practice 
"for the time being in force".
9« The Western Nigeria High Court Law (Cap.44) (1959 ed.), and 
the Mid-Western State, High Court Law, No.9 of 1964, contain 
no express provisions authorising their High Courts to exer­
cise their jurisdiction in probate bauses and proceedings in 
Conformity with English law and practice, but the same result 
as in the other states is produced by s.8 of the Western 
Nigeria Law and s.9 of the Mid-Western State Law, both of 
which empower the High Courts of the two States to exercise 
jurisdiction in matters not expressly mentioned in any local 
enactment in conformity with the jurisdiction being exercised 
by "Her Majesty's High Court of Justice in England".
High Court is obliged to follow the English common law in making
presence of assets of the deceased in the state the basis of its
jurisdiction to grant probate of a will or to issue letters of
administration in respect of the deceased intestate estate.
An added authority for this practice of the High Courts is
afforded by the Federal Administrator-General Act ^  and the
11Eastern and the Western Nigeria Administrator-General Laws*
PC
They all follow the common law in enjoining a state High Court
to appoint a personal representative viz. the Administrator-
General, if the deceasedsproperty is situated in the state and
there is no proper person to administer the'estate. For the
exercise of this power by the High Court, it is immaterial if
the deceased was not a national of Nigeria or was not, at the
time of his death, domiciled in the state where application for
12the grant is being made.
But a question on which both the common law and the 
Nigerian statutes are silent is as to whether domicile of the 
deceased ip the state where the application for a grant is being 
made is alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court, 
regardless of the fact that there are no assets located there.
The answer to the question would seem to be in the affirmative
10* Cap.4 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1958 ed.) ss.13*
16 (1) (a), 24, 41 and 60 (1). The Act applies to the Lagos 
and the Northern Nigerian States.
11. Western and Mid-Western States: Administrator-General Law,
Laws of Western Nigeria, (1955 ed.), ss.13» 16 (1) (a), 36(1) 
and 51 (1);
Eastern Nigeria States: Administrator-General Law, Cap.4,
Laws of Eastern Nigeria (1963 ed.) ss.13, 16 (1), 39 (1) 
and 54 (1)\.
12. See Administration of Estates By Consular Officers Act, (Fed.) 
Cap.3* Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (1958 ed.) s.2.
by virtue of the Federal Administrator-General Act and the simi­
lar Laws of the Eastern and the Western Nigerian states which 
empower an ancillary personal representative appointed in a 
Nigerian state to transfer the net assets of the deceased to
the principal personal representative "in the country of the
13domicile of the deceased?? ^ for distribution to the persons en­
titled thereto. If the principal personal representative is
entitled to receive the net balance of the deceased!*property
found in a Nigerian state for distribution to those entitled 
according to the lex domicilii of the deceased at the time of 
his death, a fortiori, the state of domicile of the decedent 
in Nigeria has a reciprocal right to receive from a foreign 
ancillary representative, assets of the state's domiciliary 
who died in the foreign country. And unless the state of
domicile in Nigeria has power to appoint a personal represen­
tative solely on the basis of the last domicile of the deceased 
in such state, there will be no person charged with the respon­
sibility of distributing the residue of such assets remitted to 
Nigeria by a foreign ancillary personal representative.
If for this reason alone, it is submitted that the 
relevant Administrator-General Act or Law impliedly authorises 
the state in which the deceased person had his last domicile 
to appoint a principal representative even though the deceased 
left p.o assets in such state. This point seems to have been 
assumed by the Probate (Re-Sealing Decree, 1966, section 3(”b) 
of which provides that the High Court of a state in Nigeria may 
ascertain "the domicile of the deceased person" before it allows 
his personal representative who had been appointed in a sister- 
state or in a foreign country to re-seal his grant "at the forum.
13. Administrator-General Act (Fed.) s.41; Administrator-General 
Law (West) s.36(1) and Administrator-General Law (East) s.
39 (1).
14. The Probate (Re-Sealing) Decree, No.13 of 1966 (Fed.) will be 
fully discussed below.
Furthermore, it is submitted that presence of the de­
ceased assets in the state, or the location of his last domi­
cile there, should afford the logical basis of the customary 
court's jurisdiction in situations where such court has power 
to make a grant.
3. PERSONS TO WHOM A GRANT OF ADMINISTRATION MAY BE MADE.
Besides the point that a testator has an inherent
right to nominate who is to be his personal representative, the
person to whom grant of administration may be made under the
domestic law is the relative of the deceased who, not invariably,
also constitutes one of his beneficiaries."^ Indeed, all
State enactments expressly provide that in considering to whom
a grant of administration should be made, the court must have
regard to the rights and interests of persons interested in the
1
estate of the deceased person. The class of persons, of 
course, includes the deceasedscreditor if there is no proper 
relative t£o administer the estate. So in the normal case where 
a person died in a Nigerian state, leaving one of those right­
fully entitled to administer his estate, no problems is en­
countered. But wheneva? a person from a sister-state died in 
the other or a national of a foreign country died in a Nigerian 
state, and left no person who can administer his estate, then 
the court of the state where the assets of the deceased are • ;>
15* Por a detailed discussion on the entitlement of the deceased 
next of kin to a grant of administration under the domestic 
law see, B.W. Harvey, The Law and- Practice of Nigerian Wills, 
Probate and Succession, pp.112-115*
16. Lagos State: Administration (Real Estate) Act, Cap.2, Laws
of the Federation of Nigeria (1958 ed.) s.3.
Western and thei^Mid^Westerh:'Btates: Administration . of,Estates 
Law, Cap.l, Laws of Western Nigeria (1959 ed.), s.26(l).
Eastern Nigerian States: Administration (Real Estate) Law, 
Cap.3* Laws of Eastern Nigeria (1963 ed.), s.3.
Northern Nigerian States: Administration (Real Estate) Law, 
Cap.2, Laws of Northern Nigeria (1963 ed.) s.3*
to be located has the power to appoint the local Administrator-
General as the deceased personal representative."^ Also, there
are treaty arrangements with some foreign countries, viz.,
Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Japan, Thailand, Turkey,
18Yugoslavia and the United States of America whereby a con­
sular officer accredited to Nigeria by the country of which 
the deceased died a national, may take possession of his pro­
perties situated in Nigeria pending his application for letters 
of administration iJnmediately afterwards. In other words, 
instead of making a grant in favour of the local Administrator- 
General, the court of a state will appoint the Consular Officer 
of the country of nationality of the deceased as his personal 
representative if such Consular Officer had already taken 
possession of the deceased properties.
4. FUNCTIONS OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.
After the grant of administration, the functions of 
the personal representative commence. His first duty is to 
collect the assets of the deceased, whether movables, or immo­
vables or intangible choses action. And in doing this, he
may accept voluntary payments of money due to the estate and give 
valid discharges for them. If an action is necessary to recover 
an asset of the deceased, he has the right to sue in his official 
capacity.
The second duty is for personal representative to con­
serve the assets thus collected and thereby ensure that they are
17* Administrator-General Act (Fed.), Cap.4; Administrator-General 
Law (West) Cap.2; Administrator-General Law (East), Cap.4.
18. See Administration of Estates by Consular Officers (Fed.)
Cap.3; and for the United States of America, Rules of the 
Supreme Court, Order 48, Rule 41, Cap.211 Sub., Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria (1948 ed.) and High Court Rules 
(West), Order 33> Rule 41, Cap.44.
safe during the period of his administration* Thus in the case 
of a business enterprise which must be kept as a going concern 
before it is passed over to the beneficiary, the personal re­
presentative runs the rifek of personal liability if he neglects 
the business and it, as a result, suffers some losses.
Thirdly, out of the disposable assets in his possession, 
the personal representative is obliged to pay the deceased cre­
ditors. In this respect, a creditor of whatever nationality or 
domicile should be paid on the same order of priority as a cre­
ditor who is a national of Nigeria or domiciled in the forum,^ 
except that if the estate is being managed by a local Administra-
tor-G-eneral, his fees, charges and r&inbursements, have priority
20over all other debts of the deceased. The personal represen­
tative is also entitled to settle claims which accrued after 
the death of the deceased. An obvious example is funeral 
expenses.
Lastly, when the personal representative has completed 
his administration by paying all debts, expenses and liability 
incident to the collection, management and general administra­
tion of the estate, he is obliged to distribute . the residue 
of the estate among those designated by the deceased in his 
will or to those entitled according to law in the case of in­
testacy. His power in this respect is wide indeed. He must 
pay directly to the beneficiaries if they are readily available 
at the forum. If the beneficiaries are outside the state in 
which the personal representative has been appointed, the balance 
of the deceased assets is, by the Administrator-General Act and.
19. Re Kloebe (1884) 28 Ch.D.175.
20. Administrator-General Act (Fed.) s. 48(2); Administrator- 
General Law (West) s.43(2); Administrator-General Law (East) 
s. 46 (3).
Laws, to be remitted to the principal personal representative
in the country where the deceased was domiciled, at the time
of his death, for distribution to those entitled. Alternatively,
such balance may be paid over to the Consular Officer in Nigeria
of the country in which the deceased died domiciled for onward
transmission to the beneficiaries as determined by the law of
such country. Or if the country of domicile of the deceased
is a Commonwealth country, the ancillary personal representative
appointed in Nigeria may, instead, transfer the surplus of the
deceased assets to the Government of such country, if it is
21willing to distribute the assets to the persons entitled.
There is no doubt that the above statutory provisions 
are based on the common law principle that it is the lex 
domicilii of the deceased, at the time of his death, which 
governs succession to his movable property and that a personal 
representative appointed by the country of domicile of the de­
ceased is best able to distribute any surplus assets according
22to the law of domicile. Therefore, the provision of the
Federal and state enactments, even though couched with reference
to the Administrator-General, must, it is submitted, apply to
other persons acting in the capacity of' personal representatives
in Nigeria. Furthermore, being a statutory adaptation of a
common law rule, it would seem that the various statutes, unlike 
23the common law,  ^do not permit an ancillary representative
21. Section 41 of the Federal, Administrator-General Act; s.'36(1) 
of the Western Nigeria, Administrator-General Law; and s. 39(1) 
of the Eastern Nigeria, Administrator-General Law.
22. See Re Achillopoulos [1928] Ch.433; Re Lorillard [1922] 2 Ch. 
638. The first Nigerian Statute on the point commenced on 
1st December, 1938.
23* See Re Lorillard [1922] 2 Ch. (C.A.) 638, where it was held 
that an ancillary representative appointed in England must 
not transfer to New York principal Representative, the balance 
of the assets in England so as to enable the domiciliary re­
presentative to pay certain creditors whose debts were 
statute-barred by English law, but not by New York law.
appointed in a Nigerian state to concern himself with what the
principal or domiciliary personal representative, the Consular
Officer, or the Government of the country of the decedent’s
domicile, proposes to do with the surplus assets transferred
for distribution to those entitled. According to the relevant 
24-sections, the consent of the domiciliary representative to 
receive the surplus assets, the receipt of the Consular Officer, 
or the written acknowledgment by the Federal or State Accountant- 
General (as the case may be) that he had received the residue 
of the deceased assets for onward transmission to the Common­
wealth country concerned, is, in each case, a full and complete 
discharge to the ancillary personal representative. Provided 
that the deceased creditors in Nigeria have been satisfied, 
an ancillary representative appointed in a Nigerian state will 
not be liable if he paid over the residue to one of the above 
persons or Government with the knowledge that some debts, barred 
by the law of the state of his appointment, but which is still 
due according to the lex domicilii, remained to be satisfied.
THE LAW GOVERNING ADMINISTRATION OP ESTATES.
According to the common law, which coincides in this 
respect with universal practice, all the functions of the per­
sonal representative described above, i.e. collection and con- 
servance of assets, payments of debts and the physical distribu­
tion of the residue of the estate, are all matters classified 
as procedural. They are therefore regulated exclusively by the 
law of the country where the personal representative derives 
his authority; in .other words, the lex fori. ^  In the words
Og
of Person, J., in Re Kloebe "a man who takes out a grant as 
24-. Supra, note 21.
25* Preston v. Melville (184-1) 8 Cl. & P.l; Re Kloebe (1884-) 
SETBETE.l751--------  ----------
26. (1884-) 28 Ch.D. 175 at p. 178.
executor or administrator is bound to deal with the property- 
under the grant, according to the law of the country which 
gives him the grant”. The law which governs succession to the 
deceased^property has no place in regulating how his assets 
should be administered; neither is the deceased capable of 
making a prior identification, of the law that will be applied 
in such a case.
But despite these long standing authorities, the dis­
tinction between the law which regulates administration and 
that which determines who should succeed was not appreciated 
in the Lagos Divisional Court’s case of Re Sarki. ^  The sole
question arising for determination in the case was whether the 
of the
(hi^p'sronX^hensnji was a more suitable person, as against the
po
father of the deceased, to administer his immovable (leasehold) 
property situated in Nigeria. The stepson claimed a prior right 
to be appointed on the ground that he succeeded to the property 
by virtue of Syrian law which the deceased had agreed with him 
should govern devolution of the property. Although it was 
clear that the deceased was Syrian by origin, it was not clear 
whether he still had his domicile or nationality in Syria at 
the time of his death. So it is not clear on what basis Syrian 
law could have applied to him. All that was known was that he 
died in Nigeria. The father, on the other hand, claimed that 
he had a paramount interest in the property according to Nigerian 
law which governed succession to the deceased!immovable property 
and hence should be appointed the deceased! administrator.
27* (1936) 15 N.L.R.20. This case was decided before Nigeria be­
came a federation hence the constant reference to ’’Nigerian 
law” rather than the law of a particular former Region or 
state.
28. At common law, leasehold property or an interest therein is 
classified as immovable. See Freke v. Lord Carbery (1873) 
L.R.16 Eq.461.
Graham Paul, J., agreed with the contention of the parties that 
the real question as to who should he granted letters of admin­
istration depends on ”whether English law [i.e. Nigerian gene­
ral law] or,Syrian law governed succession to the property”. 
Since only two laws were claimed to be applicable, the simple 
problem, from the view point of the learned judge, was to make 
a choice between the Nigerian general law and the Syrian law.
On this point, he found that evidence was lacking that there 
was any agreement that succession to the property should be 
gDsemed by Syrian law. According to the judge,
”To oust the application of the ordinary 
law of succession by agreement would require 
definite and convincing evidence of the 
agreement in quest ion!® • gg
Since such agreement Was not conclusiveproved, it was held 
that the deceased^immovable property ”must be administered 
according to the [Nigerian general law] of succession”.
There was no explanation about what made Nigerian law 
"the ordinary law of succession”. Was it because it happened 
to be the law of the country where the action was commenced, 
i.e. the lex fori, or because it constituted the law of the 
location of the immovable property, i.e. the lex situs, or 
because it was the law of the country where the deceased died 
domiciled, i.e. the lex domicilii? Rather the judge went on 
to establish two propositions of doubtful validity. The first 
is that the person who is entitled to be appointed an adminis­
trator in a conflictual situation will ;be known if the law 
governing succession to the estate is known. Secondly, the law 
governing succession to an immovable property of an intestate 
may be designated by a clear agreement between the deceased 
and some other person. Had such agreement been conclusively
29. Re Sarkis (1936) 15 N.L.R. 20 at p.21.
proved in the instant case, Graham Paul, J., would have been 
quite prepared to allow the administration of, and succession 
to, the deceased!-immovable property in Nigeria to be governed 
by Syrian law. On present authority, the fallacy of a pro­
position that succession to immovable property is governed by 
the system of law agreed by the deceased calls for no acument.
And as regards administration of estates, we have 
just seen that the various Administrator-General Act and Laws 
make it obligatory for the High Court of state in Nigeria to 
appoint the local Administrator-General as a personal representa­
tive of a deceased person, who was a national or domiciliary 
of a foreign country, and who left no proper person to administer 
his estate in the state. Since the statutes do not enjoin the 
respective High Courts to consult the foreign personal law of 
the deceased before deciding to allow the local Administrator- 
General to act, it becomes clear that the aim of these statutes,
■zl
all of which were passed after the decision m  Re Sarkis,:? 
is to follow the common law in determining all matters of adminis­
tration (including the question of who is entitled to be given 
a grant) by reference to the lex fori.
Finally, it must be pointed out that the case represents 
an instance where incorrect analysis of legal problems resulted
30. See Re Whyte (1946) 18 N.L.R.70 and In Re Ogunro1s Estate 
(I960) 5 F.S.C. 137 for the laws governing succession to 
the movable andimmovable estate of an intestate; and also, 
Geprge v. George [1964] All N.L.R. 136 and Yinusa v. Adesubo- 
kan, Unreported decision of the North-Central State Higti 
Court, Suit No.Z23/67 af 30/10/68, for the laws governing 
testate succession to the movable and immovable property
of a deceased person.
31. (1936) N.L.R.20. The Administrator-General Act, which was 
subsequently re-enacted as their own statutes by the former 
Eastern and Western Regions, was passed in 1938.
in rules of interlocal conflicts being prescribed for an inter­
national conflict. As will shortly.be discussed in detail, the 
principle as regards cases of inter-local conflicts is that the 
deceased^personal law governs succession to his intestate estate.
The same law also determines who is entitled to administer his 
32estate. However, to apply such a rule for the determination 
of a case having a factual connection with two sovereign countries 
is not only contrary to authority but is bound to produce disas­
trous results. For instance, if the law determining matters 
of administration is made dependent on the law governing succes­
sion, it follows that the foreign lex domicilii of a deceased 
person at the time of his death will not only have to govern suc­
cession to his movable property in Nigeria but will also deter­
mine other matters of administration, e.g. in what order are 
the deceased creditors in Nigeria to be paidI
6. CAPACITY OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ACT OUTSIDE THE 
STATE OF HIS APPOINTMENT.
(a) Position at Common law.
At common law, no court of a particular country or 
state has exclusive jurisdiction to appoint a personal representa­
tive to administer the- estate of a deceased person. Just as the 
local court has jurisdiction to appoint a personal representative 
under certain circumstances, so also is it conceeded that other 
countries or territories where the deceased left property or in 
which he was domiciled at the time of his death, have concurrent 
powers to appoint personal representatives for purposes of adminis 
tration of the deceased!;estate. This is the result of the common 
law principle that the grant of probate or letters fo administra­
tion in one jurisdiction, e.g. the Lagos state, does not of its
32. Tapa v. Kuka (1945) 18 N.L.R.5.
own force carry the power of dealing with properties of the
deceased situated in another jurisdiction, e.g. the Western
55state or Sierra Leone. Similarly, a foreign 'personal repre­
sentative is not entitled to administer the deceased!estate
54-in the local jurisdiction without the grant of the local court.
Otherwise, such foreign personal representative would he liable.
56as an executor de son tort♦ Thus in Tourton v. Flower, ^ it
was held that a personal representative appointed in France had
no authority to administer the properties of the French testator
in England, merely by virtue of his foreign appointment. While
5®in Finnegan v. Cementation Co. Ltd.ythe foreign personal re­
presentative who was barred from acting in her representative 
capacity in the High Court in England was appointed in the Re­
public of Ireland; the reason being that an Irish grant carried 
no power of dealing with the right of action accruing to the 
deceaseds dependants under an English statute. However, if the 
personal representative has been appointed at the country where 
the deceased was a domiciliary at the time of his death, that
factor is sufficient to enable the local court to confirm his 
58foreign grant. But it must be emphasised that this preference
55* The word ’’foreign” wherever used to describe a personal 
representative under this heading should be construed as 
including a personal representative appointed by a sister- 
state in Nigeria.
54-. Tourton v. Flower (1755) 5 P.Will. 569; Bond v. Graham
(184-2.) I Hare 4-82; New York Breweries v. Attorney-General
[1899] A.C.62; Finnegan v. Cementation Co. 1/fcd. H955J 
1 Q.B. 688.
55* New York Breweries Co. v. A.-G. [18991 A.C.62.
56. (1755) 5 P. Will. 569.
57. [19551 1 Q.B.688.
58. In the Goods of Hill (1870) 2 P. & D. 89.
for the foreign domiciliary representative, to act as a local
*59representative is discretionary^' and is made on the basis that
it is desirable to have the whole estate of the deceased adminis
tered by the same person designated by the personal law of the
deceased, despite the several locations of his properties at the
time of his death*
The traditional explanation given for the existence of
the rule regarding multiple administration is that a personal
representative is often a statutory creation and that since the
statute of one country or state cannot operate outside the
geographical boundaries of such state or country, any personal
representative appointed in one jurisdiction is incapable of
exercising his statutory functions in another jurisdiction,
41unless he obtains a fresh grant. Perhaps a less theoretical 
explanation for the existence of the rule will be found in the 
concern of each country or state to protect the interests of 
the creditors of the deceased who are its subjects. This 
the domestic law is able to do by insisting that properties 
of the deceased found within the jurisdiction should be set a- 
side primarily to meet the claims of the local creditors. And 
the only means of achieving this objective is by making it 
compulsory that a local representative is appointed by, and 
subject to the control and supervision of, the courts of such 
jurisdiction. Moreover, such policy saves local creditors the
59. In the Goods of Her Royal Highness the Duchess of D*Orleans 
(lb$9) 1 SW. & Tr. where it was held that an English
grant would not be given to a minor even though duly appoint 
ed by the deceased foreign lex domicilii under which the 
minor had full capacity to act with the guidance of a 
relative.
40. In the Goods of Rogerston (1840) 2 Curtis 656.
41. See Beale, op.cit., Vol.5? p.1533.
expense and trouble of having to travel to a long and distant 
country of domicile of the deceased in order to prove their. 
claims before a foreign court whose law and procedure may be 
alien to them and before which their rights may be differently 
treated. And if the estate of the deceased is insolvent, such 
a rule guarantees that local creditors would be satisfied 
first out of the assets in the local jurisdiction before the 
claims of foreign creditors are met. Por whatever the tolerance 
of the common law in allowing creditors of foreign nationalities 
and domiciles to be paid pari pasu with local creditors, the 
operation of such rule must be limited by reason of difficulty 
of ascertaining who the foreign creditors of the deceased are, 
and other such practical difficulties. Indeed, the domestic 
law might have barred their claims, even though such claims may 
be still open in the foreign country.
Whatever its advantages, the common law rule that a 
personal representative may neither bring a suit, nor perform 
any act, in his representative capacity in other jurisdictions 
except that from where he derives his authority, leads to the 
absurd result that if a decedent died domiciled in a Nigerian 
state leaving properties in six other sister-states, six addi­
tional grants of administration must be obtained by the domici­
liary representative before he could collect the assets of the 
deceased in the other states. This is on the assumption that 
the six states would merely confirm the grant obtained in the 
state of the deceaseds last domicile instead of insisting on the 
appointment of ancillary representatives in all the states.
This they are entitled to do at common law. And if, for one 
reason or the other, they all insist on this procedure, then
42. As occurred in the English case of Re Lorillard£l922] 2 Ch. 
638.
seven personal representatives would be necessary to administer 
a single estate of the deceased. Much more, such multiple 
administration would give title in the deceased properties to 
seven representatives. Especially at the inter-state level, 
where boundaries are more matters of geographical formality, 
and where such boundaries can be crossed and re-crossed without 
let or hinderance, the common law rule makes more difficult, 
cumbruous and wasteful, the administration of the estate of a 
person who, at the time of his death, had properties in more 
than one legal territory.
It is not surprising, therefore, to observe that both 
the mundane theory of territoriality and the policy of indirect 
discrimination against foreign creditors of the deceased which 
underlie the common law rule have recently been discarded for 
inter-state conflicts and also for international relations with 
certain foreign countries. But as we shall discover, the 
statutory remedy is not complete. Therefore, the common law 
solution is still applicable in certain situations. But first, 
it is proposed to consider the partial statutory amelioration 
of the hardships caused by the common lav/ rule before we con­
sider what further improvements should be made.
(b) Position under the Probates (Re-Sealing) Decree 1966.
The 1966 Decree is the most recent of the three sta­
tutes passed in Nigeria to eliminate, as far as possible, un­
necessary multiplicity of administration of the deceased^ estate 
when such assets are scattered in several territories at the 
time of his death. One of the earliest Ordinances on this
43 44point was passed in 1956, ^ amended in 1949* and re-enacted
45in 1958. ^ These early Ordinances all sought to secure a unified 
administration at the international sphere, i.e. between Nigeria 
and the "British possessions". It even escaped the attention 
of the draftsmen of the 1958 re-enactment that the effect of 
federalism in Nigeria in 195^ was that each of the former Re­
gions (like the new states) became a separate territory for 
purposes of private international law and that the common law 
rule regarding multiple administration was necessarily intro­
duced into inter-state relations as a result. This defficiency 
has now been remedied by the Probates (Re-Sealing) Decree 1966, 
section 9 of which repealed the 1958 Ordinance*
The most important provisions of the Decree are con­
tained in sections 1, 2 and 6. These sections provide, in ef­
fect, that an executor or administrator who was appointed in 
the High Court af a Nigerian state or the court of a Commonwealth 
country, either before or after 7th March, 1966, may commence 
and prosecute an action or proceedings in any High Court of the 
sister-states, and may also perform in the sister-states other 
acts in connection with administration of the deceaseds estate, 
in like manner and with the same effect as an executor or an 
administrator appointed by the High Court of that state. The 
right to bring proceedings in the High Court of a state or to 
perform other duties in a representative capacity conferred on
45. Probates (Re-Sealing) Ordinance, No.5 of 1956, repealing the 
British Colonial Probates Ord. Cap.12, Laws of Nigeria (1923 
ed.). The 1923 Ord. made reciprocity the condition precedent 
to a foreign grant being re-sealed in Nigeria since the Ord. 
applied to those British possessions which gave the same 
effects as they gave to local grants to grants of administra­
tion issued in Nigeria.
44. Ord. No.17 of 1949.
45. Probates (Re-Sealing) Ordinance, Cap.161, Laws of the Fede­
ration of Nigeria, <[1958 ed.).
such, foreign personal representative is, however, conditional
on certain requirements being fulfilled.
First, the probate or letters of administration
granted by the foreign or sister-state court must be re-sealed
in the High Court of the recognising state. And in order to do
this, the original probate or letters of administration, or an
authenticated copy, must be produced to the High Court of the
state in which the foreign personal representative is to act.
Not only that, a copy of such grant must actually be deposited 
46with the court.
Secondly, the High Court of the state where the foreign 
personal representative is to perform his functions must, be 
satisfied,
that probate duty has been paid in respect of property
47liable to such duty in the recognising state, f and
that a security in a sum equal to the value of the
assets to be recovered in the state has been given
48by the foreign personal representative.
Other conditions which rest on the discretion of the
Court of the recognising state are
that the court may accede to the request of a domestic
creditor that security adequate for the payment of thB
debts due from the estate to all the creditors in that
state should be given before the probate of letters of
49administration could be re-sealed. y
that the court may require evidence of the domicile
50of the deceased person. y
46. Probates (Re-Sealing) Decree, ss. 1 & 2.
47. Ibid., s. 3 (a).
48. Ibid., s. 3 (b).
49- Ibid., s. 5.
50. Ibid., s. 3 (b).
(a)
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The last requirement would seem to suggest that what the decree
is getting at is that only the personal representative who had
"been appointed by the court of the country of the last domicile
of the deceased should be able to act in a Nigerian state under
the provisions of the Decree, If so, it would seem that the
purpose of the Decree, i.e. to eliminate all unncessary ancillary
51administrations, has been achieved, albeit iirpart. However, 
a provision enabling only the domiciliary or principal repre­
sentative of the deceased to perform his official duties in a 
Nigerian state ought to have been made a compulsory, rather than 
a discretionary, requirement.
Finally, it must be emphasised that the Decree applies 
not only to the original personal representative appointed in 
a foreign country or in a sister-state, but also an administra­
tor de bonis non administratis. This follows from the wording 
of sections 1 and 2 of the Decree which speah of a probate or 
letters of administration granted "in respect of the estate of 
a deceased person”,
From the above provisions, it seems clear that the 
basic philosophy of the Decree is to regard the entire estate 
of the deceased as a unit and the domiciliary representative as 
the primary person to administer it, despite the multi-location 
of the assets of the deceased at the time of his death* In 
furtherance of this aim, the domiciliary or principal represen­
tative , once his grant has been re-sealed by the court of the 
recognising state, may sue as the local personal representative 
to recover assets of the deceased situated in the state. Debtors 
of the deceased in such state may safely turn assets over to him 
without fear of possible consequences. And the interest of the 
local creditors are adequately protected.by the provision which
51. Bee below for the shortcomings of the Decree on this score.
requires the domiciliary representative to give security in
to a
case he removes the local assets/foreign jurisdiction without
satisfying the claims of such creditors.
Certain points however mar the overall effect of the
Decree. One is that it limits a foreign personal representative
having capacity to act in his representative role in a Nigerian
state to one appointed by "a court having jurisdiction in mat-
52ters of probate in a Commonwealth country". It is beyond dis- 
put that diversity, rather than uniformity, is a notable feature 
of the legal systems in the Commonwealth. Of course, it must be 
admitted that the common law, whether in its pristine condition 
or its diluted form (e.g., as the "Anglo-Roman-Dutch-Law" ^  
of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland) serves as a basic or re­
siduary law for them all. But in so. far as English law has no 
special predominance in the Commonwealth, the result of the 
Nigerian provision is, that if there is a Commonwealth country 
where court proceedings are not necessary for the appointment 
of a personal representative, an extra-judicial representative, 
designated in accordance with the law of such country (even when
it is the domicile of the deceased at the time of his death),
5 ll
should be denied the right of representation in Nigeria. In 
point of fact, this provision indirectly contradicts the relevant 
sections of the Administrator-General Act and such statutes in
52. Probate (Re-Sealing) Decree, s.l.
55* This is the term used by Professor Allott to describe the 
admixture of the English common law and Roman-Dutch law in 
the above-named countries in Southern Africa. See Allott, 
"Towards the Unification of Laws in Africa" in 14 I.C.L.Q. 
(T9S5')’"3£5”aF "p .372 *-------- :----!---------
54. In Section 2 of the Probates (Re-Sealing)"Act, 1958 (Cap.161), 
a court of Probate was defined, like in the English Colonial 
Probates Act, 1892 on which it was based, to include an 
"authority, by whatever name designated, having jurisdiction 
in matters of probate". Therefore, if a family council was 
the competent authority according to the law of the country 
of appointment of the foreign representative, such person 
would be allowed to re-seal his grant in a Nigerian state.
Now this seems impossible under the 1966 Decree because of the 
absence of such a definition.
55the states. ^ The statutes all empower the federal-or the state 
Administrator-Generals to transfer the surplus or residue of 
the deceaseds assets located in Nigeria, after administration 
of the estate had heen completed, to the ’’executor or administra­
tor •••• as the case may he, in the country of the domicile of 
the deceased’’, for distribution to those entitled. As could 
he seen, none of the Enactments makes an appointment hy the court 
of domicile the indispensable pre-requisite to the domiciliary 
personal representative being able to receive the net balance 
of the deceaseds assets located in the Nigerian state.
Secondly, there is also less reason for limiting the 
personal representative who may sue and act in Nigeria to those 
appointed in Commonwealth countries. What happens to such re­
presentatives appointed by neighbouring countries like Dahomey, 
Niger, Togoland and the Cameroons Republic, whose citizens are 
likely to have more contact with the Nigerian states than most 
of the Commonwealth countries. Should the burden of administra­
tion be made more onerous for the representatives appointed in 
such countries simply because of the political association to 
which they belong, even when such personal representatives are 
quite prepared to give the security necessary for guaranteeing 
the debts due to the deceased^creditors living in Nigeria?
It is submitted that Nigeria should face the reality and stop 
imagining that a composite State known as the Commonwealth exists, 
with a common nationality and a common system of law, all of which 
justify preferential treatment being given to its members. In 
logic and in reality, there may be more sense in allowing a 
personal representative appointed in such a non-Commonwealth 
country like the Niger Republic, Dahomey, Togo, Chad or the
55* Supra, note 21
Cameroons,^ to administer the estate of a deceased national 
or domiciliary of such country located in Nigeria, This is 
because of the nearness of these countries to Nigeria and hence 
the probability that more of their nationals and domiciliaries 
would die leaving assets in Nigeria. Consequently, mapy personal 
representatives from such neighbouring countries will have 
functions of administration to perform in the Nigerian states*
On the other hand, to provide, as the Decree has done, that the 
principal representatives from such Commonwealth countries, 
like Canada, Australia, Malaya and Cyprus, among others, shall 
be able to act in their official capacity in the Nigerian states, 
merely by presenting their grants, may not be more than the 
conferment of mere theoretical rights. The distance between 
these latter countries and Nigeria presupposes that few, if any, 
personal representatives appointed in such countries will ha^e 
recourse to collect assets of their deceased nationals or do­
miciliaries in Nigeria. If it is considered desirable,in the 
interest of justice, to confer rights of representation in the 
Nigerian states on the principal representatives from distant 
countries, then there is no justification for excluding those 
from countries with the same geographical frontiers with Nigeria 
simply because of their political grouping. It is of signifi­
cant interest to observe, in this connection, that Kenya is now 
in the process of discarding with a similar statutory limitation 
which confines the re-sealing, in the country, of foreign grants 
to those obtained in Commonwealth countries. In the words of 
the Kenya Commission on the Law of Succession, such a limitation
56. Indeed, the Western Cameroon ceased being a Commonwealth 
member only in October, 1961 and, more important,inherits 
from Nigeria the predecessor of the Probates (Re-Sealing) 
Decree, 1966. Consequently, the West Cameroon courts are 
obliged under the local statute to permit a domiciliary re­
presentative appointed in a Nigerian state to re-seal his 
grant in the territory.
is "out of date".^ Of course, the Commission also considers 
it undersirable that only persons appointed by courts of law 
should be allowed to act in their representative capacity in 
Kenya.^
Thirdly, why should the re-sealing of probate granted 
by one Nigerian state in the other be limited to a grant obtained 
in the High Court, when all the customary courts of the states are 
equally competent to make grants of administration? Is there 
any evidence to suggest that personal representatives appointed 
by the customary courts will have no cause to realise a deceased 
person's assets in more than one state in the country? Or is 
the failure of the Decree to provide for inter-state registra­
tion of grants, or orders, of customary courts another instance 
of the unwarranted discrimination by the draftsmen of federal 
statutes against the personnel and, indeed, the very existence 
of such courts, despite their recognition by the Federal Consti­
tution?
We may summarise the criticisms so far levelled against 
the Probates (Re-Sealing) Decree thus: A domiciliary representa­
tive cannot act in his representative capacity in a Nigerian 
state merely by producing his grant for resealing in the court 
of the state if:
(a) he Was appointed by an extra-judicial method in a
Commonwealth country, even though such method was 
valid by the law of the country of his appointment 4
(b) He was appointed, whether judicially or ex:tra-judicially
by a non-Commonwealth country, notwithstanding the fact
that the courts of such country, like the West Cameroon;
57* Report of the Commission on the Law of Succession, para.187 
(Kenya).
58. Ibid., s.77 of the Draft Bill on Law of Succession, which 
is contained in Appendix VI of the Report.
are obliged under a local statute to permit a 
domiciliary representative appointed in a Nigerian 
state to act within the jurisdiction of the foreign 
country merely by producing his Nigerian grant for 
re-sealing;
(c) he was appointed by a sister-state customary court,
the fact that the president of such court was as 
legally qualified (common law-wise) as a High Court 
judge notwithstanding.
In these sort of situations, the common law rule of separate 
administrations under different grants still applies.
The last defficiency of the Act is revealed when an 
ancillary representative had been appointed to administer the 
deceaseds properties in the local jurisdiction before the domi­
ciliary personal representative, whether from a sister-state or 
from outside Nigeria, produced his grant for re-sealing. Under 
such circumstance, the Decree still permits, rightly it is sub­
mitted, the grant of the foreign personal representative to be 
re-sealed, but does not say whether the appointment of the local 
representative should be revoked or not. Presumably, the court 
has a duty to do just that so as to prevent multiple administra­
tion in the same jurisdiction and the uncertainties that would 
be created in the minds of the deceased!debtors in the forum as 
to the proper personal representative with whom to deal.
If the Probate (Re-Sealing) Decree can be amended to 
remedy the defects listed above, there is no doubt that the Fe­
deral Government would have accomplished a worthwhile objective 
for the Nigerian private international law in decreeing the 
statute.
7. UNIFIED ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE WITHIN A STATE.
The last point to he dealt with under the subject of 
administration is not strictly that of private international 
law, although it has some bearing on it* It has just been 
shown that the basic philosophy of the Probates (Re-Sealing)
Decree is to regard the entire estate of the deceased as a unit 
for purposes of administration, regardless of the several lo­
cations of the assets making up the estate at the time of his 
death, and that in furtherance of this objective, the Decree 
even permits the grant of probate or letters of administra­
tion made in "a court'1 of a Commonwealth country to be re­
sealed in any Nigerian state* For purpbses of the Decree, it 
seems clear that such court may be the customary court of Ghana 
or the Sharia court of Malaysia: Provided that such court has
jurisdiction in matters of probate according to its own law*
This state of affairs would seem to suggest that
dualism of laws in each of the Nigerian states should not have
meant dualism of administration, either locally or inter-state,
simply because the assets of the deceased were held under two
systems of law* A problem of this nature was presented to the
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Federal Supreme Court in Lawal v* Younan and it is instructive 
to observe how easily a court in Nigeria can mistakenly prescribe 
a private international law remedy for problems of internal con­
flicts as a result of failure to make a clear analysis of concepts 
The inevitable result of such confusion is to produce injustice.
The two deceased persons were, during their life-time, 
governed by customary law under which they held some properties 
at the time of their death. Both were killed in a motor accident 
by the degligence of the defendants. The plaintiffs had pre­
viously been given powers to administer the deceased person's
59. C1961] All N.L.R.245*
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estates by a Grade B customary court in Western Nigeria. The 
court bad acted under statutory powers. These customary law 
"administrators” brought an action in the High Court to claim 
compensation for the benefit of the deceased person's wives and 
children. The claim was based on the English Fatal Accidents 
Acts 1846 hnd 1864, both of which were made applicable in 
Western Nigeria by a local statute. In short, the realization 
of the assets comprised in the deceased persons' estates fell 
to be made both under the customary law and the general I^ iw.
Under the English Acts, an action must only be brought, apart 
from the dependants of the deceased themselves, by "the executor 
or administrator of the person deceased”. Therefore, the ques­
tion which arose for determination by the High Court was whether 
a person appointed an "administrator” by the state's customary 
court, in pursuance of its statutory powers, could bring an 
action for wrongful death in his representative capacity in the 
High Court of the state of his appointment, without a fresh 
grant by the High Court being made. On this point the learned 
trial judge held that since the judgment of the customary court 
had conferred power on the plaintiffs as the "true and proper 
persons to administer the estate" of the deceased persons, such 
judgment or power entitled them under the Fatal Accidents Acts 
to sue in the High Court in their representative capacity. In 
other words, the requirement of the English statutes was satis­
fied if the person suing for wrongful death had been appointed 
by a competent Court in the state.
On this point, among others, the defendants appealed 
to the Federal Supreme Court which reversed the judgment of the 
court below. The view of the Supreme Court on this point was 
given by Ademola C.J.F. Having observed that the customary court
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which empowered the plaintiffs to administer the estates of the
deceased failed to grant the usual letters or make an order from
which it could he deduced what part of the estates should he
administered by them, he went on to say that
"an administration under a grant by &
Customary Court di. ffers materially from > 
an administration under the English law 
[i.e. the general law of the state] which 
is not applicable or taken cognisance of in 
an administration Tinder the Customary Law",
What material difference there is between a power to administer 
the deceaseds estate granted hy a Customary court, and a grant 
of administration made hy a High Court, was not spelt out hy 
the learned Chief Justice. In our submission there is no 
authority to justify the proposition that the two are not iden­
tical in substance. The essence of both is to enable the person 
designated hy whichever court to collect the assets of the de­
ceased, conserve and manage them, pay the deceased debts and 
see that his dependants get the residue. The fact that the 
customary courts may not see the necessity for using the same 
legal formulae usually employed hy the English-type courts in 
issuing their grants of administration, is, in our view, irre­
levant. However, on the basis that there is such fundamental 
difference between the two, the learned Chief Justice held that
Ma person to whom power is given under 
Customary Law to administer the Estate of 
a deceased person, is a person empowered by that 
law to administer the estate of the deceased 
where Customary law can be invoked, and such 
power cannot be extended to matters which are 
statutory rights ••••••. and to which statutory
remedies apply." ^  
the
With these wohfe/Ghief Justice turned down the contention 
of the counsel for the plaintiffs that the efficacy of a grant 
of administration throughout the courts of a state should not 
depend on which particular court of the state granted it but 
on whether the grant had been validly issued according to the
60. Lawal v. Younan [1961] All F.L.R.24-5 at p.252.
61. Ibid., p.255.
law of the state. In short the court established the principle 
that a personal representative appointed by the customary court 
of a state cannot bring an action in the High Court of that 
state on the authority of his customary law grant. E converso, 
two further propositions would seem to follow from this prin­
ciple of ''fundamental difference”. The first is that an admin­
istrator appointed by the High Court of a state cannot insti­
tute proceedings in his representative capacity in the customa­
ry court of the same state. Secondly, a personal representa­
tive appointed by the High Court of a sister-state cannot in­
stitute proceedings in a Western Nigerian customary court, 
even after his grant had been re-sealed by the Western Nigerian 
High Court pursuance to the provisions of the Probates (Re- 
Sealing) Decree, unless he seeks a fresh mandate from the 
customary court.
There being no prior authority on this point in Ni­
geria, the Supreme Court rested its decision on the authority
of the English Court of Appeal case of Finnegan v. Cementation 
62Co. Ltd. Like the personal representatives in Lawal's case, 
the administratrix in Finnegan's case brought an action in the 
English High Court in her representative capacity to claim compen* 
sation for the dependants of the deceased on the ground of his 
wrongful death. Both claims were based on the English Fatal 
Accidents Acts, which as we have stated earlier, were made 
applicable to Western Nigeria by a local statute. Both per­
sonal representatives owed their appointment to courts other 
than those in which they sought to commence proceedings. And 
both failed to take fresh grants before suing in their represen­
tative capacity. But there the similarities ended. The admin­
istratrix in Finnegan's case was appointed by a court in the 
Republic of Ireland, which is a foreign country to England
62. [1953] 1 Q.B.688.
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according to English rules of private international law; 
whereas the administrators in Lawal's case were appointed by 
the Customary Court of the Western state, i.e. the same state 
in which the High Court was sitting, in accordance with the pro­
vision of the state's statute. It is therefore clear that an 
English decision on a case having factual connections with two 
different countries ought not to have been allowed to influence 
the decision of the Western Nigeria High Court on a matter which 
is purely of a local setting.
Furthermore, both reasons usually adduced to Justify
rule
the existence of the common law/regarding separate administra­
tions in different countries are inapt to explain the applica­
tion of the rule within a single state, whatever the degree of 
multiplicity of laws, or dualism of ^sterns of courts, in such 
state. The accentuated territoriality doctrine is inapplicable 
since the administrator who was disbarred from pursuing a claim 
in the High Court was appointed under the law of the same state, 
albeit by another type of court. Protection of local creditors 
cannot be a reason since the deceased creditors in the state 
could have recourse to a representative appointed by whichever 
court within the state.
The only practical result of the amazing decision in 
Lawal v. Younan ^ is the economic dissipation of the assets of
the deceased persons instead of assisting the customary law re-
the a
presentatives to consolidate them for/benefit of the eleven wives
and twenty children of the deceased. It will be of interest, 
in this respect, to observe that the customary law administra­
tors were ordered to pay 430 guineas as legal costs - an amount 
which would certainly be paid out of the meagre estate of the 
deceased. In such a circumstance, it becomes obvious that
63. [1961] All N.L.R.245.
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the only^persons who benefitted were the disputants* counsels
and attorneys.
Not surprisingly, this Western Nigerian case appears
to the rest of the Nigerian states as nothing hut a mechanical
application of an English rule of private international law to
a problem of internal conflicts - an alien conception to English
law - without appreciating the policies which necessitated the
enunciation of the rule by the English courts. Moreover, it
appears to have been thought that there is no logical basis for
a rule whose ultimate result is the deprivation of the children
and wives of a. deceased person of the meagre assets which are
theirs by right in a society which believes in devolution of
properties on death on the descendants of the deceased. Eor
64-instance, the Fatal Accidents Act of the Lagos State, which 
was enacted three months after the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Lawal's case, defines "administrator” for the purpose of the
Act as including " a person appointed according to any system of
!
customary law as representative of a deceased person or his 
65estate”, ^ while both the Eastern and the Northern Nigerian 
Fatal Accidents Laws allow "person or persons ....  empowered
to represent the deceased person or his estate according to
66... customary law" to sue in their representative capacity 
in the High Courts. In addition, the Eastern and the Northern 
Nigerian statutes even allow a customary law personal repre­
sentative the choice of the most convenient forum between the 
High Court, the Magistrate's or District Court and the customary 
court
64-. No.34- of 1961.
63. Ibid., s. 2 (1).
66. For Eastern Nigerian States, See Cap.52, Laws of Eastern
Nigeria (1963 ed.) s.4- (1) (b); and for the Northern Nigerian 
States, see Cap.4-3, Law of Northern Nigeria (1963 ed.) 
s.4- (1) (b).
67* Ibid., s. 9.
Only in the Western and the Mid-Western States where 
dualism of administration was sanctioned by the Federal Supreme 
Court's decision in Lawal's case has such a remedial legisla­
tion not been passed. But the above remarks about the unfor­
tunate result of the decision would have conclusively shown 
that such statute is long overdue. If the policy of the Fe­
deral Government concur with that of the states in substituting, 
at the inter-state and international spheres, a unified adminis­
tration for a diversified one, on the basis that the deceased . 
person's heirs and beneficiaries are entitled to demand an in­
expensive administration of the estate as is possible, and 
so as to ensure that they receive more of the deceased! proper­
ties, then commonsense and justice demand that all systems of 
laws in Nigeria should reflect this policy. In other words, 
a customary law personal representative should be able to act 
not only in the High Court of the state of his appointment, 
but also in that of any sister-state in Nigeria, if necessary.
The only situation in which a qualification should justifiably 
be made to this rule is when a customary law representative is 
completely incompetent to perform the duties of administration. 
Furthermore, this general rule should not be a one-way traffic.
A personal representative appointed by the High Court should be 
able to act in the customary courts, without seeking fresh grants 
if proceedings in such courts are necessary to recover the debts 
owed to the estate of the deceased.
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CHAPTER F IN E .
SUCCESSION-
1. PROBLEMS Off UIOiiQTOIiY OF SYSTEMS OP LAW.
An attempt to answer the question, which lav; 
governs succession to estate of the deceased raises a 
variety of problems in Nigeria. These legal problems 
are the result of (a) the fact that Nigeria is a federation 
of many states, each of which constitutes a territorial 
unit for the enactment of its own laws on succession, as 
in most matters of family relations: (b) the co-existence,
in each state, of the system of customary lav; with that 
of the general law, which is made up of the common law 
and statutes; coupled with the fact that each system of 
law determines matters of inheritance differently from 
the other; and (c) the fact that within a single state, 
there may be as many bodies of customary law as there are 
ethnic groups, thereby giving rise to multiplicity of 
laws within the same territorial legal unit. It will 
not be surprising to note that the following variety of 
conflicts of laws arise as a result, regardless of whether 
or not the deceased made a will*
(a) Internal Conflicts:
The choice of the applicable law to govern 
succession to the properties of the deceased person may, 
at the local level, depend on a variety of factors even 
when the decedent had no contact with more than one ethnic 
group throughout his life-time and such ethnic grouping
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is co—■fcerminous with the geographical boundaries of a 
state* An obvious example of this sort of situation is 
when a Yoruba man lived his whole life, and died intestate, 
in the Western state where only one ethnic group, the 
Yoruba, is to be found. In such situation, the answer 
to the question as to whether his intestate estate should 
devolve according to the Yoruba customary law or the 
general law of the state may well depend (i) on the type 
of marriage contracted by the deceased. Thus in all the 
Nigerian states, the marriage of a decedent native in a 
monogamous form removed the administration of, and 
succession to, his estate from the operation of the state*s 
customary law or laws, and brings them under the state*s 
general law, notwithstanding the fact the deceased was 
throughout his life subject to customary law.^ (ii)
In the Lagos state alone, the applicable law will be the 
general law if the deceased was the issue of a monogamous 
marriage even though he himself contracted a polygamous
p
marriage. (iii) The deciding factor in determing 
whether one or the other system of law governs devolution 
of the estate may be neither of the above two tests, but 
the nature of the property left by the deceased. Thus 
assuming that the decedent was not the issue of a 
monogamous marriage and did not himself contract a
1. For the Western and the Mid-Western States, see section 
49(5), Administration of Estates Law, Gap• 1, Laws of 
Western Nigeria, (1959 ed.); Lagos State, s . 36 of the 
Marriage Act, Cap. 115, Laws of the Federation of Nig# 
(1958 ed.); and for the rest of the States, Cole v. Cole 
(1898) 1 N.l.R* 15 and Administrator-G-eneral v. Egbhna 
(1945)'18 N.L.R. 1.
2. Marriage Act, s.3 6; Bamgbose v. Daniel [l955) A.C. 107 
(P.C.).
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monogamous marriage, nonetheless, if he left such assets 
as company shares and G-overnment securities which are 
transferrable only hy registration, or some negotiable 
instruments, the collection and distribution of such 
assets must be governed by the general law since such 
assets are unknown to customary law* This factor (the 
nature of the property) may result in making both the 
general law and the customary law of the state concerned 
applicable concurrently, not only as regards administration 
but as to who should succeed to the estate,^ (iv) Alter­
natively, the choice of the applicable law for determining 
matters of inheritance may be made by using the test of
the deceased person*s manner of life or his position in
5
society during his living life.
If the deceased made a will, then the choice of 
the applicable law between the general law and the customary 
lav/ depends on the intention of the testator as could be 
gathered from his will in which he might have employed 
a common law terminology to devise what smacks of a 
customary law property interest. Thus in one case,^ 
a testator devised his real estate to twelve named persons, 
"their heirs and assigns for ever' as tenants in common without; 
any pov/er or right to alienate or anticipate the same or
3.Cf. G-lwa v. Otun (1932) 11 N.L.R. 160 at p.l6l; hawal v* 
Y o i m H ^ 9 6 i n A l l  N.L.R* 245
4. Lawal v. Younan Q.963 All H.i.E. 245 ►
5. Smith-v. Smith (1924) 5 1T.1.R. 105 s.t p.108; A.jayi v.
White (194*) 18 14.L.R. 41.
5. George v. ffa.jore (1939) 15 H.h.R. 1
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any pari; thereof1 * It was held that notwithstanding the 
use of the words "tenants in common" which has a precise 
meaning at common lav, the intention of the testator was 
to create a family property which is a concept of customary 
law. Therefore, that law, and not the general law, governed 
the succession to the property* Prom the reasoning in 
the case, it is dear'that the making of a will in an 
English form to devise property does not necessarily 
import the application of the English common law or a 
statute based on English act of Parliament to govern the 
devolution of the estate comprised in the will. Certainly, 
the distribution of the estate will be governed by the 
customary law if the testator designated such law or 
expressly created a family property.^ Moreover, if the. 
deceased was a Moslem subject to Moslem law, he can only 
devise the disposable part of his estate as determined 
by Moslem law. The fact that he. complied with the pro­
vision of the. Wills statute does not entitle him to 
devise away the compulsory share allocated to his next-
O
of-kin by Moslem law.
(b) Interlocal Conflicts:
When the conflict is interlocal, i.e. between 
two or more ethnic groups within the same territorial 
unit e.g. hetween the Urhobo and Ishan customary laws
Jacobs v. Qladunni Bros. 11.935) 12 N.L.R. 1 ; Coker v* 
Coker"(1939)14- N.L.R* 83; Ayoola and Balogun v. Polawiyo 
(3-942) a W.A.C.A. 39.
3. Yinusa v. Adesubokan, Unreported decision of the North 
Central State High Court, No. Z23/67 of 30/10/68, per 
Bello J. Contra: the dictum of Ames J., In Apatira v*
Akanke (1944) 17 N.L.R. 149 at p.151.
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in the Kid-Western state, the determination of which of 
the two customary laws should govern matters of in­
heritance on death depends on the ethnic group of which 
the deceased was a member at the time of his death- The 
customary law of this locality governs succession to 
the deceased!estate in the Western, the Mid-Western 
and the Lagos States as the ’'customary law 'applying 
to the deceased” on the authroity of section 20(2) of 
the Western Nigeria Customary Courts Law.^ No dis­
tinction is made as regards the applicable law even when 
the inheritable property is an immovable property, e.g. 
landi.^ Neither is it of any significance whether 
the deceased died testate or intestate* Indeed, the 
statutory provision merely follows case law and there­
fore accords with the principle operating in the rest
11of the federation on the authority of Tapa v* Kuka.
In the Northern Nigerian States, statutory 
backing has even been given to the rule of customary 
lav/ that succession is governed by the personal law
9. Cap* 31 (1959, ed.) This lav/ now applies to the Lagos 
State by virtue of the Lagos State (Applicable Lav/s) 
Edict, No. 2 of 1968.
10.Except that the lex situs may restrict the right of the
beneficial successor to occupy the land, as opposed to a- 
deprivation of ;;his other beneficial interests, e.g. the 
right to receive the proceeeds of its sale. See s.20 (4) 
Western Nigeria, Customary Courts law, Cap.31.
11. (1945) 18 N.L .R. 5 , where it was held that the personal 
law of the deceased in the sense of the customary lav/
of his tribe at the time of his death, decides who is to
administer his estate. This decision is baded on the
prior analysis that the deceased person’s personal law 
not only governs succession to his immovable property, 
but in addition, decides the degree of relationship and 
in what order his relatives are to .succeed; and that 
grant of administration should normally be made to a. 
person designated by such law as having a beneficial 
interest in the property.
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of the deceased as regards devolution of his immovable
properties as well as the movable ones. The land fenure 
12Law, at section: 30, provides that
devolution-upon death of land situated in the Northern 
Region of Nigeria, shall be regulated, in the case of 
a native, by the customary law “existing in the 
locality in which the land is situated1’ and,, in the 
case of a non-native, by the customary law “of such 
non-native at the time of his death relating-, to the 
distribution of property of like nature”. ^
According to section 2 of the law, a ’native” is defined 
as a person whose father was a member of any tribe in­
digenous to Northern Nigeria”* Since the word “Region”
( or “Northern Nigeria” when used in any enactment to de­
scribe the former Northern Region of Nigeria) must now be 
construed as a. “State” created under the States (Creation 
and Transitional Provisions) Decree, 1967 ^ t  follows that; 
the words rNorthern Nigeria” as used in section 2 of the 
land Tenure law should not)be construed as“a State in 
Northern Nigeria”. Furthermore, since the Land Tenure, 
enacted by the former Northern Region of Nigeria is now 
deemed to be the enactment of each of the six States 
created out of the former Region, it also follows that 
the words “any tribe indigenous to Northern Nigeria” in 
section 2 of the Lav/ should be construed as "any tribe 
indigenous to the particular State in Northern Nigeria
15
whose land Tenure Law is being considered."
12. Cap. 59, Laws of Northern Nigeria (1963 ed.)
13. The section is slightly re-’phrased to make it more lucid.
14. No. 14 of 1967, s. 7 (1) and (2) as amended by the States 
(Creation and Transitional Provisions) (Amendment) Decree, 
No. 19 of 1967.
15. The effect of the States Creation Decrees on the Northern 
Nigeria, Land Tenure Law seems to have escaped the 
attention of Dello, J., in Yinusa v. Adesubokan, Un­
reported decision of the North Central State High Court, 
No. 223/67 of 30/10/6 8. In that case he held that a 
native within the purview of the Law means a person whose 
father was a member of a tribe indigenous to the Northern. 
States.
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The clear effect of section 30 .of the land Tenure 
Law in the light of the recent constitutional development 
is that when the choice of the applicable lav/ to govern 
succession to land is to be made between two or more 
customary laws existing within a Northern Nigerian State, 
and the deceased was a member of a tribe indigenous to ■ 
that State, then the. relevant law is the customary law 
existing in the ethnic community in which the land is 
situated. But when the land which is situated in such. 
Northern Nigerian State is the property of a deceased 
person who was not a native of a tribe within the. state, 
then succession to such land is governed, not by the lex 
situs but by the customary lav/ of the ethnic community 
to which the deceased belonged "at the time of M s  death".
One point must be emphasised about the provision of the 
Northern Nigerian states Land Tenure Lav/. The lex situs 
rule is new. Indeed, the statute was itself passed only 
in 1962. Therefore, the influence of the common lav/ 
here is not concealed.
As section 30 of the Land Tenure Law of the 
Northern Nigerian States has acknowledged, problems of 
interlocal conflict may cut across state boundaries and 
involve a choice betv/een the customary law of one ethnic 
community within, one state and the customary M a w  of 
another etchnic community within a second state. It 
might be more appropriate to designate such conflict as 
"inter-state1 but we should be'wary to use that term to 
describe such a situation since the problem does not 
involve the whole territorial lav/ of one state being in 
conflict with the other. Be that as it may, the personal 
law of the deceased still governs succession to all his
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properties, both movable and immovable, despite the fact 
that the diversity of laws cuts across territorial 
boundaries*
16Thus in Tapa v. Kuka, a Moslem who was a 
native of Bida (now in the North-Western State) died 
intestate leaving a house in Lagos. If. was held by 
Brooke., J*, in the Supreme Court that the Moslem law 
prevailing among the Nupes of Bida, and not the customary 
lav/ of Lagos where the land was situated, governed the 
beneficial succession to the house. Consequently, the 
Moslem personal law decided the question as to whom a. 
grant of administration should be made. Although it 
must be pointed out that this decision was given before 
Lagos and the North-Western States became separate legal 
districts, it is obvious that the "foreignness" of the 
Nigerian States to one another does not alter the 
position. Indeed, there are statutory provisions passed 
after regionalisation which emphasize the point that the 
systems of customary law do not accept the omnipotence 
of the lex situs so far as succession to immovable 
property is concerned. Por instance, nine out of the 
twelve Nigerian states have almost identical, statutes providing 
that:
Where the customary lav/ of the ethnic community in 
which land is situated restricts or prohibits the 
rights of any particular classs of persons, to occupy 
such land, or provides.that the land may devolve on 
a particular class of persons, such restriction, 
prohibition, or rule regarding devolution on a parti­
cular class of persons, "shall not operate to de­
prive any person of any beneficial interest in such
1&. (1945) 18 N.L.R. 5
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land (other than the right to occupy the same), 
or in the proceeds of sale thereof, to which he 
may be entitled under the rules of inheritance 
of any other customary law". IT
■The above provision has an interesting historical 
antecedent. It is pointed;out by Mr. Marshall, the 
former legal Secretary to the Government of Northern 
Nigeria, that Northern Nigeria was the first legal dis­
trict in Nigeria to enact the above provision. It was 
inserted in the Native Courts law as a result of a 
Northern Nigerian case concerning succession to the 
estate of an Iho person who died leaving land in Northern 
Nigeria. According to the Ibo personal law of the de­
ceased at the time of his death, a woman relative of the 
deceased succeeded to the land. But according to the law 
of the locality where the land was situated, women were 
not allowed to occupy such property. A compromise decision. 
was therefore reached that the property should be sold and
17. See s.20(4), Western Nigeria Customary Courts lav/, Cap.31, 
which, as we have said above, applies in the Western, the 
Mid-Western and the Lagos States; s.30(a) of the Land 
Tenure Law, Cap. 59, Laws of Northern Nigeria (1963 ed.) 
which, as we have also pointed out, applies in all the six 
states carved out of the former Northern Region; and the 
identical s. 21(2) of the North-Western State, Area Courts 
Edict, No.l of 1967; Kv/ara State, Area Courts Edict, No.2
of 1967; Kano State, Area Courts Edict, No. 2 of 1967;
North-Central State, Area Courts Edict, No. 2 of 1967;
North-Eastern State, Area Courts Edict, No. 1 of 1968;
Benue-Plateau, Area Courts Edict, No. 4 of 1968.
This provision has been slightly re-phrased because of 
its unhappy wording in all the enactments. Bor example, the 
Western Nigeria provision reads thus:
"Where the customary law applying to land prohibits, 
restricts or regulates the devolution on death to any 
particular class of persons of the right to ofcupy such 
land it shall not operate to deprive any person of any 
beneficial interest in such land (other than the right to 
occupy the same) or ip. the proceeds of sale thereof, to 
which he may be entitled under,the rules of inheritance of 
any other customary law".
There is no indication as to how the phrase underlined,
i.e. the customary lav; applying to land, should be. de­
termined. Is it by reference to the situs of the property 
or to some other criterion? A reading of the whole
(Continued on next page)
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the proceeds of sale paid over to the female successor* 
Though unreported, the principle of the case is preserved 
for posterity in the above provision, which, as we have 
stated, has a counterpart in the enactments of most of 
the Nigerian states. !
(c) Inter-State and International Conflicts:
A- further complication, with which we are here 
mainly concerned, may be introduced by the deceased leaving 
properties scattered about some of the states of the 
Nigerian federation and one or two foreign countries.
Such properties need not be extremely large before we 
encounter this sort of problem. Even a moderate-sized 
estate may be made up of enterprises, interests and other 
properties which are spread over a number of territories, 
all of which the deceased had managed as an integral 
whole during his life-time., Thus for example, certain 
debts may be owed to the estate at the Kano State, a right 
of action for wrongful death might have accrued in the 
Western State under the staters Torts Law, a life in­
surance policy has matured in the Lagos State, some shares
(Pootnote 1.7 continued from previous page)
section 20 of the law, especially s. 20(1) which provides 
that l!In land matters the appropriate customary law shall 
be the customary law of the place where the land is 
situated1’, clearly shows that the lex situs is meant.
The above provision is to delimit the role of the lex 
situs when succession to land is governed by a different 
personal law of the deceased as stipulated by s. 20(4) 
of the Law. In this respect, the terminology which we 
adopt in the text to express the intention of the Law, 
appears more lucid.
Notwithstanding their unhappy wording, the meaning of 
the provisions of the other states would seem to be well 
aonveyed by the above statement.
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and stocks in a Tin Mining company, plus a bank balance 
are to be found in the BenuetPlateau State, certain im­
movable properties are situated in Ghana, and the deceased 
had an interest in a family property in the Mid-Western 
State where he died domiciled-
As regards the devolution of the properties, 
the parties to the succession suit, or the court on its 
own motion, may consider it inappropriate to apply jointly, 
the different substantive laws of the several legal systems 
with which the deceased, or his assets, had contact at the 
time of his death to determine who should succeed to the 
properties. Indeed, the deceased might have disposed all 
the disposable part of the assets, both movable and im­
movable, by one single will. To determine in such a 
situation the matter of succession to the estate by ref­
erence to the six odd legal systems of the territories 
where the properties are situated is seemingly the simplest 
but the mos*t primitive solution of all. Under such an 
arrangement, the will would be valid in one State but 
may be invalid in the foreign country. A, would be able 
to take as a beneficiary in one state but may be unable 
to do so in another. This would lead to a result quite 
contrary to the intention of the deceased to make a 
valid legacy of his properties regardless of wherever 
they may be located at the time of his death. And the 
testator.*s intention is a matter of major consideration 
in deciding who should succeed to his estate in most 
cases. Even when the problem is uncomplicated by the 
fact that the deceased held the assets under two kinds
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of law, the customary and the general : ;laws, the court 
will still he faced with the primary question as to'which 
particular municipal lav/ should govern succession to the 
deceased personrs estate, and as to whether the applicable 
lav/ should be the same for the deceased movables and 
immovables, as under the systems of customary law.
To recapitulate, the determination of the simple 
question, which law governs the succession to the estate 
of a deceased person in Nigeria may involve a three tier
1 a
reference. ^ First we must determine the particular 
municipal or territorial system of law which governs the 
issue. For this choice of law determinant, we must, 
obviously, employ the rules of private international lav/, 
e.g. the domicile of the decedent or the situs of the 
property. Having located the particular territorial 
lav/ applicable with the aid of the connecting factors 
provided by private international lav/, we find that there 
is dichotomy of legal systems in existence in such territory. 
The next question, therefore, is to decide whether the 
governing lav/ is the general lav/ or the customary lav/ 
of such territory. For this purpose, we employ the 
rules of internal conflict of laws, e.g. Y/liat type of 
marriage was contracted by the deceased? Is he the 
issue of a particular type of marriage? What is the 
nature of tne property to be inherited and is it held 
under the system of customary claw or that of the general
18. As occurred in Yinusa v. Adesubokan, Unreported 
decision of the North Central State High Court,
No. Z23/67 of 20/10/68.
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law? If the deceased made a will, what is his intention 
ad regards the applicable law as revealed by such will?
Is the deceased a Moslem governed by Moslem law? If 
by employing one of such relevant tests, we discover 
that customary lav/, as opposed to the general lav/, applies, 
then we must go further to ascertain whether there are 
more than one system of customary law v/ithin the territorial 
unit. If so, we then proceed to the third and the final 
stage of reference by making a choice between the customary 
lav/s of the two or more ethnic groups v/ithin the st%te 
or territory, by applying the statutory provisions or 
rules of customary lav/ relating to such interlocal 
conflicts, i.e. the lex originis or the lex rei sitae, 
from this lengthy, but necessary, survey, it 
v/ould have been apparent that problems of private inter­
national law relating to succession in Nigeria, cannot 
be divorced from problems of internal and interlocal 
conflicts relating to such matters. Both bodies of law 
are branches of the same tree, Ihey may have different 
choice of lav/ rules because of the different spheres in 
v/hich they operate: Nonetheless, their rules should be
complementary since they lead to the same goal, viz, the 
determination of the question, v/hich law governs a parti­
cular legal relation. But it must be admitted that this 
sort of situation gives rise to often bewildering 
difficulties of characterization as to which problem is 
of private international law and which is of internal or 
interlocal conflicts. Hence the result of wrong analysis 
of legal problems has led, as in the field of administration
of estates, to the judges applying private international 
law remedies for problems of internal or interlocal con­
flicts and vice versa. Of course, the results have not 
been satisfactory.
for the problems of internal and interlocal . 
conflicts, the ideal solution has been proposed^ and accepted 
in principle by the respective Governments in Nigeria. ^
This is by the method of unification, by each state of 
the federation, of the different bodies of customary law 
now existing within its geographical boundaries, followed 
by an integration or harmonisation of the principles of 
such unified customary law with those of the staters 
general lav/, to produce a single territorial law applicable 
to all and sundry. But it must be stressed that to achieve
this ultimate objective, especially the latter, will not
21be easy and will certainly take some time. Therefore,
with the painful awareness that dichotomy of lav/s .'.will, 
at least for a while, continue with us even at the purely 
domestic level, it is proposed to grapple in this part
10* See e.g. Allott, nTowards the Unification of Laws in 
Africa” in 14 I.C.L,Q. (19&5) 366; and also, Harvey,
The Law and Practice of Nigerian Wills, Probate and 
Succession (1968) pV 172.
20. See Report of the Bar-es-Salaam Conference on Local 
Courts and Customary Law in Africa (1963J pp. 56-81’.'
21. The Lagos and the Western States seem to be in the 
process of overcoming the hurdle of multiplicity of 
bodies of customary law within the states, as a result 
of the homogeniety of the ethnic group in each state*
A conscious effort aimed at unification of bodies of 
customary law has so far been taken only by the Western 
state with the promulgation of such measures as the 
Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children Adoptive Bye - 
Lav/s Order, W..R.1.N. 456 of 1958* This Order has been 
adopted by over 30 District Councils in the state.
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with the problems of private international law relating 
to succession, indicating at the appropriate places, where 
the topic has been complicated by dualism of systems of 
laws, and how the Nigerian private international law can 
deal with such peculiar complexities♦
2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES Off PRIVATE, INTERNATIONAL LAV/>
There has never been any doubt in systems of 
private international law about the law that may possibly 
govern succession to the property of a deceased person*.
The competition has traditionally been between the lav/ 
of the place where the property was sfcituated at the time 
of death, i.e. the lex loci rei sitae or, to put it shortly, 
the lex situs; and the personal lav/ of the deceased*
As we have frequently stated, the personal law day tie 
determined, on a first reference, by the law; of the country 
of which the deceased v/as a national at the time of his 
death (lex patriae), or the law of the country in which 
he v/as domiciled at the date of his death (lex domicilii)* 
On a second reference, it has also been seen that the 
personal law may ultimately be the law of the ethnic 
community of which the deceased iwas a member or the 
lav/ applicable to adherents of the religion v/hich he 
professed at the time of his death*
The real problem for each system of law is 
whether to apply both the lex situs and the personal law, 
or either, andlf so, which of them, in determin|.ngiithe 
rights of succession to the estate of the deceased person 
in a conflictual situation* Hence the following diversity 
of solutions emerge according to whether the Lex Situs
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Approach, the Unitary Principle of Succession or the 
Scission Principle (otherwise known as the Split System 
of Succession), is accepted*
(a) The Lex Situs Approach*
This is the oldest theory of alL* It.pre­
supposes that there is no distinction in nomenclature 
between the assets making up the deceased estate, whether 
it be land or an item of property like a piece of furniture. 
Every portion of the property, whether movable or im­
movable, devolve according to the lav/ of its location 
at the time of death of the decedent. The practical 
result of this approach is that whenever there is multi- 
location of properties, the lav/ governing succession be­
comes various. In case of testate succession, a will 
that is valid by the lav/ of one situs may be invalid by 
the law of the other. If A is entitled to take as a 
devisee for the purpose of the land situated in country 0, 
he may inherit nothing out of the money located in country 
P. The fact that the testator designated him as the 
successor to both properties in his Will, is immaterial.
If the deceased left no will, his next of kin according
X.
to the law of situs of property/may be different from 
his next of kin as designated by the lav/ of the situs of 
property Y* In short, whenever the deceased left, pro­
perties e.g. in twelve countries or territories, at the 
time of his death, his estate is immediately dismembered 
into $welve separate units according to their location. 
Succession to each unit will be governed by the lav/ of 
its location.
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In view of the fact that the use of connecting
factors based on location leads to a plurality of solutions
for different parts of the estate, we have categorised
this approach as the most primitive of all. Other
writers have employed epithets of varying intensity in
its attack, one of which is that the Lex Situs Approach
constitutes a "monument of isolationism”.. Yet this
principle is still foundiin the Montevideo Conventions
of 1928 and 1940, to v/hich some Latin American Countries
are signatories. According to article 44 and 45 of
the latter Convention:
The law of the place where hereditary property is 
located at the time of death of the person whose 
estate is involved, governs the form of the 
testament......
"The same law of location governs:
(a) The capacity of the heir or legatee to inherit; 
£b; The validity and effects of the testament;
(c) The hereditary titles and rights;.
(d) The existence and amount of the available assets; 
(f; In fine., everything relative to the legitime or
testamentary estate.”
Because of its inconvenience, this approach will not be 
discussed further.
(b) The Principle of Unitary Succession.
By far the most successful of the choice of
law rules for regulating matters of succession is the
22'principle of unitary or universal succession. Wolff
points out that this solution, "obtains today in a great
22
majority of modern laws”. Rabel lists over thirty
21. on. cit.. p. 568.
25. op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 257-259.
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of such systems, including some common law jurisdictions
like the Federation of I'lalaya and two African legal systems
viz. Egypt and Congo Kinshasa (the former Belgian Congo);
24;
while Drobnig emphasises the growing universalism of
this approach with reference to certain treaties concluded
between the East-European countries. To this growing
25list may be added the Ghanaian legal system. And diver­
gence between practice and principle is observed in the
Sudan where the principle of unitary succession is operated
26in practice by the courts, * even though the Sudanese 
oonflict methodology persists in calling the practice
07
the Scission Principle. u •
The rationale of this approach is akin to that 
v/hich underlies the principle of unified administration.
That is to say, that just as the deceased, during his 
lifetime, owned and managed his properties, whatever 
their nature and wherever they may be located, as one 
single entity, so also should these properties devolve on
his death as a unit and according to one single system
of law. For this solution, it is argued that if a person 
died testate and gave his properties to certain named personsr 
or if he died intestate, hoping that his properties would,
24. "Conflict of Laws in Recent East-European Treaties” in
5 Am.J.Comp. L. 487 at p. 493.
25. See Wilson v. Wilson (1925) Div. Court (1921-1925) Rep.155
26. See Kattan v. Kattan (1957) S.L.J.R.35; Ilihran
Bidjikian and Others v. Estate of Hagop Stephanian
(1967) S.L.J.R. 70.
27’. For the meaning of this term, see below
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in any event, descend to his next of kin according to law, 
the only municipal system that would he in his contem­
plation in both cases, would be the law of the territory 
with which he had the most real and substantial connection; 
in other words, his personal lav/. Why, it is asked, should 
the law of the place where the property is situated not 
recognise the legitimate claim of the deceased personal 
lav/ in such situation? If the lav/ of location had no 
objection, as a matter of policy, to the deceased owning 
the property during his life-time, v/hy should it object 
to a beneficiary nominated by the deceased or designated 
by his personal law? If the conflicts rule of the 
country of location is prepared to co-operate with the 
personal lav/ of the deceased in regulating devolution 
of his movable property, for example, why should it object 
to the same system of lav/ governing succession to his 
immovable property situated in the same country?
Ihese considerations move the majority of 
the worldfs legal system to cling to this Roman law 
concept of universality of succession, i.e. the principle 
that the same law had to determine succession to both 
the movable and immovable property of the deceased* In 
such countries like Colombia, Denmark, Norway and Quebec, 
where' domicile is the connecting factor for determining 
the personal law, the lav/ of the country in v/hich the 
deceased had his domicile at the time of his death, 
governs succession to his properties. , In others like 
Egypt, Germany, Greece, Italy where the principle of 
nationality is accepted as basis of personal law, the 
lex patriae at the time of death governs.
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(c) The Scission Principle or the Split System of Succession.
This principle owes its origin to the "statute 
theory11 of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by 
which Italian jurists, followed, by their French successors,
f
classified statutes and rules of law as either "Personal"
or "Real". The Personal Statutes regulated men in their
personal and domestic relations, as distinct from, their
proprietary and commercial affairs. They also applied
whenever the person might be; whereas the Real Statutes
were primarily concerned with things and applied within
the territorial ^limits of the legal system in which the
2R
thing was lo.cated. The application of this theory to 
matters of succession was attributed to D*Argentre.^
He limited the categories in which.personal statutes were 
applicable, but contended that statutes relating to 
movables should be classified as "personal", even though 
other statutes might remain "real".^ When this theory 
was applied to succession, it meant the demise of the 
principle of unitary or universal succession.The resultant 
effect was the rise of the Scission theory of succession 
whereby the estate of a deceased person was split into the 
categories of movables and immovables. Succession to the 
decedent |:s movable property is governedjby his personal
28. Graveson, op. cit.. 6th ed. p.32
29'.. Stumberg, Cases on the Conflict of haws (2nd ed. 1956) 
p. 3.
30. Thereby emphasising the preponderance of the real statutes 
and virtually eliminating the third,category of "mixed 
statutes". See Stumberg, op.. cit.t p. 5 and Cheshire, 
op. cit.. 7th ed. p.23.
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law at the time of his death (on the basis that movables 
follow the person - mobilia sequuntur personam), while 
the lex loci rei sitae governs the descent of his im­
movable property.
The Scission Principle fitted perfectly into
the legal orders of many European countries in which
feudalism v/as the system of land tenure. As Aptly put 
3 ©aby Wolff ' "the feudal lords could not allow the descent 
of their land to be affected if one of their vassals 
should acquire a foreign domicile". As could be expected, 
the principle of scission obtains today in most common 
law countries having the matrix of their legal systems 
in England,, including majority of the United States of 
America. it is in vague in Belgium, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Prance (therefore suggesting that it exists in most 
Prench law countries in Africa), San Salvador and * Siam.
Por purposes of inheritance, these countries apply the 
lex domicilii as the personal lav/, while a second group 
e.g. Austria, Bolivia, Iran, Liechtenstein and Turkey, 
which also favours the split system of succession, apply 
the lex patriae as the personal law, to govern succession 
to the deceased movables.
Whether a given property is to be classified as
e?r*
movable A immovable, is determined by the lex situs, according 
to most conflict rules. So the first difficulty about 
the scission principle is that two municipal systems of 
law may classify a particular type of property differently. 
Por example, Wolff rightly points out that mortgages on 
immovable property are regarded under the Prench and Berman 
laws as movables, v/hereas English common law regards them.
39a Op:offit./, p.567
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51}as immovables. Thus if a person died leaving such
properties both in Prance and England, different laws 
may have to be applied despite the fact that' both systems 
are operating the same scission principle and moreover, 
using the same connecting factor of domicile to determine
which lav/ governs succession to his movable property.
This divergence of classification is due to the fact that 
the meaning of the terms ’‘movable” and “immovable” does 
not strictly conform, with the popular meaning of ’mobility” 
or “immovability” of the property being classified.-^2
3. SUCCESSION AMD THE CHOICE OP LAW IN NIGERIA,
We have repeatedly stated that the Nigerian
private international lav/ owes its existence to the common
law of England as at 1st January, 1900, The scission
principle of succession has been established in England
35well over two centuries ago,  ^ Therefore, it is beyond 
dispute that it is the scission principle or the split 
system, of succession that is accepted as a general rule 
in Nigeria for the solution, inter-state and internationally, 
of the problem of multi-location of Ihe properties of 
the deceased. In short, the private international lav/ 
rules being applied in the Nigerian courts- are that 
succession to the movable property of a deceased person 
is governed by lex domicilii at the time of his death
31. Wolff, op. cit., p. 503.
32. ibid. p, 50$.
p.. See Pipon v. Pip on (1744) Amb. 25, 799; Bruce v. Bruce 
(1790) b -BroP.O.,506 5 Copin v. Copin (17£5 ) 2 P.
Wms, 291; Nelson v. Bridport (l84o) 8 Beav. 547.
34. Re Whyte (1946) 18 N.l.R. 70; See also, Cole v. Cole 
(1898; 1 N.B.R. 15 at pp. 18 and 22,
n
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while the lex situs governs the devolution of his immovable
35.
property. It makes no difference to these rules
whether the deceased died testate or intestate: the
only exception being that if he died testate, his will
will be tested also according to the scission principle.
That is to say, that the formal as well as the essential
validity of a will relating to immovable is governed by 
36the lex situs;/' whereas the formal and the essential 
validity of a will relating to movables are determined 
according to the deceased law of domicile at the time, 
of death.
A detailed analysis of these rules needs not be 
embarked on in a work of -this nature since the rules of 
testate and intestate succession in conflictual situations 
can be found in standard English texts on this subject.
The main, purpose; of this part is to consider what diffi­
culties are being encountered in Nigeria in operating 
the rules. Erom this, it becomes clear that the adequacy 
or otherwise of the scission principle will be called into 
questi oil with a view to discovering whether it needs be 
preserved in its present form in a country where dualism 
of systems of law leads, inevitably, to multiplicity of
35* Re Oguurots Estate (I960) 5 E.S.C.137; Yinusa v.
Adesubokan, Unreported, North-Central State high Court 
decision. No. Z23/67 of 30/10/68. This lex situs rule, 
is so rigorously enforced that a lagos High Court will 
not assume jurisdiction to entertain a claim for damages 
for trespass to land situated in the Western State. See 
The British Bata Shoe Co. Ltd.. v. Helikian (1956)1.E.S.G. 
TOO.; Lanleyin v. Rufai (193?) 4 E.S.C. 184.
36. G-eorge v. (George [1964] All N.L.R. 136
37. Yinusa v. Adesubokan, Unreported, North-Central State 
High Court decision No. Z23/67 of 30/10/68.
39. Dicey and Morris, op. •cit., 8th ed. pp. 519-543 and 589- 
628; Cheshire, op. cit. 7th ed. pp. 481-523; G-raveson, 
op. cit., pp. 504-536 and 548-560; Wolff, on. cit.. p 
p.567 et. seq.
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laws. A discussion in this respect will cover the formal 
validity of wills. But first, we shall consider the 
slight, but necessary modification made to the choice 
of law rule concerning succession to the movable property 
of a deceased person under Nigerian private international 
law.
(a) Limitation of the Application of the lex domicilii by 
the hoc trine- of Public Policy.
39Re Whyte seems to be the first case in which
the common law rule of devolution of movable property
according to the lex domicilii of the deceased at the
time of his death v/as confirmed for Nigeria, besides
the case of Cole v. Cole ^  where the applicable lav/ v/as
assumed to be the lex domicilii without any discussion.
According to Brooke ag. C.J. in Re Nhyte-,
’succession to the movable of the deceased is in 
general governed by the law of his domicile at 
the time of his death”. 41
It will be observed that the. Chief Justice stated the 
principle in a general term, implying that exceptions 
may be made to it in certain cases. The only quali­
fication to the general rule was made by the Chief Justice 
himself in the case.
The deceased was a member of Ranti tribe in 
G-hana. He died domiciled in Ghana leaving certain 
movable properties in Nigeria. There was no dispute 
about the law of the country v/hic& governed succession
39. (1946) 18 N.L.R. 70.
40. (1898) 1 N.L.R. 15.
41. (1946) 18 N.L.R. 70.
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to the movable properties of the deceased in Nigeria•
This, the court confirmed to be the Ghanaian law since 
the deceased v/as domiciled there at the time of his death* 
The Ghanaian lex domicilii, however, provided that the 
deceased personal lav/ was the law of his tribe, i*e. the 
Panti customary lav/* The real dispute was whether the 
Nigerian court could vary the scale of distribution in a 
way not in accordance with Panticustomary lav/, as had 
been proposed by the ancillary representative of the 
deceased who v/as appointed in Nigeria viz* the Adminis­
trator General*
According to Panti customary law the deceased 
sister succeeded to the whole of the estate, while the 
infant daughter of the deceased was to be taken to the 
family members in Ghana, Nothing v/as to be given to 
the widow of the deceased. The widow intended to con­
tinue living in Nigeria with her infant daughter. The 
deceased person1s sister who inherited everything was a 
native of Ghana where she had always been resident* On 
the other hand, the Administrator-General made an ap- 
plication for an order authorising one third share of 
the estate to be shared equally between the v/idow and her 
daughter, the widow acting as the legal guardian of her 
minor child in uti-lising the daughter's share for her 
"maintenance, education and advancement". The remaining 
two thirds share was to be remitted to the deceased 
universal successor in Ghana,
Brooke Ag. C,J. held that though the Ghanaian 
lex domicilii of the deceased governed succession to
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his movables property, such law must not be enforced in. tthe 
particular case since the effect would be to separate 
mother and child from each other and compel the latter 
to live in a foreign country in which the mother was not 
minded to live. The court noted, but was unimpressed 
by, the fact that the deceased sister was obliged to 
maintain and educate the infant daughter. The judge 
therefore approved of the scheme of distribution proposed 
by the Administrator-General as being more equitable in 
the "special circumstances" of the case.
The case has been criticised by some writers ^  
on Nigerian domestic law as being wrongly decided, mainly 
on the ground of its alleged failure to follow prior 
authority established by the Privy Council in Eshugbayi 
Elelco v. Government of Nigeria.^ In that case it was 
held that a Nigerian court "cannot itself transform a 
barbarous custom into a milder one. If it still stands 
in its barbarous character it must be rejected as re­
pugnant to natural justice equity and good conscience".
It is therefore argued that since the Chief Justice did 
not find the rule of inheritance of the Panti customary 
law repugnant as a whole, he ought not to have declared 
its application objectionable in the particular circum­
stances of the case. According to these writers, the 
Panti customary law of succession ought to have been 
applied in its entirety.
42. Park, on. cit.. pp. 7/4-75; Daniel, The Common Law in
West Africa, pp. 265-266; . See also Keay and Richardson, 
on. cit.. 237 to 233.
45. 1951 A.C. 662.
It is submitted that the learned authors of ■ 
these views are completely mistaken as to the scope of the 
principle established in Eshugbayi!'s case. Moreover, 
their views seem to be out of tune with the conflict 
methodology of the common lav/. Eshugbayirs case was a. 
case on administrative lav/ in which the validity of an 
action performed.by the Officer Administering the Government 
of Nigeria was the sole matter in issue. According to. 
the Deposed Chiefs Removal Ordinance 1917,^ the Governor 
of Nigeria may remove a Chief from one part of the country 
to the other on any of the following grounds:
i. that the customary law of the area over which 
the Chief exercised his authority required him 
to leave the area, or
ii. that, in the opinion of the Governor, the ChiefTs 
v removal is desirable so as to re-establish or 
maintain peace, order and good government in 
the area.
Chief Eleko of Lagos had purportedly been deposed by a 
representative majority of the members of the ruling family 
in Lagos. As a result, the Officer Administering the 
Government ordered him to be taken to another part of 
the country. The order v/as based on the ground that the 
customary law of Lagos demanded such a measure. The Chief, 
in a habeas corpus application, challenged the order on 
the grounds, inter alia, that (a) the fact of deposition 
and justifiability of such action according to the relevant 
customary lav/, and (b) the existence of a rule of customary 
law authorising his expulsion from his area of authority,
44. No. 59 of 1917, as amended in 1925.
45. Ibid. S. 2 (1).
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were conditions precedent to.his deportation by the Governor 
under the Ordinance* It was contended that these factors 
were not present and that the deportation order made by 
the Officer Administering the Government was, therefore, 
invalid*
In the court below, lew Jv held that any dis­
pute concerning the desposition of the Ohief was not 
cognizable by the courts in so far as the Officer Adminis­
tering the Government had been satisfied that the Chief 
v/as deposed. On the second ground, he held that there 
was a rule of customary lav; v/hich compelled the deportation, 
or banishment of a deposed chief* He therefore held 
that the deportation order made by the Officer was valid*
On appeal, the court v/as divided as to whetheir the fact 
and validity of the deposition by the ruling family 
were matters cognizable by the courts. . The matter went 
on to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council whose 
views were first, that both-grounds on v/hich the appeal 
v/as based were matters into v/hich the courts could inquire, 
and secondly, that the failure of the trial judge to 
adjudicate on the issue as to whether the Chief v/as pro­
perly deposed vitiated his finding that the lagos customary 
law provided for the banishment of a deposed chief* The 
Judicial Committee, therefore, ordered the questions, 
whether customary lav/ required the chief to be deposed, 
and if so, whether he was in fact deposed in a manner 
authorised by that lav/, and such similar matters,, to be 
referred to the lower court to be decided anew.
In this connection, the Committee noted with 
interest the opinion of the trial judge that the original
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custom was that a chief who had fallen out of favour 
with his subjects should be killed, but that a milder 
custom of banishment had been substituted. On this 
point, the Judicial Committee further gave a direction 
that it would be wrong to accept evidence of such modi­
fications of the customary lav/ without ascertaining 
whether the custom which modified it had been accepted 
by the local community as a whole. The particular portion 
of Ibhe judgment of Lord Atkin on this point was as follows:
"It would...... be necessary to show that in their
milder form they are still recognised in the native 
community as custom, so as: in that form to regulate, 
the relations of the native community inter se. In 
other v/ords, the Court cannot itself transform a 
barbarous custom into a milder one. If it stands in 
its barbarous character it must be rejected as re­
pugnant to tnatural justice, equity and good conscience1. 
It is the assent of the native community that gives a 
custom its validity, and, therefore, barbarous or mild, 
it must be shown to be recognised by the native com­
munity whose conduct it is supposed to regulate.”
From the above analysis of the case, it would 
have been seen that the decision v/as on the domestic lav/ 
of Nigeria, just as the statute v/hich provides that customary 
lav/ should not be enforced if it is . "repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good sconscience” is only of territorial 
operation. Like the statute, the rule established in the 
case deals with the method of ascertainment of customary 
law at the domestic level and the inability of a Nigerian 
judge to substitute, in the guise of judicial development 
of legal rules, his own notion of justice for an alleged 
barbarous rule of customary law. The.danger of such 
judicial legislation v/as pointed out by the Judicial 
Committee as the non-acceptance of such modified rule by 
the native community and the disrepute into which the law 
would be brought as a result. Eshugbayi’s case has never
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purported to fetter the Nigerian courts1 inherent power 
under the common law to declare a foreign law otherwise 
applicable to a legal relation inapplicable on the ground 
of public policy.
According to Cotton L.J. in the English Court
46
of Appealfs case of Sottomayor v. De Barros,
"No country is bound to recognise the laws of a 
foreign state when they work injustice to its 
own subjects".
The Lord Justice also emphasised, in the same passage,
that this principle of public policy applies in specific
instances to prevent an undesirable solution; therefore,
the judgment in a case in which thadoctrine has been
applied does not necessarily constitute an authority for
subsequent cases. Since the question in Re Nhyte^ was
one. of application in Nigeria of the Ghanaian law, and
since it is not disputed even by the critics of the case,
that had the Eanti customary law been strictly applied
in the particular case, its effect would have been the
separation of an infant child from her only surviving
parent, public policy considerations demand that such
foreign law should not have absolute sway in Nigeria..
It. must, however, be admitted that the Acting 
Chief Justice did not expressly attribute his rejection 
of the Eanti customary law of succession to public policy, 
b.u1r. based his decision on the authority of the "repugnancy 
clause" i.e. the statutory rule that the court should 
strike out any customary law rule which is repugnant to
46. (Nol.) (1877) 3 P.D, 1 at p.77.
47. (1946) 18 N.L.R. 70.
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natural justice, equity and good conscience. It Is
submitted that in doing so the Acting Chief Justice: was
in error. No doubt the line of distinction between.the
repugnancy clause, and the doctrine of public policy Is
thin indeed. Nonetheless, they are not identical in.
scope. As we. have pointed out above, the repugnancy
test is of territorial operation and applies only to
customary law. Thus, no court in Nigeria can reject.
the application of a common law rule in a concrete case
under this clause. On the other hand, the doctrine of
public policy is of global relevance* Under it, the
application. of any rule of a domestic law and that of a
foreign system of law can be rejected in the particular
case, as contrary to the interest of the state or that of
ARthe community at large. furthermore, the rule of the 
foreign law whose application is being denied on ground 
of public policy needs not be customary or tribal in 
origin; it may be a rule of the general lav/ of it he foreign 
country.
Besides the above objection, there is no denying 
the point that the judgment of Brooke Ag. C.J. could be: 
categorised as a public policy decision on the sole reason- 
given for the decision. And to do this, v/e do not have 
to look for a passage in the judgement in which the: Acting 
Chief Justice expressly declared that he was applying the 
doctrine of public policy. To quote the v/ords of
A Q
Cozens-Hardy M.R. in Re Hall, " y o u  do not look for 
public policy, in the sense in which that expression, is
48. See G-raveson. on. cit. 6th ed. p. 169; Cheshire, op. cit., 
7th ed. p. 135.
49. S. 1 at p.5.
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used, in an Act of Parliament. It is something which,
is really part of the common law of the land and does not
50depend upon statute11* And common law, as the legal 
historians will put it, is embedded in the breast of the 
judges.
Thus explained, the decision of Brooke Ag. C.J. 
should betaken as merely an affirmation in Nigeria of the 
general head of public policy under which a irule a foreign 
lex causae may be disregarded in particular case where 
its enforcement will work injustice to subjects of the 
local jurisdiction. This, like all heads of public 
policy, is not confined to the field of succession, but.
51extends to any action in which a foreign law is applicable.
52Re Wh.ifte  ^ therefore constitutes a particular instance
of lthe application of such doctrine. Hie limitation placed
55on the doctrine by Cotton L.J. in So tto mayor v. I)e Barr os ^
effectively prevents a state court in Nigeria using the
doctrine to strike down the law of succession of a matri-
Linial society in Ghana or in an Eastern Nigerian state.,
for example, if the law of such territory happens to be 
54the lex causae, unless the same sort of injustice pro­
duced im Re Whyte will be reproduced in the latter case.
50* This statement must be qualified in Nigeria in relation 
to the application of public policy to rules of customary 
law by virtue of s. 14 (3) of the Evidence Act, Cap. 62, 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 ed*
51. Indeed, in Sottomayor v. Be Barros (No. 1) (1877), 3 P.B.
1, where the principle was established, the matter con­
cerned the essential validity of a marriage: And, as
pointed out by Kahn-Ereund “Reflections on Public Policy 
in the English Conflict of Laws” in 39 Ir. Gr. Soc 
(1954) 39 at up. 56-57, the rule formulated in Sottomayor 
v. Be Barros (No. l) and subsequently applied in 
SoAtromayor y.pgBarros (No. 2) (1879) 5 P.B.94. “ought not. 
to appear in our textbooks in the section on marriage but 
in the introduction which deals with public policy.”
52. (1.946) 18 N.L.R. 70.
53. (No. l) (1877), 3 P.D. 1. .
(Cont. on next page)
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Our conclusion, therefore, is that the decision, of Brooke
Ag. C.J. in this case rests on a sound■foundation provided
we bear in mind that public policy is the only satisfactory
basis for the decision thdtthht the doctrine in private
international law is 11 an ultimum remedium preventing judg-
55ments with bad effects.’1,
A final point of difficulty about this case is 
that after the foreign lex:t domicilii of the deceased had 
been redacted in the special circumstances of,the case, the 
only alternative law applicable under the doctrine of 
public policy should have been the lex fori. But there 
is no known Nigerian law which justified the scheme of , 
distribution proposed by the Administrator-General and 
which was eventually approved by Brooke Ag., C.J*
(b) Dispensing with the Scission Principle in the Nigerian 
Private International Law*
i. Formal Validity of Wills
It has been seen that the common law rules 
relating to Ithe formal validity of wills are based on the 
Split System of Succession or the Scission Principle,*
The will of immovable property is governed as to form by 
the law of the place where the property is located and
(Cont. from previous page)
54-m Failure to appreciate; =? this point led Okoro, op. cit., 
p .233 to suggest that the effect of the decision in 
Re Whyte is that the law of matrriineal succession of 
certain communities in the Eastern states will not now 
be enforced on the basis that it is contrary to natural 
justice, equity, etc.
55. Baxter, Essays on Private Law, Foreigh Law and Foreign 
Judgments, p.1 2 .
673
the form of a will of movable property is governed, by
the law of the domicile of the testator at the date
of his death* In 1964, the federal Supreme Court, in
56G-eorge v. G-eorge approved the statement of the law 
made as above by the High Court of Northern Nigeria*.
This raises the question as to whether both the Northern 
Nigeria High Court and the federal Supreme Court fully 
addressed their minds to the law on this topic, so as 
to discover whether or not the qualifications introduced 
by statutes in England to this common law principle are 
part of the lav/ of any territorial unit within Nigeria, 
especially the Northern Nigerian states* Unfortunately, 
this is a topic on which it is impossible to speak of a 
uniform oonflicts rules in all the Nigerian states as in 
other fields. Consequently, the answer to the question 
raised must be considered with reference to three groups 
of states viz* the Lagos and the six Northern Nigerian 
states; the western and the Mid-Western states, and the 
three Eastern Nigerian states.
The Lagos and the Northern Nigerian States:
As pointed out earlier., section 16 of the High Court 
of Lagos Act and section 33 of the Northern Nigeria High 
Court Lav/ provide, almost in identical terms that the. juris­
diction of the High Court of a state in "probate causes and 
proceedings" may be exercised "in conformity with the law. and 
practice for the time being in force in England". The inter­
pretation placed on the predecessor of these provisions by
57the West African Court of Appeal in Taylor v. Taylor is
56. [1.964] All N.L.R. 136.
57. (1935) 2 w.A.C.A. 348 at p.349.
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that "in probate causes and proceedings the lav/ and
practice in Nigeria change as the law and practice in
England change”* Therefore, the current English law
and practice applies in the Lagos state and in each of
the six Northern Nigerian states. Any suggestion that
the application, in these states, of English law and
practice relating to probate jurisdiction is discretionary,
because of the use of the word "may”, instead of "shall”
in the provisions, goes into the melting pot when it is
recalled that none of the states has substantive or
procedural laws on administration of estates or on the
grant of probate.
The next question is, what is meant by "probate
causes and proceedings" in the two enactments?
Eortunately, these words have been the subject of two
judicial pronouncements by the former West African Court
58of Appeal. In Godwin v. Crowther, it was held that
"probate causes and proceedings cannot mean more than
causes and proceedings connected with the grant or recall 
5Qof probate"^  or letters of administration". And in 
Taylor v. Taylor^  the same court, after expressing an 
unanimous view that "the grant of Letters of Administration 
is a probate matter", went on to propound a test for 
determining whether a particular matter relates to pro­
bate or to succession: "The test to be applied" the court;
said, "is 1 would this matter in England be dealt v/ith in
58. (.1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 109 at p. Ill and 112*
59. ©tphh^iS supplied.
60. (1935) 2 W.A.C.A., 348 at p. 4349
the Probate Division or in the Chancery Division*? If. 
in the former it is a ■■.probate matter, if in the latter, 
it is not a probate matter11.
In England, probate, in the-sense of a certi­
ficate issued by the court to the effect that the will, of 
a certain person has been proved and registered in the 
court, can be granted, either in solemn form (per testes). 
or in common form. The per testes form is used when 
there is a probability that the validity of the will will 
be disputed, and in such case, an action is commenced by 
the person who wishes the validity of the will to be est­
ablished, against the person who disputes it. The common 
form procedure is employed when there is no likelihood of 
a dispute arising about the validity of the will. In 
either.case, the Probate Division in England will not admit 
to probate a will which is not executed in accordance with 
the requirements of the English Wills Acts.^ Hence the. 
statement that probate of a will proves the nature of an 
instrument as a will. In other words, the formal validity 
of a will, whether or not^pleaded as an issue, Is a con­
dition precedent to its registration by the court.
If the will was made by an English domiciliary, 
or if it was made in England, or is one which relates to 
immovable property situated in England, then the internal 
law of England may be consulted in testing its formal 
validity. If it is the will of a foreign domiciliary, 
or was made abroad, or is one. which relates to a foreign
61. Cock v. Cooke, (1886), L.R. 1 P. & D. 241; In the G-oods 
of Coles (1871) L.R. 2 P. & D. 362; Warwick v. Warwick 
(1918), 34 T.L.R. 475 (C.A.); ;?3odman v. G-odman .1920 
261 (C.A.).
See also, Halsbury*s Laws of England, 3rd ed. Vol. 16, 
pp. 172-173•
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immovable, then recourse will have to he made to English 
private international Ihw rules for the choice of the legal 
system which governs the formal validity of the will.
On the authority of G-odwin v. Crowther t^ a  
proceeding to determine the formal validity of a will is 
one connected with the grant of probate in so far as an
invalid will vaLl not be probated; and according to the.
63test propounded by Kingdom C.J, in Taylor v. Taylor,  ^
the formal validity of wills is a matter exclusively 
dealt with in the Probate Division of the High Court in 
England, and],hence a probate matter. Since the laws 
and practice relating to probate and administration in 
the Dagos and the Northern Nigerian states change as the 
law and practice in England change, it becomes apparent;
that the law in England relating to the formal validity
of wills, as modified by the Wills Act, 1963, applies in 
these states.
Section 1 of the Act provides, in effect, that 
a will, whether of movables or immovables, shall be treated 
as properly executed if its execution conformed to the 
internal law in force in the territory
(a) where the will was executed, or
(b) where, either at the time of execution or at 
the time of the testatorTs death,
(i) he was domiciled, or 
(ii) he had his habitual residence, or
(iii) he was a national.
62, (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 109.
63. (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 348.
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section 2 (1) (b) of the Act provides, as an additional 
rule, that a will of immovable property shall be treated 
as properly executed if its execution conformed to the 
internal law in force in the territory where the property 
was situated. The conclusion arrived at is that by a 
process of legislation by reference, and without any 
conscious effort by any of the states, all the options 
available to the English courts in testing the formal 
validity of wills in conflictual situations are now open 
to the Lagos state and the six northern Nigerian states. 
Also by this chance element, the unjustifiable distinc­
tions and unnecessary complications in the common law 
rules of private international law relating to the formal 
validity of wills have now been removed in this group of 
states.
The d e s t e m  ana the kid-;/e stern States.
It has been pointed out above that the effect
of section 8 of the Western Nigeria High Court Law and
Section 9 of the hid-Western State High Court Law, is
to empower the respective High Courts to exercise their
jurisdiction in probate and administration in conformity
with the jurisdiction, as opposed to lav/ and practice,
65
being exercised by the High Court of Hustice in England. 
The same submission made above, that the determination of 
the formal validity of wills is a probate matter, applies
to these two states as well as the third group of states 
whose choice of lav/ rules on this topic will shortly be 
considered.
64. Emphasis supplied.
65. See Chap. 8 p.609 and footnote 9.
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But as regards the lav/ to he applied by the courts
of the Western and Kid-Western stages, in determining the,
formal validity of wills presented to them for probate, 
section 4 of the Lav/ of England (Application) law becomes 
relevant. It provides that no "Imperial Act " ^  hitherto 
in force in any of the two states shall have any force or 
effect as from the commencement of the Lav/, In place of 
such English statutes, the two states have their own set. 
of statutes, compiled in 1959* The statutes are mostly 
re-enactments and adaptations of the English statutes of 
general application as at 1st January, 1900, A signi­
ficant ommission from such compilation is the English
Wills -Act, 1861 which introduced some qualifications
to the scission principle as regards the formal validity 
of wills of British subjects who were domiciled abroad. 
However, section 3 of the Law of England (Application) 
lav/ continues in the two states the operation of the 
English common lav/. The net result of the continued 
application of the English common law, and the omission 
of the English Wills Act in the operative enactments of 
the states, is that only the common law rules of private 
international law which refer the formal validity of a 
will of immovable to the lex situs and the formal validity 
of a will of movable property to the law of the last, 
domicile of the deceased, are operative in the Western 
and the Mid-Western states.
66. Cap. 60, Laws of Western Nigeria (1959 ed.) The Law 
also applies to the Mid-Western state, by virtue of the 
Kid-Western Region (Territorial Provisions) Act 1963, 
federal Act No. 19 of 1963, S.2,
67. Defined in section 2 of the Lav/ as any "statute enacted 
by the Parliament of England, the Parliament of Great 
Britain and Ireland, or the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland",
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The Eastern Nigerian sStates,
The Mlaw and practice for the time being in
force in England on 30th September, I960” are operative,
68as we have seen, in the three Eastern Nigerian states
as regards the grant of probate. It has also been shown
above that the formal validity of wills are probate matters
within the context of this provision. In this group of
states, therefore, the common law principle of scission
applies. furthermore, it is clear from the proposition,
that the formal validity of a will is a condition precedent
to its probation, that the English Wilfles Act, 1861 applies
69in these states. J This is because the Act is not merely
a statute of general application in England on 1st January, 
701900, but more important, because it was the law being
appLied in England on 30th September, I960 for determining
the formal validity of wills presented for probate, as
the language of its provisions quoted below will confirm.
The Wills Act, 1861 was passed as an endeavour
to overcome the hardships caused by the common law rules
to British subjects. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act
provided as follows:
nI. Every will and other testamentary instrument made, 
out of the United Kingdom by a British subject 
(whatever may the domicile ox such person at 
the time of making the same or at the time of his
or her death) shall as regards personal estate be?
held to be well executed for the purpose of being 
admitted in England and Ireland to probate. *1
68. Chap. 8 p. 609 n.8
69. The Wills Act, 1861 has now been repealed in England by
the Act of 1963*
70. See, Eastern Nigeria, High Court Law, s. 15.
71. Emphasis supplied.
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and in Scotland to confirmation, if the same be made 
according to the forms required either by the law of 
the place where the same was made, or by the law of 
the place where such person was domiciled when the 
same was made, or by the laws then in force in that 
part of Her Ka:jesty1 s dominions where .he had his 
domicile of origin,
2. Every will and other testamentary instrument 
made within the lUnited Kingdom by any British sub­
ject (whatever may be the domicile of such person 
at the time of making the same or at the time of 
his or her death) shall as regards personal estate 
be held to be well executed and shall be admitted in , 
England and Ireland to probate,'^  and in Scotland to 
confirmation, if the same be executed according to the 
forms required by the laws for the time being in, force 
in that part of the United Kingdom where the same is 
made,"
72Contrary to the view expressed by Iiarvey, it 
will be quite easy to construe the above provisions "with 
such formal or verbal alterations not affecting the sub­
stance as to names, localities, courts, offices, persons.,.
and otherwise as may be necessary to make it applicable to
na
the circumstances" obtaining in Higerra,  ^ Thus, "British
subject" as used in the provisions will become "Nigerian
subject" or "Nigerian citizen". ^'United Kingdom" will
be altered to "Eederatioh of Nigeria" as already held
74in Arinze v. Arinze. A reference to "England, Scotland
or Ireland" will be construed as a reference to the 
three Eastern Nigerian states, viz. East Central state, 
South Eastern state, or the Rivers state, as the case 
may be. And the words "Her Hajesty’s dominions will
72. op. cit., p.8.
73. Interpretation Act, s. 15 Cap . 89, .Laws of the’ 
Federation of Nigeria (1958 ed*).
74. [19663 N.H.L.R. 155 at p.157.
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become simply "the Commonwealth" according.to current
Constitutional law usage.. With the incorporation of
these formal alterations, the whole of section 1 of the
Act will read thust
"Every will and other testamentary instrument made 
out of the Federation of Nigeria by a Nigerian 
citizen (whatever may be the domicile of such person 
at the time of making the same or at the time of 
his or her death) shall ad regards personal estate 
be held to be well executed for the purpose of being 
admitted in East-Central state, South-Eastern state, 
or the Rivers state to probate, if the same be made 
according to the forms rdquired either by the law of 
the place where the same was made, or by the law of 
the place where such person was domiciled when the 
same was made, or by the laws then in force in that, 
part of the Commonwealth where he had his domicile 
of origin.."
And as regards section 2 of the Act, the necessary verbal 
or formal alterations will be made on the above lines.
In short, the effect of the operation in the 
Eastern Nigerian states of the English Wills Act, 1861 
is that any will made by a Nigerian citizen outside, the 
Federation of Nigeria shall be considered as formally 
valid if it relates to personalty and its execution 
conforms to any of the following systems of law:
(a) the law of theplace where the will was executed 
(lex loci actus);
(b) the law of the domicile of the testator art the 
time of making; (lex domicilii praesentis)
Cc) the law of the domicile of origin of the testator 
(lex domicilii originis), provided such domicile 
is located in a territory within the Commonwealth. 
If the will was made by a Nigerian citizen in one of the 
Nigerian states, then the will will be valid if it conforms.
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to the lex loci actus. That the last provision of the
Act in this respect is an unnecessary repetition of the
first, is clear enough*
This Act was much criticised when it was the 
75law in England, These adverse comments contributed 
greatly to its repeal; but in so far as the statute 
continues to form part of the conflicts rules of the 
Eastern Nigerian states, these criticisms must, briefly, 
be mentioned. The first is that it provides only for 
the formal validity of wills of testators who are citizens 
of Nigeria, If this limitation could have been justi­
fiable in the early history of Nigeria, there is no 
logical basis "for its retention ai the present time when 
the economic potentialities of these oil-producing states 
draw a large number of foreign nationals into them. 
Secondly, the Act deals with the wills of 
personal estate which constitutes a cross-section of 
movables and immovables. It is, therefore, merely a 
parlia.tive which does not completely cover the will of 
movable property and applies only to few wills of mo-
movables. As rightly pointed out in the Fourth Report
76of the English Private International law Committee
"The Act is manifestly dealing with situations in­
volving rules of private international law in v/hich 
the universal distinction is between movable and 
immoveable property; yet it applies the purely 
domestic distinction between real and personal 
property. The incongruous result is that, while
75. See e.g. Ealconbridge, 52 Can. Bar. Rev. (1954) 426, 
at. pp. 430-434; Fourth Report of the Private Inter­
national Law Committee (.England), Cmnd. 491.
76. Ibid. para. 4 (c) (ii).
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the provisions of the Act apply to all moveable 
property (except such as are treated as immovables by 
associations with land, e,g, keys and title deeds), 
it has been held also to extend to such immovable 
property as freehold land held on trust for sale, 
and leasehold11,
The third defect of the Act is that it; deter­
mines the formal validity of a will of personalty by 
reference to the law in force in that part of the Common­
wealth where the deceased had his domicile of origin,. 
According to the existing "revival doctrine of domicile
of origin", coupled with the principle of dependent 
77domicile", the rule contained in section 1 of the Act 
may operate to fix the law which will govern the form of 
execution of the testator*s will in a country which the 
testator did not know and in which he did not live, and 
consequently, whose law he was not acquainted with. The 
artificiality of making the lex domicilii originis the 
applicable lav/ which will govern formal validity of a 
will is another reason adduced by the above-named Committee 
in favour of its rejection by most systems of private 
international law,
V/e may now sum up the absurd result of legis­
lation by reference as it has affected the law on formal 
validity of wills in the Nigerian states. The English 
Wills Act 1963, operates in the Lagos and the six 
Northern Nigerian states. Consequently, a testator
whose will is to be probated in any of the seven states,
with
has the option of eight systems of la\/which the exe­
cution of the will can be tested. With the wider choice
77. See Chapter 2 for the meaning of these terms.
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of laws, a testator1s expectations as to who should succeed 
to his property will probably not be defeated by his
i
lack of knowledge of the intricacies of private inter­
national law.
In the Western and the Mid-Western states, he must, 
be properly schooled in the scission principle by which 
the formal validity of the will of his movable property 
is governed by the lex domicilii testatoris and by which 
the formal validity of the will dfif. his immovable property 
is regulated by the lex situs. Otherwise his expectations 
will be frustrated.
In the three Eastern Nigerian states, the 
scission principle has been supplemented by the provisions 
of the English Wills Act, 1861-*- As a result, there is 
polarization between foreign nationals and citizens of 
Nigeria as regards the law governing formal validity 
of wills. The former must comply with the lex situs in 
in executing wills of immovable properties and with the 
lex domicilii in making wills relating to movable pro­
perties. The latter, however, have the choice of three 
additional systems of law in making wills of personalty, 
as distinct from realty. These are the lex loci actus, 
the lex domicilii praesentis, and the lex domicilii originis 
in a Commonwealth country.
The lamentable result of the diversity oif rules 
of private international law for determining the formal 
validity of wills in the Eederation may be illustrated 
by the following hypothetical case.
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H. and W., who were husband and wife, were domiciled 
in. the Western State at the dates of their death.
They made a joint will in holographic form in the 
East Cameroon, where they lived for a considerable 
time. According to East Cameroon law, a holograph 
will requires no attestation. W. Also made a 
holograph will in accordance with the East Cameroon 
law. H. was a Nigerian citizen while W. was a 
na tional of the Cameroons Republic. The joint 
will contained a devise, of the spouses* leasehold 
properties situated in the Western, the Lagos, and 
the Eastern-Central states to L* By W.*s will, 
she bequeathed her valuable jewelleries located in 
the Lagos state, and a certain bank balance situated 
in the Western state to L. . Probate of the. two wills 
was sought by X. Who was appointed executor under 
both wills, in the Western, the Lagos and the East 
Central states.
Eor convenience, we shall consider first, the 
formal validity of the joint will of leasehold properties 
according to the conflicts rules of their states of 
location. In the Western state where the scission
principle is still fully adhered to, the leasehold estate;
78would be classified as immovable* There, a will of 
immovable property is governed by the lex situs at the 
time of the testatorrs death. Since an unattested will 
is invalid according to the Western Statels Wills Law, 
1959,^ the law obtaining at the situs of the; property, 
it follows that the holograph will is invalid, what­
ever the view of the East Cameroon1 s lav; might have 
been on it.
In.the Lagos state where the English Wills 
Act, 1963 operates, the holograph will in relation, to 
the leasehold property situated in the state, is valid 
since it conformed to the law of East Cameroon where it
8. Ereke v. Lord Carbery (1873) L.R. l(?_Eq. 4-61,
C'S'pIT3,' LAWS' Of" irsstern Nigeria, (1939 ed.) s.6.
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was executed. The fact that holographic wills are: not 
permitted in the Lagos state would he considered immaterial. 
Therefore, D. succeeded to the Lagos property even though 
he could not inherit the Western state property.
The problem is more complicated in the East -
Central state. There, as we have seen, the scission
principle has been modified by the English Wills Act,
1861, in favour of Nigerian citizens. ; But the joint
will by which the leasehold property, situated in the
East-Central state, was devised, was made by persons one
of v/hom was not a Nigerian citizen, i.e. a national! of
the Cameroons Republic. Had the will been made by H.,
the Nigerian national, alone, it-would have been formally
valid since It was a will of personalty which complied
80with the lex loci actus. The question is, should the 
court hold the joint will wholly invalid since both 
testators were not citizens of Nigeria? Or should the. 
joint will be held valid as to the moiety of the property? 
We find it difficult to hazard a guess as to what the 
decision of an East-Central state court would be under 
such circumstances. But whatever it is, the result would 
be inequitable.
We now come to W ls will relating to her 
jewelleries and bank balance situated in the Lagos state.* 
and the Western state respectively. According to the 
Western state.conflicts rule, the formal validity of a 
will of movable property is governed by the testatorls 
lex domicilii at the time of death. In so far as 
Western state was the domicile of W. at the time of her
80, s. 1 Wills Act, 1861.
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death and since a holograph will is invalid hy that state*s 
wills Law, Wrs holograph will is invalid and consequently,
1. could not inherit the money.
But as regards the same will disposing of W Ts 
jewelleries in the Lagos state, a Lagos state court would 
hold it formally valid by virtue of the English Wills Act,, 
1963 which operates in the state. As we have indicated 
above, one of the choice of law rules provided by the Act. 
for determining the formal validity of wills is that of 
conformity to the law of the place where it was made.
And the will presented for probate in the state had been 
executed in accordance with the law of the East Cameroon 
where the testatrix was living at the time of its execution. 
Therefore, L. takes the jewelleries.
In short, a single will disposing of leasehold 
properties situated in three states of Nigeria, has different 
effect in each of the states. The devisee succeeds in 
one, he was unable to take in the second, and his position 
in the third is uncertain. Similarly, the will of the 
testatrix in respect of movables is considered valid in 
the Lagos state, but void in the Western state where she 
was domiciled.
We believe that the time is long overdue for a. 
consideration of uniform proposals as regards the formal 
validity of wills in all states of the Bederation, rather 
than leaving the matter to the chance element of what the 
result of legislation by reference to English law will be. 
In this respect, there could be no better solution than 
to accept the Convention on the Conflicts of Laws Relating 
to the Eorm of Testamentary Disposition made at the Hague
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on Octobei’ 5, 1961. !Hhe conclusion of this Convention
owes its origin to the suggestion of the United. Kingdom
delegation to the Hague Conference in 1956 and I960.
Hence the similarity between the proposals suggested in 1958
for adoption in the United Kingdom by the lord Chancellor*d
82Private International law Committee and the rules finally 
adopted by the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law.^ As at 15th Match, 1969, the Convention had been 
ratified by not less than 6 countries, viz. Germany, Austria,
ft A
Prance, Japan, Yugoslavia, and Great Britain. The effect 
of ratification is that the Convention becomes law in all 
the countries which had ratified it. Por instance, it 
was with a view to the subsequent ratification by the 
United Kingdom, on 6th November, 1963 that the. Y/ills Act,
ftR
1963 was passed on 31st July of the same year.
The success of this British initiative can be 
seen in the number of countries which, either had acceded 
to the Convention itself, or adopted a statute based on it.
Por example, Ireland and Botswana were not parties to the 
promulgation of the Convention but later adhered to ilt in 
August, 1967 and January 1969 respectively.^ Gambia chose, 
instead of adhesion, to adopt the English statute of 1963
81. Por the text of this Convention see, Cmnd 1729 of 1962.
82. Cmnd. 491 of 1958.
83. The rules contained in the Hague Convention are more 
extensive than the ones suggested by the Pourtln Report 
of the lord Chancellor’s Private International Law 
Committee in that the former made the law of the 
territory where the testator habitually resides, either 
at the time of execution of the will or at the time of 
the testator’s death, applicable laws.
84. See, Revue Critique de droit international prive,
Vol. 58, (No. l) 1989, p.169. ^
85. The Act, however came into effect in England on January 1, 
1964.
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as part, of its own rules of private international law
on the subject. Thus, according to Gambials Law of
England (Application) Law, 1966, it is provided that
,rThe Wills Act, 1963, shall apply to the Gambia 
and shall be deemed to have had effect therein 
from the 1st day of January 1964*
Similar rules are being recommended for adoption in Kenya, 
by the Country*s Commission, on the Lav/ of Succession, 
Section 16 of the Commissions Draft Bill on Law of 
Succession contains a slightly modified.version of the 
English r u l e s , I t  is reliably learnt that this Bill 
will soon become law.
Since the rules of the Hague Convention re­
lating to the formal validity of wills is the child of 
the United Kingdom, nurtured into existence with the 
assistance of such a country like Prance, it is almost.
certain that majiy more legal systems in the common lav/ 
and the French law countries of Africa will soon adopt
o o
these rules in one form or the other. The Nigerian
states should bring their lav/s on formal validity of 
wills into line with the convention and hence join in 
the unification of systems of private international law 
on this subject. Furthermore, such measure will arrest; 
the chaos obtaining at the inter-state sphere as a result.
86. s, 20, Cap. 104, Laws of The Gambia (1966 ed.)
87. See Report of the Kenya Commission on the Law of 
Succession, (Nairobi: Govt. Prihter, 1968), Para.91-93,
88. Indeed, such country like Egypt has long shown a 
certain degree of liberalism as regards the choice 
of law rules for determining the formal validity 
of wills*Art. 17 of the Egyptian Civil Code 1949, 
provides that "The form of a will is governed by 
the national law of the testator at the time, the 
will is made, or by the law of the country in which 
the will is made".
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of lack of any national policy on this topic.
ii. Por Other Matters of Succession.
It has been pointed out in the early part of 
this chapter that there is dualism of laws within each 
state of Nigeria, that .questions of interlocal conflicts 
under the system of customary law often cut across.the 
territorial frontiers of the sister-states, and that the 
choice of lav/ rule provided by statutes, or enunciated by 
Judges, for resolving problems of interlocal conflicts 
is based on the unity of succession in so far as the-rule 
is that of succession according to the personal law of 
the deceased, whatever the nature of his property and 
regardless of the multi-locations of such assets at the 
time of his death. This is in sharp contrast to the 
position under the general (territorial) law under which 
the scission principle prescribed by the common law for 
inter-state, and international conflicts results in the 
estate of the deceased being split into two categories 
of movables and immovables; succession to the first 
part being governed by the personal law of the deceased,
i.e. his lex domicilii, at the time of his death, while 
devolution on death of the other part is regulated 
exclusively by the lex situs.
Obviously, the co-existence of these two prin­
ciples which are diametrically opposed to each other cannot, 
work harmoniously in regulating succession to the estate of 
deceased persons, not to mention the complications that 
would be introduced when, as the Federal Supreme Court
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89case of Lawal v. Younan and section 4-9 (5) (Id) of
the Western Nigeria, -Administration of Estates Law*^
have shown, "both the general lav/ and the customary law
cumu-late to determine rights of succession to different
portions of the deceased estate* The difficulty, of an
attempt to blend these two principles together can be
seen in the first of the following two cases, while
the second reveals, in a glaring manner, the irrelevance
of the scission principle in interstate conflicts*
91In Owe v* Owe, the intestate was survived 
by tv/elve children of his four polygamous marriages,
A thirteenth child, who was a daughter, predeceased him 
and her share was claimed by her three children. The. 
estate comprised of three houses and three pieces of 
land. Two houses were in what was then the Federal 
Territory of Lagos (now the Lagos state), while the 
rest of the properties were located in the former Western 
Region, of N i g e r i a . I t  appeared that the deceased and 
all the beneficiaries were domiciled in Lagos, a. territory
89. [l96l] All N.L.R. 245
90. Gap. 1, Laws of Western Nigeria (1959 ed.)
91. (1966) Unreported decision of the High Court of 
Lagos, Suit No. Ld/13/66 of 5/9/66.
92. An interesting point about the case is that if the. 
proceedings had been commenced after 26th May,1967 
(the twelve states structure came into operation, on 
27th May, 196.7) all the immovable properties v/ould 
have been situated in the same jurisdiction i.e. the 
Lagos State, since all that part of Western Nigeria 
where a house and three pieces of land were situated 
has now been merged with the former Federal Territory 
of Lagos and called the Lagos State.
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of which they were natives. The dispate merely concerned 
the mechanics of distribution, i.e. the respective shares 
of the fifteen beneficiaries. There was no dispute as 
to the applicable law which the parties assumed was the 
Lagos customary law. Indeed, the per capita (Ori o j*ori) 
system of distribution, which was sanctioned as a fair 
system of distribution by the Privy Council in Dav/odu v. 
Lanmole, had been decided upon. And this was the 
system employed by the judge to declare the respective 
shares of the beneficiaries.
It will be remembered that for inter-local con­
flicts, the applicable lav/ for determing who succeeds to 
the estate of a deceased person is his personal law.
This customary choice of lav/ rule, which the Lagos High 
is enjoined to apply,^makes it unnecessary for emphasis 
to be placed on the jurisdictional factor, i.e. which 
court of a state has jurisdiction to determine rights of 
succession to immovable property situated outside the 
state but within Nigeria. But being a common law judge, 
Omalolu J., proceeded by adopting the jurisdictional
rules of the common law as regards foreign immovables
95and found, on prior authority, J that the Lagos High 
Court had "no jurisdiction in making an order of dis­
tribution regarding the immovable property in Western 
Nigeria 11. This statement notwithstanding, he went on 
to deliver the following judgment:
93. /19627 All H.L.R. 702; [1962] 1 V/.l.R. lo53.
94. High Court of Lagos Act, Cap. 80, laws of the 
federation of Nigeria (1958 ed^) s. 27.
95. e.g. British Bata Shoe Co. v. Melikian (1965) 1 P.S.C. 
.100; Lanleyin v. Rufai (1959) 4 P.S.C. 184* These 
cases were, however, not cited to the judge.
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"The order of the court shall be as follows:......
With regard to the properties situated outside the 
jurisdiction of this court, that is, 194 Ikorodu Road, 
tlLe two Farmlands...and the Building plot at Ijoko 
[Western Nigeria] , it is hereby, declared that the 
plaintiff and the defendants [_aILl the beneficiaries] 
are entitled to them in equal proportions, that is. 
l/l3th portion each".
In arriving at this conclusion, the learned judge applied
the common law exception to the lex situs rule which was
approved by the Federal Supreme Court in Re Ogunro*s 
96Estate. This is to the effect that; where the court
has jurisdiction to administer an estate and the property
includes immovables situated abroad, the court has
jurisdiction to determine questions of title to the foreign
97immovables for the purpose of administration. This
exception the judge was justified in applying since the
plaintiff*s action included a claim that an account should
be rendered by some of the other beneficiaries who were
the personal representatives of the deceased.
But it must be emphasised that the exception
relates only to jurisdiction. It does not, as the
Federal Supreme Court clearly recognised, authorise the
local court to employ the lex fori, as opposed to.ihe lex
situs, in determining who is entitled to succeed to the
foreign immovable or in what proportions the beneficiaries 
98should take. However, there is no indication in the 
whole of the judgment that the learned judge ever bothered 
to ascertain what the law of succession in the Western
96. (1960) 5 F.S.C. 137.
97. ibid at p. 139.
98. Nelson v. Bridport (1846) 8 Beav. 547; See also Dicey 
and Morris, op. cit.t 8th ed. p. 526.
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Nigerian situs of the properties was, so as to discover 
whether it was the same as the Lagos customary law on the 
system of per capita distribution. The impression con­
veyed is that once the judge had overcome the problem of 
jurisdiction, he saw no necessity for applying any other 
law than the Lagos customary law. But it is uncertain 
whether the law applied as the personal law of the deceased 
or as the lex fori.
The ascertainment of the principle applied did
QQ
not present such difficulties in linusa v. Adesubokan.
Only the result of the application of the scission principle 
was deplorable. The testator was a Moslem and was also 
a member of an ethnic ocommunity in the Kwara state. At 
an early age, he was taken to Lagos by his parents but he 
subsequently moved to Zaria, in the North-Central state, 
where he lived until the time of his death. By his will,^ * 
he devised each of his two houses situated in the North - 
Central state to each of his two younger sons. The third 
house situated in the Western state, together with all his 
residuary movable property, were also given to the two 
sons in equal shares. The eldest son was cut off, not 
with the proverbial farthing, but with five pounds *
According to Moslem law, a testator must give equality 
of treatment to his children in his will, unless a child 
is not a Moslem, or he forfeits his compulsory share by 
killing the testator with a view to inheriting his properties,
99. Unreported decision of the North-Central State High 
Court, No. Z23/67 of 30/10/68.
1. Which complied with the English TWills Act, 1837. This Act 
was a statute of general application in England on 1st 
January 1900 and therefore applies to the Northern states, 
by virtue of s. 28 of the Northern Nigeria, High Court Law.
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or consents to his compulsory share being disposed away* 
Probate of the will having previously been granted, the 
crux, of the case was whether the testator could validly 
give more shares to the two younger sons to the detriment 
of the eldest. This in turn raised the question, what 
law determines the essential validity of the will. It 
was found that all the three sons of the deceased were 
Moslems and that the eldest son had not consented to being 
discriminated against.
As regards the will of movable properties of 
the deceased, it was held that the essential validity 
of a /will of movables is governed by the law of domicile 
of the deceased at the time of his death, and that the 
term "essential validity” embraces the question as to 
whether or not the testator was bound to leave certain 
shares, and in what proportion, to his children. The 
court also held that the deceased vzas domiciled in the 
former Northern Region of Nigeria at the time of his death 
in August, 1965 and that his personal law, according to 
his lex domicilii, was the I Moslem law of the Maliki 
school as it obtained in his ethnic community. Therefore, 
the rule of Moslem law which forbids discrimination among 
Moslem children of the testator invalidated the will since 
the shares of the three sons were not equal.
As regards the immovable properties of the 
deceased situated in Northern Nigeria and which the test­
ator devised by the same will, the learned judge held that 
the essential validity of wills of immovables is governed 
by the law of the situs, and that the lex situs (terri­
torially speaking) meant section 50 of the Northern 
Nigeria, Land Tenure law. According to this section,
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succession to a. Northern Nigerian land, owned by a deceased 
who was a member of a tribe indigenous to that legal 
territory, is governed by the customary law existing in 
the locality in which the land is situated. The deceased 
was such a native and the two houses were situated in Zaria. 
Therefore, the Moslem law of the Kaiiki sect prevailing 
in Zaria governed succession to the immovable properties*
As we have indicated above, this lav/ demanded equality o£ 
treatment of the three sons of the deceased. Therefore, 
the testator1s will was intrinsically bad since it dis­
criminated against the eldest son*
No mention was maderaf the validity of the same, 
will in relation to the house situated in Western Nigeria.
In his own words, the judge was only concerned with "the 
bequest of the two houses situated in Zarian. Obviously, 
this was because of the common rlaw rule that the Northern 
Nigerian court has no jurisdiction over land situated outr-
side the territorial limits of Northern Nigeria. The
2
exception established in Re Ogunro’s Dstate did not 
apply since there was no question of administration of 
estate involved. The effect of the judgment was that the. 
deceased beneficiaries must commence fresh proceedings 
in the court of Western Nigeria in order to determine 
whether or not the testator’s will was valid in relation 
to the immovable property situated in that state. It is 
needless to say that by such multiple proceedings in the 
different states, a substantial part of the testator’s 
estate would go, not even to the two sons he contemplated 
in his will, but by way of litigation costs.
2. (I960) 5 P.S.C. 137.
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But had Bello J., not chosen to accept the
jurisdictional limitation of the scission principle,
the following consequences would have followed. He
would have assumed jurisdiction to adjudicate on the
succession suit on basis of presence of ..the disputants
within Northern Nigeria, which was the obvious forum
convenient on the ground that it also constituted the
jurisdiction in which the deceased died domiciled and
where the majority of his assets were located. He would
have adopted the choice of law approach laid down in 
3
Tapa v. Kuka and decided the question of succession to 
the deceased estate, both movable and immovable, situated 
anywhere in Nigeria, according to the personal law of the 
deceased at the time of his death, i.e. the Moslem law 
of the Maliki school as found. He would have been happy 
to note that the same personal law would have been applied, 
whether by a Customary Court or the High Court, in Western 
Nigeria by virtue of section 2o (2) of the Customary Courts 
Law.^ And finally, effect would have been given in Western 
Nigeria to any order of distribution made by the Northern 
Nigeria High Court under the provisions of the Sheriffs
5
and Civil Process Act.
There is no douht that there must be a parting 
of the ways between the scission principle of the common 
lav/ and the unitary system of succession favoured by 
customary law. The determination of which one should be
3. (1945) 18 N.L.R. 5
4. Cap. 31, Laws of Western Nigeria (1959). Section 12 (4) 
of the Western Nigeria, High Court Law, Cap. 44, provides 
that the High Court of that state must apply s.20 of the 
state1s Customary Courts Law in cases of inter-local 
conflicts betv/een systems of customary law.
5. Cap. 189 (Bed., 1958 ed.), ss. 104-112
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jettisoned as a mere conceptual approach raises the question
of the relative advantages of the two principles* As
the ahove cases have shown, and as many writers on corn­
er
parative private international law have agreed, the
defects, if any, of the unitary system of succession is
negligible when compared with the complexities of ...the
split system. As aptly put by Wolff.^
nlhe advantage of the unitary rule is its greater 
simplicity. When the deceased leaves several 
immovables in different countries, these together 
with his movable property form a single mass, all 
parts of which are treated alike11*
In other words, this principle pre-supposes that those
who are entitled to succeed to the totality of the estate
of the deceased are uniformly determined in accordance with
one single territorial system of law. Adjustment of the
beneficial shares, according to the doctrines of election,
8
ademption, hotch-potch or "fard", is easier to operate 
whenever it falls to be considered. A will is either 
valid intrinsically, or essentially void, according to 
the deceased personfs personal law.
On the other hand, the scission rule, as we 
have frequently stated, operates on the basis that the 
estate of the deceased is split into two categories of 
movables and immovables, the rights of succession to the 
first part being determined by the personal law; while
6* See e.g. Baxter, op. cit.,p. 48; Rabel, op. cit., Vol. 4, 
pp. 270-273 Wolff, op. cit., 2nd ed. pp. 568-569;
0.0. SommeVich "Conflict of Laws with Regard to Boreigfa 
Decedent Instates” p.lb, The Hague Rijhoff, 1930; 3rd 
International Conference of the legal Profession Inter­
national Bar Assoc., London, July 1950.
°P» cifr** 2nd ed. pp. 568-569.
8. i.e. the specific shares allocated by Moslem law to the 
deceased heirs.
the latter, category is further dismembered into different 
portions according to their location. The lex situs of 
of each portion decides who is entitled to succeed, and in 
what proportion. Hence the court of a country or other 
legal territory may be forced by the split system to 
uphold the essential validity of the testator1s will as 
regards his immovables within the forum, while ruling the 
same will invalid, as regards its essentials, in respect, 
of movable property located in the same jurisdiction. If 
becomes clear, therefore, that to describe the scission 
principle as more difficult cumbrous and wasteful, is 
an under-statement.
With these obvious disadvantages, it might 
be asked why most countries in the common law world still 
operate the scission principle. The answer lies in 
the "theory of territoriality" or the "doctrine of comity", 
which, in turn has given rise to the principle of effec­
tiveness. The gist of this formidable sounding doctrine, 
as summarily put by Professor Graveson, is the "recognition 
of rthe right of every state to exclusive control in all 
matters affecting land within his own territorial boundaries". 
Therefore, the principle of effectiveness operates on the j 
basis that any judgment affecting foreign land must, 
ultimately be enforced by execution in the country where, 
the land is located, and the enforcement of such judgment 
depends on the benevolence of the lex situs. Consequently 
any determination made by the personal law of the deceased 
as to who is entitled to succeed to a foreign immovable
3
is a brutum fuimen in so far as is at variance with the 
lex situs.
9. G-raveson, op. cit.,6th ed. p. 138. See also, Dicey and 
Morris, op ..cit .mh ed. p. 520; Wolff, op, cit. 2nd ed. 
p. 569* ------
There is some force in this argument. But 
whatever the position might be in the international sphere, 
different considerations arise with the inter-state ref­
lations in Nigeria. The theory of territoriality and 
the principle of effectiveness do not strictly apply be­
tween the Nigerian states as a result of constitutional 
arrangements. As we have shown fully in Chapter one^Sf 
this work, the Federal Government has by a law enacted 
under the Constitution, provided for the inter-state 
enforcement of the processes, judgments, decrees, orders 
and decisions of the Federal Supreme Court, or those of 
the High or Magistrate!s court of a state, in any part of 
Nigeria. We have also shown that the statutory backing 
given to the enabling provisions of the Constitution do 
not fully implement the powers conferred by the Constitution, 
in that the processes, judgments, etc, of customary courts 
do not enjoy inter-state recognition under the Federal Act. 
Hence our suggestion that both the enabling provision of 
the Constitution and the Federal statute which implemented 
it, should be amended so as to make inter-state enforcement; 
of judgments not only more effective, but also make their 
non-enforcement by any state court a breach of the Federal 
Constitution. But even in its present unsatisfactory 
form, the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act allows the 
judgment or order of a state High Court in Nigeria, re­
lating to descent of land or other immovable property 
situated in another Nigerian state, to be enforced by way 
of registration at the situs of such property or in any 
other sister-state. And quite apart from this federal
10. Supra p • •
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measure, it has also been shown that the Governments of 
the respective states in Nigeria have demonstrated their 
willingness to allow unitary succession to a physically 
scattered immovable estate in accordance with the personal 
law of the deceased, in so far as descent under customary 
law is concerned. And that the power of the lex situs 
in matters of succession is limited to one of mere de­
termination of who may occupy the land, but excluding 
power "to deprive any person of any beneficial interest
in such land or in the proceeds of sale thereof, to
which he may be entitled under rules of inheritance of 
any other customary law".’*'*'
If the purpose for which the scission rule
exists is to provide for a just determination of the 
rights of succession where immovable properties of the 
deceased are subject to the competing rules of two countries, 
then it is submitted that there is no competition between 
the legal units in Nigeria. What we have is "false 
conflicts" of territorial laws, i.e. the uniform deter­
mination by different legal territories of the same legal 
relation. And if we accept the proposition that each
sovereignty adjusts its rules of conflicts "to suit its
12particular domestic climate”, it is further submitted 
that the scission principle of succession should be dis­
carded, at least, for inter-state relations as a matter 
of policy. The acceptance of this suggestion will cure 
the irrational results produced by the split system of 
succession in the two cases discussed above. Such su 
solution will also give meaning to the fact that the
11. Supra, pp. 647-643.  ^ ■
12. Rabel, "An Interim Account on Comparative Conflict Laws",
46 Mich. L.R. 625 at p. 627*
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Federation, of Nigeria is a single national entity merely 
with multiple systems Of territorial law*
After operating the scission principle of 
succession for several years, a conclusion that it is 
inconvenient and that it has no logical foundation to 
exclusive control for inter-state conflicts in a feder­
ation is the conclusion now reached by the American.
13Restatement on the Conflict of Laws.  ^ So by adopting 
such a solution, Nigeria will only be following the 
examples of some systems of law in Africa and else­
where ^  where the existence of multiplicity or dualism 
of systems of law seems to have led to the adoption of
n ^
13. Proposed Official Draft, Part III,As. 236, Comment a,p.58 
where it is stated:
"The state of the situs has an obvious interest in having 
interest in local land decided upon intestacy in a. manner 
that complies with its own notions of what is reasonable 
and just. This point, however, should not be over­
emphasized. There may in the given case be other states 
which have an even greater interest in this question, as 
would probably be true of a state where the decedent and 
all his heirs were domiciled. Also undoubtedly all 
States of the United States provide for a method of 
distribution upon intestacy that is reasonable and just, 
and the differences between the laws of the several 
states as to the manner of division may be said to lie 
more in the area of detail than of principle. Hence 
it is unlikely that any policy of the state of the situs 
would be seriously infringed if interests in local land 
were to be decided in accordancewith the local law 
of another state*n
14. e.g. the Federation of Malaya: See, Ong Cheng Neo v.
Yap Kwan Seng (1897), Digest of Reported Cases,
Federated Malay States, (1897 to 1925) 47. A similar 
rule is also contained in s. 12 (4) and (7) of the 
Small Estates (Distribution) Ord., No. 34 of 1955,
of the Malay Federation; Egypt: Art. 17 of the
Egyptian Civil Code provides that "inheritance, will 
and other dispositions taking effect after death are. 
governed by the national law of the de cujus, the 
testator or the person disposing of property at death"; 
Ghana: The Application of the unitary principle of
succession led Michelin C.J. into holding in Wilson v. 
Wilson (1925) Div. Ct. (1921-25) Rep. 155, that the 
Nigerian lex domicilii of an intestate governed succession 
to both his movable and immovable property situated in 
Ghana•
■the unitary principle of succession. For instance, it
has been held as early as 1897 in Ong Cheng Neo v. Yap 
15Kwan Seng that "succession to an intestate.*s estate, 
both movables and immovables, in the Federated.Malay 
States, is determined by the lex domicilii, provided it* 
is not contrary to public policy*”
On the other hand, it must be realised that the 
concept of unitary succession according to the personal 
law of the deceased at the time of his death, is a noble 
idea yet to be attained at the international scene. For 
instqp.ce, on the basis that the following countries 
operate the unitary principle of succession, it may be 
conjectured that Congo Kinshasa, Egypt, Ghana or the 
Sudan may not object to the laws of a Nigerian state 
governing ...matters of succession to the immovable property 
situated in such country. But it is equally true that 
English law may not permit a Nigerian state domiciliary 
to create by his will a family property (which is wholly 
inalienable in the absence of a dispute between the 
beneficiaries) of a house situated in England, in 
accordance with his personal law at the time of his death. 
Neither is it conceivable that Article 590 of the 
Ethiopian Civil Code^ will allow a Nigerian beneficiary, 
under the will of a testator who died domiciled in a 
Nigeria state, to inherit the testator*s land situated in 
Ethiopia without an "Imperial Order". To designate the 
personal law of the deceased as the applicable law under
15. ibid.
16. Civil Code of The Empire of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 
of i960. Art. 590 provides that "No foreigner may own 
immovable property situate in Ethiopia except in 
accordance with an Imperial Order."
such circumstances is to provide for the creation of 
nominal rights which are virtually unenforceanle.
Therefore to take account of the dissimilar positions 
at the inter-state and international spheres, it may be. 
suggested that the choice of law rule in matters of 
succession at the inter-state level be distinguished 
from the international rule and stated as follows:
(a) Interstate Rule
Succession to the estate of a deceased person, 
whether movable or ^immovable, and whether held 
under the general lav; or the customary law, shall 
be governed by the law of .the state in which he. 
was domiciled at the time of his death*
(b) International Rule
Succession to the estate of a deceased person, 
whether movable or immovable, shall be governed 
by the lav/ of the country in which he was 
domiciled at the time of his death: Provided
that if the conflicts rule of the country in 
which his immovable property was situated at 
the time of his death provides for succession 
according to the local law, such lav; of location 
shall be applied. 17
17. In stating these rules, account has not been taken 
of the doctdine of Renvoi which is beyond the scope, 
of this work.
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POSTSCRIPT
Since the completion of this work, the Nigerian 
Federal Military Government has promulgated the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree 1970.^ The Decree, a copy of which is made
2Appendix 5 of this work, came into force on 17th March 1970,
s
three days before its publication. There was no advance 
warning of the Nigerian public of its promulgation and hence 
no opportunity was provided for a comment to be made on its 
draft provisions before they were decreed into law.
The Decree marks the first general legislation by 
any Nigerian Government in the field of divorce and other 
matrimonial causes relating to monogamous marriages. For 
almost a century, i.e. 1876 to 1970, successive Governments 
in Nigeria had refused to enact a local law on divorce and 
other matrimonial causes relating to monogamous marriages,. 
Rather, they had all compelled the Nigerian Supreme or the 
High Courts to apply, from time to time, the current matrimonial 
causes law in force in England. If solely for the fact that 
the 1970 Decree unties, albeit belatedly, the Nigerian law from 
the apron strings of the English matrimonial law, it constitutes 
a remarkable achievement in itself.
The Decree applies throughout the federation, but
5
only in respect of monogamous marriages. While it deals
1. No. 18 of 1970.
2. See the Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970 (Appointed Day)
Order 1970, L.N.26 of 1970 which accompanied the Decree 
as published.
3. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Official Gazette No. 15, Vol.57 
of 20/3/70.
1+. Matrimonial Causes Decree, s. 116 (1).
5. Ibid.. s. 11*+ (6).
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mainly with the substantive law of divorce and other matri­
monial causes, several of its provisions are important from 
the point of view of private international law or conflict of 
laws. Since the Decree effects a fundamental change in some 
English common law, and English statutory rules of private 
international law hitherto applicable in Nigeria, this 
Postscript attempts to show in summary form, how the new 
Decree has affected certain aspects of this work.
1. AREA OF DOMICILE
The Decree deals with the problem discussed in 
Chapter Two as regards area of domicile in the Nigerian 
federation in two ways. First, it recognises, as has been 
stated in the first part of the chapter, that the law in 
force in Nigeria on 16th March 1970 made it clear that 
domicile for all purposes, including the basis of jurisdiction
in matrimonial causes, was necessarily located in a state of
£
Nigeria, as distinct from the federation as a whole.
However, the Decree stipulates, as from 17th March 1970, that
the High Court of a State in Nigeria has jurisdiction to
dissolve a monogamous marriage and entertain proceedings in
other matrimonial causes relating to such a marriage, when
such a proceeding is instituted "by a person domiciled in 
7Nigeria*'. The term "domiciled in Nigeria" is explained by
section 2(3) of the Decree thus:
"a person domiciled in any State of the Federation 
is domiciled in Nigeria for the purposes of this 
Decree and may institute proceedings under this 
Decree in the High Court of any State whether or not 
he is domiciled in that particular State".
6, See Chapter Two, p. 102 et seq..
7. Ibid., s. 2(2) read with s. 1(1).
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Domicile for the purpose of the Decree is not
defined. Therefore it must be ascertained according to the
principles of common law, i.e. by actual residence in a
Nigerian State coupled with “the intention of remaining
8
there permanently1*. Only after a State domicile has been 
acquired in the manner described can it ripen into a Nigerian 
domicile under the Decree so as to enable the High Court 
of a Stqte, other than that of domicile, to assume juris­
diction in respect of a petition represented by a person 
domiciled in another Nigerian State.
True to the common law conflict methodology, 
section 8 of the Decree provides that once jurisdiction has 
been assumed by the High Court of a State on basis of the 
“Nigerian domicile** of the parties, the provision of the 
Decree should be applied. Thus by this section, a complete 
harmony is achieved between choice of jurisdiction and choice 
of the applicable law in matrimonial causes relating to 
monogamous marriages. But in so far as all the High Courts 
of the Nigerian States appear to have ordinary jurisdiction
over non-Nigerian persons who are polygamously married as 
9
well, and since customary divorce laws are not uniform 
throughout the federation, a Nigerian domicile will be impossible 
to operate as a jurisdictional rule in matrimonial causes 
relating to polygamous marriages. Indeed, the Federal 
Matrimonial Causes Decree expressly excludes such marriages 
from the ambit of its provisions, as has been pointed out 
above. The net result is that the High Court of a State 
will have to apply different jurisdictional rule according
8 . Udom v. Udom (i960) L.L.B. 112 at p. 118.
9. See Chapter Four, p. 273.
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to whether the person instituting divorce or other matri­
monial proceeding is monogamously or polygamously married.
It is with a view to avoiding this sort of inconvenience that 
we have suggested above10 that dualism of divorce laws in 
Nigeria should not mean dualism of jurisdictional rules and 
that the High Qourt of any State in Nigeria should be 
required to assume jurisdiction over a monogamous or poly­
gamous marriage of a tligerian State domicilary on basis of 
residence, but that such court, if it is not the court of 
domicile of such person, should apply the law of domicile of 
such person in Nigeria.
A final point under this head which appears to make 
section 2(2) of the Decree a retrograde provision is that 
it dispenses, contrary to the common law rules of private 
international law and similar rules which have been embodied 
into statutory provisions in other countries, 11 with 
residence as basis of jurisdiction in proceedings for nullity 
of void or voidable marriages, judicial separation, 
restitution of conjugal rights and jactitation of marriage. 
The abrogation of the residential basis of jurisdiction for 
nullity of a voidable marriage might be justifiable on the 
ground that a nullity decree affects the status of parties to 
such a marriage. But to enjoin the Nigerian courts to 
insist on domiciliary jurisdiction to declare invalid a 
marriage which was celebrated in Nigeria, albeit by persons 
domiciled outside Nigeria, in contravention of the provisions
10. See Chapter Four, p. 329 et seq.
11. See e.g. ss. 6(a) and 9 of the New Zealand, Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act, No. 71 of 1963; s. 23(5) of the 
Australia, Matrimonial Causes Act, No. 10^ of 1959*
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of section 3(1) of the Decree, i.e. for lack of proper rites,
becomes difficult to justify: more so when such a nullity
decree granted on the jurisdictional base of residence will
be recognised in almost all foreign countries. Again, what-
12ever might be the position as regards judicial separation, 
a decree of restitution of conjugal rights, or jactitation 
of marriage, certainly does not change the status of the 
parties to the marriage. Why domicile, as opposed to resi­
dence, should be made the sole jurisdictional base for such 
decree cannot be satisfactorily explained. The ridiculous 
aspect of the point is that the Decree makes residence the
13
basis of recognition of such decrees granted outside Nigeria]
2- SEPARATE DOMICILE OF THE WIFE AS BASIS OF MATRIMONIAL 
CAUSES JURISDICTION.
Another ‘'change11 in the common law rule introduced 
by section 7 of the Decree concerns the domicile of a married 
woman. The section provides that a deserted wife who was 
domiciled in Nigeria either immediately before her marriage 
or immediately before the desertion, or a wife who has been 
resident in Nigeria for three years prior to the institution 
of a matrimonial proceeding, shall be deemed to be domiciled 
in Nigeria for the purpose of founding the court's jurisdiction 
in the proceeding.
Some observations on this section are necessary.
Some provisions of the Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Decree are 
identically phrased with some provisions of the Australian 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 as to suggest that the Nigerian
12. Graveson, o p.cit.« p. 367 is of the opinion that a decree 
of judicial separation does not change the status of the 
parties to the marriage while Cheshire, op.cit.. 7th ed. 
p.35^ thinks that it might do so in certain situations. /
13. Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970, s.81 (2)(b) and 81 (5)*
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Decree was based on the Australian Act. Section 7 of the 
Nigerian Decree and section 2k of the Australian Act, both 
of which accord a married woman a separate domicile, are such 
identical provisions. In view of the uncertainty already 
caused by the use of the word “desertion” in the Australian
lb,
provision and similar provision elsewhere, one would have
been happy to see the ommission of that word from the section
which gives a wife separate domicile. Without “desertion11
anywhere being defined in the Nigerian Decree, there is the
possibility that arguments will soon arise as to whether the
word as used in section 7 should be construed with “desertion11
as employed in section 15 (2) (d) of the Decree as a ground
for divorce. In other words, it is uncertain whether
desertion as a criterion for attributing a separate domicile
to a wife means mere “abandonment11 by her husband for less
than the statutory period of desertion or is synonymous with
desertion as a ground for divorce. Since it has been shown
that the Nigerian provision is identical with the Australian
provision, it may be expected that a similar meaning placed
on the word “desertion" in the New South Wales Supreme
15
Court’s decision in Buckner v. Buckner will be adopted 
in Nigeria.
“Residence" as used in the section is also not 
defined, even though “ordinary residence" is, happily, 
omitted. Hence the quality of the presence necessary to 
establish the separate domicile of wife for purpose of 
jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings is not known. What
l^ f. See Chapter Four, p. 298 and n.,65 see also, the
English case of Navas v. Navas /19&2/ 3 W.L.R. **37*
15* ^1962^1F.L.R. k6Q. The case was fully discussed on p. 299
of Chapter Four.
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is known is that by reading section 2(3) of the Decree with
section 7> an uninterrupted presence of a wife in a state
for three years will suffice as a criterion of a State
domicile which automatically, on completion of the three
years1 residence, ripens into a Nigerian domicile. But it
is uncertain whether residence in several States of Nigeria
for a total period of three years entitles a wife to petition
on basis of her separate domicile. Neither is it clear
whether a temporary absence abroad e,g, on holidays, for
few months will be fatal to the acquisition of a Nigerian
l6
domicile by such wife, or whether absences for long periods,
e,g. on business trips, will be considered immaterial so long
as she is able to prove that she has throughout the period
17
a continuing contact with Nigeria, These questions become 
relevant in view of the fact that the Lagos State High Court
18had already held in Onwuka v, Tavmani that the word 
“resident11 and cognate expressions admit of a variety of 
meanings depending on the intent and scope of the particular 
enactment, and that it must be construed as “ordinary 
residence’1 in the particular circumstances of the textthe 
court was interpreting. If residence is to be strictly 
contrued, it seems that there is no Justification for requiring 
a wife to stay in Nigeria for three years before she can 
start matrimonial proceedings when she has evinced a clear 
intention to settle animo manendi after a brief period*
Connected with the above point is the failure of 
the Decree, like the Australian Act, to allow a wife who is
16. See Hopkins v. Hopkins £1951/ P.116.
17. See Stransky v. St ran sky £195it/ P.^28.
18. (1965) L.L.R. 62 at p. 75*
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voluntarily or judicially separated from her husband to 
enjoy the benefit of a separate domicile at any time in 
Nigeria, except after three years residence. The absurd 
effect of section 7 of the Decree may be illustrated by 
contrasting the following two hypothetical cases with the
>
last one.
1. A Nigerian woman was domiciled in a Nigerian State 
before her marriage to a man who was domiciled 
outside Nigeria. Both were resident in Nigeria 
after the marriage. (It is well recognised that 
the woman under such circumstances acquires the 
foreign domicile of her husband). If she was 
deserted, in the sense of being abandoned, by her 
husband who has now settled in his foreign country, 
the High Court of any Nigerian State has juris­
diction to dissolve the marriage on the basis of 
the Nigerian ante-nuptial domicile of the wife.
The fact that she petitioned only three weeks 
after the husband’s desertion, on the ground of 
his adultery with another woman in Nigeria, will 
be considered immaterial.
2. The facts are the same as above except that the 
parties went immediately after their marriage to 
reside in the foreign country in which the husband 
was domiciled. There the wife was abandoned, 18 
months later, by her husband who has now acquired
a new domicile in another country. The wife could
come back to Nigeria and start proceedings at once
in any of the Nigerian States on the basis of her
19ante-nuptial domicile in Nigeria.
19, Cf, Buckner v. Buckner ^1962^1 F.L.P.. *t68.
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3* Mrs. W. was born in Ghana by a Nigerian father who 
was married to a Ghanaian woman. Both parents were 
domiciled in Ghana at the time of W.r s birth, she 
therefore having a Ghanaian domicile of origin.
W. married a Ghanaian domiciliary. Later she 
obtained a decree of judicial separation from her 
husband in a Ghanaian court on the ground of her 
husband’s cruelty. Her mother is now dead and her 
father has returned to Western Nigeria. W. joined 
him there and began proceedings 12 months after 
leaving Ghana. Under the Decree, neither the 
Western Nigerian High Court nor any State High 
Court in Nigeria could entertain her divorce petition, 
even though it is clear that she has evinced an 
intention to stay in Nigeria permanently. The fact 
that, by definition, she is a Nigerian, or that she 
has resolutely forsaken Ghana must not be considered.
If she could not wait patiently for another 2b months 
to complete her three years residential qualification 
of a “deemed” domicile, she must go back to Ghana 
to obtain her divorce.
Similarly, the wife of a deportee from Nigeria, who 
does not have a Nigerian ante-nuptial domicile, cannot now, 
as before, petition for a matrimonial relief on the basis of 
the last common domicile of the spouses in Nigeria immediately 
before the husband’s deportation. The fact that she had made 
up her mind not to leave Nigeria after 1? months’ residente, e.g. 
because she is expecting a baby for a person domiciled in 
Nigeria and seeks the dissolution of her marriage so that she 
may marry him, will be of no moment to the courts. Indeed, 
it is still uncertain whether the period of residence stipulated
71k
by the section must have been lived qua wife, or whether
20
a period of residence as a feme sole should be included.
Happily enough, the Decree uses the opportunity of
its promulgation to dispense with the artifical restriction
placed on the husband who is not domiciled in Nigeria to
21
cross-petition in a proceeding instituted by his wife.
But the above defects of the Decree are too serious
for a law which comes into existence over ten years after
its model, the Australian Matrimonial Act 1959, has taken
effect. The provisions of the Australian Act has had the
22benefit of critical comments by many jurists in the common
23law world. A whole book has been written by two distinguished
jurists on the provisions of the Act on conflict of laws. A
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of
2kCommons in Canada has had the priviledge of twenty-four
sittings to consider, among others, the provisions of the
Australian Act on conflict of laws with the assistance of three
distinguished Canadian Professors of law, who are experts on
25private international law. J As a result of these juristic 
and Parliamentary analysis of section 2k of the Australian
20. But see, e.g. the English case of Navas v. Navas £L9&2/
3 W.L.R. 1+37.
21. This follows from the definition of "petition11 as including 
cross-petition by section im(l)(e) of the Decree.
22. e.g. Cowen and Mendes da Costa, o p.cit.; and Lucke H.K. 
and Kelly, D.L. Recognition of Foreign Divorces; The 
Time Factor in 3 Adelaide L.R. (1968) 178.
23. Cowen and Mendes da Costa, Matrimonial Causes Jurisdiction 
(I96I), esp. Chap. 3.
2k, See Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate 
and House of Commons on Divorce, Nos. 1 - 2*+. For being 
able to read these proceedings, we are grateful to the 
Library Staff of the Canadian Embassy in London
25. viz. Professor Gordon Bale, Queen’s Univ., Kingston, Ontario; 
Professor Stephen Skelly, University of Manitoba; and 
Professor Payne; in Proceedings Nos. 18, 21 and 22 
respectively.
715
Matrimonial Causes Act, of which section 7 of the Nigerian
Decree is a carbon copy, it has been discovered that the
section of the Australian Act do not cover, like section *+0
of the English Matrimonial Causes Act 1965 which the Nigerian
Decree now rejects, the variety of circumstances under which
spouses might be living in different countries as a result of
a broken home. Consequently, a simple way of avoiding the
defects of the Australian Act (and also the Nigerian Decree)
was found in section 3(1) of the New Zealand Matrimonial
Proceedings Act 1963 . It provides that for the purpose of
establishing the jurisdiction of a court to grant a divorce
or other matrimonial decree,
"the domicile of a married woman shall be determined 
as if she were unmarried and, if she is a minor, 
as if she had attained her majority."
The New Zealand expedient has been followed in
27
Canada because, in the words of the Special Joint Committee,
28it represents an "extremely simple solution to this problem"
29A similar measure is actively being considered in Kenya.
In short, if the Federal Government in Nigeria had wanted to 
give opportunity to persons outside the orbit of promulgation 
of Decrees to comment, as in other countries, on the draft 
provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Decree, perhaps the 
attention of the draftsmen of the Decree would have been 
directed to the more rational provisions of the Canadian Federa­
tion as regards how an independent domicile could be given to 
a wife, in a federation, for purposes of jurisdiction in
26. No. 71 of 1963.
27* Divorce Act 1968$ S. 6 (t)
28. Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and 
House of Commons on DIVORCE (Canada), Ottawa: Queen’s 
Printer, 19&7* P*G3.
29. See s. 8 (*+), Draft Bill on Law of Domicil , Appendix V, 
Report of the Commission on Marriage and Divorce.
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matrimonial causes.
The net result is that while the Decree left the 
jurisdictional rules in relation to the dissolution and 
annulment of polygamous marriages to the enlightened self- 
interest of individual States of the federation, it provides 
a national solution for half the problem of inter-state 
conflict by making a Nigerian domicile the basis of the 
courts1 jurisdiction in matrimonial causes relating to mono­
gamous marriages. In between, the Decree sandwiched, at the 
international sphere, a separate basis of jurisdiction in 
favour of a deserted wife who was domiciled in Nigeria 
immediately before her marriage or immediately after she was 
abandoned by her husband. In all other cases where a wife 
is living apart from her husband, she is still left helpless 
until after the expiration of three years’ residence - a 
humiliating disability to which her husband is not subject.
In view of the shortcomings of the Decree as 
indicated above, it is submitted that its provisions relating 
to the jurisdictional rules of the High Courts of the 
Nigerian States have not been well thought out and that it
30
should be amended on the lines proposed in our Chapters One 
and Four^l.
3. RECOGNITION OF SISTER-STATE AND FOREIGN DECREES.
Section 80 and 81 of the Matrimonial Causes Decree 
deal with the problem of recognition of sister-state and 
foreign decrees granted in matrimonial proceedings. Like the 
provision dealing with the wife’s separate domicile, the
30. pp. 136 and 143.
31. Pp. 329 -341.
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sections on recognition of decrees are identically phrased
and set out as sections 9^ a11^  95 of the Australian Matrimonial
Causes Act 1959, dealing with the same matter in Australia.
If properly considered, the Nigerian provisions on recognition
could have benefitted from the foresight of the draftsmen of
the relevant sections of the Australian Act, as the Nigerian
Decree has shared the defects of the Australian provisions on
the wife’s separate domicile as basis of jurisdiction. But
as will be presently shown, the mere pedantic adoption of the
Australian provisions on recognition in the Nigerian Decree
has some repercussion not intended by the draftsmen of the
Nigerian Decree.
Section 80 of the Decree, like section 9^ of the
Australian Act, provides for the recognition in all the
States of Nigeria of decrees granted under the Decree by the
High Court of a State. To cater for a smooth transition
32
from the old to the new law, section 81(1) provides that
any matrimonial decree granted by the High Court of a
Nigerian State before 17th March 1970, or made after that
date in a proceeding which had been instituted before 17th
March but which was completed subsequently, in accordance
with the law in force in Nigeria before 17th March 1970,
should be recognised in all the sister-states. In this
respect, sections 80 and 81 (1) dispense with registration,
33stipulated by the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, as a 
condition under which the decrees of a State’s High Court 
should be recognised in the sister-states. This is a welcome 
change.
32. Compare s. 95(1) of the Australian Act.
33. See Chapter Four, 341 - 345.
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Section 81 of the Nigerian Decree, also following 
section 95 of the Australian Act, not only gives statutory 
force to the English common law rules of recognition in 
existence before 1959 (the date of the enactment of the
3^Australian Act), but attempts to echo, albeit inaccurately,
35a provision of the Australian Act^ by making prospective 
“rules of private international law" on recognition of foreign 
decrees applicable in Nigeria. The significance of the words 
“rules of private international law“ will be explained shortly. 
But first, it is proposed to consider those rules of recognition 
which are certain under the Nigerian Decree.
A foreign decree of dissolution or annulment of a 
monogamous marriage will be recognised in Nigeria ifs
1. it was obtained by either party in accordance with
the law of a country in which the husband was
domiciled at the date of institution of the
proceedings.^ (This is a statutory enactment of
the common law historic rule in Le Mesurier v.
37Le Mesurier.
2. it was obtained, at the instance of a deserted wife,
in accordance with the law of a country in which she
was domiciled immediately after the desertion, or in a
country in which she was domiciled immediately before
her marriage.3^ (This is a statutory enactment of the
39principle in Travers v. Holley.
3 .^ Nigerian Decree, section 81(5)*
35. Australian Act, s. 95(5)-
36. Nigerian Decree, s.81(2)(a); Qompare, Australian Act, 
s1.95 _(2) (a)
37. Z1895/ A.C.517* The rule is discussed fully in Chap.
Four at p. 351 - 352.
38. Nigerian Decree, s. 81(3)(a); Compare, Australian Act, 
s. 95<3)<a).
39* Z^9537 P*2*+6. The rule is discussed fully in Chap. Four
at p. 357.
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3, it was obtained, at the instance of the wife, in 
accordance with the law of a country in which she
has been resident/immediately before the commencement
of the proceeding' and in which she was, as a result,
IfO
deemed to have been domiciled. (This is a
statutory enactment of the rule in Robinson-Scott v. 
klRobinson-Scott ).
I*, though not obtained in accordance with the law of a
country in which the husband was domiciled or in which
the wife was domiciled in the circumstances described
under Rules 2 and 3 above, such decree would be
recognised as valid by the law of the country in
which “the parties were domiciled at the date of the
dissolution*1 of the marriage - in effect, if it would
be recognised by the lex domicilii of the husband at
L.0
the commencement of the suit. (This is also a
statutory enactment of the rule in Armitage v. Att.-Gen.)
5. In the case of annulment of a void marriage only,
if it was obtained in accordance with the law of a
country in which one or both the parties were resident
kk
at the date of the institution of the proceedings.
(This appears to be an attempt to enact the rule in 
Mitford v. Mitford.
In operating the above rules, the courts are enjoined 
to proceed as follows: First, a court in Nigeria may treat
*+(). Nigerian Decree, s.8l(3)(b); Compare, Australian Act,
95(3)(b).
1+1. £L95.27 71. The rule is fully discussed in Chapter Four,
at p.559.
1+2. Nigerian Decree, s. 8l(*+); Compare Australian Act, s.95(*+)* 
*+3» Z199£7 F*135* The rule is fully discussed in Chap.Four p. 352
1*4. Nigerian Decree, s.81(2)(b); Compare Australian Act,
s.
/I9237 P.130; see also, Corbett v. Corbett Z195Z/1 -W.L.R 
h 8 o ; i-ferker v. Me rice r £19^37 P. 283*
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as proved any fact found by the court of a foreign country,
or established before such a court, for the purpose of the
law of the foreign country. Thus, for example,
recognition of a foreign divorce decree needs not be
predicafce^Lupon proof of proper jurisdiction, based on
domicile, by such a foreign court. If the judgment of the
foreign court shows on the face of it that jurisdiction was
assumed on basis of domicile, the fact that a Nigerian court
would not have held, under similar circumstances, the
party or parties domiciled in such country, should not be
fatal to recognition.
Secondly, a Nigerian court must refuse recognition
to a foreign decree, except that based on the wife!s separate
domicile as described above, if a “party to the marriage had
been denied natural justice or ... the dissolution or annul-
k7ment had been obtained by fraud. 11
Thirdly, the term “foreign country" as used in 
formulating the recognition provisions means a territory out­
side Nigeria which is subject to one system of law. Therefore
in reference to a country which is a federation, it means
kQa part of such federation.
The problematic provision of the Decree is contained 
in section 81(5) which omits two vital words in adopting 
section 95(5) of the Australian Act. Section 81(5) of the
1*6. Matrimonial Causes Decree, 81(6); Compare s. 95(6) 
of the Australian Act.
Nigerian Decree, s.81 (7); Compare Australian Act 
at s. 95(7).
1+8. Nigerian Decree, s. 81 (9); Compare Australian Act 
at s. 95(9).
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Nigerian Decree provides:
“Any dissolution or annulment of a marriage that would 
be recognised as valid under the rules of private 
international lavn-9 but to which none of the preceding 
provisions of this section applies shall be 
recognised as valid in Nigeria, and the operation 
of this subsection shall not be limited by any 
implication from those provisions.1*
The Australian version is stated at section 95(5) of the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 thus:
“Any dissolution or annulment of a marriage that would 
be recognised as valid under the common law rules of 
private international law50 but to which none of the 
preceding provisions of this section applies shall be 
recognised as valid in Australia, and the operation 
of this subsection shall not be limited by any 
implication from those provisions.“
The main question concerning the Nigerian provision 
is, which rules private international law is contemplated?
At least the Australian provision makes a specific reference 
to “the common law rules of private international law", a 
phrase which is generally acknowledgedto be a reference to 
the rules of English private international law.' Is the 
omission of the words “common law1* from the Nigerian provision 
accidental or deliberate?
In any event, the phrase “rules of private inter­
national law“ contained in the Nigerian Matrimonial Causes
1+9. Emphasis supplied.,
50. Emphasis supplied.
51. See Alexsandro v. Alexsandro ZI96Z/ 12 F.L.R.^3^0* Even 
before the decision in this Australian case, it has 
been the view of commentators on the subsection of
the Australian Act that the phrase refers to the rules 
of English private international law. See e.g. Cowen 
& Mendes da Costa, op.cit.. at pp. 83 and 93? Lucke,
H.K. cc Kelly, D.L. “Recognition of Foreign Divorces:
The Time Factor*1 in. 3 Adelaide L.R. (I968) 178 at p. 185*
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Decree is capable of at least four interpretations. First, 
it might be argued that it is a reference to the rules of 
private international law being applied universally by all 
nations. We have shown in Chapter One of this work^ that 
no body of private international law exists which applies to 
all countries. Secondly, it may mean the rules of private 
international law as being applied by the common law 
countries of which Nigeria is one. This interpretation is 
also inconvenient as it may involve a clash between principles, 
e.g. American Conflicts rules and rules established in the 
Commonwealth countries. Indeed, the question might be asked 
how common is the common law between the Commonwealth 
countries?
Thirdly, the phrase might mean r,such rules of 
private international law as might subsequently be established 
by the Nigerian High Courts*1. This interpretation is possible 
but is inconsistent with the fact that the rules of recog­
nition incorporated in the Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Decree 
are common law rules established by the English courts.
Finally, the phrase “rules of private international law*1 might
be construed as indicative of the intention of the makers of
the Decree to allow any rule of recognition subsequently 
established in England, after the commencement of the Decree,
to be applied in Nigeria. As has been stated, this is how the
similar provision of the Australian Matrimonial Causes Act 
is understood. This interpretation seems plausible in respect 
of the Nigerian provision, even though it omits the vital 
words “common law“ from the section, in as much as the specific
52. Supra, p. 19 et seq.
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rules of recognition contained in the Decree are common law
rules.
Since it was enacted in 1959, the recognition 
provisions of the Australian Matrimonial Causes Act made a 
list of the common law rules of recognition which were in 
existence in England in 1959* It is therefore understandable 
that it stopped with the principle established in 1958 in 
Robinson-Scott v. Robinson-Scott. ^  Until the 16th of 
March 1970, the Nigerian High Courts were enjoined to exercise 
their jurisdiction in matrimonial causes relating to monogamous 
marriages in accordance with the law for the time being in force
51+
in England. This situation would seem to suggest that
English rules of recognition up to that date should normally
operate in Nigeria so that the jurisdictional rules of the
High Courts will complement their recognition rules. The
Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Decree wajs promulgated in March
1970 and yet, it too, like the Australian Act, lists the rule
of recognition which obtained in England in 1959* In other
words, unlike the Australian Matrimonial Act 1959, the
Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970 is not up to date
in the list of common law rules of recognition which it
incorporates. For example the principle established by the
55House of Lords in Indyka v. Indyka and other rules established 
by the subsequent decisions which interpreted the rationes 
decidendi of Indyka1 s case, are not part of the specific rules 
incorporated by the Nigerian Decree.
53. Z195S7 P.71.
51*. S.1+ of the States Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act. This 
section of the Act has now been repealed by s. 115(2) (d) 
of the Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970.
55. 0-9&2/ 3 W.L.R. 510.
72k
There can only be one explanation for this anomalous 
situation. Sections 80 and 81 of the Nigerian Decree 
are not merely verbatim adoption of sections 9*+ and 95 °f 
the Australian Act; the Nigerian provisions were “drafted*1 
by a person or a group of persons whose knowledge of Nigerian 
or English private international law is limited. Hence the 
disappointing lack of awareness that the common law rules 
of recognition have been greatly enlarged since 1 9 6 7? that 
the phrase “rules of private international law11 as employed 
in sub-section 81(5) of the Decree is not only vague but 
meaningless, and that the words “common law“ which precede 
such phrase in sub-section 95(5) of the Australian Act 
have an especial significance and therefore should not have 
been omitted either deliberately or inadvertently.
Now, we have narrowed the interpretation of sub­
section 81(5) of the Decree to two possibilities, viz. that 
the sub-section is a general directive to the Nigerian High 
Courts to establish new rules of recognition in future 
cases as the justice of the particular situation demands, or 
that any common law rules of recognition established in 
England after 1959 (after Robinson-Scott1s case) should be 
applied in Nigeria. According to the first interpretation, 
only the recognition rules listed above are operative in 
Nigeria. But if, as is more probably the case, sub-section 
81(5) imports the rules established in England after 
Robinson-Scott1s case into Nigeria, it means that the present 
rules of recognition of decrees of divorce^ and anhulment
56. The common law rules for the recognition of foreign 
divorce decrees are fully discussed in Chapter Four 
at p. 365 - 389.
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of monogamous marriages obtaining in England are part of 
the Nigerian law. Also, subsequent common law rules of 
recognition established in England will still apply in Nigeria.
It is, of course, needless to say that the uncertain­
ties revealed by the recognition provisions of the Nigerian 
Decree bring home forcefully the point that an uncritical 
adoption of a foreign statute to regulate matters of conflict 
of laws in Nigeria may create more difficulties than those the 
foreign statute is designed to solve. Also, these difficulties 
of interpretation and the fact that the provisions of the 
Decree do not apply to the recognition of foreign dissolution 
and annulment of polygamous marriages^ 7 emphasise the point 
that the mere fact that a solution has been tried and found 
successful in a federation does not necessarily mean that such 
expedient should not be properly considered before it is foisted 
on the citizens of the federation of Nigeria. Besides being 
a federation, the dualism of systems of territorial and non­
territorial (customary) law in each of the Nigerian States 
makes the Nigerian position rather unique.
Since the recognition provisions of the Decree, like 
its provisions on basis of jurisdiction of the Nigerian courts, 
relate exclusively to the recognition of foreign decrees given 
in respect of monogamous marriages, each Nigerian State is 
left to work out what rules should be applied for the 
recognition of foreign decrees dissolving or annulling poly­
gamous marriages. Undoubtedly the limitation imposed on its 
own effect by the Matrimonial Causes Decree is justified by the 
Constitutional allocation of legislative competence whereby all
57. S.ll*+(6).
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matters regarding monogamous marriages are reserved for 
the Federal Government, while matters concerning polygamous 
marriages are within the legislative competence of each 
State Government. Since the provisions of the Federal 
Matrimonial Causes Decree on conflict of laws are not clear, 
and probably not up to date, it is to be expected that most 
States will not follow the provisions in enacting recognition 
rules in respect of foreign dissolution and annulment of 
polygamous marriages. Indeed, as we have pointed out repeatedly, 
a "Nigerian domicile** as basis of jurisdiction for the 
dissolution and annulment of polygamous marriages is an impossible 
proposition at present in view of the diversity of customary 
divorce laws in Nigeria. The result is that by the promulgation 
of the Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970, we in Nigeria have 
now adopted an unprecedented and unique experiment of having 
two bodies of private international law, one relating to the 
institutions of the common law, the other governing the 
institutions of our indigenous customary laws.
It is accordingly suggested that an urgent amendment 
of the provisions of the Decree on recognition of foreign 
decrees is necessary. Some guide lines have been provided 
ifa Chapter Four of this work. Furthermore, perhaps an 
ultimate solution would be the repeal of the conflict 
provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970* In its 
place would be a Code of Nigerian private international law 
subsequently to be worked out by a National Committee on Law 
Reform. The Committee should be made up of persons who have 
made a specialised study of the local circumstances in Nigeria
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and know more than one approach to conflictual problems*
From this specialised knowledge they would be able to devise 
some conflict rules which will cater for the institutions 
of the common law and the customary law in Nigeria* The Code 
subsequently produced would be revised periodically so as 
to take account of legal developments in Nigeria and the 
world around it.
LEGITIMACY IN THE DOMESTIC LAW OF NIGERIA
The Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970 also effects some 
slight change in the mode of establishing legitimacy which 
is alleged to have arisen as a result of birth in lawful 
monogamous marriage. We saw in Chapter Four^ that section 
Ik? of the Evidence Act was a statutory enactment of the rule
/ Q
of common law established in Russell v. Russell. Under
the section, a child born by a woman during the subsistence 
of her monogamous marriage or within 280 days after its 
dissolution, the woman remaining unmarried, was ‘'conclusively11 
presumed to be the legitimate child of the woman’s husband, 
or former husband, as the case may be. By the same section, 
these so-called conclusive presumptions of legitimacy could 
be rebutted by either the husband or the wife giving evidence 
of non-access at the time the child could have been conceived. 
Neither spouse could, however, adduce oral or documentary 
evidence of absence of sexual intercourse to show that the 
child was not the legitimate issue of the husband.
Section 115(3) the Decree preserves the 
presumptions contained in section Ik? of the Evidence Act,
59* Supra pp. 405 -  406.
60. ,£192^7 A.C. 687.
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but dispenses with theV* conclusive nature. Further, it is 
provided in section 8*+ of the Decree that
“Notwithstanding any rule of law, in proceedings 
under this Decree either party to a marriage may 
give evidence proving or tending to prove that the 
parties to the marriage did not have sexual 
relations with each other at any particular time, 
but shall not be compellable to give such evidence 
if it would show or tend to show that a child 
born to the wife during the marriage was illegitimate”.
This is a good step forward on a similar line suggested in
6l
Chapter Five of this work.
However, the Decree does not say what happens when 
a spouse volunteers evidence of absence of sexual intercourse 
ih order to bastardise a child presumed legitimate under 
section 1^7 of the Evidence Act and the other spouse alleges 
in his or her own evidence that sexual intercourse did take 
place. Presumably a court faced with such conflictual 
evidence would merely allow the presumptions to operate as 
if there had been no dispute between the parties about the 
legitimacy of the child. Or could the court now order a 
blood test?
A second change in the law made by the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree as regards the question of legitimacy of a 
person is contained in section 38. Sub-section (1) enacts 
the common law rule that a decree annulling a voidable 
marriage shall operate as if the marriage had been void 
ab initio. Sub-section (g), however, preserves the legitimacy 
of any child born during such a marriage by providing that 
such decree shall not render illegitimate “a child of the 
parties born since, or legitimated during, the marriage**.
61. Supra, p.428.
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The Decree leaves unresolved the problem of a child of a 
void marriage which the common law says is always illegitimate. 
Perhaps this is not a serious omission after all, if we are
62correct in our submission in Chapter six that legitimacy, 
whether arising out of a birth in a valid or ostensible 
monogamous marriage, or whether it emanates from birth in 
lawful polygamous marriage, is a matter within the legislative 
competence of the State under the constitutional allocation 
of legislative powers between the federal and the state 
Governments, In other words, in so far as sections 38, 
and 11^(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Decree are provisions 
on legitimacy, their promulgation appears ultra vires 
the powers of the Federal Government,
62, Supra P# 498 et seq.
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APPENDIX A
ENGLAND
CODE OF THE LAW OF DOMICILE
Article 1
(1) Every person shall have a domicile but no person shall 
have more than one domicile at the same time.
(2) A domicile is either a domicile of origin or a domicile 
of choice.
(3) A domicile of origin is the domicile assigned to every 
person at his birth in accordance with the provisions of 
Article *+(1) of this Code.
(^ ) A domicile of choice is the domicile acquired through 
the exercise of his own will by a person who is legally 
capable of changing his domicile, or a domicile acquired by 
virtue of an order or with the approval of a court of competent
jurisdiction in accordance with Article ^(3) or Article 5 of
this Code.
(5) A domicile, whether of origin or of choice, shall continue 
until another domicile is acquired.
Article 2
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Code, the domicile of a 
person shall be in the country in which he has his home and 
intends to live permanently.
(2) Unless a different intention appears, the following are
rules for ascertaining a person1s intention to live permanently
in a country:-
Rule 1: Where a person has his home in a country, he
shall be presumed to inflend to live there
permanently.
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Where a person has more than one home, he shall 
be presumed to intend to live permanently in 
the country in which he has his principal home.
Where a person is stationed in a country for the
principal purpose of carrying on a business,
profession or occupation and his wife and children 
(if any) have their home in another country, 
he shall be presumed to intend to live permanently 
in the latter country.
(3) Paragraph (2) shall not apply to persons entitled to
diplomatic immunity or in the military, naval, air force
or civil service of any country, or in the service of an
international organisation.
Article ^
The domicile of a married woman shall be that of 
her husband: Provided that a married woman who has been
separated from her husband by the order of a court of 
competent jurisdiction shall be treated as a single woman.
Article k
(1) Subject to Articles 1 and 5 of this Code, the domicile 
of an infant shall be -
(i) that of his father, if the infant is legitimate or 
legitimated, provided that, as from the termination 
of the marriage of his parents, an infant’s domicile 
shall be that of the person (if any) in whom the 
custody of the infant is from time to time lawfully 
vested or, if it is vested in more than one person, 
that of such one of them as they may agree;
(ii) that of his mother, if the infant is illegitimate;
(iii) that of the adopter, if the infant has been lawfully 
adopted, so however that where an infant has been 
lawfully adopted jointly by two spouses he shall, 
for the purposes of this Code, be treated as if 
he were a legitimate child of the marriage.
Rule 2: 
Rule 3:
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(2) If any such person as is referred to in the proviso to 
paragraph 1(1) of this Article changes his domicile, the 
domicile of the infant shall not thereby be changed unless 
that person so intends.
(3) Notwithstanding anything herein contained, a court of 
competent jurisdiction shall have power to make such 
provision for the purpose of varying an infant1s domicile as 
it may deem appropriate to the welfare of the infant.
(l+) “Infant” means a person who has not attained the age 
of 21 years and who has not married.
Article 5
A lunatic shall retain during lunacy the domicile which 
he had immediately before he became a lunatic: Provided
that the person or authority in charge of the lunatic shall 
have power to change the lunatic’s domicile with the approval 
of a court of competent jurisdiction in the country in which 
the lunatic is domiciled.
733
APPENDIX B 
CANADA
DRAFT MODEL ACT TO REFORM'AND CODIFY 
THE LAW OF DOMICILE
1. This Act may be cited as the Domicile Code.
2. This Act replaces the rules of the common law for
determining the domicile of a person.
3 . In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, 
‘•mentally incompetent person11 means ....
h. (1 ) Every person has a domicile.
(2) No person has more than one domicile at the same 
time.
(3) The domicile of a person shall be determined under 
the law of the province.
(k) The domicile of a person continues until he acquires 
another domicile.
5. (1) Subject to section 6 , a person acquires and has a
domicile in the state and in the subdivision thereof
in which he has his principal home and in which he
intends to reside indefinitely.
(2) Unless a contrary intention appears,
(a) a person shall be presumed to intend to reside 
indefinitely in the state and subdivision where 
his principal home is situate; and
(b) a person shall be presumed to have his principal 
home in the state and subdivision where the 
principal home of his spouse and children (if any) 
is situate.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to a person entitled to 
diplomatic immunity or in the military, naval or air 
force of any country or in the service of an inter­
national organization.
73*+
6. The person or authority in charge of a mentally 
incompetent person may change the domicile of the mentally 
incompetent person with the approval of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state and subdivision 
thereof in which the mentally incompetent person is 
resident.
7. This Act comes into force on a day to be fixed by the 
Lieutenant-Governor by his proclamation.
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APPENDIX C 
KENYA
DRAFT BILL ON LAW OF DOMICIL 
A Bill for
An Act to Declare and Amend the Law relating to Domicil
Short title
Interpretation
Domicil of 
origin
Foundlings
Legitimation
1. This Act may be cited as the Law of 
Domicil Act 196,
2. In this Act -
ucountryu means a sovereign state, except 
where the law of the state recognises 
that different domicils attach to 
different parts of that state, when it 
means any such part.
3. Every person shall acquire at the date 
of his birth -
(a) if he is born legitimate or deemed to be 
legitimate, the domicil of his father, 
or if he is born posthumously, the 
domicil which his father had at the 
date of his death;
(b) if he is born illegitimate, the domicil 
of his mother.
*+. An infant who is a foundling shall acquire 
domicil in the country where he is found.
5. An infant who is legitimated by the 
marriage of his parents shall acquire the 
domicil of his father at the date of the 
legitimation.
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Adoption
Marriage
Domicil of 
Choice
6. An infant whose adoption has been 
authorised by a court of competent jurisdiction 
or recognised by a declaratory decree of
such a court shall, as from the date of the 
order or decree, acquire the domicil of the 
adopter or, where he is adopted by two 
spouses, that of the husband.
7. A woman shall, on marriage, acquire the 
domicil of her husband.
8. (1) where a person, not being under any 
disability, takes up residence in a country 
other than that of his domicil with the 
intention of making that country his 
permanent home, or where, being resident in 
a country other than that of his domicil,
he decides to make that country his permanent 
home, he shall, as from the date of so taking 
up residence or of such decision, as the case 
may be, acquire domicil in that country and 
shall cease to have his former domicil.
(2) A person may intend or decide to 
make a country his permanent home even though 
he contemplates leaving it should circum­
stances change.
(3) An adult married woman shall not, by 
reason of being married, be incapable of 
acquiring an independent domicil of choice.
(*+) The acquisition of a domicil of 
choice by a married man shall not, of itself, 
change the domicil of his adult wife or wives, 
but the fact that a wife is present with
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Consequential 
change of 
domicil
her husband in the country of his domicil 
of choice at the time when he acquires that 
domicil or subsequently Joins him in that 
country shall raise a rebuttable presumption 
that the wife has also acquired that domicil,
9, (1) Subject to the provisions of sub­
sections (2) and (3) of this section, the 
domicil of an infant shall change -
(a) where the infant was born legitimate 
or is deemed to be legitimate or has 
been legitimated, with that of his 
father; and
(b) where the infant is illegitimate, 
with that of his mother:
Provided that where the custody of an 
infsnt has been entrusted to his mother by 
decree of a court of competent Juris­
diction, his domicil shall not change with that 
of his father but shall change with that 
of his mother I
(2) The domicil of an infant female who
is married shall change with that of her 
husband.
(3) the domicil of an infant, other than 
a female who is married, whose adoption
has been authorised by a court of competent 
Jurisdiction or recognised by a declaratory 
decree of such a court, shall change with 
that of his adopter or, where he was adopted 
by two spouses, that of the husband.
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Unity and 
continuity of 
domicil
Cessation of 
application of 
Part II of the 
Indian Sucession 
Act.
10. (1) No person may have more than
one domicil at any time and no person may he 
without a domicil.
(2) A person retains his domicil until 
he acquires a new domicil notwithstanding 
that he may have left the country of his 
domicil with the intention of never 
returning.
11. Part II of the Succession Act, 1865, of 
India shall cease to extend or apply to 
Kenya.
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STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS BORN ‘ ’ ‘ " ', ‘
GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON EQUALITY-AND NON-DISCRIMINATION IN 
RESPECT OP PERSONS BORN OUT OP WEDLOCK
Text adopted by the Sub-Commission
Preamble
Whereas the peoples of the world have, in the Charter of the United Nations, 
proclaimed their'determination to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
•che dignity ana worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and 
of nations large and small, and to promote social progress and better, standards of 
life in larger freedom,
Whereas the Charter sets forth, as one of the purposes of the United Nations, *" 
che promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedom^ 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,
Whorc-as the Universal Declaration of Human -Rights proclaims that all human-
beings are equal in dignity and rights and, elaborating the principle of
non-discrimination, further proclaims that everyone is entitled to all the rights ■ 
and freedoms set forth therein without distinction of any kind,
Whereas the principle of the same social protection for all children, 'whether
born in or out of wedlock, has been proclaimed in article 2 5 , paragraph .2 , ’of'the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and confirmed by article 10, paragraph 5 , of 
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and by article 2k of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
6 7 -CC9 5 6 /.
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Pace 2
Uhereas a sizable portion of the population of the world is composed of persons 
born out of wedlock many of whom, because of the nature of their birth, are the ■ - 
victims of'legal or social discrimination in violation of the principles of equality 
and non-discrimination set out in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenants on Human Rights,
Uhereas efforts should be made, through all possible means, to promote respect 
for the inherent dignity and worth of the human person, so as to enable all.members 
of society, including persons born out of wedlock, to enjoy the equal and 
inalienable rights to which they are entitled,  a— — -—    “ '
Now therefore,with a view to eliminating this form of discrimination, the- ' 
following general principles are proclaimed:
Fart I '
1. Every person born out of wedlock shall be entitled to legal recognition of 
his maternal and paternal filiation in so far as compatible with the principle of 
the protection’ of the family.
2. The fact of birth of a child shall by itself establish maternal filiation 
to the whoman who gives birth to the child.
3 . The establishment of paternal filiation shall be provided for by laws 
through a variety of means, including acknowledgement, recognition of legal 
presumptions and judicial decision. Judicial proceedings to' establish paternal 
filiation shall not be subject to any time-limits.
4. The husband shall be presumed to be the father of any child born to his 
wife whether he is conceived or born during the marriage. This presumption may be 
overcome only by a judicial decision based upon evidence that the husband is not .* 
the father. Proceedings to that end shall be initiated within a limited period 0% 
time.
3- Any child born of parents who, intermarry after the birth of that child
shall be considered to be born of that marriage.
6. Every person born in wedlock, or considered to be born in wedlock as a
result of the subsequent marriage of his parents, shall retain his status
notwithstanding the invalidity or annulment of the marriage.
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Part II
7'. Every person, once his filiation has 'seen established, shall nave the same 
legal status as a person born in wedlock.
8. Every person born out of wedlock whose filiation is established in relation
to both parents shall have the right to bear a surname determined as in the case of
a person born in wedlock. If his filiation is established in relation only to his
mother, he shall be entitled to bear her surname, modified, if necessary, in such a
manner as not to reveal the fact of birth out of wedlock.
9. The rights and obligations pertaining to parental authority shall be the 
same, whether the child is born in wedlock or out of wedlock. Unless otherwise 
decided by the court in the best interest of the child born out of wedlock, parental
authority shall be exercised according to the same rules as for a child born in '
wedlock if his filiation is established in relation to both parents, or by his 
mother alone if his paternal filiation is not established. 1 '
10. The domicile of any child born out of wedlock whose filiation is
established in relation to both parents shall be determined according to the same 
rules as for children born in wedlock.
If the filiation is established to the mother alone, appropriate rules shall 
ensure, in any case that the child has a domicile.
11. Every person born out of wedlock shall, once his filiation has been 
established, have the same maintenance rights as persons born in wedlock. Birth oui 
of wedlock shall not affect the order of priority of claimants.
l£. Every person born out of wedlock shall, once his filiation has been 
established, have the same inheritance rights as persons born in wedlock. Legal 
limitations or restrictions on the freedom of a testator to dispose of his property 
shall afford equal protection to persons entitled to inheritance, whether they are 
born in wedlock or out of wedlock.
1 3 . The nationality or citizenship of a person born out of wedlock shall be’ 
determined by the same rules as those applicable to persons born in wedlock.
Special protection against statelessness shall bs.provided for persons born ou 
of wedlock. In particular, when only the maternal filiation of a person born out o 
wedlock is established, its effects shall be the same as in the case of paternal 
filiation.
/ •  • •
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i f  Political, social, economic and cultural rights shall be enjoyed equally, 
by all persons, whether they are born in wedlock or out of wedlock, without 
prejudice, as regards social welfare services, to the special care which shall be/ 
provided to children born out of wedlock and their mothers, by the State or society, 
when necessary.
Part III
1 5 .' Information in birth and other registers containing personal data which 
might disclose the fact of birth out of wedlock shall be available only to person's 
or authorities having a legitimate interest with respect to filiation.
In referring to persons born out of wedlock, any designation which might carry 
a derogatory connotation shall be avoided.
lo. The adoption of a child borrNeut of wedlock shall be subject to the same. 
rules and provisions and shall have the same consequences as the adoption of 
children born in wedlock. '
Restrictions on the right to adopJp shall be limited uo such requirements,, as are 
necessary to establish a parent-child relationship and to assure the best interests’ 
of the adoptee. In particular, no restrictions based solely on a difference of 
race, colour or national origin shall be permitted.
Adoption procedure should be carried' out under the supervision of the State
, /  •; • ; 1 and/or a competent social welfare agency to ensure full protection of the child and
his well-being. '■ I ' •' .7
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MATRIMONIAL CAUSES DECREE 1970
Arrangement of Sections
Section
P a r t  I — J u r i s d i c t i o n
1. Institution of matrimonial cause
proceedings only under this 
Decree.
2. Jurisdiction in matrimonial causes.
3. Void marriages and prohibited
degrees of consanguinity.
4. Marriage of persons within pro­
hibited degrees of affinity.
5. Voidable marriages.
6. Validity, etc. of certain marriages
not affected.
7. Special provisions as to wife's
domicile.
8. Law to be applied.
9. Staying and transferring of pro­
ceedings.
10. Courts to aid one another.
Part II—M atrimonial R elief
Reconciliation
11. Reconciliation.
12. Hearing when reconciliation fails.
13. Statements, etc. made in course of
attempt to effect reconciliation.
14. Marriage conciliator to take oath of
secrecy.
Dissolution of marriage
15. Ground for dissolution of marriage,
16. Provisions supplementary to s. 15.
17. Additional provisions to encourage
reconciliation.
18. Constructive desertion.
19. Refusal to resume cohabitation.
20. Desertion continuing after
insanity.
21. Restriction on finding of non­
consummation.
22. Aggregation of concurrent
sentences in reckoning imprison­
ment.
23. Restriction on finding of non­
maintenance.
24. Restriction on finding of insanity.
25. Power to refuse to make decree
without maintenance, etc. in 
proper case.
26. Condonation and connivance.
27. Collusion.
28. Discretionary bars.
29. No dissolution where petition for
nullity before court.
30. Petition within two years of
marriage.
31. Claim for damages.
32. Joinder of adulterers, etc.
33. Effect of dissolution of marriage.
Nullity of marriage
34. Ground for decree of nullity of
marriage.
35. Who may institute proceedings.
36. Incapacity to consummate mar­
riage.
37. Restrictions on certain grounds.
38. Effect of decree of nullity of a
voidable marriage.
Judicial separation
39. Grounds for judicial separation.
40. Application to judicial separation
of sundry sections of this Part.
41. Effect of decree of judicial separa­
tion.
42. Effect on rights to sue, devolution
of property, etc.
43. Exercise of joint powers not
affected.
44. Decree of judicial separation not to
bar subsequent proceedings for 
dissolution of marriage.
45. Discharge of decree of judicial 
* separation on resumption of
cohabitation.
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Arrangement of Sections—continued
Section
46. Application of ss. 41 to 45 to
certain decrees.
Restitution of conjugal rights
47. Ground for decree of restitution
of conjugal rights.
48. Agreement for separation.
49. Sincerity of petitioner.
50. Notice as to home.
51. Enforcement of decree.
Jactitation of marriage
52. Ground for decree of jactitation
of marriage, and discretion of 
court.
General
53. Facts, etc. occurring before com­
mencement of Decree or out­
side Nigeria,
54. Institution of proceedings.
55. Duty of court.
56. Decree nisi in first instance.
57. Decree absolute where children
under sixteen years, etc.
58. When decree becomes absolute.
59. Certificate as to decree absolute.
60. Rescission of decree nisi where
parties are reconciled, etc.
61. Rescission of decree nisi on ground
of miscarriage of justice.
Part I II— Intervention
62. Intervention by Attorney-General
on request from court.
63. Intervention of Attorney-General
in other cases.
64. Delegation by Attorney-General.
65. Intervention by other persons.
66. Rescission of decree nisi in conse­
quence of intervention.
67. When proceedings finally disposed
of.
68. Procedure on intervention.
Part IV—M aintenance, 
C ustody a n d  Settlement
69. Interpretation of “marriage” , etc.
in the application of this Part.
70. Powers of court in maintenance
proceedings.
71. Powers of court in custody, etc.
proceedings.
72. Power of court in proceedings
with respect to settlement of 
property.
73. General powers of court.
74. Execution of deeds, etc, by order
of court.
75. Power of court to make orders on
dismissal of petition.
Part V — A ppeals
76. General right of appeal,
77. Appeals with leave.
78. Appeal from court of summary
jurisdiction.
79. Appellate jurisdiction and powers.
Part VI— R ecognition of D ecrees
80. Effect of decrees.
81. Recognition of other decrees.
Part VII— E vidence
82. Standard of proof.
83. Evidence of husbands and wives.
84. Evidence of non-access.
85. Evidence as to adultery.
86. Proof of marriage, etc.
87. Evidence of rape, etc.
Part VIII— E n f o r c e m e n t 
of D ecrees
88. Attachment.
89. Enforcement of decrees by other
High Courts.
90. Recovery of moneys as judgment
debt.
91. Summary enforcement of orders
for maintenance.
92. Enforcement of maintenance
orders by attachment of earn­
ings.
93. Enforcement by other means.
94. Enforcement of existing decrees.
95. Power to make rules of court for
purposes of this Part.
Part IX— T ransitional Provisions
96. Definitions.
97. Pending proceedings generally*
98. Continuance of proceedings for
dissolution or nullity of 
marriage, or judicial separation.
99. Application of this Decree to
pending proceedings for dis­
solution or nullity of marriage, 
or judicial separation.
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A r r a n g em en t
Section
100. Continuance of other pending
proceedings.
101. Special provisions as to pending
appeals or existing rights to 
appeal.
102. Decrees of restitution of conjugal
rights under previous law.
Part X — M iscellaneous
103. Hearings to be in open court.
104. Proceedings to be heard by judge
alone.
105. Transactions intended to defeat
claims.
106. Service of process,
107. Position of clergy as to re­
marriage.
108. Restriction on publication of
evidence.
109. Injunctions.
o f  S e c t io n s — continued
110. Costs.
111. Frivolous or vexatious proceed­
ings.
112. Rules of court.
113. Savings for sundry domestic and
foreign decrees, etc.
114. Interpretation.
115. Amendments and repeals.
116. Citation, extent and commence­
ment.
SCHEDULES
Schedule 1—Prohibited degrees of 
consanguinity and 
affinity.
Schedule 2—Oath or affirmation 
by marriage concilia­
tor.
Schedule 3—Enforcement of
orders for mainten­
ance.
Decree No. 18
[Section 116 (2)]
THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT hereby decrees as 
follows:—
P art  I — J u r is d ic t io n
1.— (1) After the commencement of this Decree a matrimonial cause 
shall not be instituted otherwise than under this Decree ; and if a matrimonial 
cause has been instituted before the commencement of this Decree but not 
completed, it shall be continued and dealt with only in accordance with the 
provisions of this Decree prescribed in that behalf.
(2) Where before or after the commencement of this Decree a matrimo­
nial cause has been or is instituted, and whether or not it has been completed, 
proceedings in relation thereto for any relief or order of a kind that could be 
sought under this Decree shall be instituted after the commencement of this 
Decree only under this Decree, so however that, subject to the succeeding 
provisions of this and the next section—
(a) any jurisdiction of a court of summary jurisdiction of a State or of a 
court on appeal from such a court, under the law of that State, to make—
(*) orders with respect to the maintenance of wives or children or the 
custody of or access to children ; or
(ii) separation orders or other orders having the effect of relieving a 
party to a marriage from any obligation to cohabit with the other party, 
shall not be affected by this Decree or any proceedings thereunder; and
Com m ence­
m ent.
Institution 
of matrimo­
nial cause 
proceedings 
only under 
this Decree.
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(b) proceedings for or in respect of such an order, or for its enforcement, 
may be continued or instituted as if this Decree had not been made.
(3) Where a marriage is dissolved or annulled by a decree of a court of 
competent jurisdiction under this Decree—
(a) any jurisdiction of such a court or of a court on appeal from such a 
court, to make orders of the kind specified in subsection (2) (a) above shall, 
by virtue of this subsection, cease to be applicable in relation to the parties 
to the marriage or the children of the marriage ; and
(b) any order of that kind (unless it is a maintenance order, when sub­
section (5) below will apply) made by such a court in relation to those 
parties or children shall cease to have effect.
(4) A court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under this Decree may at 
any time by order direct that an order of the kind specified in subsection (2) 
(a) above made by a court of summary jurisdiction, or by a court on appeal 
from such a court, shall cease to have effect; and that order shall cease to 
have effect accordingly.
(5) Where an order of the kind specified in subsection (2) (a) above made 
with respect to the maintenance of a wife or of children ceases to have effect 
under subsection (3) or (4) above, the order made may, in so far as it relates 
to any period before it so ceased to have effect, be enforced as if this Decree 
had not been made.
2.— (1) Subject to this Decree, a person may institute a matrimonial 
cause under this Decree in the High Court of any State of the Federation, 
and for that purpose the High Court of each State of the Federation shall have 
jurisdiction to hear and determine—
(a) matrimonial causes instituted under this Decree ; and
(b) matrimonial causes (not being matrimonial causes to which section 
101 of this Decree applies) continued in accordance with the provisions of 
Part IX of this Decree, so however that jurisdiction under this Decree in 
respect of matrimonial causes within this paragraph shall be restricted 
to the court in which the matrimonial cause was instituted,
and in any case where maintenance is ordered in proceedings in a High 
Court, a court of summary jurisdiction in any State shall have jurisdiction 
to enforce payment in a summary manner.
(2) Proceedings for a decree—
(a) of dissolution of marriage ; or
(b) of nullity of a voidable marriage ; or
(c) of nullity of a void marriage ; or
(d) of judicial separation; or
(e) of restitution of conjugal rights ; or
(/) of jactitation of marriage,
may be instituted under this Decree only by a person domiciled in Nigeria.
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(3) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that a person 
domiciled in any State of the Federation is domiciled in Nigeria for the 
purposes of this Decree and may institute proceedings under this Decree in 
the High Court of any State whether or not he is domiciled in that particular 
State.
3.— (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a marriage that takes 
place after the commencement of this Decree is void in any of the following 
cases but not otherwise, that is to say, where—
(a) either of the parties is, at the time of the marriage, lawfully married 
to some other person ;
(b) the parties are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or, 
subject to section 4 of this Decree, of affinity ;
(c) the marriage is not a valid marriage under the law of the place where 
the marriage takes place, by reason of a failure to comply with the require­
ments of the law of that place with respect to the form of solemnization 
of marriages ;
(d) the consent of either of the parties is not a real consent because—
(i) it was obtained by duress or fraud ; or
(ii) that party is mistaken as to identity of the other party, or as to
the nature of the ceremony performed ; or
(Hi) that party is mentally incapable of understanding the nature of
the marriage contract;
(e) either of the parties is not of marriageable age.
(2) The prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity respectively 
on and after the commencement of this Decree shall be those set out in 
Schedule 1 to this Decree, and none other.
(3) A marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Decree 
shall not be voidable on the grounds of consanguinity or affinity of the 
parties unless the parties were, at the time of the marriage, within one of the 
degrees of consanguinity or affinity set out in Schedule 1 to this Decree; 
but nothing in this subsection shall make voidable a marriage that would 
not, apart from this provision, be voidable.
4.— (1) Where two persons who are within the prohibited degrees of 
affinity wish to marry each other, they may apply, in writing, to a judge for 
permission to do so.
(2) If the judge is satisfied that the circumstances of the particular case 
are so exceptional as to justify the granting of the permission sought he may, 
by order, permit the applicants to marry one another.
(3) Where persons marry in pursuance of permission granted under this 
section, the validity of their marriage shall not be affected by the fact that they 
are within the prohibited degrees of affinity.
(4) The Head of the Federal Military Government may arrange with 
the Military Governor or Administrator of a State for the performance by 
judges of the High Court of that State of functions under this section.
(5) In this section, “judge” means a judge in respect of whom an 
arrangement made under subsection (4) above is applicable.
(6) Rules made under section 112 of this Decree may make provision 
for the practice and procedure in and in connection with applications under
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this section, and may include provision for or in relation to the summoning 
of witnesses, the production of documents, the taking of evidence on oath or 
affirmation, and the payment of expenses of witnesses.
5.— (1) Subject to this Decree, a marriage that takes place after the 
commencement of this Decree not being a marriage that is void, shall be 
voidable in the following cases but not otherwise, that is to say, where at the 
time of the marriage—
(a) either party to the marriage is incapable of consummating the 
marriage;
(ft) either party to the marriage is—
(f) of unsound mind ; or
(ii) a mental defective; or
(Hi) subject to recurrent attacks of insanity or epilepsy ;
(c) either party to the marriage is suffering from a venereal disease in a 
communicable form; or
(d) the wife is pregnant by a person other than the husband.
(2) For the purposes of this section, “mental defective” means a person 
who, owing to an arrested or incomplete development of mind, whether 
arising from inherent causes or induced by disease or injury, requires over­
sight, care or control for his own protection or for the protection of others 
and is, by reason of that fact, unfitted for the responsibilities of marriage.
6.— (1) Save as expressly provided in this Part of this Decree, nothing 
in this Part shall affect the validity or invalidity of a marriage that took place 
before the commencement of this Decree.
(2) A provision of this Decree shall not affect the validity or invalidity 
of a marriage where it would not be in accordance with the rules of private 
international law to apply that provision in relation to that marriage.
7. For the purposes of this Decree,—
(a) a deserted wife who was domiciled in Nigeria either immediately 
before her marriage or immediately before the desertion shall be deemed 
to be domiciled in Nigeria; and
(ft) a wife who is resident in Nigeria at the date of instituting proceedings 
under this Decree and has been so resident for the period of three years 
immediately preceding that date shall be deemed to be domiciled in Nigeria 
at that date.
8. The jurisdiction conferred on a court by this Decree shall be exercised 
in accordance with this Decree ; and any law in force immediately before the 
commencement of this Decree which confers jurisdiction in divorce or 
matrimonial causes on the High Court of a State or provides for the law and 
practice to be applied in the exercise of that jurisdiction shall, to the extent 
that it does so, cease to have effect.
9.— (1) Where it appears to a court in which a matrimonial cause has 
been instituted under this Decree that a matrimonial cause between the 
parties to the marriage or purported marriage ha9 been instituted in another 
court having jurisdiction under this Decree, the court may in its discretion 
stay the matrimonial cause for such time as it thinks fit.
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(2) Where it appears to a court in which a matrimonial cause has been 
instituted under this Decree (including a matrimonial cause in relation to 
which subsection (1) above applies) that it is in the interests of justice that 
the matrimonial cause be dealt with in another court having jurisdiction to 
hear and determine that cause, the court may transfer the matrimonial cause 
to the other court.
(3) The court may exercise its powers under this section at any time 
and at any stage either on application by any of the parties, or of its own 
motion.
(4) Where a matrimonial cause is transferred from a court in pursuance 
of this section—
(a) all documents filed of record in that court shall be transmitted by 
the registrar or other proper officer of that court to the registrar or other 
proper officer of the court to which the cause is transferred ; and
(ft) the court to which the cause is transferred shall proceed as if the 
cause had been originally instituted in that court, and as if the same 
proceedings had been taken in that court as had been taken in the court 
from which the cause was transferred; but all subsequent proceedings 
shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the court to 
which the cause is transferred.
10. All courts having jurisdiction under this Decree shall severally act 
in aid of and be auxiliary to one another in all matters under this Decree.
Part II— Matrimonial Relief 
Reconciliation
11.— (1) It shall be the duty of the court in which a matrimonial cause 
has been instituted to give consideration, from time to time, to the possibility 
of a reconciliation of the parties to the marriage (unless the proceedings are 
of such a nature that it would not be appropriate to do so), and if at any time 
it appears to the judge constituting the court, either from the nature of the 
case, the evidence in the proceedings or the attitude of those parties, or of 
either of them, or of counsel, that there is a reasonable possibility of such a 
reconciliation, the judge may do all or any of the following, that is to say, 
he may—
(a) adjourn the proceedings to afford those parties an opportunity of 
becoming reconciled or to enable anything to be done in accordance with 
either of the next two succeeding paragraphs ;
(ft) with the consent of those parties, interview them in chambers, with 
or without counsel, as the judge thinks proper, with a view to effecting a 
reconciliation;
(c) nominate a person with experience or training in marriage concilia­
tion, or in special circumstances, some other suitable person, to endeavour 
with the consent of the parties, to effect a reconciliation.
(2) If, not less than fourteen days after an adjournment under subsection
(1) above has taken place, either of the parties to the marriage requests that 
the hearing be proceeded with, the judge shall resume the hearing, or the 
proceedings may be dealt with by another judge, as the case may require, 
as soon as practicable.
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12. Where a judge has acted as conciliator under section 11 (1) (6) 
above but the attempt to effect a reconciliation has failed, the judge shall not, 
except at the request of the parties to the proceedings, continue to hear the 
proceedings, or determine the proceedings; and, in the absence of such a 
request, the proceedings shall be dealt with by another judge.
13. Evidence of anything said or of any admission made in the course 
of an endeavour to effect a reconciliation under this Part of this Decree 
shall not be admissible in any court (whether exercising federal jurisdiction 
or not) or in proceedings before a person authorised by any enactment, 
federal or state, or by consent of parties, to hear, receive and examine 
evidence.
14. A marriage conciliator shall, before entering upon the performance 
of his functions as such a conciliator, make and subscribe, before a person 
authorised in Nigeria to take affidavits, an oath or affirmation of secrecy in 
accordance with the form in Schedule 2 to this Decree.
Dissolution of marriage
15.— (1) A petition under this Decree by a party to a marriage for a 
decree of dissolution of the marriage may be presented to the court by either 
party to the marriage upon the ground that the marriage has broken down 
irretrievably.
(2) The court hearing a petition for a decree of dissolution of a marriage 
shall hold the marriage to have broken down irretrievably if, but only if, the 
petitioner satisfies the court of one or more of the following facts—
(a) that the respondent has wilfully and persistently refused to consum­
mate the marriage;
(b) that since the marriage the respondent has committed adultery 
and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent;
(c) that since the marriage the respondent has behaved in such a way 
that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the 
respondent;
(d) that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous 
period of at least one year immediately preceding the presentation of the 
petition;
(e) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous 
period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of 
the petition and the respondent does not object to a decree being granted ;
(/) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous 
period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of 
the petition;
(g) that the other party to the marriage has, for a period of not less 
than one year, failed to comply with a decree of restitution of conjugal 
rights made under this Decree ;
(h) that the other party to the marriage has been absent from the 
petitioner for such time and in such circumstances as to provide reasonable 
grounds for presuming that he or she is dead.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(e) and (f) above the parties to a 
marriage shall be treated as living apart unless they are living with each 
other in the same household.
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16.— (1) Without prejudice to the generality of section 15 (2) (c) of this Provisions
Decree, the court hearing a petition for a decree of dissolution of marriage tary^o™611
shall hold that the petitioner has satisfied the court of the fact mentioned in 
the said section (15) (2) (c) if the petitioner satisfies the court that—
{a) since the marriage, the respondent has committed rape, sodomy, or 
bestiality; or
(b) since the marriage, the respondent has, for a period of not less than 
two years—
(i) been a habitual drunkard ; or
(ii) habitually been intoxicated by reason of taking or using to excess 
any sedative, narcotic or stimulating drug or preparation,
or has, for a part or parts of such a period, been a habitual drunkard and 
has, for the other part or parts of the period, habitually been so intoxi­
cated ; or
(c) since the marriage, the respondent has within a period not exceed­
ing five years—
(i) suffered frequent convictions for crime in respect of which the 
respondent has been sentenced in the aggregate to imprisonment for 
not less than three years ; and
(ii) habitually left the petitioner without reasonable means of 
support; or
(d) since the marriage, the respondent has been in prison for a period 
of not less than three years after conviction for an offence punishable by 
death or imprisonment for life or for a period of five years or more, and 
is still in prison at the date of the petition ; or
(e) since the marriage and within a period of one year immediately 
preceding the date of the petition, the respondent has been convicted of—
(i) having attempted to murder or unlawfully to kill the petitioner ; or
(ii) having committed an offence involving the intentional infliction 
of grievous harm or grievous hurt on the petitioner or the intent to 
inflict grievous harm or grievous hurt on the petitioner ; or
(/) the respondent has habitually and wilfully failed, throughout the 
period of two years immediately preceding the date of the petition, to pay 
maintenance for the petitioner—
(i) ordered to be paid under an order of, or an order registered in, 
a court in the Federation ; or
(ii) agreed to be paid under an agreement between the parties to the 
marriage providing for their separation; or
(g) the respondent—
(i) is, at the date of the petition, of unsound mind and unlikely to 
recover; and
(ii) since the marriage and within the period of six years immediately 
preceding the date of the petition, has been confined for a period of, 
or for periods aggregating, not less than five years in an institution 
where persons may be confined for unsoundness of mind in accordance 
with law, or in more than one such institution.
(2) Where a petition is based on the fact mentioned in section 15 (2) (h) 
of this Decree—
(a) proof that, for a period of seven years immediately preceding the 
date of the petition, the other party to the marriage was continually absent 
from the petitioner and that the petitioner has no reason to believe that
A 70 1970 No. 18 Matrimonial Causes
Additional 
provisions 
to encourage 
reconcilia­
tion.
Construc­
tive
desertion.
Refusal to 
resume 
cohabita­
tion.
Desertion 
continuing 
after insa­
nity.
Restriction 
on finding of 
non-consum­
mation.
the other party was alive at any time within that period is sufficient to 
establish the fact in question, unless it is shown that the other party to the 
marriage was alive at a time within that period ; and
(b) a decree made pursuant to the petition shall be in the form of a 
decree of dissolution of marriage by reason of presumption of death.
17.— (1) Where the petitioner alleges that the respondent has behaved 
in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with 
him but the parties to the marriage have lived with each other for a period 
or periods after the date of the occurrence of the final incident relied on by the 
petitioner and held by the court to support his allegation, that fact shall be 
disregarded in determining for the purposes of section 15 (2) (c) of this 
Decree whether the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with 
the respondent if the length of that period or of those periods together was 
six months or less.
(2) In considering for the purposes of section 15 (2) of this Decree 
whether the period for which the respondent has deserted the petitioner or 
the period for which the parties to a marriage have lived apart has been 
continuous, no account shall be taken of any one period (not exceeding six 
months) or of any two or more periods (not exceeding six months in all) 
during which the parties resumed living with each other, but no period 
during which the parties lived with each other shall count as part of the period 
of desertion or of the period for which the parties to the marriage lived 
apart, as the case may be.
(3) References in this section to the parties to a marriage living with 
each other shall be construed as references to their living with each other 
in the same household.
18. A married person whose conduct constitutes just cause or excuse for 
the other party to the marriage to live separately or apart, and occasions that 
other party to live separately or apart, shall be deemed to have wilfully 
deserted that other party without just cause or excuse, notwithstanding that 
that person may not in fact have intended the conduct to occasion that other 
party to live separately or apart.
19.— (1) Where husband and wife are parties to an agreement for 
separation, whether oral, in writing or constituted by conduct, the refusal 
by one of them, without reasonable justification, to comply with the other’s 
bona fide request to resume cohabitation shall constitute, as from the date of 
the refusal, wilful desertion without just cause or excuse on the part of the 
party so refusing.
(2) For the purposes of this section, “reasonable justification” means 
justification that is reasonable in all the circumstances, including the conduct 
of the other party to the marriage since the marriage, whether that conduct 
took place before or after the agreement for separation.
20. Where a party to a marriage has been wilfully deserted by the other 
party, the desertion shall not be deemed to have been terminated by reason 
only that the deserting party has become incapable of forming or having 
an intention to continue the desertion, if it appears to the court that the 
desertion would probably have continued if the deserting party had not 
become so incapable.
21. The court shall not find that a respondent has wilfully and persistently 
refused to consummate the marriage unless the court is satisfied that, as at 
the commencement of the hearing of the petition, the marriage had not been 
consummated.
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22. Where—
(a) a person has been sentenced to imprisonment in respect of each of 
two or more crimes that, in the opinion of the court hearing the petition, 
arose substantially out of the same acts or omissions ; and
(b) the sentences were ordered to be served, in whole or in part, 
concurrently,
then, in reckoning for the purposes of section 16 (1) (c) of this Decree the 
period for which that person has been sentenced in the aggregate, any period 
during which two or more of those sentences were to be served concurrently 
shall be taken into account once only.
23. A finding in accordance with section 16 (1) (/) of this Decree shall not 
be made unless the court is satisfied that reasonable attempts have been 
made by the petitioner to enforce the order or agreement under which 
maintenance was ordered or agreed to be paid.
24. A finding in accordance with section 16 (1) (g) of this Decree shall not 
be made unless the court is satisfied that, at the commencement of the 
hearing of the petition, the respondent was still confined in an institution 
referred to in the said section 16 (1) (^ ) and was unlikely to recover.
25. On the application of the respondent made in the course of 
proceedings for a decree of dissolution of marriage, the court may, if it 
considers it just and proper in the circumstances of the case to make provision 
for the maintenance of the respondent or other provision for the benefit of 
the respondent, refuse to make a decree unless and until it is satisfied that 
the petitioner has made arrangements satisfactory to the court to provide 
the maintenance or other benefit as aforesaid upon the decree becoming 
absolute.
26. Except where section 16 (1) (g) of this Decree applies, a decree of 
dissolution of marriage shall not be made if the petitioner has condoned or 
connived at the conduct constituting the facts on which the petition is based.
27. A decree of dissolution of marriage shall not be made if the petitioner, 
in bringing or prosecuting the proceedings, has been guilty of collusion with 
intent to cause a perversion of justice.
28. The court may, in its discretion, refuse to make a decree of dissolu­
tion of marriage if since the marriage—
(а) the petitioner has committed adultery that has not been condoned 
by the respondent or, having been so condoned, has been revived ;
(б) the petitioner has wilfully deserted the respondent before the 
happening of the matters relied upon by the petitioner or, where those 
matters involve other matters occurring during, or extending over, a 
period, before the expiration of that period ; or
(c) the habits of the petitioner have, or the conduct of the petitioner has, 
conduced or contributed to the existence of the matters relied upon by the 
petitioner.
29. Where both a petition for a decree of nullity of a marriage and a 
petition for a decree of dissolution of that marriage are before a court, the 
court shall not make a decree of dissolution of the marriage unless it has 
dismissed the petition for a decree of nullity of the marriage.
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30.— (1) Subject to this section, proceedings for a decree of dissolution 
of marriage shall not be instituted within two years after the date of the 
marriage except by leave of the court.
(2) Nothing in this section shall apply to the institution of proceedings 
based on any of the matters specified in section 15 (2) (a) or (b) or 16 (1) (a) of 
this Decree, or to the institution of proceedings for a decree of dissolution of 
marriage by way of cross-proceedings.
(3) The court shall not grant leave under this section to institute pro­
ceedings except on the ground that to refuse to grant the leave would impose 
exceptional hardship on the applicant or that the case is one involving 
exceptional depravity on the part of the other party to the marriage.
(4) In determining an application for leave to institute proceedings 
under this section, the court shall have regard to the interest of any children 
of the marriage, and to the question whether there is any reasonable probabi­
lity of a reconciliation between the parties before the expiration of the period 
of two years after the date of the marriage.
(5) Where, at the hearing of proceedings that have been instituted by 
leave of the court under this section, the court is satisfied that the leave was 
obtained by misrepresentation or concealment of material facts, the court 
may—
(а) adjourn the hearing for such period as the court thinks fit; or
(6) dismiss the petition on the ground that the leave was so obtained.
(б) Where, in a case to which subsection (5) above applies, there is a 
cross-petition, if the court adjourns or dismisses the petition under that 
subsection, it shall also adjourn for the same period, or dismiss, as the case 
may be, the cross-petition ; but if the court, having regard to the provisions 
of this section, thinks it proper to hear and determine the cross-petition, it 
may do so, and in that case it shall also hear and determine the petition.
(7) The dismissal of a petition or a cross-petition under subsection (5) or
(6) of this section shall not prejudice any subsequent proceedings on the 
same, or substantially the same, facts as those constituting the ground on 
which the dismissed petition or cross-petition was brought.
(8) Nothing in this section shall prevent the institution of proceedings, 
after the period of two years from the date of the marriage, based upon 
matters which have occurred within that period.
(9) In this section, a reference to the leave of the court shall be deemed 
to include a reference to leave granted by a court on appeal.
31.— (1) A party to a marriage, whether husband or wife, may, in a 
petition for a decree of dissolution of the marriage alleging that the other 
party to the marriage has committed adultery with a person or including 
that allegation, claim damages from that person on the ground that that 
person has committed adultery with the other party to the marriage and, 
subject to this section, the court may award damages accordingly.
(2) The court shall not award damages against a person where the 
adultery of the respondent with that person has been condoned, whether 
subsequently revived or not, or if a decree of dissolution of the marriage 
based on the fact of the adultery of the respondent with that person, or on 
facts including that fact, is not made.
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(3) Damages shall not be awarded under this Decree in respect of an act 
of adultery committed more than three years before the date of the petition,
(4) The court may direct in what manner the damages awarded shall be 
paid or applied and may, if it thinks fit, direct that they shall be settled for the 
benefit of the respondent or the children of the marriage.
32.— (1) Where, in a petition for a decree of dissolution of marriage 
or in an answer to such a petition, a party to the marriage is alleged to have 
committed adultery with a specified person, whether or not a decree of 
dissolution of marriage is sought on the basis of that allegation, that person 
shall, except as provided by rules of court, be made a party to the proceedings.
(2) Where, in a petition for a decree of dissolution of marriage or in an 
answer to such a petition, a party to the marriage is alleged to have committed 
rape or sodomy on or with a specified person, whether or not a decree of 
dissolution of marriage is sought on the basis of that allegation, that person 
shall, except as provided by rules of court, be served with notice that the 
allegation has been made and is thereupon entitled to intervene in the 
proceedings.
(3) Where a person has been made a party to proceedings for a decree 
of dissolution of marriage in pursuance of subsection (1) above, the court 
may, on the application of that person, if it is satisfied after the close of the 
case for the party to the marriage who alleged the adultery that there is not 
sufficient evidence to establish that that person committed adultery with the 
other party to the marriage, dismiss that person from the proceedings,
33. Where a decree of dissolution of marriage under this Decree has 
become absolute, a party to the marriage may marry again as if the marriage 
had been dissolved by death.
Nullity of marriage
34. .Subject to the following provisions of this Part of this Decree, a 
petition under this Decree for nullity of marriage may be based on the 
ground that the marriage is void, or on the ground that the marriage is 
voidable at the suit of the petitioner.
35. A decree of nullity of marriage shall not be made upon the petition—
(a) of the party suffering from the incapacity to consummate the 
marriage, on the ground that the marriage is voidable by virtue of section 
5 (1) (a) of this Decree, unless that party was not aware of the existence 
of the incapacity at the time of the marriage ;
(b) of the party suffering from the disability or the disease, on the 
ground that the marriage is voidable by virtue of section 5 (1) (6) or (*:) of 
this Decree; or
(c) of the wife, on the ground that the marriage is voidable by virtue of 
section 5 (1) (d) of this Decree.
36.— (1) A decree of nullity of marriage shall not be made on the 
ground that the marriage is voidable by virtue of section 5 (1) (a) of this 
Decree unless the court is satisfied that the incapacity to consummate the 
marriage also existed at the time when the hearing of the petition commenced 
and that—
(а) the incapacity is not curable ;
(б) the respondent refuses to submit to such medical examination as the 
court considers necessary for the purpose of determining whether the 
incapacity is curable ; or
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(c) the respondent refuses to submit to proper treatment for the purpose 
of curing the incapacity.
(2) A decree of nullity of marriage shall not be made on the ground that 
the marriage is voidable by virtue of section 5 (1) (d) of this Decree where 
the court is of opinion that—
(a) by reason of—
(*) the petitioner’s knowledge of the incapacity at the time of the
marriage; or
(ii) the conduct of the petitioner since the marriage ; or
(Hi) the lapse of time ; or
(b) for any other reason,
it would, in the particular circumstances of the case, be harsh and oppressive 
to the respondent, or contrary to the public interest, to make a decree.
37. A decree of nullity of marriage shall not be made on the ground that 
the marriage is voidable by virtue of section 5 (1) (b), (c) or (d) of this Decree 
unless the court is satisfied that—
(a) the petitioner was, at the time of the marriage, ignorant of the facts 
constituting the ground;
(b) the petition was filed not later than twelve months after the date of 
the marriage; and
(c) marital intercourse has not taken place with the consent. of the 
petitioner since the petitioner discovered the existence of the facts consti­
tuting the ground.
38.— (1) A decree of nullity under this Decree of a voidable marriage 
shall annul the marriage from and including the date on which the decree 
becomes absolute.
(2) Without prejudice to the operation of subsection (1) above in other 
respects, a decree of nullity under this Decree of a voidable marriage shall 
not render illegitimate a child of the parties born since, or legitimated during, 
the marriage.
Judicial separation
39. Subject to this Division, a petition under this Decree by a party 
to a marriage for a decree of judicial separation may be based on one or more 
of the facts and matters specified in sections 15 (2) and 16 (1) of this Decree.
40. The provisions of sections 18 to 24 and sections 26 to 32 of this 
Decree shall apply to and in relation to a decree of judicial separation and 
proceedings for such a decree and, for the purposes of those provisions 
as so applying, a reference in those provisions to a decree of dissolution 
of marriage shall be read as a reference to a decree of judicial separation.
41. A decree of judicial separation relieves the petitioner from the 
obligation to cohabit with the other party to the marriage while the decree 
remains in operation, but, except as provided by this Division, it shall not 
otherwise affect the marriage or the status, rights and obligations of the 
parties to the marriage.
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42.— (1) While a decree of judicial separation is in operation, either 
party to the marriage may bring proceedings in contract or in tort against the 
other party.
(2) Where a party to a marriage dies intestate as to any property while 
a decree of judicial separation is in operation, that property shall devolve as 
if that party had survived the other party to the marriage.
(3) Where upon, or in consequence of, the making of a decree of judicial 
separation a husband is ordered to pay maintenance to his wife, and the 
maintenance is not duly paid, the husband shall be liable for necessaries 
supplied for the wife’s use.
43. Nothing in this Division shall prevent a wife, during separation 
under a decree of judicial separation, from joining in the exercise of any 
power given to herself and her husband jointly.
44.— (1) A decree of judicial separation shall not prevent the institution 
by either party to the marriage of proceedings for a decree of dissolution of 
marriage.
(2) Subject to the next succeeding subsection, the court may, in any 
proceedings for a decree of dissolution of marriage on the same, or substan­
tially the same, facts as those on which a decree of judicial separation has 
been made, treat the decree of judicial separation as sufficient proof of the 
facts constituting the ground on which that decree was made.
(3) The court shall not grant a decree of dissolution of marriage without 
receiving evidence by the petitioner in support of the petition.
45. Where, after the making of a decree of judicial separation the 
parties voluntarily resume cohabitation, either party may apply for an order 
discharging the decree; and the court shall, if both parties consent to the 
order, or if the court is otherwise satisfied that the parties have voluntarily 
resumed cohabitation, make an order discharging the decree accordingly.
46. The provisions of sections 41 to 45 of this Decree shall apply to and 
in relation to a decree of judicial separation made before the commencement 
of this Decree by a court in Nigeria as well as to such a decree made after 
the commencement of this Decree.
Restitution of conjugal rights
47. A petition under this Decree by a party to a marriage for a decree of 
restitution of conjugal rights may be based on the ground that the parties to 
the marriage, whether or not they have at any time cohabited, are not cohabit­
ing and that, without just cause or excuse, the party against whom the decree 
is sought refuses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the petitioner.
48. An agreement for separation, whether entered into before or after 
the commencement of this Decree, shall not constitute a defence to proceed­
ings under this Decree for a decree of restitution of conjugal rights.
49. The court shall not make a decree of restitution of conjugal rights 
unless it is satisfied—
(a) that the petitioner sincerely desires conjugal rights to be rendered 
by the respondent and is willing to render conjugal rights to the respondent; 
and
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(b) that a written request for cohabitation, expressed in conciliatory 
language, was made to the respondent before the institution of the proceed­
ings, or that there are special circumstances which justify the making of 
the decree notwithstanding that such a request was not made.
50. Where the court makes a decree of restitution of conjugal rights on 
the petition of a husband, the petitioner shall, as soon as practicable after 
the making of the decree, and at such other times as rules of court so require, 
give to the respondent notice, in accordance with rules of court, of the 
provision made by the petitioner, or which the petitioner is willing to make, 
with respect to a home, for the purpose of enabling the respondent to comply 
with the decree.
51. A decree of restitution of conjugal rights shall not be enforceable 
by attachment.
Jactitation of marriage
52. A petition under this Decree for a decree of jactitation of marriage 
may be based on the ground that the respondent has falsely boasted and 
persistently asserted that a marriage has taken place between the respondent 
and the petitioner; but the making of the decree shall be in the discretion 
of the court, notwithstanding anything contained in this Decree.
General
53.— (1) A decree may be made, or refused, under this Part of this 
Decree by reason of facts and circumstances notwithstanding that those 
facts and circumstances, or some of them, took place before the commence­
ment of this Decree or outside Nigeria.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the provisions of sections 18, 19 
and 20 of this Decree shall be deemed to extend to matters which occurred 
before the commencement of this Decree.
54.— (1) Subject to the next succeeding subsection, a matrimonial 
cause of a kind referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) of the definition of 
“matrimonial cause” in section 114 (1) of this Decree shall be instituted by 
petition.
(2) A respondent may, in the answer to the petition, seek any decree or 
declaration that the respondent could have sought in a petition.
(3) Proceedings of a kind referred to in paragraph (c) of the definition 
of “matrimonial cause” in section 114 (1) of this Decree that are in relation 
to proceedings under this Decree for a decree or declaration of a kind 
referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) of that definition—
(a) may be instituted by the same petition as that by which the proceed­
ings for that decree or declaration are instituted ; and
(b) except as permitted by the rules or by leave of the court, shall not
be instituted in any other manner.
(4) The court shall, so far as is practicable, hear and determine at the 
same time all proceedings instituted by the one petition.
55. Save where other provision in that behalf i3 made by this Decree,
the court, upon being satisfied of the existence of any ground in respect of 
which relief is sought, shall make the appropriate decree.
56. A decree of dissolution of marriage or nullity of a voidable marriage 
under this Decree shall, in the first instance, be a decree nisi.
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57.— (1) Where there are children of the marriage in relation to whom 
this section applies, the decree nisi shall not become absolute unless the 
court, by order, has declared—
(a) that it is satisfied that proper arrangements in all the circumstances 
have been made for the welfare and, where appropriate, the advancement 
and education of those children ; or
(b) that there are such special circumstances that the decree nisi should 
become absolute notwithstanding that the court is not satisfied that such 
arrangements have been made.
(2) In this section, “children of the marriage in relation to whom this 
section applies” means—
(a) the children of the marriage who are under the age of sixteen years 
at the date of the decree nisi; and
(b) any children of the marriage in relation to whom the court has, in 
pursuance of the next succeeding subsection, ordered that this section 
shall apply.
(3) The court may, in a particular case, if it is of opinion that there are 
special circumstances which justify its so doing, order that this section 
shall apply in relation to a child of the marriage who has attained the age of 
sixteen years at the date of the decree nisi.
58.— (1) Subject to this section, where in relation to a decree nisi—
(a) section 57 above applies, the decree nisi shall become absolute by 
force of this section at the expiration of—
(i) a period of three months from the making of the decree ; or
(ii) a period of twenty-eight days from the making of an order under
subsection (1) of that section,
whichever is the later ; and
(b) section 57 above does not apply, the decree nisi shall become absolute 
by force of this section upon the expiration of a period of three months 
from the making of the decree.
(2) Where a decree nisi has been made in any proceedings, the court of 
first instance (whether or not it made the decree), or a court in which an 
appeal has been instituted, may, either before or after it has disposed of the 
proceedings or appeal, and whether or not a previous order has been made 
under this subsection—
(a) having regard to the possibility of an appeal or further appeal, make 
an order extending the period at the expiration of which the decree nisi 
will become absolute ; or
(b) if it is satisfied that there are special circumstances which justify its 
so doing, make an order reducing the period at the expiration of which the 
decree nisi will become absolute.
(3) Where an appeal is instituted (whether or not it is the first appeal) 
before a decree nisi has become absolute, then, notwithstanding any order in 
force under the last preceding subsection at the time of the institution of the 
appeal, the decree nisi, unless reversed or rescinded, shall become absolute by 
force of this section—
(a) at the expiration of a period of twenty-eight days from the day on which 
the appeal is determined or discontinued ; or
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(b) on the day on which, in the particular circumstances, the decree would 
have become absolute under subsection (1) above if no appeal had been 
instituted,
whichever is the later.
(4) A decree nisi shall not become absolute by force of this section where 
either of the parties to the marriage has died.
(5) In this section, “appeal”, in relation to a decree nisi, means—
(a) an appeal, application for leave to appeal or intervention, against or 
arising out of—
(i) the decree nisi; or
(ii) an order under the last preceding section in relation to the proceed­
ings in which the decree nisi was made ; or
(b) an application under section 60 or 61 of this Decree for rescission of 
the decree or an appeal or application for leave to appeal arising out of such 
an application.
59.— (1) Where a decree nisi becomes absolute, the registrar or other 
proper officer of the court by which the decree was made shall prepare and 
file a memorandum of the fact and of the date upon which the decree became 
absolute.
(2) Where a decree nisi has become absolute, any person shall be entitled, 
on application to the registrar or other proper officer of the court by which the 
decree was made and on payment of the appropriate fee, to receive a certificate 
signed by the registrar or other proper officer that the decree nisi has become 
absolute; and a certificate given under this subsection shall in all courts 
and for all purposes be evidence of the matters specified in the certificate.
60. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Division, where a 
decree nisi has been made in proceedings for a decree of dissolution of 
marriage, the court may, at any time before the decree becomes absolute, 
upon the application of either of the parties to the marriage, rescind the 
decree on the ground that the parties to the marriage have become reconciled.
61. Where a decree nisi has been made but has not become absolute, 
the court by which the decree was made may, on the application of a party 
to the proceedings, if it is satisfied that there has been a miscarriage of justice 
by reason of fraud, perjury, suppression of evidence or any other circumstance, 
rescind the decree and, if it thinks fit, order that the proceedings be reheard.
P art  III— I n t e r v e n t io n
62. In any proceedings under this Decree where the court requests him 
to do so, the Attorney-General of the Federation may intervene in, and con­
test or argue any question arising in, the proceedings.
63. In proceedings under this Decree for a decree of dissolution or 
nullity of marriage, judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights, or in 
relation to the custody or guardianship of children, where the Attorney- 
General of the Federation has reason to believe that there are matters relevant 
to the proceedings that have not been, or may not be, but ought to be, made 
known to the court, he may, at any time before the proceedings are finally 
disposed of, intervene in the proceedings.
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64.— (1) The Attorney-General of the Federation may, either generally 
or in relation to a matter or class of matters and either in relation to the whole 
of the Federation or to a State, by writing under his hand, delegate all or any 
of his powers and functions under this Part of this Decree (except this 
power of delegation) to the person occupying from time to time, while the 
delegation is in force, the office of Attorney-General of a State ; and a power 
or function so delegated may be exercised or performed by the delegate in 
accordance with the instrument of delegation.
(2) A delegation under this section shall be revocable at will and the 
fact that any power or function has been delegated shall not prevent the 
exercise of the power or the performance of the function by the Attorney- 
General of the Federation.
(3) More than one delegation may be in force under this section at the 
one time in relation to the whole of Nigeria or in relation to the same part of 
Nigeria ; and a delegation in relation to the whole of Nigeria may be in force 
at the same time as a delegation in relation to parts of Nigeria.
65.— (1) In proceedings under this Decree for a decree of dissolution or 
nullity of marriage, judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights, 
where a person applies to the court for leave to intervene in the proceedings 
and the court is satisfied that that person may be able to prove facts relevant 
to the proceedings that have not been, or may not be, but ought to be, 
made known to the court, the court may, at any time before the proceedings 
are finally disposed of, make an order entitling that person to intervene in the 
proceedings.
(2) An order under this section may be made upon such conditions as the 
court thinks fit, including the giving of security for costs.
66. Where an intervention takes place under this Part of this Decree 
after a decree nisi has been made and it is proved that the petitioner has 
been guilty of collusion with intent to cause a perversion of justice, or that 
material facts have not been brought before the court, the court may rescind 
the decree.
67. Where a decree nisi has been made in any proceedings, for the 
purpose of this Part of this Decree, the proceedings shall not be taken to have 
been finally disposed of until the decree nisi has become absolute.
68. A person intervening under this Part or Part II of this Decree shall 
be deemed to be a party in the proceedings with all the rights, duties and 
liabilities of a party.
P a r t  IV— -Ma in t e n a n c e , C u sto d y  a n d  S e t t lem en ts
69. In this Part of this Decree,—
“marriage” includes a purported marriage that is void, but does not 
include one entered into according to Muslim rites or other customary 
law, and “children of the marriage” includes—
{a) any child adopted since the marriage by the husband and wife or 
by either of them with the consent of the other;
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(ib) any child of the husband and wife born before the marriage, 
whether legitimated by the marriage or not; and
(c) any child of either the husband or wife (including an illegitimate 
child of either of them and a child adopted by either of them) if, at the 
relevant time, the child was ordinarily a member of the household of 
the husband and wife,
so however that a child of the husband and wife (including a child born 
before the marriage, whether legitimated by the marriage or not) who has 
been adopted by another person or other persons shall be deemed not to 
be a child of the marriage ;
“relevant time” means in relation to proceedings under this Part of this 
Decree either—
(a) the time immediately preceding the time when the husband and 
wife ceased to live together or, if they have ceased on more than one 
occasion to live together, the time immediately preceding the time 
when they last ceased to live together before the institution of the 
proceedings; or
(b) if the husband and wife were living together at the time when the 
proceedings were instituted, the time immediately preceding the 
institution of the proceedings.
70.— (1) Subject to this section, the court may, in proceedings with 
respect to the maintenance of a party to a marriage, or of children of the 
marriage, other than proceedings for an order for maintenance pending the 
disposal of proceedings, make such order as it thinks proper, having regard 
tojthejmeans, earning capacity and conduct of the parties to the marriage 
and all other relevant circumstances.
(2) Subject to this section and to rules of court, the court may, in 
proceedings for an order for the maintenance of a party to a marriage, or of 
children of the marriage, pending the disposal of proceedings, make such 
order as it thinks proper, having regard to the means, earning capacity and 
conduct of the parties to the marriage and all other relevant circumstances.
(3) The court may make an order for the maintenance of a party not­
withstanding that a decree is or has been made against that party in the 
proceedings to which the proceedings with respect to maintenance are related.
(4) The power of the court to make an order with respect to the main­
tenance of children of the marriage shall not be exercised for the benefit of 
a child who has attained the age of twenty-one years unless the court is of 
opinion that there are special circumstances that justify the making of such 
an order for the benefit of that child.
71. — (1) In proceedings with respect to the custody, guardianship, 
welfare, advancement or education of children of a marriage the court shall 
regard the interests of those children as the paramount consideration; and 
subject thereto, the court may make such order in respect of those matters as 
it thinks proper.
(2) The court may adjourn any proceedings within subsection (1) above 
until a report has been obtained from a welfare officer on such matters 
relevant to the proceedings as the court considers desirable, and any such 
report may thereafter be received in evidence.
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(3) In proceedings with respect to the custody of children of a marriage, 
the court may, if it is satisfied that it is desirable to do so, make an order 
placing the children, or such of them as it thinks fit, in the custody of a person 
other than a party to the marriage.
(4) Where the court makes an order placing a child of a marriage in the 
custody of a party to the marriage, or of a person other than a party to the 
marriage, it may include in the order such provision as it thinks proper for 
access to the child by the other party to the marriage, or by the parties or a 
party to the marriage, as the case may be.
72.— (1) The court may, in proceedings under this Decree, by order 
require the parties to the marriage, or either of them, to make, for the benefit 
of all or any of the parties to, and the children of, the marriage, such a settle­
ment of property to which the parties are, or either of them is, entitled 
(whether in possession or reversion) as the court considers just and equitable 
in the circumstances of the case.
(2) The court may, in proceedings under this Decree, make such order 
as the court considers just and equitable with respect to the application for 
the benefit of all or any of the parties to, and the children of, the marriage of 
the whole or part of property dealt with by ante-nuptial or post-nuptial 
settlements on the parties to the marriage, or either of them.
(3) The power of the court to make orders of the kind referred to in 
this section shall not be exercised for the benefit of a child who has attained 
the age of twenty-one years unless :the court is of opinion that there are 
special circumstances that justify^ the^ making of such an order for the benefit 
of that child.
73.— (1) The court, in exercising its powers under this Part of this 
Decree, may do any or all of the following, that is to say, it may—
(a) order that a lump sum or a weekly, monthly, yearly or other periodic 
sum be paid;
(b) order that a lump sum or a weekly, monthly, yearly or other periodic 
sum be secured;
(c) where a periodic sum is ordered to be paid, order that its payment 
be wholly or partly secured in such manner as the court directs;
(d) order that any necessary deed or instrument be executed, and that 
the documents of title be produced or such other things be done as are 
necessary to enable an order to be carried out effectively or to provide 
security for the due performance of an order;
(e) appoint or remove trustees ;
(/) order that payments be made direct to a party to the marriage, or to 
a trustee to be appointed or to a public officer or other authority for the 
benefit of a party to the marriage;
(g) order that payment of maintenance in respect of a child be made to 
such persons or public officer or other authority as the court specifies ;
(h) make a permanent order, an order pending the disposal of proceed­
ings, or an order for a fixed term or for a life or during joint lives, or until 
further order;
(i) impose terms and conditions ;
(j) in relation to an order made in respect of a matter referred to in 
section 70, 71 or 72 of this Decree, whether made by that court or by
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another court, and [whether made before or after the commencement of 
this Decree,—
(z) discharge the order if the party in whose favour it was made 
marries again or if there is any other just cause for so doing;
(ii) modify the effect of the order or suspend its operation wholly or 
in part and either until further order or until a fixed time or the happening 
of some future event;
(Hi) revive wholly or in part an order suspended under sub-paragraph
(ii) above; or
(iv) subject to subsection (2) below, vary the order so as to increase 
or decrease any amount ordered to be paid by the order ;
(k) sanction an agreement for the acceptance of a lump sum or periodic 
sums or other benefits in lieu of rights under an order made in respect of a 
matter referred to in section 70, 71 or 72 of this Decree, or any right to seek 
such an order;
(1) make any other order (whether or not of the same nature as those 
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs of this subsection, and whether or 
not it is in accordance with the practice under any other enactment or law 
before the commencement of this Decree) which it thinks it is necessary to 
make to do justice ;
(m) include in its decree under another Part of this Decree its order 
under this Part; and
(n) subject to this Decree, make an order under this Part of this Decree 
at any time before or after the making of a decree under another Part 
thereof.
(2) The court shall not make an order increasing or decreasing an 
amount ordered to be paid by an order unless it is satisfied—
(а) that, since the order was made or last varied, the circumstances of the 
parties or either of them, or of any child for whose benefit the order was 
made, have changed to such an extent as to justify its so doing ; or
(б) that material facts were withheld from the court that made the order 
or from a court that varied the order or material evidence previously given 
before such a court was false.
(3) The court shall not make an order increasing or decreasing—
(a) the security for the payment of a periodic sum ordered to be paid ; or
(b) the amount of a lump sum or periodic sum ordered to be secured, 
unless it is satisfied that material facts were withheld from the court that made 
the order, or from a court that varied the order, or that material evidence given 
before such a court was false.
74.— (1) Where a person who is directed by an order under this Part of 
this Decree to execute a deed or instrument refuses or neglects to do so, the 
court may appoint an officer of the court or other person to execute the deed or 
instrument in his name and to do all acts and things necessary to give validity 
and operation to the deed or instrument.
(2) The execution of the deed or instrument by the person so appointed 
shall have the same force and validity as if it had been executed by the person • 
directed by the order to execute it.
(3) Where a deed or instrument is executed pursuant to this section, the 
court may make such order as it thinks just as to the payment of the costs and 
expenses of and incidental to the preparation and execution of the deed or 
instrument.
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75.— (1) Save as provided by this section, the court shall not make an 
order under this Part of this Decree where the petition for the principal relief 
has been dismissed.
(2) Where—
(a) the petition for the principal relief has been dismissed after a hearing 
on the merits ; and
(b) the court is satisfied that— -
(i) the proceedings for the principal relief were instituted in good faith 
to obtain that relief; and
(ii) there is no reasonable likelihood of the parties becoming reconciled, 
the court may, if it considers that it is desirable to do so, make an order 
under this Part of this Decree, other than an order under section 72 of 
this Decree.
(3) The court shall not make an order by virtue of subsection (2) above 
unless it has heard the proceedings for the order at the same time as, or 
immediately after, the proceedings for the principal relief.
(4) In this section, “principal relief” means relief of a kind referred to in 
paragraph (a) or (b) of the definition of “matrimonial cause” in section 114 (1) 
of this Decree.
P a r t  V — A ppea ls
76.— (1) Subject to section 77 of this Decree, an appeal shall lie as of 
right from a decision of the High Court of a State in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction under this Decree—
(a) to the Court of Appeal of the State and thence to the Supreme 
Court; or
(b) if there is no such Court of Appeal, to the Supreme Court.
(2) In this section “decision” means any decree, order or other deter­
mination.
77. An appeal under this Decree—
(a) from any order made ex parte ;
(b) from any order relating only to costs ;
(c) from any order made with the consent of the parties ; or
(d) in the case of a party to proceedings for dissolution or nullity of 
marriage who, having had time and opportunity to appeal from any 
decree nisi in the proceedings, has not so appealed, from any decree 
absolute founded upon the decree nisi,
shall lie only with the leave of the court from which, or the court to which, 
the appeal is sought to be made.
78. Subject to section 77 of this Decree, where—
(a) a maintenance order is registered in a court of summary jurisdiction 
under section 91 (1) of this Decree; and
(b) in relation to the maintenance order—
(*) that court makes any order or does any other thing by way of
enforcement of the maintenance order ; or
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(ii) that or another court of summary jurisdiction makes an attach­
ment of earnings order under paragraph 4 of Schedule 3 to this Decree,
then, without prejudice to any right of appeal which may exist against 
the making of the maintenance order, there shall exist in respect of the 
order made or other thing done by the court such rights of appeal (if any) 
as would have existed if the order had been made or the other thing 
done in the exercise of the court’s ordinary civil jurisdiction.
79. The court hearing an appeal under this Part—
(a) is hereby invested with the necessary jurisdiction ;
(b) may confirm, vary or reverse any decree, judgment, order or other 
determination appealed from, order a re-hearing or make such other 
order as it considers proper to determine the real issue of the appeal; and
(c) subject to this Part, shall otherwise have the same powers as it has 
in its ordinary appellate jurisdiction in civil proceedings.
P art  V I— R e c o g n it io n  o f  D ecrees
80. Where a decree is made under this Decree it shall have effect in all 
States of the Federation.
81— (1) A decree of dissolution or nullity of marriage made before the 
commencement of this Decree by a court in Nigeria or made after the 
commencement of this Decree by such a court in accordance with the 
transitional provisions of this Decree shall be recognized as valid in all 
States of the Federation.
(2) A dissolution or annulment of a marriage effected in accordance 
with the law of a foreign country shall be recognised as valid in Nigeria 
where, at the date of the institution of the proceedings that resulted in the 
dissolution or annulment, the party at whose instance the dissolution or 
annulment was effected (or, if it was effected at the instance of both parties, 
either of those parties) —
(а) in the case of the dissolution of a marriage or the annulment of a 
voidable marriage, was domiciled in that foreign country ; or
(б) in the case of the annulment of a void marriage, was domiciled or 
resident in that foreign country.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) above—
(a) where a dissolution of a marriage was effected in accordance with the 
law of a foreign country at the instance of a deserted wife who was 
domiciled in that foreign country either immediately before her marriage 
or immediately before the desertion, she shall be deemed to have been 
domiciled in that foreign country at the date of the institution of the 
proceedings that resulted in the dissolution ; and
(b) a wife who, at the date of the institution of the proceedings that 
resulted in a dissolution or annulment of her marriage in accordance with 
the law of a foreign country, was resident in that foreign country and had 
been so resident for a period of three years immediately preceding that 
date shall be deemed to have been domiciled in that foreign country at 
that date.
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(4) A dissolution or annulment of a marriage effected in accordance 
with the law of a foreign country, not being a dissolution or annulment to 
which subsection (2) above applies, shall be recognised as valid in Nigeria 
if its validity would have been recognised under the law of the foreign 
country in which, in the case of a dissoiution, the parties were domiciled at 
the date of the dissolution or in which, in the case of an annulment, either 
party was domiciled at the date of the annulment.
(5) Any dissolution or annulment of a marriage that would be recognised 
as valid under the rules of private international law but to which none of 
the preceding provisions of this section applies shall be recognised as valid 
in Nigeria, and the operation of this subsection shall not be limited by 
any implication from those provisions.
(6) For the purposes of this section, a court in Nigeria, in considering 
the validity of a dissolution or annulment effected under the law of a foreign 
country, may treat as proved any facts found by a court of the foreign country 
or otherwise established for the purposes of the law of the foreign country.
(7) A dissolution or annulment of a marriage shall not be recognised as 
valid by virtue of subsection (2) or (4) above where, under the rules of 
private international law, recognition of its validity would be refused on the 
ground that a’party to thejmarriage had been denied natural justice or that the 
dissolution or annulment had been obtained by fraud.
(8) Subsections (2) to (7) above shall apply in relation to dissolutions 
and annulments effected, whether by decree, legislation or otherwise, 
before or after the commencement of this Decree.
(9) In this section, “foreign country” means a country, or part of a 
country, outside the Federation.
P art VII— E v id en ce
82.— (1) For the purposes of this Decree, a matter of fact shall be 
taken to be proved if it is established to the reasonable satisfaction of the 
court.
(2) Where a provision of this Decree requires the court to be satisfied 
of the existence of any ground or fact or as to any other matter, it shall be 
sufficient if the court is reasonably satisfied of the existence of that ground or 
fact, or as to that other matter.
83.— (1) Subject to this Part of this Decree, all parties and the wives 
and husbands of all parties are competent and compellable witnesses in 
proceedings under this Decree.
(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, in proceedings under this Decree 
a husband is competent, but not compellable, to disclose communications 
made between him and his wife during the marriage, and a wife is competent, 
but not compellable, to disclose communications made between her and her 
husband during the marriage.
(3) Where a husband and wife are both parties to proceedings under 
this Decree each of them is competent and compellable to disclose communi­
cations made between them during the marriage.
(4) Subsections (2) and (3) above shall apply to communications made 
before, as well as to communications made on or after, the commencement 
of this Decree.
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84. Notwithstanding any rule of law, in proceedings under this Decree 
either party to a marriage may give evidence proving or tending to prove that 
the parties to the marriage did not have sexual relations with each other at any 
particular time, but shall not be compellable to give such evidence if it 
would show or tend to show that a child born to the wife during the marriage 
was illegitimate.
85.— (1) A witness in proceedings under this Decree who, being a party, 
voluntarily gives evidence on his own behalf or, whether he is a party or not, 
is called by a party may be asked, and shall be bound to answer, a question 
the answer to which may show, or tend to show, adultery by or with the 
witness, where proof of that adultery would be material to the decision of the 
case.
(2) Except as provided by subsection (1) above, a witness in proceedings 
under this Decree (whether a party to the proceedings or not) shall not be 
liable to be asked, or bound to answer, a question the answer to which may 
show, or tend to show, that the witness has committed adultery.
86. In proceedings under this Decree the court may receive as evidence 
of the facts stated in it a document purporting to be either the original or a 
certified copy of any certificate, entry or record of a birth, death or marriage 
alleged to have taken place whether in Nigeria or elsewhere.
87.— (1) In any proceedings under this Decree—
(a) evidence that a person, being a party to a marriage, was after the 
marriage convicted, whether in Nigeria or elsewhere, of the crime or 
offence of rape or any other crime or offence in which sexual intercourse 
with a person of the opposite sex is an element shall be evidence that the 
former person committed adultery with the person on whom the rape or 
other crime or offence was committed ; and
(ib) evidence that a person, being a party to a marriage, was after the 
marriage convicted, whether in Nigeria or elsewhere, of the crime or 
offence of sodomy or bestiality shall be evidence that that person committed 
sodomy or bestiality.
(2) In proceedings under this Decree a certificate of the conviction of a 
person for a crime or offence, on a date specified in the certificate, by a court 
of a State of the Federation, being a certificate purporting to be signed by the 
registrar or other appropriate officer of that court, shall be evidence of the 
fact and date of the conviction and, if the certificate shows that a sentence of 
imprisonment was imposed, of the fact that that sentence was imposed.
P art  VIII— E n fo r c e m e n t  o f  D ecrees
88.— (1) Subject to rules of court, a court having jurisdiction under 
this Decree may enforce by attachment or other process an order made by it 
under this Decree for payment of maintenance or costs or in respect of the 
custody of, or access to, children.
(2) The court shall order the release from custody of a person who has 
been attached under this section upon being satisfied that that person has 
complied with the order in respect of which he was attached and may, at 
any time, if the court is satisfied that it is just and equitable to do so, order 
the release of such a person notwithstanding that he has not complied with 
that order.
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(3) Where attachment or other process remains unsatisfied for not less 
than six weeks, the person who has been attached under this section in 
consequence of his failure to comply with an order for the payment of 
maintenance or costs shall be deemed to be an insolvent person and may 
be kept in custody under the attachment for a period not exceeding six 
months after the expiry of the period of six weeks aforesaid, unless the 
court otherwise orders.
89.— (1) A decree made under this Decree by a court having jurisdiction 
under this Decree may, in accordance with rules of court, be registered in 
another court having jurisdiction under this Decree.
(2) A decree registered in a court under this section may, subject to 
rules of court, be enforced as if it had been made by the court in which it 
is registered.
(3) A reference in this Part of this Decree to the court by which a decree 
was made shall be construed as including a reference to a court in which the 
decree is registered under this section.
90.— (1) Where a decree made under this Decree orders the payment 
of money to a person, any moneys payable under the decree may be recovered 
as a judgment debt in a court of competent jurisdiction.
(2) A decree made under this Decree may be enforced, by leave of 
the court by which it was made (or in which it is registered) and on such 
terms and conditions as the court thinks fit, against the estate of a party 
after that party’s death.
91.— (1) Where pursuant to this Decree a court has made an order for 
payment of maintenance, the order may be registered in accordance with 
rules of court in a court of summary jurisdiction of a State of the Federation, 
and an order so registered may, subject to rules of court, be enforced in the 
same manner as if it were an order for maintenance of a deserted wife made 
by the court of summary jurisdiction.
(2) The several courts of summary jurisdiction of the States of the 
Federation are hereby authorised to do all things necessary for the purposes 
of subsection (1) above.
92. An order under this Decree for the payment of maintenance may 
be enforced in accordance with Schedule 3 to this Decree and the provisions 
of that Schedule shall have effect in relation to the enforcement of any such 
order.
93. Subject to this Decree, rules of court may make provision for the 
enforcement of decrees made under this Decree by means other than those 
specified in the preceding provisions of this Part of this Decree.
94. A decree made in a matrimonial cause before the commencement 
of this Decree by a court in Nigeria or by an officer of such a court may be 
enforced—
(a) in the manner in which it could be enforced if this Decree had not 
been made; or
(b) subject to rules of court, in the manner in which a like decree 
made by that court under this Decree may be enforced.
95. Section 112 of this Decree shall include power to make rules of 
court for the purposes of this Part and shall apply in relation to any such 
rules.
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P a rt  IX— T r a n sit io n a l  P r o v isio n s
96. In this Part of this Decree,—
“pending proceedings” means proceedings instituted in the High Court 
of a State before the date of commencement of this Decree but not 
completed before that date ;
“the court”, in relation to pending proceedings, means the court in 
which the proceedings were instituted.
97. Pending proceedings constituting a matrimonial cause may be 
continued and dealt with in accordance with and by virtue of this Part of 
this Decree and not otherwise.
98— (1) Except as provided by this Part of this Decree, the law to be 
applied, and the practice and procedure to be followed, in and in relation to 
pending proceedings, being proceedings for a decree of dissolution or nullity 
of marriage or of judicial separation, shall be the same as if this Decree had 
not been made.
(2) Without prejudice to any power that the court has by virtue of 
subsection (1) above to amend or permit the amendment of a petition, the 
court may in any such proceedings, upon application by the petitioner and 
on such conditions, if any, as the court thinks fit, permit the petitioner to 
amend the petition so as to include a ground of relief provided by this Decree 
and not already included in the petition; and where such a ground is so 
included, then, in relation to that ground, the provisions of this Decree 
applicable in relation to that ground shall apply as if the proceedings had 
been instituted under this Decree.
(3) Notwithstanding section 114 (4) of this Decree, a reference in this 
Decree to the date of the petition or the date of institution of proceedings 
shall, in relation to a ground of relief included or sought to be included in a 
petition by virtue of the subsection (2) above, be read as a reference to the 
date on which the application for leave to amend the petition was instituted.
(4) Where, in pending proceedings for a decree of dissolution of marri­
age, the facts and circumstances that have been established, whether before 
or after the commencement of this Decree, by the petitioner in support of 
a ground included in the petition are such that they would have established 
a ground or grounds for the same relief under this Decree if this Decree had 
been in force at the date of the petition and the proceedings had been institu­
ted under this Decree, the bars to relief applicable in relation to the ground 
included in the petition shall be those that would be applicable in proceedings 
on the ground that would have been established under this Decree, or, if 
more than one ground would have been established, such one of those 
grounds as most nearly corresponds to the ground included in the petition, 
and no other bars.
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(5) In the case of pending proceedings, being proceedings for a decree 
of nullity of marriage on the ground that the marriage is voidable by reason 
of the parties being within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity 
under the law of a State, a decree of nullity of the marriage shall not be made 
after the commencement of this Decree if the parties were not at the time 
of the marriage within one of the degrees of consanguinity or affinity set out 
in Schedule 1 to this Decree.
(6) A decree of dissolution or nullity of marriage or of judicial separation 
may be made in pending proceedings either—
(a) on any basis of jurisdiction that would have been applicable to the 
proceedings if this Decree had not been made, or
(b) on any basis of jurisdiction applicable to proceedings under Part II 
of this Decree for the same relief.
(7) A reference in this section to a bar to relief shall be read as a reference 
to a bar to the granting of the relief sought, whether absolute or in the 
discretion of the court, other than a bar arising by virtue of section 30 of 
this Decree.
(8) In this section—
“date of the petition”, in relation to a petition, means the date on which 
the petition was filed in, or issued out of, a court;
“petition” includes a writ of summons, a cross-petition, a counter­
petition, a counter-claim and an answer;
“petitioner” includes a plaintiff, a cross-petitioner, a counter-petitioner, 
a defendant counter-claiming and a respondent seeking relief in an answer.
99.— (1) Subject to section 101 of this Decree, the provisions of sections 
11 to 14, 18 to 20 (including in respect of sections 18 to 20 those sections as 
applying to proceedings for a decree of judicial separation by virtue of 
section 40), sections 33,38,41 to 45 and 53, sections 62 to 95, and sections 103 to 
112 of this Decree apply, so far as they are capable of application, to and in 
relation to pending proceedings, being proceedings for a decree of dissolution 
or nullity of marriage or judicial separation, as if those proceedings had been 
instituted under this Decree and any decree made in the proceedings had 
been made in proceedings so instituted.
(2) Subject to section 101 of this Decree, the provisions of sections 56 
to 61 of this Decree shall apply to and in relation to pending proceedings, 
being proceedings for a decree of dissolution of marriage or nullity of a 
voidable marriage other than proceedings in which a decree nisi has been 
pronounced before the commencement of this Decree, as if those pending 
proceedings had been instituted under this Decree and any decree made in 
the proceedings had been made in proceedings so instituted.
100. Subject to section 101 of this Decree, pending'proceedings consti­
tuting a matrimonial cause, not being proceedings for a decree of dissolution 
or nullity of marriage or of judicial separation, shall be deemed to have been 
instituted and dealt with under this Decree and may be continued and dealt 
with under this Decree.
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101.— (1) Notwithstanding section 97 of this Decree, where in any 
proceedings constituting a matrimonial cause a decree has been made before 
the commencement of this Decree, the following provisions of this subsection 
shall have effect as if it had not been made, that is to say—
(a) any appeal in respect of that decree may be continued or instituted ;
(ib) any new trial or rehearing ordered upon the hearing of such an 
appeal, or upon an appeal heard before the commencement of this Decree, 
may be had and completed ; and
(c) any decree may be made upon any such appeal, new trial or rehearing, 
and, if a decree so made is a decree nisi, the decree may be made or become 
absolute.
(2) In this section, “appeal” includes—
(a) an application for leave or special leave to appeal;
(b) an application for a new trial or a rehearing; and
(c) an intervention.
102.— (1) Subject to this section, section 15 (2) (g) of this Decree shall be 
deemed to apply in relation to a decree of restitution of conjugal rights made 
by a court in Nigeria before the commencement of this Decree in like manner 
as it applies in relation to decrees made under this Decree.
(2) Where there has been, whether before or after the commencement of 
this Decree, a failure to comply with a decree referred to in subsection (1) 
above made before the commencement of this Decree and that failure 
enabled, or would, if this Decree had not been made, have enabled, the 
party in whose favour the decree of restitution of conjugal rights was made 
to institute proceedings for dissolution of marriage forthwith upon that 
failure, proceedings for dissolution of marriage may be instituted by that 
party under this Decree as if the words “for a period of not less than one 
year” were omitted from the said section 15 (2) (g) and as if section 30 of this 
Decree had no application to proceedings on the ground specified in that 
paragraph.
(3) For the purposes of proceedings brought by virtue of this section 
(other than proceedings under subsection (2) above), the requirements of 
a decree of restitution of conjugal rights made before the commencement of 
this Decree shall, notwithstanding that any time limited by law for compliance 
with those requirements has expired, be deemed to have continued so long 
as the decree did not, by order of a competent court, cease to have effect.
P art X — M iscella n eo u s
103.— (1) Except to the extent to which rules of court make provision 
for proceedings or part of proceedings to be heard in chambers, the jurisdic­
tion of a court under this Decree shall, subject to the next succeeding sub­
section, be exercised in open court.
(2) Where in proceedings under this Decree the court is satisfied that 
there are special circumstances that make it desirable in the interests of the 
proper administration of justice that the proceedings or any part of the 
proceedings should not be heard in open court, the court may order that 
any persons not being parties to the proceedings or their legal advisers 
shall be excluded during the hearing of the proceedings or the part of the 
proceedings, as the case may be.
104. Proceedings at first instance constituting a matrimonial cause 
shall be heard and determined by a judge sitting alone as the court.
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105.—t(1) In proceedings under this Decree, the court may set aside 
or restrain the making of an instrument or disposition by or on behalf of, 
or by direction or in the interest, of, a party, if it is made or proposed to be 
made to defeat an existing or anticipated order in those proceedings for 
costs, damages, maintenance or the making or variation of a settlement.
(2) The court may order that any money or real or personal property 
dealt with by any such instrument or disposition may be taken in execution 
or charged with the payment of such sums for costs, damages or maintenance 
as the court directs, or that the proceeds of a sale shall be paid into court to 
abide its order.
(3) The court shall have regard to the interests, and shall make any 
order proper for the protection, of a bona fide purchaser or other person 
interested.
(4) A party or a person acting in collusion with a party may be ordered 
to pay the costs of any other party, or of a bona fide purchaser or other person 
interested, of and incidental to any such instrument or disposition and the 
setting aside or restraining of the instrument or disposition.
(5) In this section, “disposition” includes a sale and a gift.
106. Service of process of a court under this Decree may be effected 
in or outside the Federation in accordance with rules of court, so however 
that the court, where it thinks it necessary or expedient to do so, may dispense 
with service of process.
107. A minister of religion shall not be bound to solemnize the marriage 
of a person whose former marriage has been dissolved, whether in Nigeria 
or elsewhere, otherwise than by death.
108.— (1) Except as provided by this section, a person shall not in 
relation to any proceedings under this Decree print or publish, or cause to be 
printed or published, any account of evidence in the proceedings, or any 
other account or particulars of the proceedings, other than—
(a) the names, addresses and occupations of the parties and witnesses, 
and the name or names of the member or members of the court and 
of the legal advisers of the parties ;
(b)[ a concise statement of the nature and grounds of the proceedings and 
of the charges, defences and counter-charges in support of which evidence 
has been given;
(c) submissions on any points of law arising in the course of the proceed­
ings, and the decision of the court on those points ; or
(d) the judgement of the court and observations made by the court in 
giving judgement.
(2) The court may, if it thinks fit in any particular proceedings, order 
that none of the matters referred to in subsection (1) (a) to (d) above shall be 
printed or published, or that any matter or part of a matter so referred to 
shall not be printed or published.
(3) Any person who contravenes subsection (1) above, or prints or 
publishes, or causes to be printed or published, any matter, or part of a matter, 
in contravention of an order of a court under subsection (2) above shall be 
guilty of an offence punishable on conviction—
■ ' (a) in the case of a first offence (or a second or subsequent offence if 
prosecuted summarily) by a fine not exceeding five hundred pounds or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months ; and
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(b) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, being an offence pro­
secuted otherwise than in a summary manner, by a fine not exceeding one 
thousand pounds or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.
(4) Proceedings for an offence against this section shall not be com­
menced except by, or with the written consent of, the Attorney-General of 
the Federation.
(5) The preceding provisions of this section shall not apply to or in 
relation to—
(a) the printing of any pleading, transcript of evidence or other document 
for use in connection with proceedings in any court or the communication 
of any such document to persons concerned in the proceedings ;
(ib) the printing or publishing of a notice or report in pursuance of the 
direction of a court;
(c) the printing or publishing of any publication bona fide intended 
primarily for the use of members of the legal or medical profession, being—
(i) a separate volume or part of a series of law reports ; or
(ii) any other publication of a technical character ; or
(d) the printing or publishing of a photograph of any person, not being 
a photograph forming part of the evidence in proceedings under this 
Decree.
(6) In this section, “court” includes an officer of a court investigating a 
matter in accordance with rules of court and “judgement of the court” 
includes a report made to a court by such an officer.
109. A court exercising jurisdiction under this Decree may grant an 
injunction, by interlocutory order or otherwise (including an injunction in 
aid of the enforcement of a decree), in any case in which it appears to the 
court to be just or convenient to do so and either unconditionally or upon 
such terms and conditions as the court thinks just.
110. In proceedings under this Decree the court may, subject to rules 
of court, make such order as to costs and security for costs, whether by way of 
interlocutory order or otherwise, as the court thinks just.
111.—(1) The court may at any stage of proceedings under this Decree, 
if it is satisfied that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, dismiss the 
proceedings.
(2) The court may at any stage of proceedings under this Decree, if it is 
satisfied that the allegations made in respect of a party to the proceedings are 
frivolous or vexatious, order that that party be dismissed from the proceed­
ings.
112.—(1) The Chief Justice of Nigeria after consultation with the 
Chief Justices of the States and the Presidents of any Courts of Appeal therein 
may make rules for or in relation to the practice and procedure of the courts 
(including courts of summary jurisdiction) having jurisdiction under this 
Decree, or any of them, and without prejudice to the generality hereof, 
the rules may—
(a) prescribe matters relating to the costs of proceedings and the assess­
ment or taxation of those costs;
(b) prescribe the court fees to be charged in respect of proceedings under 
this Decree or in relation to declarations, affidavits, instruments, documents, 
searches or extracts;
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(t) authorise a court to refer to an officer of the court for investigation, 
report and recommendation claims or applications for or relating to the 
custody of children or maintenance or any other matter before the court;
(d) authorise an officer making an investigation referred to in paragraph
(c) above to take evidence on oath or affirmation and to obtain and receive 
in evidence a report from a welfare officer, and provide for the summoning 
of witnesses before an officer making such an investigation for the purpose 
of giving evidence or producing books and documents ;
(e) regulate the procedure of a court upon receiving a report of an officer 
who has made an investigation referred to in paragraph (c) above ;
(/) authorise an officer of a court to perform and exercise on behalf of 
the court or otherwise, in relation to proceedings under this Decree, 
functions and powers not involving the exercise of the judicial power of the 
Federation or of a State and enable the court to review the decision of that 
officer in relation to the performance or exercise of any function or power ;
(5) provide for proceedings in forma pauperis and the remission of court 
fees in the case of persons authorised to proceed in forma pauperis ; and
(h) prescribe matters incidental to the matters specified in the preceding 
paragraphs of this subsection.
(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, the power of the appropriate 
authority under the law of a State to make rules of court in relation to the 
practice and procedure of courts of summary jurisdiction, the High Court or 
the Court of Appeal of the State shall extend to the making for that State 
of rules of court for any matter in respect of which rules may be made 
under subsection (1) above.
(3) Rules made under subsection (2) above shall be subject to rules 
made under subsection (1) above ; and, if there is any inconsistency between 
rules made under those subsections, the rules made under subsection (1) 
above shall prevail and the rules made under subsection (2) above shall be 
void to the extent of the inconsistency.
(4) Notwithstanding section 8 or any other provision of this Decree, 
the rules of court in force immediately before the commencement of this 
Decree in respect of divorce and matrimonial causes shall continue in force 
with necessary modifications until they are expressly revoked by rules of 
court made under subsection (1) above, which said subsection shall be 
deemed to include power to make such a revocation.
113. For the avoidance of doubt it is declared—
(a) that a decree, judgement, order or sentence of the High Court of a 
State of the Federation given, made or pronounced before the commence­
ment of this Decree in the exercise of jurisdiction invested or conferred 
upon it in respect of matrimonial causes and in force immediately before 
the commencement of this Decree shall, notwithstanding the repeal of any 
legislation under which the decree, judgement, order or sentence was 
given, made or pronounced, continue to have effect throughout the 
Federation; and
(6) that the validity of a decree, judgement, order or sentence given, 
made or pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction in the Common­
wealth (elsewhere than Nigeria) before the commencement of this Decree 
by virtue of any enactment passed or made in respect of a marriage entered 
into during the war of 1939-1945 and in force immediately before the 
commencement of this Decree shall, if reciprocal arrangements are made
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for the recognition of the like decrees, judgements, orders or sentences 
given, made or pronounced in Nigeria in respect of any such marriages, be 
accorded in Nigeria the same recognition as if they were decrees, judgements, 
orders or sentences given, made or pronounced by a court of competent 
jurisdiction in Nigeria.
114.— (1) In this Decree unless the contrary intention appears—
“adopted”, in relation to a child, means adopted under the law of any 
place (whether in or out of Nigeria) relating to the adoption of children ;
“appeal” includes an application for a rehearing ;
“court” or “the court”, in relation to any proceedings, means the court 
exercising jurisdiction in those proceedings by virtue of this Decree ;
“court of summary jurisdiction” means a magistrate’s court or District 
Court;
“crime” means an offence punishable by imprisonment;
“cross-petition” includes an answer in which the respondent to a petition 
seeks a decree or declaration of a kind referred to in paragraph (a) or (6) of 
the definition of “matrimonial cause” in this subsection;
“decree” (not being a Decree having effect as an enactment made by the 
Federal Military Government) includes a decree absolute or decree nisi, a 
judgement, and any order dismissing a petition or application or refusing 
to make a decree or order;
“marriage conciliator” means a person authorised to endeavour to effect 
marital reconciliations or a person nominated by a judge, in pursuance of 
section 11 of this Decree, to endeavour to effect a reconciliation ; 
“matrimonial cause” means—
(a) proceedings for a decree of—
(i) dissolution of marriage ;
(«) nullity of marriage;
(iii) judicial separation;
(iv) restitution of conjugal rights ; or
(v) jactitation of marriage;
(b) proceedings for a declaration of the validity of the dissolution 
or annulment of a marriage by decree or otherwise or of a decree of 
judicial separation, or for a declaration of the continued operation of a 
decree of judicial separation, or for an order discharging a decree of 
judicial separation;
(c) proceedings with respect to the maintenance of a party to the 
proceedings, settlements, damages in respect of adultery, the custody 
or guardianship of infant children of the marriage or the maintenance, 
welfare, advancement or education of children of the marriage, being 
proceedings in relation to concurrent, pending or completed proceedings 
of a kind referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) above, including proceedings 
of such a kind pending at, or completed before, the commencement of 
this Decree;
(d) any other proceedings (including proceedings with respect to the 
enforcement of a decree, the service of process or costs) in relation to 
concurrent, pending or completed proceedings of a kind referred to in 
paragraph (a), (b) or (e) above, including proceedings of such a kind 
pending at, or completed before, the commencement of this Decree ; or
Matrimonial Causes 1970 No. 18 A  95
{e) proceedings seeking leave to institute proceedings for a decree of 
dissolution of marriage or of judicial separation, or proceedings in 
relation to proceedings seeking such leave;
“petition” includes a cross-petition ;
“petitioner” includes a cross-petitioner;
“proceedings” includes cross-proceedings;
“respondent” includes a petitioner against whom there is a cross­
petition ;
“State” means a State of the Federation ;
“welfare officer” means a person authorised by the Attorney-General 
of the Federation by instrument in writing to perform duties as a welfare 
officer for the purposes of this Decree, being—
(а) a person who is permanently or temporarily employed in the 
public service of the Federation ; or
(б) a person who is permanently or temporarily employed in the 
public service of a State and whose services have been made available 
for the purposes of this Decree in pursuance of an arrangement between 
the Federation and the State ; or
(c) a person nominated by an organisation undertaking child welfare 
activities.
(2) A reference in this Decree to a court having jurisdiction under this 
Decree or exercising jurisdiction under this Decree shall be deemed not to 
include a reference to a court having jurisdiction under this Decree or 
exercising jurisdiction under this Decree by virtue only of section 91 or 92 
of this Decree or Schedule 3 to this Decree.
(3) In this Decree “this Division” occurring in a group of sections 
under an italicised cross-heading means that group of sections.
(4) For the purposes of this Decree, the date of a petition shall be taken 
to be the date on which the petition was filed in a court having jurisdiction 
under this Decree.
(5) For the purposes of this Decree, a person shall be deemed to have 
been convicted of an offence if he has been convicted of that offence otherwise 
than by a court in its exercise of summary jurisdiction or on appeal from 
such a court.
(6) Nothing in this Decree shall have effect in relation to a marriage 
which is not a monogamous marriage or which is entered into in accordance 
with Muslim rites or with any customary law in force in Nigeria.
115.— (1) In section 33 of the Marriage Act—
(а) the marginal note “Marriage with deceased wife’s sister or niece 
lawful.” shall be deleted and the marginal note “Invalid marriages.” 
shall be applied to the whole section ; and
(б) in subsection (1), the words “A marriage may be lawfully celebrated 
under this Act between a man and the sister or niece of his deceased wife, 
but, save as aforesaid,” and the words “which, if celebrated in England, 
would be null and void on the ground of kindred or affinity, or” shall be 
deleted.
(2) In the State Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act (formerly cited as the 
Regional Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act)—
(a) the words “and, to the extent that”, and all the following words, in 
the Long Title;
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(6) the words “and whereas”, and all the following words, in the 
Preamble;
(c) the definitions of “marriage” and “matrimonial cause” in section 2; and
(d) section 4, section 5 (without prejudice to anything saved thereby or 
lawfully done thereunder) and section 6,
are hereby repealed.
(3) For section 147 of the Evidence Act there shall be substituted the 
following section—
“Presump- 147. Without prejudice to section 84 of the Matrimonial
ti°n of Causes Decree 1970, where a person was born during the
continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any 
man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, 
the mother remaining unmarried, the court shall presume that 
the person in question is the legitimate son of that man.”
(4) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that, if there is any 
inconsistency between this Decree and any other law, this Decree shall 
prevail and that other law shall be void to the extent of the inconsistency.
116.— 1^) This Decree may be cited as the Matrimonial Causes Decree 
1970 and shall apply throughout the Federation.
(2) This Decree shall come into operation on a day to be appointed by 
the Federal Commissioner for Justice by order published in the Federal 
Gazette.
SCHEDULES
SCHEDULE I Section 3
Prohibited D egrees of Consanguinity and A ffinity 
Consanguinity Affinity
Marriage of a man is prohibited if the woman is, or has been, his—
Wife’s mother 
Wife’s grandmother 
Wife’s daughter 
Wife’s son’s daughter 
Wife’s daughter’s daughter 
Father’s wife 
Grandfather’s wife 
Son’s wife 
Son’s son’s wife 
Daughter’s son’s wife 
Marriage of a woman is prohibited if the man is, or has been, her—
Ancestress
Descendant
Sister
Father’s sister 
Mother’s sister 
Brother’s daughter 
Sister’s daughter
Husband’s father 
Husband’s grandfather 
Husband’s son 
Husband’s son’s son 
Husband’s daughter’s son 
Mother’s husband 
Grandmother’s husband 
Daughter’s husband 
Son’s daughter’s husband 
Daughter’s daughter’s husband 
For the purposes of this Schedule, it is immaterial whether the relation­
ship is of the whole blood or half-blood, or whether it is traced through, or to, 
any person of illegitimate birth.
Ancestor 
Descendant 
Brother
Father’s brother 
Mother’s brother 
Brother’s son 
Sister’s son
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SCHEDULE 2 Section 14
O ath or A ffirmation by M arriage Conciliator
I, A.B., do swear by Almighty God (or solemnly and sincerely affirm 
and declare) that I will not disclose to any person any communication or 
admission made to me in my capacity as a marriage conciliator except in so 
far as it is necessary for me to do so for the proper discharge of my function 
as a marriage conciliator.
SCHEDULE 3 Section 92
Enforcement of O rders for M aintenance
1. In this Schedule, unless the contrary intention appears—
“attachment of earnings order” means an order under paragraph 4 below;
“defendant”, in relation to a maintenance order, means the person liable 
make payments under the order ;
“earnings”, in relation to a defendant, means any sums payable to the 
defendant— -
(a) by way of wages or salary (including any fees, bonus, commission, 
overtime pay or other emoluments payable in addition to wages or 
salary); or
(b) by way of pension, including—
(*) an annuity in respect of past services, whether or not the services 
were rendered to the person paying the annuity ; and
(it) periodical payments by way of compensation for the loss, 
abolition or relinquishment, or any diminution in the emoluments, of 
any office or employment,
but not including any pension payable to the defendant in respect of injury, 
disablement or disability ;
“employer”, in relation to a defendant, means a person (including the 
Federal Republic or a State thereof as the case may be) by whom, as a 
principal and not as a servant or agent, earnings are payable or are likely to 
become payable to the defendant;
“maintenance order” means an order under this Decree for the payment 
of maintenance, and includes such an order that has been discharged if any 
arrears are recoverable under the order ;
“net earnings”, in relation to a pay-day, means the amount of the 
earnings becoming payable on that pay-day, less any sum deducted from 
those earnings under any law relating to income tax;
“normal deduction”, in relation to an attachment of earnings order and 
in relation to a pay-day, means an amount representing a payment at the 
normal deduction rate specified in the order in respect of the period between 
that pay-day and either the last preceding pay-day or, where there is no 
last preceding pay-day, the date on which the employer became, or last 
became, the defendant’s employer ;
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“pay-day” means an occasion on which earnings to which an attachment 
of earnings order relates become payable ;
“protected earnings”, in relation to an attachment of earnings order and 
in relation to a pay-day, means the amount representing a payment at the 
protected earnings rate specified in the order in respect of the period 
between that pay-day and either the last preceding pay-day or, where 
there is no last preceding pay-day, the date on which the employer became, 
or last became, the defendant’s employer.
2. In this Schedule—
{a) a reference to a person entitled to receive payments under a mainte­
nance order is a reference to a person entitled to receive payments under the 
maintenance order either directly or through another person or for 
transmission to another person ;
(b) a reference to proceedings relating to an order includes a reference to 
proceedings in which the order may be made ; and
(c) a reference to costs incurred in proceedings relating to a maintenance 
order shall be read, in the case of a maintenance order made by the High 
Court of a State, as a reference to such costs as are included in an order for 
costs relating solely to that maintenance order.
3. Subject to this Schedule, a person entitled to receive payments under 
a maintenance order may apply to’—
(a) the court that made the order ; or
(b) the court in which the order is for the time being registered, under 
section 89 or 91 of this Decree,
for an attachment of earnings order.
4. If the court is satisfied that the defendant is a person to whom earnings 
are payable or are likely to become payable and—
{a) that, at the time when the application was made, there was due 
under the maintenance order and unpaid an amount equal to not less than—
(i) four payments in the case of an order for weekly payments; or
(a) two payments in any other case ; or .
(b) that the defendant has wilfully and persistently failed to comply with 
. the requirements of the order,
the court may in its discretion by an order require a person who appears to 
the court to be the defendant’s employer in respect of those earnings or a 
part of those earnings to make out of those earnings or that part of those 
earnings payments in accordance with paragraph 11 below.
5. The court shall not make an attachment of earnings order if it appears 
to the court, in a case to which paragraph 4(a) above applies, that the failure 
of the defendant to make payments under the maintenance order was not 
due to his wilful refusal or culpable neglect.
6. An attachment of earnings order shall specify the normal deduction 
rate, that is to say, the rate at which the court considers it to be reasonable 
that the earnings to which the order relates should be applied in satisfying 
the requirements of the maintenance order but not exceeding the rate that 
appears to the court to be necessary for the purpose of—
(a) securing payment of the sums from time to time falling due under 
the maintenance order ; and
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(b) securing payment within a reasonable time of any sums already due 
and unpaid under the maintenance order and any costs incurred in proceed­
ings relating to the maintenance order that are payable by the defendant.
7. An attachment of earnings order shall also specify the protected 
earnings rate, that is to say, the rate below which, having regard to the 
resources and needs of the defendant and of any person for whom he must 
or reasonably may provide, the court considers it to be reasonable that the 
net earnings of the defendant should not be reduced by a payment under the 
order.
8. An attachment of earnings order shall provide that payments under 
the order are to be made to an officer of the court specified in the order.
9. An attachment of earnings order shall contain such particulars as 
the court thinks proper for the purpose of enabling the person to whom the 
order is directed to identify the defendant.
10. An attachment of earnings order does not come into force 
until the expiration of seven days after the day on which a copy of the order 
is served on the person to whom the order is directed.
11. An employer to whom an attachment of earnings order is directed, 
being an attachment of earnings order that is in force, shall in respect of 
each pay-day, if the net earnings of the defendant exceed the sum of—
(a) the protected earnings of the defendant; and
(b) so much of any amount by which the net earnings that became 
payable on any previous pay-day were less than the protected earnings for 
the purposes of that pay-day as has not been made good on any other 
previous pay-day,
pay, so far as that excess permits, to the officer specified for the purpose in 
the order both the normal deduction and so much of the normal deduction 
for the purposes of any previous pay-day as was not paid on that pay-day 
and has not been paid on any other previous pay-day.
12. A payment made by the employer under the last preceding paragraph 
is a valid discharge to him as against the defendant to the extent of the 
amount paid.
13. Where proceedings for attachment are brought in a court under 
section 88 of this Decree, or where proceedings are taken in a court of 
summary jurisdiction to enforce an order registered in that court under 
section 91 of this Decree, the court may, instead of making any other order, 
make an attachment of earnings order.
14. Where an attachment of earnings order has been made, no writ, 
order or warrant of commitment or attachment shall be issued or made in 
proceedings for the enforcement of the maintenance order that were begun 
before the making of the attachment of earnings order.
15. The court by which an attachment of earnings order has been made 
may in its discretion, on the application of the defendant or a person entitled 
to receive payments under the maintenance order, make an order discharging 
or varying the attachment of earnings order.
16. An order varying an attachment of earnings order shall not come 
into force until the expiration of seven days after the date on which the order 
is served on the person to whom the attachment of earnings order is directed.
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17. An attachment of earnings order ceases to have effect—
(a) upon the issuing or making of a writ, order or warrant of commitment 
or attachment for the enforcement of the maintenance order in relation 
to which the attachment of earnings order applies ; or
(b) subject to the next succeeding paragraph, upon the discharge or 
variation of that maintenance order.
18. Where it appears to the court discharging a maintenance order that 
arrears under the order will remain to be recovered under the order, the 
court may in its discretion direct that the attachment of earnings order shall 
not cease to have effect until those arrears have been paid.
19. Where an attachment of earnings order ceases to have effect, the 
proper officer of the court by which the order was made shall forthwith 
give notice accordingly to the person to whom the order was directed.
20. Where an attachment of earnings order ceases to have effect or is 
discharged, the person to whom the attachment of earnings order is directed 
does not incur any liability in consequence of his treating the order as still 
in force at any time before the expiration of seven days after the date on 
which the notice required by the last preceding paragraph or a copy of the 
discharging order, as the case may be, is served on him.
21. A person to whom an attachment of earnings order is directed shall, 
notwithstanding anything in any other law, but subject to this Schedule, 
comply with the order or, if the order is varied, with the order as varied.
22. Where, on any occasion on which earnings become payable to a 
defendant there are in force two or more attachment of earnings orders in 
relation to those earnings, the person to whom the orders are directed—
(a) shall comply with those orders according to the respective dates on 
which they came into force and shall disregard any order until an earlier 
order has been complied with ; and
(b) shall comply with any order as if the earnings to which the order 
relates were the residue of the defendant’s earnings after the making of 
any payment under any earlier order,
23. A person who makes a payment in compliance with an attachment 
of earnings order shall give to the defendant a notice specifying particulars 
of the payment.
24. A person to whom an attachment of earnings order is directed who, 
at the time when a copy of the order is served on him or at any time after that 
time, has not on any occasion during the period of four weeks immediately 
preceding that time been the defendant’s employer shall forthwith give 
notice in writing accordingly to the proper officer of the court that made the 
order.
25. Where proceedings relating to an attachment of earnings order are 
brought in any court, the court may, either before or after the hearing—
(a) order the defendant to furnish to the court, within a specified period, 
a statement signed by the defendant specifying—
(i) the name and address of his employer or, if he has more employers
than one, of each of his employers ;
(ii) particulars as to the defendant’s earnings ; and
(Hi) such particulars as are necessary to enable the defendant to be
identified by any of his employers ; and
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(ib) order any person who appears to the court to be an employer of the 
defendant to give to the court within a specified period a statement 
signed by him or on his behalf containing such particulars as are specified 
in the order of all earnings of the defendant that became payable by that 
person during a specified period.
26. A document purporting to be a statement referred to in the last 
preceding paragraph shall, in any proceedings relating to an attachment of 
earnings order, be received in evidence and shall, unless the contrary is 
shown, be presumed without further proof to be such a statement.
27. The court by which an attachment of earnings order has been made 
shall, on the application of the person to whom the order is directed or of the 
defendant or of the person in whose favour the order was made, determine 
whether payments to the defendant of a particular class or description 
specified in the application are earnings for the purposes of that order.
28.— (1) A person to whom an attachment of earnings order is directed 
who makes an application under paragraph 27 above shall not incur any 
liability for failing to comply with the order with respect to any payments of 
the class or description specified in the application that are made by him to the 
defendant while the application, or any appeal from a determination made 
on the application, is pending.
(2) The foregoing sub-paragraph shall not apply in respect of any pay­
ment made after the application has been withdrawn or any appeal from a 
determination made on the application has been abandoned.
29. The officer to whom an employer pays any sum in pursuance of an 
attachment of earnings order shall pay that sum to such person entitled to 
receive payments under the maintenance order as is specified by the attach­
ment of earnings order.
30. Any sum received by virtue of an attachment of earnings order by 
the person entitled to receive it shall be deemed to be a payment made by 
the defendant to that person, so as to discharge first any sum due and unpaid 
under the maintenance order (a sum due at an earlier date being discharged 
before a sum due at a later date) and secondly any costs incurred in proceed­
ings relating to the maintenance order that were payable by the defendant 
when the attachment of earnings order was made or last varied.
31. On any occasion on which an employer makes a payment under 
this Schedule in respect of a defendant, the employer may retain for his 
own use out of any balance of the defendant’s earnings remaining after the 
making of that payment the sum of sixpence or, if on that occasion the 
employer makes payments in pursuance of two or more attachment of 
earnings order relating to the defendant, the sum of sixpence in respect of 
each such payment.
32.— (1) Any person who—
(a) fails to comply with any requirement of this Schedule, or of an 
order under this Schedule, that is applicable to him ; or
(b) in any statement or notice furnished to a court under this Schedule 
or in compliance with an order made under this Schedule makes a statement 
that he knows to be false or misleading in a material particular ; or
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(c) recklessly furnishes such a statement or notice that is false or 
misleading in a material particular,
shall be guilty of an offence punishable on conviction by a fine not exceeding 
one hundred pounds.
(2) It shall be a defence if a person charged with an offence arising 
under subparagraph (1) (a) above proves that he took all reasonable steps to 
comply with the requirement or order.
33. Any person who dismisses an employee, or injures him in his 
employment, or alters his position to his prejudice, by reason of the circum­
stance that an attachment of earnings order has been made in relation to the 
employee or that the person is required to make payments under such an 
order in relation to the employee shall be guilty of an offence punishable 
on conviction by a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds.
34. In any proceedings for an offence arising under paragraph 33 above, 
if all the facts and circumstances constituting the offence, other than the 
reason for the action of the person charged with having committed the 
offence, are proved, the burden shall be upon that person to prove that he 
was not actuated by the reason alleged in the charge.
35. Where a person is convicted of an offence arising under paragraph 33 
above, the court by which he is convicted may order that the employee be 
reimbursed any wages lost by him, and may also direct that the employee be 
reinstated in his old position or in a similar position.
36. This Schedule shall have effect in relation to a defendant notwith­
standing any law that would otherwise prevent the attachment of his earnings 
or limit the amount capable of being attached.
M ade at Lagos this 17th day of March 1970.
M ajor-General Y. G o w o n,
Head of the Federal Military Government, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, 
Federal Republic of Nigeria
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MATRIMONIAL CAUSES DECREE 1970 
(1970 No. 18)
Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970 (Appointed Day)]Order 1970
In exercise of the powers conferred on m e by section 116 (2) of the Matri­
m onial Causes D ecree 1970, and of all other powers enabling m e in that behalf, 
I hereby m ake the following Order :—
1. The day appointed for the coming into operation of the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree 1970 shall be 17th March 1970.
2. This Order may be cited as the Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970 
(Appointed Day) Order 1970.
M ade at Lagos this 17th day of March 1970.
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